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Abstract
The one which is considered the standard model of theory change was presented in
[AGM85] and is known as the AGM model. In particular, that paper introduced
the class of partial meet contractions. In subsequent works several alternative con-
structive models for that same class of functions were presented, e.g.: safe/kernel
contractions ([AM85, Han94]), system of spheres-based contractions ([Gro88]) and
epistemic entrenchment-based contractions ([Ga¨r88, GM88]).
Besides, several generalizations of such model were investigated. In that regard
we emphasise the presentation of models which accounted for contractions by sets of
sentences rather than only by a single sentence, i.e. multiple contractions. However,
until now, only two of the above mentioned models have been generalized in the
sense of addressing the case of contractions by sets of sentences: The partial meet
multiple contractions were presented in [Han89, FH94], while the kernel multiple
contractions were introduced in [FSS03].
In this thesis we propose two new constructive models of multiple contraction
functions, namely the system of spheres-based and the epistemic entrenchment-based
multiple contractions which generalize the models of system of spheres-based and of
epistemic entrenchment-based contractions, respectively, to the case of contractions
(of theories) by sets of sentences. Furthermore, analogously to what is the case
in what concerns the corresponding classes of contraction functions by one single
sentence, those two classes are identical and constitute a subclass of the class of
partial meet multiple contractions.
Additionally, and as the first step of the procedure that is here followed to
obtain an adequate definition for the system of spheres-based multiple contractions,
we present a possible worlds semantics for the partial meet multiple contractions
analogous to the one proposed in [Gro88] for the partial meet contractions (by one
single sentence).
Finally, we present yet an axiomatic characterization for the new class(es) of
multiple contraction functions that are here introduced.
Keywords:
Belief Change; Theory Contraction; Multiple Contraction; Possible Worlds Seman-
tics; System of Spheres; Epistemic Entrenchment.
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Resumo
Aquele que e´ considerado o modelo padra˜o de mudanc¸a de teorias foi introduzido
em [AGM85] e e´ conhecido por modelo AGM. Em particular, esse artigo apresenta
a classe das contrac¸o˜es partial meet. Em trabalhos posteriores foram apresentados
va´rios modelos construtivos alternativos para essa mesma classe de func¸o˜es, e.g.:
contrac¸o˜es safe/kernel ([AM85, Han94]), contrac¸o˜es baseadas em sistemas de es-
feras ([Gro88]) e contrac¸o˜es baseadas em relac¸o˜es de entrincheiramento episte´mico
([Ga¨r88, GM88]).
Ale´m disso, foram investigadas va´rias generalizac¸o˜es desse modelo. Nesse sentido
destacamos a apresentac¸a˜o de modelos que tinham em considerac¸a˜o as contrac¸o˜es
por conjuntos de sentenc¸as − expresso˜es suscet´ıveis de serem verdadeiras ou falsas
− em vez de apenas por uma u´nica sentenc¸a, i.e. contrac¸o˜es mu´ltiplas. No entanto,
ate´ o momento, apenas dois dos modelos acima mencionados foram generalizados
no sentido de considerar o caso de contrac¸o˜es por conjuntos de sentenc¸as: As con-
trac¸o˜es mu´ltiplas partial meet foram apresentadas em [Han89, FH94], enquanto que
as contrac¸o˜es mu´ltiplas kernel foram introduzidas em [FSS03].
Nesta tese propomos dois novos modelos construtivos de func¸o˜es de contrac¸a˜o
mu´ltipla, nomeadamente as contrac¸o˜es mu´ltiplas baseadas em sistemas de esferas e
as contrac¸o˜es mu´ltiplas baseadas em relac¸o˜es de entrincheiramento episte´mico. Tais
modelos generalizam os modelos de contrac¸o˜es baseadas em sistemas de esferas e de
contrac¸o˜es baseadas em relac¸o˜es de entrincheiramento episte´mico, respectivamente,
ao caso de contrac¸o˜es (de teorias) por conjuntos de sentenc¸as. Ale´m disso, tal como
no caso das classes correspondentes de func¸o˜es de contrac¸a˜o por uma u´nica sentenc¸a,
verifica-se que as duas classes de contrac¸o˜es mu´ltiplas aqui introduzidas sa˜o ideˆnticas
e constituem uma subclasse da classe das contrac¸o˜es mu´ltiplas partial meet.
Adicionalmente, e como primeiro passo do procedimento que aqui seguimos para
obter uma definic¸a˜o adequada para as contrac¸o˜es mu´ltiplas baseadas em sistemas
de esferas, apresentamos uma semaˆntica de mundos-poss´ıveis para as contrac¸o˜es
mu´ltiplas partial meet ana´loga a` que foi proposta em [Gro88] para as contrac¸o˜es
partial meet (por uma u´nica sentenc¸a).
Finalmente, apresentamos ainda uma caracterizac¸a˜o axioma´tica da(s) nova(s)
classe(s) de func¸o˜es de contrac¸a˜o mu´ltipla que sa˜o aqui introduzidas.
Palavras-chave:
Mudanc¸a de Crenc¸as; Contrac¸a˜o de Teorias; Contrac¸a˜o Mu´ltipla; Semaˆntica de
Mundos Poss´ıveis; Sistemas de Esferas; Entrincheiramento Episte´mico.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The central goal underlying the research area commonly known as logic of theory
change is the study of the changes which can occur in the belief state of a rational
agent1 when he receives new information. More precisely, when an agent is faced
with evidence of some new fact (in the sense that such information is not included
in his current set of beliefs) he is forced to change his set of beliefs,2 and the main
purpose of most of the works in the area of logic of theory change is to investigate
and model how such modifications on the belief state of an agent occur. Two main
distinct kinds of such changes can be intuitively identified, namely incorporation
and contraction, where, loosely speaking, by incorporation we mean the addition of
one or more new beliefs to the set of beliefs of the agent, and by contraction we
mean removal of one or several beliefs from the belief state of the agent.
Hence, one of the main concerns of the logic of theory change consists in modeling
how information is removed from the set of beliefs of an agent, in other words,
one of its fundamental purposes is to find appropriate ways of defining contraction
functions. Roughly speaking, under the assumption that the beliefs of an agent
are represented by sentences, given a set of beliefs (i.e. a set of belief-representing
sentences), such a function receives a (or a set of) sentence(s) that is (are) intended
to be removed from it and returns a new set of beliefs that no longer contains the
given sentence(s).
For the investigation of such processes essentially two approaches are usually
followed: On the one hand contraction functions can be characterized by identi-
fying conditions − commonly referred to as postulates − which are natural to be
demanded from this kind of operations, having in mind the fulfilment of the ra-
tionality criteria under consideration at the moment. On the other hand, explicit
(constructive) definitions of contraction functions can be presented. Nonetheless,
those two approaches can be seen as being complementary to each other and, in
fact, in general, the studies of belief contraction functions attempt to conciliate the
two approaches namely by providing, simultaneously, a constructive definition of a
certain kind of contraction functions and a set of postulates which exactly charac-
1Here, by a rational agent we mean an abstract entity (which may represent a computational
system, a robot, a person, etc.) from which rational reactions are expected.
2Notice that when an agent receives information which was already present in his set of beliefs
then no change at all should occur in such set.
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2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
terizes the class of functions so obtained. The results which consist of (univocally)
identifying a certain class of contraction functions with a certain set of postulates
are called representation theorems or axiomatic characterizations.
The first and most widely known constructive model of a contraction operation
is the partial meet contraction which was introduced by Carlos Alchourro´n, Peter
Ga¨rdenfors and David Makinson in [AGM85]. The model of contraction functions
presented in that paper has acquired the status of standard model in the area of logic
of theory change. Nevertheless, several other well known constructions have been
proposed after that one, namely, safe contraction [AM85], system of spheres-based
contraction [Gro88] and epistemic entrenchment-based contraction [Ga¨r88, GM88].
However, each of the above mentioned kinds of contraction functions only models
processes consisting of the removal of a single sentence from a belief set or theory
− a set of sentences which is closed under logical consequence − thus originating
a new belief set (or theory). This fact yields, as it was promptly pointed out by
several researchers (e.g. in [AM82, Mak87, Fuh88, Han89, Fuh91, Nie91, FH94]),
two major limitations of all those approaches:
1. Only accounting for the case when the belief state of an agent is represented
by a set of sentences that is closed under logical consequence (i.e. a theory).
2. Considering only the removal of a single sentence.
Hence, it became necessary to improve those constructions in two ways:
“(...) there is a need for operators for theory change that can account
for changes in sets not closed under logical consequence and also for
changes consisting of the addition or retraction of sets with more than
one element.”
(Sven Ove Hansson, in [Han89, p. 119])
This led, in particular, to the introduction of several constructions which ex-
tended and generalized the above mentioned models in one (or both) of the following
ways:
1. They could also be applied even if the set of sentences representing the beliefs
of an agent is not (required to be) closed under logical consequence. Such sets
are called belief bases.
2. They accounted for contractions by (possibly non-singleton) sets of sentences
instead of (only) by a single sentence.
The functions which address the latter concern, i.e. which model the removal of
(possibly non-singleton) sets of sentences from a given set of beliefs are commonly
known as multiple contractions.3 One of the first constructive models of multi-
ple contractions to be presented was the class of partial meet multiple contractions
3The term multiple contraction was introduced by Fuhrmann in [Fuh88].
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([Han89, Han91a, FH94]).4 The definition of such functions consists of a general-
ization of the definition of the partial meet contractions (by one single sentence) of
[AGM85] which accounts for the case of contractions by sets of sentences.
After the publication of Fuhrmann and Hansson’s paper [FH94], several years
passed until another explicit definition of a multiple contraction function was pre-
sented. In fact, the next kind of multiple contraction function to be presented were
the kernel multiple contractions. Those functions, introduced by Ferme´, Saez and
Sanz in [FSS03], result of the generalization to the case of multiple contraction of the
kernel contraction functions, which were originally presented in [Han94] and that
can, on their turn, be seen as a generalization of the safe contractions of [AM85].
The multiple contraction functions referred in the above paragraphs are the only
generalizations (in order to account for contractions by sets of sentences) so far
presented in the literature of the constructions of contractions (of belief sets by
one single sentence) which we have mentioned further above. Thus, some of the
primordial models of contraction functions (of belief sets by one single sentence)
have not yet been generalized in that way.
Indeed, the number of explicit constructions of multiple contraction functions so
far presented is still quite smaller than the number of existing models for singleton
contraction.5 Having such fact in mind, the main goal of this text is to contribute
for the reduction of that gap by introducing some new explicit definitions of multiple
contraction functions. Such goal is more detailedly explained in the following section.
1.1 Aims
As we have remarked above, only a couple of the (above mentioned) seminal models
for singleton contraction have been, until now, generalized to the case of multiple
contractions (rather than only by a single sentence), namely the models of partial
meet contraction and of kernel contraction (which, on its turn, is a generalization
of the model of safe contraction). Having that fact in mind, the main goal of the
present thesis is precisely to present new explicit constructions of multiple contrac-
tion functions which generalize − in the sense of accounting (also) for the contraction
by sets of sentences − other two of those seminal models of contraction (of a belief
set by a single sentence), namely the system of spheres-based contractions of [Gro88]
and the epistemic entrenchment-based contractions of [Ga¨r88, GM88].
It is well known that the classes of system of spheres-based (singleton) contrac-
tions and of epistemic entrenchment-based (singleton) contractions are identical and
constitute a subclass of the class of partial meet (singleton) contractions.6 Having
4The operations that we are designating here by partial meet multiple contractions were origi-
nally called simple partial meet contractions, in [Han89, Han91a] and, latter, ⊥-based partial meet
(⊥ −pm) contractions, in [FH94].
5Throughout this text we will use the expression “singleton contraction” to designate a con-
traction by a single sentence. This designation is supported by the possibility of identifying the
contraction of a set of beliefs by a single sentence α with the (multiple) contraction of that same
set of beliefs by the singleton set {α}.
6To be more precise, it is known that both the classes of system of spheres-based (singleton)
contractions and of epistemic entrenchment-based (singleton) contractions coincide with the class
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that in mind, it is our intention that those interrelations between different construc-
tions also holds among the classes of multiple contraction functions which generalize
each of those models of singleton contraction.
Furthermore, it is also our goal to obtain an axiomatic charaterization for the
new class(es) of multiple contraction functions that we plan to propose.
Hence, the central aims of the present thesis can be summarized as follows:
1. To propose a definition for the system of spheres-based multiple contractions,
assuring that such functions:
• Can be seen as a generalization of the construction of the system of
spheres-based contractions proposed in [Gro88] which accounts for the
case of contractions by (possibly non-singleton) sets of sentences.
• Are partial meet multiple contractions.
2. To propose a definition for the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contrac-
tions which is such that:
• It generalizes the definition of the epistemic entrenchment-based con-
tractions proposed in [Ga¨r88, GM88] in order to account for the case of
contractions by sets of sentences.
• The class of epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions coin-
cides with the class of system of spheres-based multiple contractions
(mentioned in Point 1. above).
3. To present an axiomatic characterization for the system of spheres-based mul-
tiple contractions and the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions.
At this point it is worth to remark that such an axiomatic characterization can
also be thought of as a generalization, to the case of multiple contractions, of
the well know representation theorems which state that the classes of system
of spheres-based (singleton) contractions and of epistemic entrenchment-based
(singleton) contractions coincide with the class of (contraction) functions that
satisfy the basic and supplementary AGM postulates for belief set (singleton)
contraction.
1.2 Main Contributions
As it is natural to expect, having in mind those which were the aims of this work
(that we have exposed in the previous section), among the main contributions of
the present thesis we can identify the following ones: the presentation of explicit
definitions for system of spheres-based multiple contractions and for epistemic-
entrenchment multiple contractions and the obtention of an axiomatic character-
ization of such functions. We notice here that those two classes of multiple con-
traction functions are the first generalizations (to the multiple contraction level), of
of transitively relational partial meet contractions (introduced in [AGM85]), which is a (proper)
subclass of the class of partial meet contractions.
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constructive models of (singleton) contraction functions which satisfy the basic and
the supplementary AGM postulates for belief set contractions, to be defined and
axiomatically characterized.
The mentioned explicit construction of system of spheres-based multiple contrac-
tions is presented in Chapter 7, where it is also shown that such are a generalization
of the system of spheres-based (singleton) contractions (of [Gro88]) and that any
system of spheres-based multiple contraction is a partial meet multiple contraction.
The main results of that chapter have been accepted for publication and shall appear
in [FR].
As for the explicit definition of the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple con-
traction, it is presented in Chapter 8. In that chapter it is shown that the class of
epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions is such that: (a) it is a gener-
alization of the class of epistemic entrenchment-based (singleton) contractions (of
[Ga¨r88, GM88]) and (b) it coincides with the class of system of spheres-based mul-
tiple contractions.
In what concerns the above mentioned axiomatic characterization of the system
of spheres-based and the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions, such
representation theorem is presented in Chapter 9.
The definitions and results mentioned in the above paragraphs fulfil those which
were the aims of this work and are, therefore, among the main contributions of the
present thesis. However, there are some other results in this work which also deserve
to be highlighted here.
Indeed, the process of obtaining the above mentioned new definitions of theory
multiple contraction functions, led to the obtention of some other related results
whose motivation and content we briefly explain in the following paragraphs.
In order to generalize the construction of system of spheres-based contractions
proposed by Grove ([Gro88]) in a way that covers the case of contractions by sets
of sentences, we felt the need to start by obtaining a characterization of the partial
meet multiple contraction in terms of possible worlds. Such possible worlds seman-
tics of the partial meet multiple contractions is presented in Chapter 6 and consists
essentially of the generalization (to the case of contractions by sets of sentences) of
the method for constructing partial meet (singleton) contractions through a propo-
sitional approach7 which was exposed in [Gro88, Han99b]. The main results of that
chapter will appear in the paper [RF].
On the other hand, in our quest for an appropriate definition for the epistemic
entrenchment-based multiple contractions which assured, in particular, that the
class of such functions coincided with the class of system of spheres-based multiple
contractions, we realized that it was convenient to start by detailedly clarifying the
strong interrelation between systems of spheres and epistemic entrenchment rela-
tions. Therefore, we decided to start the investigation of an adequate definition
for epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions by showing in a direct way
the well known fact that (in the context of contractions by one single sentence) the
class of system of spheres-based contractions coincides with the class of epistemic
entrenchment-based contractions. More precisely, we proved that such identity holds
7Here, by “propositional approach” we mean a method which is based in selections among
propositions (i.e. sets of possible worlds).
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by means of a two-steps procedure: first we clarified that a certain condition (namely
condition (≤ −S)) relating an epistemic entrenchment relation ≤ and a system of
spheres S is necessary and sufficient to assure that the ≤-based contraction and the
S-based contraction are identical, and after that we exposed that given an arbitrary
system of spheres S there is an epistemic entrenchment relation ≤ such that the
mentioned condition holds and, vice versa, given an arbitrary epistemic entrench-
ment relation ≤ it is possible to construct a system of spheres S such that that same
condition is satisfied.
However, we must clarify here that a (different) direct proof for the fact that
those two classes of (singleton) contraction functions are identical can be found in
[RP99] and, on the other hand such a proof can also be seen as following immedi-
ately from the combination of certain results of [Gro88, Ga¨r88, PW95]. Therefore,
the presentation of a direct proof for that fact cannot be considered an original
contribution. Nevertheless, the explicit proof for that fact that is presented in the
present thesis, more precisely in Section 4.2, as well as some of the intermediate re-
sults which are part of such proof (namely, Theorem 4.2.6 and Observation 4.2.11)
are original and, furthermore, the proofs that are presented for each of them in this
thesis are completely independent from the analogous results which can be found in
some of the above mentioned papers.
1.3 Organization of the Thesis
In order to make this thesis as self-contained as possible in Chapters 2−5 we include
all the background needed to ensure the readability of this work.
In Chapter 2 we briefly introduce the main objects of study of the research area
designated by Logic of Theory Change and we present the main concepts underlying
such subject.
In Chapter 3, we present the primordial constructive models of contraction
functions of belief sets by one single sentence (namely, partial meet contraction,
safe/kernel contraction, system of spheres-based contraction and epistemic
entrenchment-based contraction), and we expose axiomatic characterizations for each
of those kinds of contraction functions. Then, in Chapter 4 we present the interre-
lations among those models which have, so far, been proven to hold in a direct way.
Of that chapter we highlight the direct proof of the equality of the classes of system
of spheres-based contraction and of epistemic entrenchment-based contraction that
is presented in Section 4.2 since it differs from any of the proofs for that fact that
have so far been presented in the literature.
Chapter 5 is dedicated to the introduction of some of the main constructive
models of multiple contraction functions which have, so far, been presented in the
literature. More precisely, in that chapter we present the models of partial meet
multiple contraction and of kernel multiple contraction which consist of generaliza-
tions to the case of contractions by (possibly non-singleton) sets of sentences of the
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models of partial meet (singleton) contraction and kernel (singleton) contraction.
We close that chapter with a section which presents some works which are closely
related to the topic of multiple contraction.
The readers of this work who are familiarized with the basic concepts of the
area of logic of theory change and, more specifically, with the known basic results
concerning the study of (singleton) contraction and multiple contraction of theories,
may skip all the above described introductory chapters and consult them only to
get acquainted with the notation that shall be used throughout the remainder of
the text as well as whenever some of the definitions or results there included is
mentioned throughout the remaining chapters.
The main contributions of the present thesis are exposed in Chapters 6− 9.
In Chapter 6 we present a characterization of the partial meet multiple contrac-
tions in terms of possible worlds. More precisely, we present a way of obtaining the
partial meet multiple contractions by means of a propositional approach. Such possi-
ble worlds semantics for the partial meet multiple contractions is, roughly speaking,
a generalization to the multiple contraction case of the possible worlds semantics for
the partial meet (singleton) contraction presented in [Gro88, Han99b].
Then, based on the above mentioned possible worlds semantics for partial meet
multiple contraction, in Chapter 7, we expose a method for using systems of spheres
as a tool for constructing multiple contraction functions. More precisely we present
a definition for the system of spheres-based multiple contractions which constitute
a new kind of multiple contractions that (a) are a generalization to the multiple
contraction level of the system of spheres-based (singleton) contractions proposed
by Grove ([Gro88]) and (b) are partial meet multiple contractions (analogously to
what is the case in what concerns the corresponding classes of singleton contraction
functions).
Afterwards, making use of the strong interrelation between systems of spheres
and epistemic entrenchment orderings (which is detailedly exposed in Section 4.2),
in Chapter 8 we obtain a definition for the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple
contractions which is such that (a) it generalizes Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson’s def-
inition of epistemic entrenchment-based (singleton) contractions ([Ga¨r88, GM88])
to the case of contraction by sets of sentences, and (b) the class of such functions
coincides with the class of the above mentioned system of spheres-based multiple
contraction (analogously to what is the case regarding the corresponding classes of
singleton contractions).
The following chapter, i.e. Chapter 9, is devoted to the presentation of an
axiomatic characterization of the newly defined classes of multiple contraction func-
tions, i.e. a representation theorem for the system of spheres-based multiple con-
tractions and the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions.
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Finally, Chapter 10 contains a brief overview of the main achievements of this
thesis as well as an exposition of some topics of future research which arise naturally
from the investigation reported in the present text.
Regarding the structure of this dissertation it remains only to remark here that,
in order to improve the readability of the thesis all the proofs provided for original
results presented in the thesis are deferred to the Appendix.
1.4 Formal Preliminaries
We will assume a language L that is closed under all Boolean connectives. By abuse
of notation we shall use the same letter L to denote also the set of the well formed
formulae of that language. The elements of L will be referred to as sentences (of L).
Lower-case Greek letters (with or without subscripts) − e.g. α, αi, β, . . . − other
than γ and σ, will be used to denote sentences (i.e. elements of L).8 > stands for an
arbitrary tautology and ⊥ for an arbitrary contradiction. Upper-case Roman letters
(with or without subscripts) − e.g. A,Ai, B, . . . − shall denote sets of sentences
(i.e. subsets of L). The conjunction of all elements of a finite and non-empty set of
sentences A shall be denoted by
∧
A.
We shall make use of a consequence operation Cn that takes each set of sentences
to another set of sentences and which satisfies the standard Tarskian properties
([Tar30]):
• inclusion: A ⊆ Cn(A),
• monotony: if A ⊆ B, then Cn(A) ⊆ Cn(B),
• idempotence: Cn(A) = Cn(Cn(A)),
Furthermore we will assume that Cn also satisfies:
• supraclassicality: if α can be derived from A by classical truth-functional logic,
then α ∈ Cn(A),
• deduction: if β ∈ Cn(A ∪ {α}), then (α→ β) ∈ Cn(A),
• compactness: if α ∈ Cn(A), then α ∈ Cn(A′) for some finite subset A′ of A.
The following alternative notations will sometimes be used: Cn(α) for Cn({α}),
A ` α for α ∈ Cn(A), α ` β for β ∈ Cn(α), ` α for α ∈ Cn(∅), A 6` α for
α 6∈ Cn(A), α 6` β for β 6∈ Cn(α), and 6` α for α 6∈ Cn(∅). A set of sentences H
shall be said to be closed under logical consequence or logically closed whenever it is
such that H = Cn(H) − such a set is called a belief set or theory. We shall use K to
represent a belief set (hence, throughout this text K is always a set of sentences such
that K = Cn(K)). Sometimes, although not very often, other capital upper-case
Roman letters in bold face shall be used to represent belief sets or theories. We shall
8The Greek letters γ and σ will be used to denote selection functions (cf. Definition 3.1.5) and
incision functions (cf. Definition 3.2.2), respectively.
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use K⊥ to denote the inconsistent belief set (containing all L-sentences). A belief
set is a consistent complete theory (of L) if and only if it is a maximal consistent
subset (of L). We shall denote the set of all theories of L by TL and the set of all
consistent complete theories of L by ML. Consistent complete theories shall play
an essential role further ahed, and we will often use the terms possible world and
world to refer to one such theory.
Upper-case Roman calligraphic letters (with or without subscripts)− e.g. M,Ni,
W , . . . − other than L, T and P , shall be used to denote subsets ofML. Such sets
are called propositions. The letter P is reserved to represent power sets, more
precisely, given an arbitrary set S , we shall denote the power set of S by P(S ) and
the set of finite subsets of S by PF(S ).
Given a set of sentences R, the set consisting of all the possible worlds that
contain R will be denoted by ‖R‖ and referred to as the set of possible worlds for R.
The elements of ‖R‖ are the R-worlds. For a sentence ϕ ∈ L, ‖ϕ‖ is an abbreviation
of ‖{ϕ}‖ and the elements of ‖ϕ‖ are the ϕ-worlds. To any set of possible worlds V
we associate a belief set Th(V) given by Th(V) = ⋂V (under the assumption that⋂ ∅ = L(= K⊥))9.
Upper-case Roman letters in mathbb font (with or without subscripts) − e.g.
M,Ni,W, . . . − shall be used to denote subsets of P(ML). In particular S is reserved
to represent a system of spheres (cf Definition 3.3.5).
9Notice that this is a natural assumption in the present context. Indeed, for any set of possible
worlds U ⊆ ML it holds that
⋂U = {α : ∀M ∈ U , α ∈ M} = {α ∈ L : ∀M ∈ U , α ∈ M} (where
this last equality holds due to the fact that the possible worlds are, by definition, subsets of L),
therefore, in the particular case of the empty subset of ML we have that
⋂ ∅ = {α ∈ L : ∀M ∈
∅, α ∈M} = L (since for any α ∈ L the condition “∀M ∈ ∅, α ∈M” is vacuously true).

Chapter 2
The Logic of Theory Change
In this chapter we introduce the main concepts concerning the logic of theory change.
The main purpose for this is to provide the reader with the preliminary material
necessary for the understanding of the remaining contents of this text and also to
leave it clear where the main contributions of this thesis stand within the general
picture of the current state of the art of the area of belief revision. Nevertheless,
we notice that completer texts on the basics and the state of the art of the research
area known (among other alternative designations) as logic of theory change can
be found in [Ga¨r88, Han99b, Pep08, Han09] (references on which the introductory
chapters of this thesis are mostly based).
2.1 Introduction
The Logic of Theory Change (also known e.g. as Belief Revision, Belief Change,
Belief Dynamics) is a research area which studies the dynamics of knowledge and
beliefs. More precisely, its main target is to model the way a rational agent’s1 set
of beliefs/knowledge is updated when he receives new information.
We start by clarifying at this stage that although, from a philosophical perspec-
tive, knowledge and belief are different entities, such distinction is beyond the scope
of the present thesis. For our purposes it is simpler and enough to see them as differ-
ent designations for the same concept. Hence, throughout this text the expressions
knowledge (set) and set of beliefs of an agent will be used with the same meaning.
The two basic and more intuitive kinds of change that can occur to the belief
state of some agent are the following:
• incorporation or addition: when the belief state is updated in order that a new
belief (which was previously not included in the agent’s set of beliefs) is added
to it.
• contraction or derogation: when the belief state is updated in order that a
certain (previous) belief of the agent (i.e., an element of its (previous) set of
beliefs) is contracted (removed) from it (in the sense that the new belief state
of the agent no longer contains such (previous) belief).
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Each one of these kinds of change will be more thoroughly and formally analysed
and explained below, after introducing the basic elements of any theoretical frame-
work for modelling the dynamics of belief. However, at this point, it is worth (and
natural) to anticipate that, if it is assumed that the belief states are, as long as that
is possible, consistent (i.e., they do not contain contradictory beliefs)10 then the pro-
cess of incorporation takes a different form in each of the two following alternative
possible cases:
1. the new belief (which is intended to be included in the agent’s set of beliefs)
is consistent with the (prior) belief state.
2. the belief intended to be added to the belief state is inconsistent with the
beliefs (previously) included in such set of beliefs.
The above mentioned (possible) assumption of consistency of the belief states
is an example of a rationality criteria. Rules of that kind play a central role in
any process of change of belief state. Therefore, as we shall clarify further ahead,
the logic of theory change aims at presenting a theoretical framework for modelling
the dynamics of belief which includes rationality principles that govern each of the
different kinds of changes of belief states.
In the following section we introduce the basic elements of any formal frame-
work to model belief change. Throughout this chapter, following [Ga¨r88], we shall
sometimes refer to such a framework as an Epistemological Theory.
2.2 The Elements of an Epistemological Theory
In this section, which is essentially based on [Ga¨r88], we clarify the meaning of
epistemological theory and introduce the main epistemic factors that form the core
of such theories.
Generally speaking, an epistemological theory is the theoretical framework which
embeds the different models of epistemic states and their dynamics. Such a theory
aims at investigating the changes in beliefs, therefore it must provide, among other
things, a representation of the epistemic elements − namely, the epistemic states,
the epistemic attitudes11, epistemic inputs and the epistemic changes or changes of
beliefs − and the criteria of rationality that govern the epistemic dynamics.
2.2.1 Epistemic States
The epistemic states or belief states are the most fundamental factor in an episte-
mological theory. Such entities are representations of actual or possible cognitive
states of some agent at a given moment.
10Notice that it is natural to make such assumption since, in general, a rational agent is not
expected to believe simultaneously in contradictory facts.
11The epistemic attitudes are also known as doxastic attitudes. In fact, to be more precise, in
philosophical terminology “epistemic” means related to knowledge and “doxastic” means related
to beliefs (e.g. [Han99b, p. 6]). However, as we have already mentioned above, along this text we
shall not distinguish between knowledge and belief.
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There are several models of epistemic states. Among them we mention the
following ones:
1. Sentential Models: An epistemic state is represented as a set of sentences
from some given object language. It is intended that each of the sentences
included in that set represents one of the agent’s beliefs in the modelled state.
In general such sets are required to be consistent, since a rational agent is
not expected to have contradictory beliefs. Sometimes it is also assumed that
such belief state-representing sets are logically closed. Such assumption is
made whenever the agent is considered to be logically omniscient, in the sense
that all the logical consequences of his beliefs are also in his set of beliefs.
Depending on whether this latter assumption is or is not made the epistemic
states of (the sentential model) are represented, respectively, by the following
kinds of sets of sentences:
• Belief Sets or Theories - sets of sentences that are closed under logical
consequence.
• Belief Bases - sets of sentences that are not (necessarily) closed under
logical consequence.
2. Bayesian Models: A state of belief is represented by a probability measure
defined over some object language or over some space of events.
3. Possible Worlds Models: In these models an epistemic state is represented
by a set of possible worlds (i.e. a proposition). The interpretation of such a set
is that the agent associated with the modelled state knows that the “actual
world” is a member of that set, but it can be any of its members.
2.2.2 Epistemic Attitudes
The epistemic attitudes or doxastic attitudes11 describe the status of various ele-
ments of belief that are contained in an epistemic state. For example, a person can
accept or not accept a particular statement as true or may judge it to be certain,
probable (with a certain degree of probability), or possible. These are some of the
different possible attitudes towards a given statement. The expressions of the nat-
ural language which are used to describe epistemic attitudes are called epistemic
judgements. Some of the most common examples are that someone “believes that
α”, “is convinced that α”, “finds it extremely likely that α”, “does not know whether
α”, “finds it possible that α” and “finds α more likely than β”.
Obviously the set of epistemic attitudes which are expressible in a certain episte-
mological theory depends on what kind of models are used to represent the epistemic
states. In formal systems it is usually preferable to consider a small number of epis-
temic attitudes. This is due to the fact that, although the existence of a lot of
epistemic attitudes increases the expressivity of the system, an excessive number of
those also makes the theoretical study of the system harder or even impossible.
For example, in a sentential model, where the epistemic states are represented by
belief sets three epistemic attitudes that can be considered are: acceptance, rejection
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and indetermination. More precisely, assuming that the epistemic state of an agent
is represented by a belief set, given an arbitrary (belief-representing) sentence α
there are only the following three possibilities for the epistemic attitude concerning
α:
1. α is accepted, which means that α belongs to the set representing the epistemic
state;
2. α is rejected, which is to say that the negation of α is included in the state;
3. α may be indetermined, which means that neither α nor its negation are
elements of the relevant set of sentences.
Furthermore, if such epistemic state is consistent (i.e. it is represented by a
belief set K such that K 6= K⊥) then one and only one of the mentioned epistemic
attitudes concerning α is withheld.
To finish this summary description of the meaning of the concept of epistemic
attitudes we remark that, in general, the epistemic attitudes can be described in
terms of a valuation of the items in a model of an epistemic state. For example,
in the case of a sentential model the valuation is given by the membership relation,
and in probabilistic models the valuation is given by the probability measure.
2.2.3 Epistemic Inputs
The epistemic inputs are pieces of (external) information that may provoke changes
in an epistemic state. Moreover it is assumed that a change of a state of belief can
only be motivated by such external forces. In other words, only an epistemic input
can alter the belief state of an agent (to another belief state). These inputs can
be seen as a result of the observation of certain phenomena or of the exchange of
information between agents.
However, since the content of the epistemic states is at focus, the form of the
epistemic input is not relevant. What matters is the effect the input has on a
given epistemic state. Thus, rather than providing a general account of the different
forms of epistemic inputs, for our purposes it is enough to define them abstractly
by describing their effects on epistemic states.
Furthermore, in this brief introduction of the concept of epistemic inputs and
their role in the context of an epistemological theory we shall only describe in more
detail a very particular type of epistemic inputs, namely the kind of epistemic inputs
which can be identified with a change (caused by them) in the epistemic attitude
towards a single sentence.
The typology of the epistemic inputs depends on the kind of model of epistemic
states considered. To clarify this fact let us analyse the case when belief states are
modelled by logically closed sets of sentences (which express exactly the beliefs that
are accepted in the modelled state). Having in mind the three epistemic attitudes
that we have mentioned above that can be considered in such sentential models and
assuming, additionally, that the epistemic states are consistent (and, consequently,
only one epistemic attitude is withheld with respect to any given sentence) it follows
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that there are the following six possible changes of epistemic attitudes concerning a
certain sentence:
(i) From indetermined to accepted.
(ii) From indetermined to rejected.
(iii) From accepted to rejected.
(iv) From rejected to accepted.
(v) From accepted to indetermined.
(vi) From rejected to indetermined.
Having in mind the above list of the possible changes of epistemic attitudes, we
can identify the following two basic kinds of changes that may occur on a consistent
epistemic state (as a consequence of a change of epistemic attitude towards a single
sentence):
1. A sentence α, which was not originally accepted, may be incorporated in (i.e.
added to) the set of beliefs.12 (Each of the changes of epistemic attitudes
(i)−(iv) above corresponds to a change of epistemic state of this kind)
2. A sentence α that was accepted may be contracted (or derogated or removed)
from the belief state.13 (Each of the changes of epistemic attitudes (v)−(vi)
above corresponds to a change of epistemic state of this kind)
Therefore, recalling that we are restricting our attention to epistemic inputs
which can be identified with a change of epistemic attitude towards one single sen-
tence, it follows that, when the epistemic states are represented by belief sets, essen-
tially two different classes of epistemic inputs can be considered: (a) one consisting
of the epistemic inputs which lead to the incorporation (or addition) of a (previously
not accepted) sentence to the (original consistent) belief state and (b) (another) one
containing the epistemic inputs which provoke the contraction (or derogation) of a
(previously accepted) sentence from a (original consistent) belief state.
However, it is convenient to remark here that, in general, a change of epistemic
attitude towards a certain sentence implies a change in the epistemic attitude to-
wards other sentences also (for instance if consistency is required to be preserved).
To clarify this statement, let us consider, for example, a change of epistemic attitude
of the type (iii) above. Let α be a sentence which is neither a tautology nor a contra-
diction and consider an epistemic input that causes the epistemic attitude towards
α to change from accepted (in the previous belief state) to rejected (in the new belief
state). Then on the one hand the original belief set contained α but not ¬α while,
on the other hand, the new belief set contains ¬α but, under the imposition that the
12Notice that if α is an inconsistent sentence then it can not be incorporated in the set of beliefs
unless the requirement of consistency of the (resulting) belief state is dropped.
13Notice that all tautologies are accepted in any epistemic state (modelled by a logically closed
set of sentences). Therefore if α is a tautology it can not be contracted from any belief state.
16 CHAPTER 2. THE LOGIC OF THEORY CHANGE
belief states are consistent (as long as possible), it does not contain α. Therefore,
we can observe that, while the epistemic attitude towards α changed from accepted
to rejected, the opposite change occurred in what concerns the epistemic attitude
towards ¬α.
Having the above in mind, we are led to notice that the class of epistemic inputs
which we have identified above as corresponding to the addition of a certain sentence
to the belief state can be subdivided into two quite different subclasses: on the one
hand the class of epistemic inputs identified with changes of the kinds (i)−(ii) (when
the sentence that is added to the belief state (as a consequence of the epistemic input)
is consistent with the previous beliefs) and, on the other hand, the class of epistemic
inputs that correspond to changes of the kinds (iii)−(iv) (when the sentence that is
added to the belief state contradicts the previous beliefs). Hence, in what follows, we
shall often consider the subdivision of the class of epistemic inputs in three (rather
than two) subclasses.
Having seen this it is convenient to clarify here that throughout this text by
identifying the epistemic inputs with a change of epistemic attitude towards one
single sentence (namely, by referring to an epistemic input as the addition or as the
contraction of a sentence to/from a belief state) we do not mean that such change
is the only one that such an input causes in the belief state. By that we mean,
however, that the change with which the epistemic input is identified is the only one
that is indeed mandatory (under that input) and, therefore, such an input14
(a) leads to the change with which it is identified, and
(b) causes the least possible amount of changes concerning the epistemic attitudes
(towards the remaining sentences), in the sense that (as a consequence of that
input) only do take place those changes which are strictly necessary in order
to assure the change mentioned in (a) indeed occurs.
In summary, given a belief state, the epistemic inputs can be identified with the
causes which lead to either the addition (which takes two different forms depending
on whether the sentence that is added contradicts or not the previous beliefs) or the
derogation of a single sentence from a given belief state. Nevertheless, in general,
when it is assumed that the belief states are modelled by sets of sentences which are
logically closed and (as long as possible) consistent, an epistemic input causes more
changes to a given belief state than the simple addition15 or contraction of a single
14 At this point we remark that the requirement made in (a) that the change that is suggested by
a certain epistemic input does indeed occur is related to the underlying assumption that the new
information is always accepted − such assumption is known as (the principle of) primacy (of the
new information). On the other hand, the rationale underlying the constraint imposed by (b) is
known as (the principle of) minimal change/loss of the previous beliefs and, as it is reasonable to
expect, such property is a basic requirement of most epistemological theories. We shall describe (in
more detail) in Subsection 2.2.5 the rationality criteria which are more usually assumed to govern
epistemological theories.
15Notice that even in the case when the epistemic input under consideration is identified with the
addition of a sentence which is consistent with the previous beliefs, in general, some more changes
occur in the belief state (for example, in order to maintain the logical closure of the corresponding
set of beliefs).
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sentence from it, however, it is natural to assume that such additional collateral
changes are as few as possible.
In what follows we will analyse in more detail what are the different effects that
each of the above mentioned different kinds of epistemic inputs have in any given
belief state and how such changes of epistemic states can be modelled. However,
from the above remarks it is already obvious at this stage that, generally speaking,
any epistemic input causes the addition of several sentences to the belief state and,
simultaneously, the derogation of several (other) sentences from the belief set.
A general way of describing epistemic inputs, which seems to be applicable to
most kinds of models of epistemic states, is to formulate the inputs as constraints
on the resulting state of belief. On this approach the addition of a sentence α
corresponds to the constraint that α be accepted in the new epistemic state, and
the derogation of α corresponds to the constraint that α be indetermined in the new
state of belief.
Another, more abstract, way of representing epistemic inputs is to describe them
as functions taking states of belief into new states of belief. This approach consists,
then, in identifying the epistemic inputs with the effects they have on different
epistemic states.
2.2.4 Epistemic Changes
The epistemic changes or changes of belief are the modifications that occur in the
epistemic states. Therefore, recalling that an epistemic input is assumed to be the
only possible cause for a change of an epistemic state, the types of changes of epis-
temic states admitted in a given epistemological theory are exclusively determined
by the kinds of epistemic inputs that are available in such framework.
Now let us see what the above remark means (and implies) in the case of senten-
tial models on which the epistemic states are modelled by belief sets. As we have
seen in the previous subsection, when such a model is considered there are essen-
tially two basic kinds of epistemic inputs, namely the ones that lead to the addition
of a sentence to the (original) belief state and the ones that lead to the derogation
of a sentence from the (original) belief set.16 Therefore, according to the previous
paragraph, we can conclude that in sentential models there are basically two kinds
of epistemic changes, namely incorporations (or additions) and contractions (or
derogations) (with the obvious meanings).
In this regard Sven Ove Hansson [Han99b, pp. 7 − 8] pointed out that the
following principle is a fundamental assumption in belief dynamics introduced by
Isaac Levi [Lev77]:
Decomposition principle [Fuh89] (first version) (as cited in [Han99b, pp.
8]):
16Recall, however, that, in the previous subsection, to justify the possibility of subdividing the
epistemic inputs in (only) such two subclasses we have made use of the fact that we had decided
to take into consideration only epistemic inputs which can be identified with a change of epistemic
attitude towards one single sentence.
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Every legitimate belief change is decomposable into a sequence of incor-
porations and contractions.
Next we characterize more formally each of those two kinds of epistemic changes.
In order to do that, we identify an epistemic state with the belief set that represents
it and describe the epistemic changes in terms of belief sets. More precisely, in what
follows an incorporation (respectively, a contraction) shall be seen as an operator
(or a function) which receives a belief set (that represents the original epistemic
state) and a sentence to be added to (resp. removed from) it and returns a belief set
(which represents the new epistemic state).
So, let K be a belief set and α be an arbitrary (belief-representing) sentence. In
what follows we investigate which properties should be satisfied by any belief set
which can be the result of either the incorporation or the contraction of α (in/from
K).
Let us start by considering the case of contraction. In the above terms, the first
remark we have to make with respect to contraction is that, for any non-tautological
sentence α (i.e., for any α ∈ L\Cn(∅))13, if K−α is a belief set that results from the
contraction of α from K then it must be such that α 6∈ K−α. Furthermore, K−α
must also satisfy the following condition K−α ⊆ K. Indeed, recalling that, as we
have remarked in the previous subsection we are assuming that an epistemic input
causes the least possible amount of changes in the (previous) belief state, we notice
that, although some other sentences K apart from α may need to be left out from
K−α in order to assure that this latter set is logically closed and does not contain
α, there is no need to include in K−α any sentences which were not originally in K
in order to assure that those two constraints are satisfied.
Notice yet that, since, in the present context, belief sets are being used as rep-
resentations of epistemic states of a rational agent, we ought to demand also that
the resulting belief set K−α does not contain contradictory beliefs. However, that
requirement does not need to be made explicitly because it is an immediate con-
sequence of K−α ⊆ K that K−α is consistent (i.e. K−α 6= K⊥) as long as the
original belief set K is so. It is worth noticing that, in most cases, given a belief set
K and a sentence α ∈ K\Cn(∅), to obtain a belief set K−α satisfying all the above
mentioned required conditions (i.e., such that α 6∈ K−α ⊆ K) many more sentences
of K apart from α itself must be left out from such new belief set. However, on
the other hand, K−α shall contain as many sentences as possible from the original
belief set K.17 This kind of change is called contraction of K with respect to α.
We now turn to the case of incorporations. The only obvious constraint that a
belief set K ∗ α which results of the incorporation of α in K must satisfy is that
α ∈ K ∗ α. Thus the simplest and most intuitive way of constructing (explicitly) a
belief set satisfying that condition is to add α set-theoretically to K and afterwards
obtaining the logical closure of the resulting set. This kind of change is called
expansion of K by α and is more formally introduced in the following definition:
17Notice that if this additional constraint is not required then Cn(∅) would be an acceptable
result for any contraction operation.
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Definition 2.2.1 ([Lev77]) Let K be a belief set and α be an arbitrary sentence.
The expansion of K by α, is the belief set K+α defined by:
K+α = Cn(K ∪ {α}).
At this point it is convenient to introduce some notation that shall be used
throughout this thesis.
Notation 2.2.2 Throughout this text, given a belief set K and a sentence α the
notation “K+α” shall always be used as a representation of the set Cn(K ∪ {α}).
Since K+α is a belief set and it is obvious that α ∈ K+α we might be tempted
to simply define the result of adding a sentence α to a belief set K as the expansion
of K by α. However, although in some cases that is indeed the most adequate
option, such is not always the case, essentially because in some situations K+α is
the inconsistent belief set K⊥.
Indeed, since we are using the belief sets as representations of epistemic states
of a rational agent, it is natural to require that (as long as possible) such belief sets
are consistent. And, if such imposition is made, then we must distinguish between
two types of incorporations. More precisely, when considering the incorporation of
a sentence α in a (consistent) belief set K the following two possibilities have to be
taken into account:
1. α is consistent with the beliefs in K (i.e. ¬α 6∈ K).
2. α contradicts the beliefs in K (i.e. ¬α ∈ K).
In the first case, the result of the incorporation of α in K can be simply modelled
by the (above defined) expansion of K by α.
In what concerns the second case we must start by distinguishing the two fol-
lowing possibilities: (i) α is a contradiction and (ii) α is a consistent sentence.
If (i) is the case then the impositions that α ∈ K ∗ α and that K ∗ α is closed
under logical consequence lead to one only possible result for the incorporation of α
in K, namely the inconsistent belief set K⊥ (i.e. K ∗ α = K⊥)18.
Hence it only remains to consider the case when α is not a contradiction but
¬α ∈ K. In this case, the expansion of K by α is the inconsistent belief set (i.e.
K+α = K⊥). However, it is possible to fulfil the goal of obtaining a belief set
which contains α and is consistent. Therefore, if it is required that the result of the
incorporation of α in K is, as long as possible, consistent, in this case K ∗ α should
not be taken to be simply the expansion of K by α.
Indeed, in this situation, in order to obtain a set K ∗α in the desired conditions
(i.e., such that α ∈ K ∗ α and K ∗ α is consistent), some other modifications need
to be made to the original belief set apart from the set-theoretical addition of α
to K and subsequent logical closure of the resulting set. More precisely, enough of
the sentences in the original belief set need to be left out from K ∗ α in order to
assure that ¬α is not a logical consequence of the remaining ones. However, such
18Cf. Footnote 12.
20 CHAPTER 2. THE LOGIC OF THEORY CHANGE
additional modifications to the original belief set should be only the ones which
are strictly necessary in order to assure that the desired properties hold. This is
because, as we have remarked in the previous subsection, it is assumed that an
epistemic input causes (only) the least possible amount of changes to the (previous)
belief state necessary to assure that the (single) change with which it is identified
does indeed take place (the so-called the principle of minimal change of the previous
beliefs).
The kind of change, consisting of the incorporation of a sentence α in a belief
set K such that ¬α ∈ K (whether or not such sentence α is contradictory), is called
revision of K by α and the resulting belief set is denoted by K∗α.
The interrelation between the three, above presented, basic kinds of epistemic
changes in epistemological theories where the belief states are modelled by belief
sets, namely expansion, contraction and revision, shall be exposed in Section 2.3.
2.2.5 Criteria of Rationality
The criteria of rationality (or rationality criteria) are basic principles that stand on
the metalevel of an epistemological theory and which are responsible for governing
the other factors of the theory. Indeed, however we did not make an explicit ref-
erence to that fact, several rationality criteria have underlain the above presented
descriptions of the epistemic elements of an epistemological theory.
To clarify the above remark, next we indicate explicitly some of the rational-
ity criteria that have been considered in such descriptions and what has been their
influence in some of the choices and distinctions there made. More precisely, we
will exemplify, in particular, how the choice of a specific way of modelling the epis-
temic states and their changes depends on the rationality criteria underlying the
epistemological theory under consideration.
Thus, in what concerns the influence of rationality criteria in the choice of the
representation for the epistemic states we start by recalling that we have several
times mentioned consistency as an intuitive characteristic (requirable) of an epis-
temic state - notice that, although we have not previously used such designation for
it, consistency is a rationality criterion - and we have clarified that in the context of
sentential models such requirement corresponds to the imposition that the sets of
sentences (used as representations of epistemic states) are consistent (whether they
are belief sets or belief bases). Regarding this same aspect, and once again with
respect to sentential models, we have also observed that the use of belief sets or be-
lief bases to represent the epistemic states is determined by whether the rationality
criterion of logical omniscience (which is modelled by the logical closure of the sets of
sentences used to represent the epistemic states) is or is not required. On the other
hand, to see how a rationality criterion can be responsible for the determination of
the different possibilities for admissible kinds of epistemic changes it is enough to
recall that, when the epistemic states are modeled by belief sets, we have seen that
there are two basic kinds of changes - incorporations and contractions - and that two
subcases of incorporations must be considered separately - expansions and revisions
- if and only if the rationality criterion of consistency (of the epistemic states) is
considered.
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In the above paragraph we have already mentioned two rationality criteria, how-
ever there are many more such criteria which are worth mentioning. Hence, be-
low we present a list of some of the most common criteria of rationality (see e.g.
[Dal88, Ga¨r88]):
1. Principle of Categorical Matching or Adequacy of Representation - After a
change the resulting epistemic state should have the same kind of representa-
tion as the initial epistemic state.
2. Irrelevance of Syntax - The result of a change should not depend on the syntax
(or representation) of neither the previous beliefs nor the new information
(acquired through some epistemic input).
3. Primacy (of the new information) - The new information should always be
accepted.
4. Consistency - The new epistemic state should be consistent, if possible.
5. Logical Omniscience - The logical consequences of the beliefs that are accepted
in a certain epistemic state should also be accepted in that epistemic state.
6. Minimal Change/Loss (of the previous beliefs) - The new epistemic state
should retain as much as possible of the old beliefs.
7. Fairness - If there are several epistemic states that are (valid) candidates to
represent the result of a certain change operation then none of them should
be arbitrarily chosen.
The above listed principles constitute some of the most intuitive properties that
can be used to characterize any given belief change process.
Notice, however, that this does not mean that any process of belief change must
satisfy all the above principles. Not all the above criteria are desirable at all times.
In fact, some of these principles contradict each other in certain situations. In this
respect another important fact must be remarked here: any given epistemological
theory besides from a (simple) list of rationality criteria that are used to govern the
dynamics of epistemic change must provide an explicit (and unambiguous) indication
of the order of priority among those principles.
We have already exposed above where the rationality criteria of consistency and
logical omniscience are present throughout the preceding part of this section. In
what follows we expose/recall that, and how, some other of the above listed ratio-
nality criteria have also been considered (however, in some cases, only implicitly)
throughout the descriptions of the epistemic elements previously introduced. Fur-
thermore, below, we also highlight some of the stages of the previous descriptions
where a certain order of priority among different rationality criteria has been clearly
taken into account.
Thus, we start by observing that the principle of categorical matching underlies
all the above mentioned descriptions since we have tacitly assumed that, although
there are several possible representations of epistemic states, in each epistemolog-
ical theory only one of such possible alternative representations is used to model
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the epistemic states. Other rationality criterion that has been implicitly assumed
in all the foregoing part of this section is the primacy (of the new information).
Some above presented explicit manifestations of the assumption of such rationality
criterion have been (a) the imposition that α is included in the result of the incorpo-
ration of α in K, for any sentence α and any belief set K, and (b) the requirement
that α is not included in the belief set resulting of the contraction of α from K,
for any belief set K and any sentence α ∈ K \ Cn(∅). Finally it remains only to
remark that the principle of minimal change/loss of the previous beliefs has also
been mentioned explicitly when we described the epistemic inputs. More precisely,
in Subsection 2.2.3, when assuming that the epistemic inputs are identified with a
change of epistemic attitude towards a (single) sentence, the satisfaction of the prin-
ciple of minimal change has been assured by the imposition, there made, that the
changes caused by an epistemic input on a belief state are only the strictly necessary
to assure that the change (of epistemic attitude) with which that epistemic input is
identified effectively occurs (and, that throughout such process, no belief is removed
or added to the belief state unnecessarily).
We close this subsection by bringing to light some of the stages, of the above
presented descriptions of the elements of an epistemological theory, in which we have
(although only implicitly) assumed some priority among two different rationality
criteria.
We start by noticing that the situations that we shall recall below and interpret
from the perspective of a certain order of priority among rationality criteria have
all appeared (in the previous subsection) in contexts when the belief states had
been assumed to be represented by belief sets. Before moving on to present such
examples it is convenient to remark that, in those circumstances, the principle of
categorical matching (or the adequacy of representation) and the rationality criteria
known as logical omniscience can be seen as being equivalent, in the sense that to
require that all the epistemic states are represented by the same kind of entity (in
this case by belief sets), i.e. that the principle of categorical matching is satisfied,
is the same as requiring that all the belief states are (represented by entities) such
that they include all the logical consequences of the beliefs they contain, i.e. that
logical omniscience holds.
Having said this, the first obvious example that we wish to highlight of an (im-
plicit) assumption of a priority among rationality criteria has occurred when we have
clarified that it is not possible to remove a tautology from a belief state (modelled by
a belief set). Notice that imposing that restriction corresponds to assuming that the
principle of categorical matching is considered more important than the rationale of
the primacy of the new information (or, in other words, the principle of categorical
matching is given priority over the assurance of primacy of the new information).
This is the case because, in that situation, under which those two rationality crite-
ria are incompatible (in the sense that, if one of them is fulfilled then the other one
is unsatisfied19) and, therefore, only one of them can hold, we have opted by the
fulfilment of first one.
Another assumption of a certain order of priority among rationality principles
19Notice that this is indeed the case when a certain epistemic input leads to the removal of a
tautology from the belief state
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has been (implicitly) made when we have stated that the result of the revision of
a belief set by a contradictory sentence is the inconsistent belief set. Indeed, such
statement corresponds to the assumption that the rationale of primacy of the new
information is given higher priority than the one of consistency.
We have also assumed in our previous descriptions that the property of con-
sistency (of the belief states) is more important than the minimal loss of previous
information. Indeed it is that assumption that explains the fact that the contraction
of the inconsistent belief set (which contains all sentences) with respect to any non-
tautological sentence is contracted gives rise to a (consistent) belief set which does
not contain that sentence (nor, eventually, many others) and, therefore, contains
much less information than the original belief set.
We must, however remark that, the above described situation can also be seen,
more adequately, as a result of a much more general and relevant assumption regard-
ing orders of priority among postulates, namely the consideration that the primacy
of the new information is more fundamental than the minimal change of previous
beliefs. Notice that, in fact, this latter mentioned assumption is one of the most
central ones underlying most epistemological theories since, if such priority was re-
versed then no changes at all would occur in any epistemic state (regardless of the
existence or not of some epistemic input).20
With the above remark, we finish our description of the main concepts underlying
an epistemological theory.
2.3 The Three Basic Kinds of Epistemic Changes
in Belief Sets-based Models and the Interre-
lations Among Them
As we have exposed in Subsection 2.2.4, in sentential models in which the epistemic
states are represented by belief sets there are essentially three basic kinds of changes
of belief state, namely expansions, contractions and revisions.
In the present section we aim to present some interconnections among those
three kinds of belief change functions as well as to introduce the terminology and
notation (concerning such operators) which we shall use throughout this text.
We start by remarking that so far we have only presented an explicit definition
to the first one of those three change operations. More precisely, we have provided
an explicit meaning for the expansion of a belief set by a sentence in Definition
2.2.1. This is because, in what concerns contractions and revisions there are several
acceptable ways of defining operations which satisfy the properties required from
such operations. Further ahed we will present a few of the constructions, which have
been proposed in the literature, of functions satisfying those properties. However
20It is convenient, however, to notice that, although the rationality criterion of primacy (of
the new information) is required in most of the existing formal models in belief revision and, in
particular, is assumed in all the models that shall be presented throughout this thesis, there are also
some models of non-prioritised belief revision (where the new information is not always accepted).
A survey of some of those models is presented in [Han99a].
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in this section we will only present some interrelations between those two kinds of
operations which are independent of the precise definition that is chosen for each of
them.
Now we recall that, in what concerns revision, if α is a contradiction there is
only one belief set which can be the result of the revision of K by α, namely the
inconsistent belief set K⊥ (i.e., if ` ¬α then K∗α = K⊥). Now we consider the
problem of revising a belief set K by a non-contradictory sentence α, such that
¬α ∈ K.
The most intuitive procedure to obtain a (consistent) belief set which satisfies
the conditions that we have stated in Subsection 2.2.4 that a belief set must satisfy
in order for it to be acceptable as the result of the revision of (a belief set) K by (a
non-contradictory sentence) α has been proposed by Isaac Levi [Lev77] and consists
of the following two steps:
1. finding a belief set which can be the result of the contraction of K with respect
to ¬α (using the terminology that we have introduced in the above mentioned
subsection).
2. taking the expansion of this latter belief set by α as the result of the revision
of K by α.
Such process for obtaining the result of the revision of a belief set K by a sentence
α, by means of a sequence of adequate contractions and expansions can be written
in the form of an equation as follows:
K∗α = (K−¬α)+α (2.1)
Since it is suggested by some of the remarks of Isaac Levi in [Lev77], the above
identity is know as the Levi identity [Ga¨r81, AM82]. Such identity provides an
explicit way of defining a revision function ∗ on K from a (given) contraction function
− on K.
It is worth noticing that the Levi identity can be seen as an equational version of
the Decomposition principle presented on page 17. More precisely, if we accept that
any desirable revision function can be defined from a contraction function by means
of the Levi identity then the mentioned principle can be more precisely stated as
follows:
Decomposition principle (second version) [Han99b, pp. 17]:
Every legitimate belief change is decomposable into a sequence of expan-
sions and contractions.
We have, thus, seen how revisions can be defined from contractions. Now we
present a widely known way of proceeding conversely, i.e. of defining a contraction
by means of a revision. Such process can be described as follows: Let K be a belief
set and α be any sentence, if K∗¬α results of the revision of K by ¬α, then the set
K−α given by:
K−α = K ∩ (K∗¬α) (2.2)
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is a possible result of a contraction of K by α, in the sense that it satisfies all the
properties that we have mentioned in Subsection 2.2.4 that should be satisfied by a
set in order for it to be acceptable as the result of such an operation.
Equation (2.2) is known as the Harper identity (e.g. [Ga¨r88]) since the idea
underlying that equation was first presented by William Harper in [Har77]. We
notice, however, that in the literature such equation is also sometimes referred to as
the Ga¨rdenfors identity (e.g. [AM82, pp.27], [Mak85, pp.352]) since it has also been
proposed by Ga¨rdenfors in [Ga¨r81].21
We notice that as an immediate consequence of the Levi and Harper identities
we can conclude that contractions and revisions are interdefinable.
Now we clarify some of the terminology and notation which we shall use through-
out the present text when referring to operations of expansion, contraction and
revision.
Hence, throughout this thesis we shall use the expression “contraction function”
(or simply “contraction”) to refer to a function22
− : TL × L → TL
(K, α) 7→ K−α ,
where the image of a pair (K, α) by − is represented by K−α. Often throughout
this text we will consider a fixed belief set K and in such situation we shall use the
expression “contraction function on K” (or simply “contraction on K”) to refer to
a function23
− : L → TL
α 7→ K−α ,
where the image of a sentence α by − is represented by K−α. In this regard it
remains only to remark that either it is seen as the image of a pair (K, α) (by a
contraction function −) or as the image of a sentence α (by a contraction function
on K) the set (denoted by) K−α consists of a belief set which is acceptable (in the
context under consideration at the moment when such a function is mentioned) as
a possible result of the contraction of the belief set K with respect to the sentence
α. Such set shall, sometimes, be referred to as “the result of the contraction of K
by α” or as “the image of α by the contraction − on K”.
Analogous terminology and notation shall be used for the case of revision. More
precisely, throughout this thesis, when dealing with revision we shall use the notation
and terminology which results of replacing in the above paragraph all the occurrences
of the word “contraction” by the word “revision” and all the occurrences of the
symbol “−” by the symbol “∗”.
Now that we have finished the introduction of the main components of any
epistemological theory, we shall, conveniently, expose a concrete belief change model.
21In this respect see also Footnote 30.
22In general we shall use the symbol − to designate such a function, however some variants of
this symbol (most of which shall be obtained simply by adding superscripts and/or subscripts to
it) shall also be sometimes used for that effect.
23We shall use the same symbols, − (or some variant of it), to denote both “contraction functions”
and “contractions on (a fixed belief set) K”.
26 CHAPTER 2. THE LOGIC OF THEORY CHANGE
More precisely, as a first example of an epistemological theory, in the following
section we shall present the most widely known among all the sentential models so
far proposed in the literature, in which belief states are represented by belief sets.
However, before moving on to the presentation of that model, we must first
clarify some issues concerning how such an epistemological theory (i.e. a sentential
model in which belief states are represented by belief sets) can be defined. In that
respect, first of all we recall that, in that kind of models, there are essentially three
types of basic changes of belief state, namely expansion, contractions and revisions.
Hence, any given sentential model is essentially characterized by the definition
provided within such model for each of the belief change operations, namely expan-
sions, contractions and revisions.
Moreover, recalling that in what concerns expansion there is a quite straight-
forward, consensual and unambiguous definition for such operation (see Definition
2.2.1), we can conclude that an epistemological theory where belief states are mod-
elled by belief sets is essentially determined by the way it models the other two
kinds of change operations (which are admissible in such class of theories), namely
contractions and revisions.24
In that respect we should notice at this point that there are mainly two ways
of characterising the operations of contraction/revision in any given epistemolog-
ical theory: one way is postulation and consists in presenting a list of properties
which every such operation must satisfy (in order to be accepted as an operation of
contraction/revision within that model) − such properties are designated by “con-
traction/revision postulates” (or simply by “postulates”) − and studying their con-
sequences and interrelations, and the other one is to provide explicit definitions for
such operations, i.e. to expose a way of constructing a belief set which can be the
results of the contraction/revision of any given belief set K by any sentence α in
such model and then investigating the main properties satisfied by the operations
thus defined.
The contraction/revision operations underlying most known belief change (sen-
tential) models have been defined by means of both of those approaches, i.e. the
class of contraction/revision functions of most such models has been defined both
by presenting a list of the properties that are required to be satisfied by each of its
members, and also by providing an explicit constructive way of obtaining each of
the functions in such class.25
In such cases, we use the designation “representation theorem” to refer to the
result that establishes that the class of functions that satisfy the given list of postu-
lates coincides with the class of functions which can be obtained by the mentioned
explicitly presented procedure. Such result is also sometimes designated by “ax-
iomatic characterization”, since they characterize the explicitly defined functions
in terms of postulates (or axioms). Representation theorems are, thus, very use-
24In fact, some of such theories contain an explicit description of only one of those two classes
of operations and the definition of the other one is obtained by making use of the above exposed
interdefinability between those two types of operations.
25In fact some change function (of certain epistemic models) have even been characterized by dif-
ferent sets of postulates (instead of only one such set). Also, for some classes of change operations,
more that one method for constructing its members have been proposed.
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ful results because, on the one hand, they explicit the intuitions which motivate
the constructions presented namely by exposing a set of postulates which precisely
characterize the functions thus defined, and, on the other hand, they confirm that a
certain explicit mechanism for building operations leads to the construction of ex-
actly those functions which satisfy precisely those properties (postulates) that were
required to be fulfilled by such an operation.
2.4 The AGM Paradigm
At this moment we are finally in a position to expose a concrete belief change model.
More precisely, in this section we will present the one which has acquired the status
of standard model in the belief change literature. Such model is commonly denom-
inated by AGM model − after the initials of its three creators: Carlos Alchourro´n,
Peter Ga¨rdenfors and David Makinson − and has been originally presented in the
paper [AGM85] (which is indeed an extension of several other previous works of its
authors (e.g. [Ga¨r78, AM81, AM82, Ga¨r82])).
The AGM model is a sentential model within which the belief states are repre-
sented by belief sets and three types of belief change operations are considered in
that framework: expansion, contractions and revisions. In what concerns expan-
sion, that operation is defined, in such model, just as presented in Definition 2.2.1
above. Regarding the other two kinds of operations, we start by remarking that, in
their model, the AGM trio, in compliance with Levi’s arguments in [Lev77], takes
contractions as primitive and revisions as the functions which are obtained from
a contraction through the Levi identity (equation (2.1)). Anyway, there is not a
straightforward definition for the classes of contraction and of revision functions (as
it is the case with expansion) in that framework and several different methods have
been made use of in the literature to describe such classes of belief change functions.
As we have already mentioned above, there are two main distinct ways of defining
a certain class of belief change functions: one way consists in presenting a list of
postulates which must be satisfied by any function in such class and the other way
consists in presenting an explicit procedure to construct all such functions. In the
following subsections we shall present those two classes (i.e. the class of contractions
and the class of revisions of the AGM model) by means of the postulation approach.
More precisely in Subsection 2.4.1 (resp. Subsection 2.4.2) we shall expose the
postulates considered in the AGM-model as the essential properties that a function
must satisfy in order for it to be accepted as a contraction (resp. revision) function.
Afterwards, in Subsection 2.4.3 we show that the classes of contractions and of
revisions determined by those sets of postulates are indeed interconnected by means
of the Levi and Harper identities. More precisely, we shall see there that the class of
revision functions coincides with the class of functions which can be obtained from
one of the contraction functions by means of the Levi identity (equation (2.1)),26 and,
26We must notice, however, that this fact is not a consequence of the lists of postulates presented
to describe each class of operations. Rather, this is the case because, as we have clarified above, it is
a foundational assumption of the AGM model that revision functions are precisely those functions
which can be obtained from a contraction function by means of the Levi identity (eq. (2.1)).
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conversely, the class of contraction functions coincides with the class of functions
which can be obtained from one of the revision functions by means of the Harper
identity (equation (2.2)).
2.4.1 The AGM (Postulates for) Contraction Functions
In this subsection we shall introduce the AGM model for contraction functions by
presenting the list of postulates which characterizes them.
In the AGM model (introduced in [AGM85]27) a function − from TL × L to TL
(resp. from L to TL) is a contraction function (resp. a contraction function on K) if
and only if, for any belief set K (resp. for a certain belief set K) and any sentences
α and β, the following properties28 are satisfied:29
• Closure: K−α is a belief set (i.e. K−α = Cn(K−α)).
• Inclusion: K−α ⊆ K.
• Vacuity: If α 6∈ K, then K−α = K.
• Success: If α 6∈ Cn(∅), then α 6∈ K−α.
• Extensionality (or Preservation): If ` α↔ β, then K−α = K−β.
• Recovery: K ⊆ Cn((K−α) ∪ {α}).
The above postulates are commonly known as basic Ga¨rdenfors postulates
for contraction or basic AGM postulates for contraction and their designa-
tions and formulations are quite self-explanatory of the meaning and the motivation
behind each of them: closure assures that the result of contracting a belief set by any
given sentence is still a belief set; inclusion tells us that the contraction of a belief set
must give rise to a subset of it; vacuity states that the outcome of the operation of
contracting a belief set by a sentence which is not in that set is precisely the original
belief set; success imposes that the result of the contraction of a certain belief set by
a sentence does not contain the contracted sentence (provided that such sentence is
not a tautology); extensionality says that the result of contracting a belief set by a
certain sentence coincides with the result of contracting that same belief set by any
other sentence which is logically equivalent to that (original) one; finally recovery
means that if a belief set is contracted by a certain sentence and, subsequently, the
result of such contraction is expanded (see Definition 2.2.1) by that same sentence
then the outcome of this second operation contains the original belief set, in other
27It must be noticed, however, that such paper is an extension of some previous works by its
authors (e.g. [Ga¨r78, AM81, AM82, Ga¨r82]).
28These properties have been originally stated in [Ga¨r78, Ga¨r82]. However, here we present them
with formulations that are more similar to the ones found in [AGM85] and, moreover, we follow
precisely the same order of presentation used in the latter mentioned paper.
29Here we are using the terminology and notation which we have introduced in page 25. Hence,
in particular, in the formulations of the postulates, for any sentence α, K−α denotes the image
of the pair (K, α) (resp. the image of α) by −, when that function is regarded as a contraction
function (resp. as a contraction function on K).
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words, this postulate states that all the sentences which are discarded in the process
of contracting a belief set by a certain sentence (as well as the remaining ones) are
present in the outcome of the expansion, by that same sentence, of the belief set
which results of mentioned contraction.
Further explanation of the motivations which underlay each of the above listed
postulates can be found, for example, in [Mak85, Ga¨r88, GR95, Han99b]. Through-
out this thesis the class of functions which satisfy basic AGM postulates for con-
traction will be of particular interest.
Definition 2.4.1 A contraction function − : TL×L → TL is a basic AGM contrac-
tion (or, simply, an AGM contraction) if it satisfies the basic AGM postulates for
contraction, namely closure, inclusion, vacuity, success, extensionality and recovery
(for any belief set K and any sentences α and β).29
Given a (fixed) belief set K, a contraction function on K, − : L → TL, is a basic
AGM contraction on K (or, simply, an AGM contraction on K) if it satisfies the
basic AGM postulates for contraction, namely closure, inclusion, vacuity, success,
extensionality and recovery (for any sentences α and β).29
Before closing this subsection it is convenient to remark here, additionally, that,
speaking in terms of the epistemological concepts introduced in Section 2.2, the
above listed postulates reflect, in an equational form, those which are the rationality
criteria underlying the AGM framework (regarding the operations of contraction).
Moreover, the order by which the postulates have been introduced indicates the
order of priority among those rationality criteria which is assumed in the AGM
framework.
In particular we emphasise the following correspondences between some the
above postulates and some of the rationality criteria mentioned in Subsection 2.2.5:
closure is, in this context, an equational version of the principle of categorical match-
ing (or adequacy of representation); success is connected to the criterion of primacy
(of the new information); extensionality corresponds to the principle of irrelevance
of syntax and, finally, the postulates of inclusion, vacuity and recovery are all essen-
tially related to the criterion of minimal change/loss (of the previous beliefs).
In what concerns the priorities among the rationality criteria which are assumed
in the AGM framework (concerning the operation of contraction) we remark only
the following (most evident) one: Since the postulate of closure comes, in the above
presented list, before the postulate of success and the formulation of this latter
postulate is conditional on the sentence to be removed not being a tautology, we
can conclude that, in the AGM framework the principle of categorical matching is
given priority over the primacy (of the new information).
Besides from the above introduced, so called, basic AGM postulates for contrac-
tion, the following two postulates (presented in [AGM85]), referring to the contrac-
tion by conjunctions, also play an important role in the AGM model:
• Conjunctive overlap (or Intersection): (K−α) ∩ (K−β) ⊆ K−(α ∧ β).
• Conjunctive inclusion (or Conjunction): K−(α ∧ β) ⊆ K−α whenever
α 6∈ K−(α ∧ β).
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Throughout this text we shall often use the expression “supplementary AGM
postulates for contraction” to refer to the two postulates above.
These postulates are defended and the motivation behind each of them is de-
tailedly exposed, for example, in [Mak85, Ga¨r88, GR95, Han99b]. In particular,
we anticipate here that these postulates are essential in some of the representation
theorems that we shall present further ahead.
Definition 2.4.2 A contraction function (resp., a contraction function on a be-
lief set K) − is a supplementary AGM contraction (resp., a supplementary AGM
contraction on K) if it satisfies the basic and the supplementary AGM postulates
for contraction, namely closure, inclusion, vacuity, success, extensionality, recov-
ery, conjunctive overlap and conjunctive inclusion, where K is an arbitrary (resp.,
fixed) belief set and α and β are arbitrary sentences.29
2.4.2 The AGM (Postulates for) Revision Functions
In this subsection we present the class of revision functions of the AGM model of
belief change by means of the postulation approach, analogously to what we have
done in the previous subsection with respect to contraction.
The following postulates, which have been presented in [AGM85] (following
[Ga¨r78, Ga¨r82]),30 constitute the essential properties required from a function ∗
from TL × L to TL (resp. from L to TL) in order for it to be considered a revision
function (resp. a revision function on K) within the AGM model:31
• Closure: K∗α is a belief set (i.e. K∗α = Cn(K∗α)).
• Success: α ∈ K∗α.
• Inclusion: K∗α ⊆ K+α.
• Vacuity: If ¬α 6∈ K then K+α ⊆ K∗α.
• Consistency: K∗α = K⊥ iff ` ¬α.
30 We must notice that, in fact, the list of postulates that we expose here coincides, rather, with
the one presented in [Ga¨r88].
In the original list of postulates for revision presented in [AGM85] (following [Ga¨r78, Ga¨r82])
there was a combined version of inclusion and vacuity instead of having them separately. Besides,
that original list of postulates also included the following postulate:
• (∗ 6) (K∗α) ∩K = K−¬α;
which was later excluded from the axioms.
By considering, instead, Ga¨rdenfors’ [Ga¨r88] slightly modified list of postulates for revision (in
the AGM model) that we present here, it is possible to treat revision and contraction as totally
independent functions.
Notice yet that the postulate (∗ 6) is equivalent to the Harper identity (equation (2.2)) that we
have presented in the previous section.
31Here we are using the terminology and notation which we have introduced in page 25. Hence,
in particular, in the formulations of the postulates, for any sentence α, K∗α denotes the image of
the pair (K, α) (resp. the image of α) by ∗, when that function is regarded as a revision function
(resp. as a revision function on K).
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• Extensionality (or Preservation): If ` α↔ β, then K∗α = K∗β.
Notice that, when the above postulates are regarded as properties of a revision
function ∗ : TL × L → TL, each of them must be read as having an implicit uni-
versal quantification of the sentences occurring in its formulation over L as well as
a universal quantification of K over the set of all theories TL, i.e., as if their state-
ments started with the expression: “For any belief set K and any sentence α” (or
by “For any belief set K and any sentences α and β” in the case of the postulate of
extensionality).
On the other hand, when the above postulates are considered as properties of a
revision function on (the fixed belief set) K, ∗ : L → TL, then each of them must
be read as having an universal quantification (only) of the sentences occurring in
its formulation over L, i.e., as if their statements started with the expression: “For
any sentence α” (or by “For any sentences α and β” in the case of the postulate of
extensionality).
We must also remark here that, although the designations of some the above
postulates are identical to the designations of some of the contraction postulates
(that we have presented in the previous subsection), throughout this text, whenever
some of those postulate designations (which are common to both of the mentioned
sets of postulates) occurs, it will be clear by the context wether it refers to the
contraction or to the revision postulate with that name.
The above postulates are commonly known as basic Ga¨rdenfors postulates
for revision or basic AGM postulates for revision and the meaning and
motivation underlaying each of them can be straightforwardly understood from their
formulations and designations: closure imposes that the result of the revision of a
belief set by a sentence is a belief set; success assures that the outcome of the revision
of a belief set by a certain sentence contains that sentence; inclusion tells us that
the belief set which results of the expansion of a belief set by a sentence is a superset
of the outcome of the revision of that same belief set by the same sentence; vacuity
means that the result of the revision of a belief set by a sentence which is consistent
with it contains the outcome of the expansion of that belief set by such sentence;32
consistency assures that the result of the revision of a belief set by a sentence is
consistent unless such sentence is itself inconsistent; finally extensionality tells us
that revising a belief set by a certain sentence is the same as revising such belief set
by another sentence which is equivalent to that one.
For more detailed explanations and motivations for these postulates see e.g.
[Mak85, Ga¨r88, GR95, Han99b]. In the following definition we formally introduce
the class of revision functions which satisfy the above mentioned basic AGM postu-
lates for revision.
32At this point it is interesting to notice that it follows from the combination of inclusion and
vacuity that the result of the revision of a belief set by a sentence which is consistent with it is
identical to the outcome of the expansion of that belief set by that sentence. This fact is expressed
by the following postulate
• (∗ 3) If ¬α 6∈ K then K∗α = K+α;
which was present (instead of inclusion and vacuity) in the original list of postulates for revision
presented in [AGM85] (following [Ga¨r78, Ga¨r82]).
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Definition 2.4.3 A revision function ∗ : TL × L → TL is a basic AGM revision
(or, simply, an AGM revision) if it satisfies the basic AGM postulates for revision,
namely closure, success, inclusion, vacuity, consistency and extensionality (for any
belief set K and any sentences α and β).29
Given a (fixed) belief set K, a revision function on K, ∗ : L → TL, is a basic
AGM revision on K (or, simply, an AGM revision on K) if it satisfies the basic AGM
postulates for revision, namely closure, success, inclusion, vacuity, consistency and
extensionality (for any sentences α and β).29
Analogously to what we have done in the previous subsection (concerning con-
traction), by analysing the above set of postulates (as well as the order by which
those postulates have been presented and the conditionals present in some of them),
we can easily identify the main rationality criteria which are assumed to govern the
operation of revision in the AGM model (and the order of priority among those
principles).
In this regard we start by observing that, the imposition that a revision function
must satisfy the postulate of consistency is obviously connected to the assumption of
the rationality criterion which we have designated by that same name in Subsection
2.2.5. On the other hand, in what concerns the remaining of the above introduced
revision postulates, just as in the case of the homonymous contraction postulates:
closure is directly related to the principle of categorical matching (or adequacy of
representation), success is an equational version the criterion of primacy (of the new
information), inclusion and vacuity are essentially related to the criterion of minimal
change/loss (of the previous beliefs) and extensionality corresponds to the principle
of irrelevance of syntax.
Now we emphasise a couple of noteworthy priorities among rationality criteria
which are assumed in the AGM model (in what concerns revision): On the one
hand primacy (of the new information) is given priority over consistency, in the
sense that, according to the AGM model when a consistent belief set is revised by
an inconsistent sentence, such sentence is accepted in the resulting belief set which
must, therefore, in such case, be the inconsistent belief set. On the other hand, in the
AGM framework, consistency has priority over minimal change/loss (of the previous
beliefs) since, when the inconsistent belief set K⊥ is revised by a non-contradictory
sentence, the resulting belief set is assumed to be consistent (and, therefore, a lot
of beliefs in the original inconsistent belief set are abandoned).
Just as in the case of contraction, apart from the set of basic postulates, in
the AGM framework, two additional postulates for revision, originally proposed by
Ga¨rdenfors [Ga¨r78, Ga¨r82], are considered, namely:
• Superexpansion: K∗(α ∧ β) ⊆ (K∗α)+β.
• Subexpansion: If ¬β 6∈ K∗α then (K∗α)+β ⊆ K∗(α ∧ β).
In what follows the two postulates above shall be sometimes referred to as the
supplementary Ga¨rdenfors postulates for revision or the supplementary
AGM postulates for revision. Further explications and motivations for the
consideration of such couple of postulates can be found, for example, in [Mak85,
Ga¨r88, GR95, Han99b].
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2.4.3 Interrelation Between AGM Revision and AGM Con-
traction (Postulates)
In Section 2.3 we have presented the Levi and Harper identities (equations (2.1)
and (2.2), respectively) which can be used in order to define a revision function on
a belief set K from a (given) contraction function on K and vice versa, respectively.
In what follows we shall analyse those two identities in terms of the postulates for
contraction and for revision postulates that we have introduced in the two previous
subsections.
More precisely, in this subsection, we will present some results which expose that:
(a) the revision function obtained from an AGM contraction (respectively, from an
AGM contraction which satisfies the supplementary AGM postulates for contrac-
tion) by means of the Levi identity (equation (2.1)) is an AGM revision (resp., an
AGM revision which satisfies the supplementary AGM postulates for revision), and
(b) the contraction function obtained from an AGM revision (respectively, from
an AGM revision which satisfies the supplementary AGM postulates for revision)
through the Harper identity (equation (2.2)) is an AGM contraction (resp., an AGM
contraction which satisfies the supplementary AGM postulates for contraction). Fur-
thermore we shall also expose a result which states that, if we regard the Levi and
Harper identities as functions (from the class of all AGM contraction to the class of
all AGM revisions and vice versa, respectively) then they are the inverse (functions)
of each other. We state this facts precisely and more detailedly in the following set
of observations.
Observation 2.4.4 ([Ga¨r78, Ga¨r82]) 33
Let − be a contraction function and ∗ be the revision function defined from − by
means of the Levi identity (i.e. equation (2.1)). If − satisfies (the contraction pos-
tulates) inclusion, vacuity, success and extensionality then ∗ satisfies all the basic
AGM postulates for revision, namely, closure, success, inclusion, vacuity, consis-
tency and extensionality.34
Observation 2.4.5 ([AGM85, Observations 3.1 and 3.2]) 35
Let − be a contraction function that satisfies (the contraction postulates) closure,
inclusion, vacuity, success and extensionality and let ∗ be the revision function de-
fined from − by means of the Levi identity (i.e. equation (2.1)). Then the following
statements hold:
33The references [Ga¨r78, Ga¨r82] presented here for this observation are the ones provided for
this result within the proof of [AGM85, Observation 2.3] as well as in [Mak87, pp. 389]. A proof
for this observation can also be found in [Ga¨r88, pp. 215] and in [GM88, pp. 91].
34It is worth noticing that, according to this result, it is not necessary that the contraction
function − satisfies the postulates closure and recovery in order to assure that the revision function
∗ satisfies all the basic AGM postulates for revision. For that to hold it is enough that − satisfies
all the remaining AGM postulates for contraction.
35Part (a) of this observation coincides with the right-to-left part of [AGM85, Observation 3.1]
and part (b) coincides with the right-to-left part of [AGM85, Observation 3.2]. A proof for this
result can also be found in [Ga¨r88, pp. 215].
34 CHAPTER 2. THE LOGIC OF THEORY CHANGE
(a) If − also satisfies recovery and conjunctive overlap, then ∗ satisfies superex-
pansion.36
(b) If − also satisfies conjunctive inclusion, then ∗ satisfies subexpansion.
The two observations above assert that the revision function that is obtained
from an AGM contraction function by means of the Levi identity (equation (2.1))
is an AGM revision function. Furthermore, from the above results, we can also
conclude that an AGM contraction function which also satisfies the two supplemen-
tary AGM postulates for contraction originates, through the Levi identity (equation
(2.1)), an AGM revision function which, additionally, satisfies the two supplemen-
tary postulates for revision.
The following observations show that the converse procedure is possible by means
of the Harper identity (equation (2.2)).
Observation 2.4.6 ([Ga¨r78, Ga¨r82]) 37
Let ∗ be a revision function and − be the contraction function defined from
∗ by means of the Harper identity (i.e equation (2.2)). If ∗ satisfies (the revision
postulates) closure, success, vacuity, consistency and extensionality, then − satisfies
all the basic AGM postulates for contraction, namely closure, inclusion, vacuity,
success, extensionality and recovery.38
Observation 2.4.7 ([AGM85, Observations 3.1 and 3.2]) 39
Let ∗ be a revision function that satisfies all the basic AGM postulates for revision
and − be the contraction function defined from ∗ by means of the Harper identity
(i.e. equation (2.2)). Then the following statements hold:
(a) If ∗ also satisfies superexpansion, then − satisfies conjunctive overlap.
(b) If ∗ also satisfies subexpansion, then − satisfies conjunctive inclusion.
From the results so far presented in this subsection we can conclude that the
Levi and Harper identities can be used in order to define maps from the class of
all AGM contraction functions to the class of all AGM revision functions and vice
versa, respectively. In what follows we shall formally introduce such maps and their
strong interconnection.
36Notice that, according to [Fer01, Observation 20], if − satisfies the contraction postulates
closure, inclusion, vacuity, success, extensionality and conjunctive overlap, but does not satisfy
recovery, then ∗ does not, in general, satisfy superexpansion.
37The references [Ga¨r78, Ga¨r82] presented here for this observation are the ones provided for
this result in [Mak87, pp. 389]. A proof for this observation can be found in [Ga¨r88, pp. 215] and
in [GM88, pp. 91− 92].
38Notice that, according to this result, it is not necessary that the revision function ∗ satisfies
the postulate inclusion in order to assure that the contraction function − is an AGM contraction.
For that to hold it is enough that ∗ satisfies all the remaining basic AGM postulates for revision.
39Part (a) of this observation coincides with the left-to-right part of [AGM85, Observation 3.1]
and also with part (a) of [Ga¨r88, Theorem 3.5]. In what concerns part (b), it is identical to the
left-to-right part of [AGM85, Observation 3.2] as well as to part (b) of [Ga¨r88, Theorem 3.5].
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Let K be a belief set. We shall denote the class of all AGM contractions on K
by −AGMK and the class of all AGM revisions on K by ∗AGMK.
The Levi identity (equation (2.1)) naturally leads to the definition of a func-
tion r : −AGMK → ∗AGMK such that, for any AGM contraction − ∈ −AGMK, its
image r(−) = ∗ is the AGM revision (cf. Observation 2.4.4) defined by: K∗α =
(K−¬α)+α, for any α ∈ L.
Conversely, having in mind the Harper identity (equation (2.2)), we are led to
the following definition of a function c : ∗AGMK → −AGMK, such that, given an
arbitrary AGM revision ∗ ∈ ∗AGMK, it holds that c(∗) = −, where − is the AGM
contraction (cf. Observation 2.4.6) defined by: K−α = K∩ (K∗¬α), for any α ∈ L.
Now that we have introduced the maps r and c between the classes of AGM
revisions and of AGM contractions we are in a position to present, as the final result
of the present subsection, the following observation, which essentially asserts that
those two functions (r and c) are such that each of them is the inverse (function) of
the other one.
Observation 2.4.8 ([Ga¨r78, Ga¨r82]) 40
Let K be a belief set and r and c be the functions introduced in the above para-
graphs. Then, the following statements hold:
(a) If − is an AGM contraction on K, then c(r(−)) = −.41
(b) If ∗ is an AGM revision on K, then r(c(∗)) = ∗.42
The above result tell us that given an AGM contraction − (respectively an AGM
revision ∗) on K, if ∗ is the AGM revision (resp. − is the AGM contraction) on
K obtained from − (resp. from ∗) by means of the Levi identity (resp. Harper
identity), then the contraction (resp. revision) function that is obtained from ∗
(resp. from −) through the Harper identity (resp. Levi identity) coincides with the
(original) contraction function − (resp. revision function ∗).
In summary, the set of results presented in this subsection provides a definite ev-
idence of the adequacy of the Levi and Harper identities as procedures for obtaining
(AGM) revisions from (AGM) contractions and vice versa, respectively.
On the other hand, these results also allow us to conclude that revision and
contraction functions are very strongly interconnected. Indeed, as we have seen,
those two classes of functions are interdefinable by means of the Levi and Harper
identities.
As a consequence of this fact, presenting methods for explicitly constructing
AGM contractions is equivalent to providing explicit constructive definitions of AGM
40The references [Ga¨r78, Ga¨r82] presented here for this observation are the ones provided for
this result in [Mak87, pp. 389]. A proof that the statements in this observation indeed hold can
be found in [Ga¨r88, pp. 70− 71].
41More generally, as it is stated (and proven) in [Han99b, Observation 3.56], it holds that in
order for the identity c(r(−)) = − to be satisfied it is enough that − satisfies the contraction
postulates of closure, inclusion, vacuity, extensionality and recovery.
42In fact, according to the statement of [Han99b, Observation 3.57] (and its proof) the identity
r(c(∗)) = ∗ is satisfied as long as ∗ satisfies the revision postulates of closure, success, inclusion
and extensionality.
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revisions (since the Levi and Harper identities can be used to “translate” an explicit
construction of a contraction function into an explicit definition of a revision function
and vice versa, respectively).
Hence, when creating/exposing a constructive model of belief change functions
it is enough to focus on explicitly defining either revision or contraction functions
(since ones can be defined from the others). As we have already remarked above
Levi [Lev77] considers contractions as more primitive than revisions (and, therefore,
takes revisions as the functions which are obtained from a contraction through the
Levi identity (equation (2.1))). Furthermore, as we have also already mentioned, in
[AGM85] the AGM trio, in accordance with Levi’s arguments, takes contractions as
primitive and revisions as derived from them by means of the Levi identity (equation
(2.1)).43
Having all that in mind, and also because that is convenient for what remains
of this thesis, in what follows we shall focus almost exclusively on contraction func-
tions (and give only very little attention to their associated revision functions). In
particular we dedicate the following chapter to the presentation of several construc-
tive models (only) for AGM contractions (and to the analysis of the interrelations
among them) and, throughout such chapter, we shall only mention revision func-
tions whenever that is necessary in order to obtain or explain some results related
to the constructions of contractions that we shall present.
43Notice also that the fact, already mentioned in Footnote 30, that the Harper identity was
included as postulate (∗ 6) in the original list of postulates for revision presented in [AGM85]
(following [Ga¨r78, Ga¨r82]), further enforces the idea that contraction is a more primitive operation
than revision.
Chapter 3
Some Constructive Models of
AGM Contractions
In Section 2.4 we have introduced the one which is currently seen as the standard
model of theory change, the so called AGM model.
It is now time to present some explicit constructions for functions of theory
change. Having all the above in mind, as well as what is the background needed
for the remainder of this work44, throughout the present chapter we shall focus
our attention essentially in such explicit definitions for contraction functions (rather
than revision functions).45
Hence, in this chapter we will expose some explicit definitions of contraction
functions as well as axiomatic characterizations for each of them. As it will be clear
from the respective representation theorems, all the contraction functions that we
shall present are AGM contractions.
Our presentation of such models in the present chapter will follow the chronolog-
ical order by which each of those classes of contraction functions have been originally
presented in the literature.
Afterwards, in Chapter 4, we will present the interconnection among the different
explicit constructions of AGM contractions introduced here.
3.1 Partial Meet Contractions
In this section we present the most widely known constructive model of contraction
functions. Such contraction functions are called partial meet contractions and were
originally presented in [AGM85].
Given a belief set K, a partial meet contraction on K is such that the result
of the contraction of K by any given sentence is built upon a selection from the
maximal subsets of K that do not imply that sentence. In what follows we present
the formal definition of such functions.
44Recall that the topic of the present thesis is essentially related to contractions (rather than
revisions) of belief sets.
45Notice, however, that, as we have seen above, from any explicit definition of a contraction
function it is possible to obtain, through the Levi identity (equation (2.1)), an explicit definition
of a revision function.
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We start by presenting the concepts of remainder set and of remainders, origi-
nally introduced in [AM81, p. 128].
Let K be a belief set and B be any set of sentences, the remainder set of K by
B (or the remainder set of K modulo B) is the set of maximal subsets of K that do
not imply any element of B and is denoted by K⊥B. The elements of K⊥B are
the remainders (of K, by B). This concepts are more formally introduced in the
following definition:
Definition 3.1.1 ([AM81, p. 128]) Let K be a belief set and B be any set of
sentences. The remainder set of K by B, denoted K⊥B is the set such that X ∈
K⊥B if and only if:
1. X ⊆ K.
2. Cn(X) ∩B = ∅.
3. There is no set X ′ such that X ⊂ X ′ ⊆ K and Cn(X ′) ∩B = ∅.
The elements of K⊥B are the remainders (of K, by B).
For any sentence α, K⊥α is an abbreviation of K⊥{α} and is called the remain-
der set of K by α. In other words K⊥α is the set of maximal subsets of K that do
not imply α (and such sets are called remainders (of K, by α)).
The following observation exposes that, since we are assuming that the conse-
quence operation Cn is compact, given a belief set K and any set of sentences B
the remainder set K⊥B is non-empty as long as B does not contain any tautology
(i.e. B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅).
Observation 3.1.2 ([AM81, Observation 2.2]) 46 Let K be a belief set and B
be any set of sentences. Then, K⊥B 6= ∅ if and only if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ (provided
that the consequence operation Cn is compact).
An immediate consequence of the above observation is the fact (which we shall
need to refer to further ahed) that given a belief set K and two sets of sentences B
and C, a necessary and sufficient condition for K⊥B = K⊥C is that every subset
X of K implies some element of B if and only if X implies some element of C. This
result is more formally stated in the following observation.
Observation 3.1.3 ([Han99b, Observation 1.39]) Let K be a belief set and B
and C be any set of sentences. Then the two following conditions are equivalent:
1. K⊥B = K⊥C
2. For all subsets X of K: Cn(X) ∩B 6= ∅ if and only if Cn(X) ∩ C 6= ∅.
46We notice that the left-to-right part of this result is an immediate consequence of the monotony
of Cn. On the other hand, the right-to-left implication follows from the compactness of Cn and
Zorn’s lemma. (Cf. [AM81, Proof of Observation 2.2])
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It is also convenient to highlight here that the remainders of a belief set are also
belief sets as stated in the following observation.
Observation 3.1.4 ([AGM85]) Let K be a belief set and B be a set of sentences.
If X ∈ K⊥B then X is logically closed, i.e. X = Cn(X).
Now we introduce the notion of selection function which is the basic construct
underlying the definition of the partial meet contractions.
Definition 3.1.5 ([AGM85]) Let K be a belief set. A selection function for K is
a function γ such that for all sentences α:
1. If K⊥α is non-empty, then γ(K⊥α) is a non-empty subset of K⊥α, and
2. If K⊥α is empty, then γ(K⊥α) = {K}.
We are now in a position to present, in the following definition, the class of
partial meet contractions.
Definition 3.1.6 (Partial meet contractions [AGM85]) Let K be a belief set
and γ a selection function for K. The partial meet contraction on K that is gener-
ated by γ is the operation −γ such that for all sentences α:
K−γ α =
⋂
γ(K⊥α).
An operation − on K is a partial meet contraction if and only if there is a
selection function γ for K such that for all sentences α it holds that K−α = K−γα.
Now we present the definition of two limiting particular cases of partial meet
contractions:
Definition 3.1.7 ([AM82, AGM85]) 47
Let K be a belief set.
1. An operation − on K is a maxichoice contraction if and only if it is a partial
meet contraction generated by a selection function γ such that for all sentences
α, the set γ(K⊥α) has exactly one element.48
2. The full meet contraction on K is the partial meet contraction ∼ that is gen-
erated by the selection function γ such that for all sentences α, if K⊥α is
non-empty, then γ(K⊥α) = K⊥α, i.e., the full meet contraction ∼ is the
contraction operation on K defined by
K ∼ α =
{ ⋂
K⊥α , if 6` α
K , if ` α ,
47It is convenient to remark that, although we present maxichoice and full meet contractions
here as particular cases of partial meet contractions, they have been introduced before these latter
(more general) contraction functions, in [AM82]. In that paper maxichoice contractions were called
choice contractions, and full meet contraction was designated simply by meet contraction.
48In [AM82] a function γ defined on the collection of all non-empty remainder sets, such that
γ(K⊥α) ∈ K⊥α (for every non-empty remainder set K⊥α) is called a choice function.
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for all sentences α.49
Finally we present another special class of Partial Meet Contractions.
Definition 3.1.8 ([AGM85]) A selection function γ for a belief set K is (tran-
sitively) relational over K if and only if there is a (transitive) relation v over
K∆L = ⋃ε∈LK⊥ε50 such that for all α ∈ L \ Cn(∅):
γ(K⊥α) = {B ∈ K⊥α : B′ v B for all B′ ∈ K⊥α}.
The above formula is called the marking-off identity and v is the marking-off
relation.
A partial meet contraction function − is (transitively) relational over K if and
only if it is determined by some selection function that is so.
Now we present one first representation theorem which clarifies that the class of
partial meet contractions coincides exactly with the class of all contraction functions
that satisfy the basic AGM postulates for contractions.
Observation 3.1.9 ([AGM85, Observation 2.5]) Let K be a belief set and − be
a contraction function on K. Then − is a partial meet contraction on K if and only
if it satisfies the postulates of closure, inclusion, vacuity, success, extensionality and
recovery.
The following result consists of an axiomatic characterization of the class of tran-
sitively relational partial meet contractions. It exposes that such class coincides with
the class of all contraction functions which satisfy the basic and the supplementary
AGM postulates for contraction.
Observation 3.1.10 ([AGM85, Corollary 4.5]) Let K be a belief set and − be
a partial meet contraction function on K. Then − is transitively relational over K
if and only if − satisfies both conjunctive overlap and conjunctive inclusion.
Before finishing this section we present an alternative axiomatic characterization
for the partial meet contractions which has been obtained by Sven Ove Hansson as
a consequence of his investigation regarding the generalization of the partial meet
contractions to the case of contraction of belief bases (i.e., sets of sentences which
are not necessarily closed under logical consequence).
Observation 3.1.11 ([Han92, Han93, Han91a]) 51
Let K be a belief set and − be a contraction function on K. Then − is a partial
meet contraction on K if and only if it satisfies, for any sentences α and β, the
following postulates:
49Notice that in the explicit definition of the full meet contraction that we have presented here
we have implicitly made use of the fact that, according to Observation 3.1.2, K⊥α 6= ∅ if and only
if 6` α.
50The notation K∆L that we use here to represent the set ⋃ε∈LK⊥ε was introduced in [FH94,
Definition 11]. In [Han99b, Definition 1.63] such a set is designated by subremainder set and its
elements are called the subremainders of K.
51We must notice that, in fact, the axiomatic characterization for partial meet contractions on a
belief set K that is presented in this observation has been proven (in the cited references) to hold
for the case of contractions on any (not necessarily logically closed) set of sentences A.
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• Success: If α 6∈ Cn(∅), then α 6∈ Cn(K−α);
• Inclusion: K−α ⊆ K;
• Relevance: If β ∈ K and β 6∈ K−α then there is a set K ′ such that K−α ⊆
K ′ ⊆ K and α 6∈ Cn(K ′) but α ∈ Cn(K ′ ∪ {β});
• Uniformity: If it holds for all subsets K ′ of K that α ∈ Cn(K ′) if and only if
β ∈ Cn(K ′), then K−α = K−β.
The postulates of relevance and uniformity for contraction used in the above
axiomatic characterization have been originally proposed in [Han91a, Han91b] and
[Han92], respectively. A detailed explanation of the motivation for those two pos-
tulates can be found, for example, in [Han99b].
3.2 Safe/Kernel Contractions
In this section we present other two constructive models of AGM contraction func-
tions for belief sets, namely, smooth (or saturated) kernel contraction and safe con-
traction.
Safe contraction functions have been originally presented in [AM85] and are
such that every safe contraction is a partial meet contraction and it is possible to
identify a subclass of the class of safe contractions which coincides with the class of
transitively relational partial meet contractions.
Latter, in [Han94], a new kind of contraction functions was introduced, the kernel
contractions, which can be seen as a generalization of the safe contractions. Kernel
contractions are such that the class of (all) partial meet contractions is a proper
subclass of the class of kernel contractions. However, in that same paper, a subclass
of the class of kernel contractions has been identified, namely the class of smooth
(or saturated) kernel contractions, which is such that a contraction function on a
belief set is a smooth (or saturated) kernel contraction if and only if it is a partial
meet contraction (on that same belief set).
In this section, instead of following the chronological order by which kernel con-
tractions and safe contractions have been originally presented in the literature, we
start by presenting the most general construction, i.e. the kernel contractions, in
Subsection 3.2.1 and only afterwards, in Subsection 3.2.2, we introduce the class of
safe contractions as a special particular kind of kernel contractions.
3.2.1 Kernel Contraction
In this subsection we present the kernel contraction functions which were intro-
duced by Sven Ove Hansson in [Han94]. Such contraction functions are defined for
any set of sentences (not necessarily closed under logical consequences) and kernel
contractions for belief sets appear as a special particular case of the general theory.
The definition of kernel contraction is based on the concepts of kernel sets and
of incision function which we present in the following two definitions.
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Definition 3.2.1 ([Han94]) Let A be a set of sentences and α be a sentence in L.
Then X ∈ A ⊥⊥ α if and only if:
1. X ⊆ A.
2. X ` α.
3. If Y ⊂ X then Y 6` α.
The set A ⊥⊥ α is called the kernel set of A with respect to α and its elements
are the α-kernels of A.
Definition 3.2.2 ([Han94]) An incision function σ for a set (of sentences) A is a
function such that for all sentences α:
(i) σ(A ⊥⊥ α) ⊆ ⋃(A ⊥⊥ α).
(ii) if ∅ 6= X ∈ A ⊥⊥ α, then X ∩ σ(A ⊥⊥ α) 6= ∅.
We are now in a position to present the definition of kernel contraction.
Definition 3.2.3 ([Han94]) Let σ be an incision function for A. The kernel con-
traction −σ for A based on σ is defined as follows:
A−σα = A \ σ(A ⊥⊥ α).
An operator − for A is a kernel contraction if and only if there is some incision
function σ for A such that A−α = A−σα for all sentences α.
The following observation presents an axiomatic characterization for kernel con-
traction.
Observation 3.2.4 ([Han94]) The operator − for (a given set of sentences) A
is a kernel contraction if and only if it satisfies, for any sentences α and β, the
following postulates:
• Success: If α 6∈ Cn(∅), then α 6∈ Cn(A−α);
• Inclusion: A−α ⊆ A;
• Uniformity: If it holds for all subsets A′ of A that α ∈ Cn(A′) if and only if
β ∈ Cn(A′), then A−α = A−β;
• Core-retainment: If β ∈ A and β 6∈ A−α, then there is some set A′ such that
A′ ⊆ A and α 6∈ Cn(A′) but α ∈ Cn(A′ ∪ {β}).
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The postulate of core-retainment for contraction used in the above axiomatic
characterization has been originally proposed in [Han91b]. An explanation of the
motivation for such postulate can be found, for example, in [Han99b].
As it has been noted in [Han94, Han99b], since core-retainment is implied by
relevance, it follows immediately from the axiomatic characterizations (of partial
meet and kernel contractions) presented in Observations 3.1.11 and 3.2.4 that all
partial meet contractions are kernel contractions. Nevertheless, the converse inclu-
sion does not hold, i.e., not all kernel contractions are partial meet contractions (for
a counterexample see, e.g., [Han94, Sec. 5]). Having this in mind, in what follows
we present a special kind of kernel contractions, the so-called smooth kernel contrac-
tions, which are such that, in what concerns the particular case of contractions of
belief sets, the class of partial meet contractions coincides with the class of smooth
kernel contractions.
Definition 3.2.5 ([Han94, Definition 11]) An incision function σ for a set A is
smooth if and only if it holds for all subsets B of A that if B ` β and β ∈ σ(A ⊥⊥ α),
then B ∩ σ(A ⊥⊥ α) 6= ∅.
A kernel contraction is smooth if and only if it is based on a smooth incision
function.
In [Han94] Hansson presented an alternative way of constructing smooth kernel
contractions. More precisely, in that paper another particular kind of kernel contrac-
tion, the so-called saturated kernel contraction, has been introduced which is such
that the class of saturated kernel contractions coincides with the class of smooth
kernel contractions. In what follows we present the definition of saturated kernel
contraction and a formal result stating the above mentioned interrelation between
smooth kernel contractions and saturated kernel contractions.
Definition 3.2.6 ([Han94, Definition 14]) Let σ be an incision function for A.
The saturated kernel contraction −sσ for A that is associated with σ is defined, for
any sentence α, as follows:
A−sσ α = A ∩ Cn(A−σα),
where −σ is the kernel contraction −σ for A based on σ.52
An operator − for A is a saturated kernel contraction if and only if there is some
incision function σ for A such that A−α = A−sσ α for all sentences α.
Observation 3.2.7 ([Han94, Observation 15]) An operator − for a set A is a
saturated kernel contraction if and only if it is a smooth kernel contraction.
The following observation asserts that when only contraction of belief sets is
under consideration there is no distinction between smooth (or saturated) kernel
contractions and partial meet contractions.
52Notice that, it follows from Definition 3.2.3 that the saturated kernel contraction −sσ for A
based on σ is such that
A−sσ α = A ∩ Cn(A \ σ(A ⊥⊥ α)),
for all sentences α.
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Observation 3.2.8 ([Han94, Theorem 16]) Let K be a belief set. Then − is a
smooth kernel contraction on K if and only if it is a partial meet contraction on K.
It is worth remarking here that in [Han94] the left-to-right part of the above result
is proven in a direct way. More precisely, such proof is essentially based on an explicit
definition of a selection function from an incision function. On the other hand, the
proof of the right-to-left part of the above result is based on certain axiomatic
characterizations of each of those two contraction operation and on interrelations
between some different sets of postulates.
In this regard it is worth mentioning here that, in [FFKI06], Falappa, Ferme´
and Kern-Isberner have presented ways of defining an incision function σγ from a
selection function γ and vice versa. Furthermore, in that same paper, they have
identified which properties are necessary and sufficient to require from selection and
incision functions in order to assure that γσγ = γ and σγσ = σ.
3.2.2 Safe Contraction
Safe contraction will be initially presented here as a special particular case of kernel
contraction as it is done in [Han99b]. However, we notice once again that, histori-
cally, the operation of safe contraction was introduced by Alchourro´n and Makinsson
[AM85] much earlier than the more general construction of kernel contraction was
proposed in [Han94] and, for that reason, we shall also present further below the
original definition of safe contraction which was formulated without the need of
any of the concepts related to kernel contractions that we have introduced in the
previous subsection.
In order to be able to define safe contraction in terms of kernel contractions we
need to start by introducing some additional concepts, namely the ones presented
in the following four definitions.
Definition 3.2.9 ([Han99b, Definition 2.38]) Let A be a set of sentences. A
kernel selection function for A is a function s such that for all X ∈ {X|X ∈ A ⊥⊥
α for some α}:
1. s(X) ⊆ X
2. s(X) 6= ∅ if X 6= ∅.
Definition 3.2.10 ([Han99b, Definition 2.39]) Let s be a kernel selection func-
tion for a set A. Then an incision function σ is the cumulation of s if and only if
for all sentences α:
σ(A ⊥⊥ α) =
⋃
{s(X)|X ∈ A ⊥⊥ α}
Definition 3.2.11 ([Han99b, Definition 2.40]) A kernel selection function s for
a set A is based on a relation ≺ if and only if for all X ∈ A ⊥⊥ α:
β ∈ s(X) if and only if β ∈ X and there is no δ ∈ X such that δ ≺ β.
An incision function is based on a relation ≺ if and only if it is the cumulation
of some kernel selection function for that is based on ≺.
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Definition 3.2.12 ([AM85]) Let A be a set of sentences and ≺ a relation over A.
We say that ≺ is a hierarchy over A if and only if it satisfies the non-circularity (or
acyclicity) condition: for all positive integers n, if {α1, . . . , αn} ⊆ A, then it is not
the case that α1 ≺ α2 ≺ . . . ≺ αn ≺ α1}.
Having the above definitions in mind we can now present the definition of safe
contraction.
Definition 3.2.13 ([AM85]) Let ≺ be a hierarchy over a set of sentences A. Let
σ be the incision function that is based on ≺ and −σ the kernel contraction based
on σ. The operation of safe contraction −s based on ≺ is defined as follows:
A−sα = A ∩ Cn(A−σα)
Remark 3.2.14 Notice that, according to Definitions 3.2.6 and 3.2.13, it holds that
every safe contraction function is a saturated kernel contraction.
The original presentation of safe contraction, in [AM85], followed slightly dif-
ferent steps and, although the approach presented in that paper is equivalent to
the one exposed above, some of the concepts introduced there, by Alchourro´n and
Makinson, deserve mentioning. Therefore we will now expose their construction of
safe contraction.
Definition 3.2.15 ([AM85]) Let A be a set of sentences and ≺ be a hierarchy
over A. An element β of A is safe with respect to α (modulo ≺) if and only if β is
not a minimal element (under ≺) of any minimal subset (under inclusion) B of A
such that α ∈ Cn(B). Equivalently, if and only if every inclusion-minimal subset
B ⊆ A satisfying B ` α either does not contain β or else contains some sentence δ
such that δ ≺ β.53
We write A/α for the set of all elements of A that are safe with respect to α.
Now we present the original definition of safe contraction which was based on
the concept of safe elements introduced above.
Definition 3.2.16 ([AM85]) The operation of safe contraction over a set A (mod-
ulo a hierarchy ≺ and given a consequence operation Cn) is defined by the equation
A−sα = A ∩ Cn(A/α)
In the case that K is a theory, since K/α ⊆ K we have Cn(K/α) ⊆ Cn(K) = K
so that K−sα = Cn(K/α).
53Notice that, making use of the concept (and notation) of kernel set of A with respect to α, the
definition of a safe element can be formulated in the following alternative way:
An element β of A is safe with respect to α (modulo ≺) if and only if
For all B ∈ A ⊥⊥ α, if β ∈ B, then there is some δ ∈ B such that δ ≺ β.
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The following remark clarifies the equivalence between both the approaches pre-
sented for the construction of safe contractions (see Definitions 3.2.13 and 3.2.16).
Remark 3.2.17 Let A be a set of propositions and ≺ a hierarchy over A. If σ is
the incision function based on ≺, then
σ(A ⊥⊥ α) = A\A/α
Hence
A−σα = A/α
In [AM85] Alchourro´n and Makinsson proved that every safe contraction is an
AGM contraction. This fact is more formally stated in the following observation.
Observation 3.2.18 ([AM85, Observation 3.2]) If − is a safe contraction func-
tion then − satisfies the basic AGM postulates for contraction (i.e. closure, inclu-
sion, vacuity, success, extensionality and recovery).
Combining the above observation with the axiomatic characterization for partial
meet contractions presented in Observation 3.1.9 we can immediately conclude that,
when considering contraction functions on belief sets, every safe contraction function
is a partial meet contraction function ([AM85, Corollary 3.3]).54
In what follows we introduce some properties which can be required of a relation
over a set of sentences A as well as some interrelations among such properties. Fur-
thermore we expose some direct relation between the fact that a given safe contrac-
tion function satisfies certain contraction postulates and the fact that the hierarchy
on which such safe contraction is based satisfies some of the mentioned properties.
More precisely, given a safe contraction −s on a belief set K based on a hierarchy
≺ over K, we state some interconnections between the properties (among the ones
that we will introduce below) which are satisfied by ≺ and the postulates which are
satisfied by −s.
Definition 3.2.19 ([AM86, pp. 192]) A relation ≺ over a set A is regular if and
only if it satisfies the two following properties:
Continuing-up ([AM85]): For all α, β, δ ∈ A, if α ≺ β and β ` δ, then α ≺ δ.
Continuing-down ([AM85]): For all α, β, δ ∈ A, if α ` β and β ≺ δ, then α ≺ δ.
In [AM85], Alchourro´n and Makinsson proved that:
1. ([AM85, Observations 4.3 and 5.3]) If a safe contraction − on a belief set K
is based on a hierarchy that satisfies continuing-up or continuing-down, then
− satisfies the postulate of conjunctive overlap;
54Notice that this result is also an immediate consequence of Remark 3.2.14 and Observations
3.2.7 and 3.2.8.
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2. ([AM85, Observation 6.2]) For a safe contraction − to satisfy the postulate
of conjunctive inclusion it is enough that such safe contraction is based on a
hierarchy ≺ which satisfies continuing-up or continuing-down as well as the
following property:
Virtual connectivity ([AM85]): For all α, β, δ ∈ A, if α ≺ β then either
α ≺ δ or δ ≺ β.55
The most advanced formal result that has been obtained by Alchourro´n and
Makinsson for safe contraction in [AM85] is the following corollary of the above
mentioned facts: if a safe contraction function on a belief set is determined by a
regular and virtually connected hierarchy, then it satisfies the basic and the supple-
mentary AGM postulates and, therefore, it is a transitively relational partial meet
contraction (cf. [AM85, Corollary 6.3]).
Afterwards, in [AM86] the same authors showed that, for the case of contractions
of finite (modulo Cn) theories, any operation is a safe contraction function deter-
mined by a regular and virtually connected hierarchy if and only if it is a transitively
relational partial meet contraction function (cf. [AM86, Theorem 2]). We notice
however that this result was obtained in a direct way, i.e. its proof does not make use
of any representation theorems for the contraction functions under consideration.
Finally, Rott [Rot92b] proved that, every contraction function, on a (possibly
infinite) theory, that satisfies both the basic and the supplementary AGM postulates
can be represented as a safe contraction function generated by a regular and virtually
connected hierarchy (cf. [Rot92b, Corollary of Theorem 4]).
All the above exposed facts can be summed up in the following representation
theorem:
Observation 3.2.20 ([AM85, Rot92b]) Let K be a belief set and − be a contrac-
tion function on K. Then − is a safe contraction, based on a regular and virtually
connected hierarchy, if and only if it satisfies both the basic and the supplementary
AGM postulates (i.e. closure, inclusion, vacuity, success, extensionality, recovery,
conjunctive overlap, and conjunctive inclusion).
It follows from Observations 3.1.9, 3.1.10 and 3.2.20 that a contraction function
on a belief set is a safe contraction, based on a regular and virtually connected
hierarchy, if and only if it is a transitively relational partial meet contraction.
3.3 System of Spheres-based Contractions
In this section we expose how AGM contraction functions satisfying the basic and the
supplementary AGM postulates for contraction can be constructed using a proposi-
tional approach. Such strategy was pioneered by Adam Grove [Gro88].
For convenience, due to the central role they play in the present section, we recall
here some concepts already introduced in Section 1.4.
55At this point it is worth noticing that, according to [AM85, Remark 6.1 − (b)], if a hierarchy
is virtually connected, then it satisfies continuing-up if and only if it satisfies continuing-down.
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We must start by reminding that a consistent complete theory or a possible world
(or, simply a world) is a maximal consistent subset of L, and that, in the present
text, we will denote the set of all possible worlds by ML.56
Next we introduce some basic definitions and notations which clarify how propo-
sitions (i.e., sets of possible worlds) can be used to represent sets of sentences.
Definition 3.3.1 ([Gro88]) Let R be a set of sentences of L. The set of possible
worlds that contain R is denoted by ‖R‖, i.e.,
‖R‖ = {M ∈ML : R ⊆M}.
If R is inconsistent this will be the empty set, ∅. The elements of ‖R‖ are the
R-worlds.
For a sentence ϕ ∈ L, ‖ϕ‖ is an abbreviation of ‖{ϕ}‖. The elements of ‖ϕ‖
are the ϕ-worlds.
Throughout the remainder of this work, given a set of sentences R, the set ‖R‖
will be sometimes referred to as the set of possible worlds for R.
In particular, in Grove’s model, a belief set K is identified with the set ‖K‖ of
all consistent complete theories (i.e., maximal consistent subsets) of L that contain
K.
Conversely, any set of possible worlds V ⊆ML has an associated belief set:
Definition 3.3.2 ([Gro88]) Let V ⊆ML. The theory associated to V is Th(V) =⋂V. If V = ∅, then Th(V) will be taken to be the inconsistent theory L(= K⊥).57
The following observation presents some properties relating belief sets and sets
of possible worlds which will be necessary further ahead.
Observation 3.3.3 ([Gro88, pp. 158]) Let H,K be belief sets and U ,V be sets
of possible worlds. Then:
(a) Th(‖K‖) = K (if the underlying logic is compact).
(b) Th(V) is consistent if and only if V is nonempty.
(c) For any sentence ϕ ∈ L, Th(V ∩ ‖ϕ‖) = Cn(Th(V) ∪ {ϕ}).
(d) If U ⊆ V, then Th(V) ⊆ Th(U).
(e) If H ⊆ K, then ‖K‖ ⊆ ‖H‖.
56Notice that, having in mind the concept of remainder set introduced in Definition 3.1.1, it
holds that ML = L⊥{⊥}.
57Notice that this is a natural assumption in the present context. Indeed, for any set of possible
worlds U ⊆ ML it holds that
⋂U = {α : ∀M ∈ U , α ∈ M} = {α ∈ L : ∀M ∈ U , α ∈ M} (where
this last equality holds due to the fact that the possible worlds are, by definition, subsets of L),
therefore, in the particular case of the empty subset of ML we have that
⋂ ∅ = {α ∈ L : ∀M ∈
∅, α ∈M} = L (since for any α ∈ L the condition “∀M ∈ ∅, α ∈M” is vacuously true).
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Remark 3.3.4 It follows immediately from Observation 3.3.3 - (a),(d) and (e) that,
if H,K are belief sets then H ⊆ K if and only if ‖K‖ ⊆ ‖H‖. That is, it holds that
to a greater number of beliefs it corresponds a smaller set of possible worlds and vice
versa.
Now, before proceeding to present the model of belief set contraction proposed
by Grove [Gro88], it is convenient to highlight the intuition behind the construction
of contraction functions using the possible worlds approach: If we wish to contract
a belief set K by a sentence ϕ (such that ϕ ∈ K \ Cn(∅)) the result must be a
new belief set which is a (proper) subset of K that does not contain ϕ. In terms of
possible worlds, having Remark 3.3.4 in mind, this means that the set of possible
worlds for the new belief set must, on the one hand, contain all K-worlds, and on
the other hand contain (in addition) some ¬ϕ-worlds.
The central contribution of Adam Grove’s paper of 1988 consists precisely of
the presentation of a way, which is based on the above described possible worlds-
based view of a contraction function, of obtaining contraction functions that satisfy
the basic and supplementary AGM postulates for contraction. In other words, the
main result of [Gro88] has been the obtention of an alternative way of (explicitly)
constructing transitively relational partial meet contractions, which is based upon
intersections of (adequately chosen) families of possible worlds. In what follows we
present such method.
The alternative modelling proposed in the mentioned paper is in form similar to
the “sphere” semantics for counterfactuals proposed by Lewis [Lew73]. In particu-
lar, Grove’s construction is based on the generalization, presented in the following
definition, of the concept of a system of spheres introduced in [Lew73, pp. 14].
Definition 3.3.5 (System of Spheres [Gro88]) Let X be a subset of ML. A
system of spheres (abrev. S.S.), or spheres’ system, centred on X is a collection S
of subsets of ML, i.e. S ⊆ P(ML), that satisfies the following conditions:
(S1) S is totally ordered with respect to set inclusion; that is, if U ,V ∈ S, then
U ⊆ V or V ⊆ U .
(S2) X ∈ S, and if U ∈ S then X ⊆ U .
(S3) ML ∈ S (and so it is the largest element of S).
(S4) For every ϕ ∈ L, if there is any element in S intersecting ‖ϕ‖ then there is
also a smallest element in S intersecting ‖ϕ‖.
The elements of S are called spheres.
Condition (S4) above is called the limit assumption ([Lew73, pp. 19− 20]).
For any consistent sentence ϕ ∈ L, the smallest sphere in S intersecting ‖ϕ‖ is
denoted by Sϕ and fS(ϕ) denotes the set consisting of the ϕ-worlds closest to X , i.e.,
fS(ϕ) = ‖ϕ‖ ∩ Sϕ.
Remark 3.3.6 Let ϕ ∈ L be a sentence such that ‖ϕ‖ 6= ∅. Then Sϕ =
⋂{G ∈ S :
G ∩ ‖ϕ‖ 6= ∅}.
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A graphical representation of a system of spheres centred on X highlighting the
sets Sϕ, ‖ϕ‖ and fS(ϕ), for a given sentence ϕ, is depicted in Figure 3.1.58
Figure 3.1: Schematic representation of a system of spheres centred on X displaying
the sets Sϕ, ‖ϕ‖ and fS(ϕ), for some ϕ ∈ L \ Cn(∅).
Based on the above presented notion of a system of spheres centred on a set of
possible worlds Grove observed that it is natural to define a contraction function on
a belief set as it is described in the following definition.
Definition 3.3.7 Let K be a belief set and S be a system of spheres centred on
‖K‖. The S-based contraction on K is the contraction operation −S defined, for
any ϕ ∈ L, by:
K−Sϕ =
{
Th(‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬ϕ)) , if 6` ϕ
K , if ` ϕ .
An operation − on K is a system of spheres-based contraction on K if and only
if there is a system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖, such that, for all sentences ϕ ∈ L,
K−ϕ = K−Sϕ.
The following remark presents an alternative equivalent definition of a system of
spheres-based contraction on K.
Remark 3.3.8 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖
and −S be the S-based contraction on K. Then, taking Observation 3.3.3-(a) into
account, since fS(¬ϕ) ⊆ ‖K‖ for every ϕ such that ϕ 6∈ K, it holds that
K−Sϕ =
{
Th(‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬ϕ)) , if 6` ϕ and ϕ ∈ K
K , if ` ϕ or ϕ 6∈ K,
for any ϕ ∈ L.
58Figure 3.1 has been adapted from [Ga¨r88, Figure 4.2].
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Figure 3.2 contains a possible graphical representation of a system of spheres
S centred on ‖K‖, for a belief set K. The shaded region in the mentioned figure
represents the set ‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬ϕ), where ϕ is a sentence such that ϕ ∈ K \ Cn(∅).
Notice that in these conditions, if −S is the S-based contraction on K then K−Sϕ
consists of the intersection of all the worlds included in the shaded region, i.e.,
K−Sϕ = Th(‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬ϕ)).
Figure 3.2: Schematic representation of a system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖ (where
K is a belief set) highlighting the worlds in ‖K‖∪fS(¬ϕ), for a given ϕ ∈ K\Cn(∅).
The intersection of all the worlds in the shaded region originates the set K−Sϕ, where
−S is the S-based contraction on K.
Intuitively, given a belief set K, a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ can be
regarded as an ordering on the set of possible worlds, which can be interpreted as
a measure of plausibility of alternative worlds given the current belief state (repre-
sented by K). The closer a possible world is to ‖K‖, the more plausible it is. From
this point of view, the contraction of K by ϕ, as defined above, consists of the theory
determined by the set of possible worlds which is the union of the most plausible
¬ϕ-worlds with the set of possible worlds for K (i.e. ‖K‖).
Next we present an axiomatic characterization for the system of spheres-based
contractions. In that regard we start by remarking that, according to [Gro88, The-
orems 1 and 2], given a belief set K, a revision function on K is a system of spheres-
based revision59 if and only if it satisfies the basic and the supplementary AGM
postulates for revision (i.e. closure, success, inclusion, vacuity, consistency, exten-
sionality, superexpansion and subexpansion).60
Now, since the system of spheres-based contractions are precisely the contrac-
tion functions which can be obtained from a system of spheres-based revision by
59 Here by system of spheres-based revision we mean a revision function that is obtained from a
system of spheres–based contraction (see Def. 3.3.7) by means of the Levi identity (eq. (2.1)).
60It must be noted here that, in [PST96, PT97], Priest, Surendonk and Tanaka have pointed out
an error in [Gro88, Proof of Theorem 1] (more precisely, in the demonstration presented by Grove
that a system of spheres-based revision59 satisfies the supplementary AGM postulates for revision,
i.e. superexpansion and subexpansion). However, in the mentioned papers, two possible ways to
correct that proof have been presented, assuring that the statement of Grove’s theorem is valid.
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means of the Harper identity (equation (2.2)) (cf. Footnote 59 and Observation
2.4.8), combining the above mentioned axiomatic characterization for the system of
spheres-based revisions59 with Observations 2.4.6 and 2.4.7, the following axiomatic
characterization for the S-based contraction on K is immediately obtained:
Observation 3.3.9 ([Gro88]) Let K be a belief set and − be a contraction func-
tion on K. Then − is a system of spheres-based contraction if and only if it satisfies
the basic and the supplementary AGM postulates (i.e. closure, inclusion, vacuity,
success, extensionality, recovery, conjunctive overlap, and conjunctive inclusion).
Before closing the present section it is worth to remark that combining the above
observation with Observations 3.1.9 and 3.1.10 we can immediately conclude that the
class of system of spheres-based contractions coincides with the class of transitively
relational partial meet contractions. Nevertheless, in Section 4.1 we shall show in
a direct way that a contraction function is a transitively relational partial meet
contraction if and only if it is a system of spheres-based contraction.
3.4 Epistemic Entrenchment-based Contractions
This section is devoted to the presentation of the class of epistemic entrenchment-
based contractions originally introduced in [Ga¨r88, GM88]. The main virtue of such
class is the fact that it coincides with the class of contraction functions which satisfy
the basic and supplementary AGM postulates for contraction.
We start by introducing in the following definition the concept of epistemic en-
trenchment relation61 which is the fundamental concept underlying the definition of
the above mentioned class of contraction functions.
Definition 3.4.1 (Epistemic Entrenchment relation [Ga¨r88, GM88]) An
ordering of epistemic entrenchment (abrev. E.E.) with respect to a belief set K
is a binary relation ≤ on L which satisfies the following postulates:
(EE1) For all α, β, δ ∈ L, if α ≤ β and β ≤ δ then α ≤ δ. (Transitivity)
(EE2) For all α, β ∈ L, if α ` β then α ≤ β. (Dominance)
(EE3) For all α, β ∈ L, α ≤ α ∧ β or β ≤ α ∧ β. (Conjunctiveness)
(EE4) When K 6= K⊥, α 6∈ K iff α ≤ β for all β ∈ L. (Minimality)
(EE5) If β ≤ α for all β ∈ L, then ` α. (Maximality)
As explained in [Ga¨r88, Sec. 4.6] and [GM88], given an epistemic entrenchment
relation ≤, the notation α ≤ β (where α and β are two sentences) is seen as meaning
that “β is at least as epistemically entrenched as α”. A detailed discussion of ratio-
nale behind each of the postulates (EE1)−(EE5), chosen as characteristic properties
61The epistemic entrenchment relations can be seen as dual to the binary relations on L proposed
by Grove [Gro88, Sec. 3], which we present in Section A.2 (of the Appendix) under the designation
of Grovean relations. In that same section this remark is explained in further detail.
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of an epistemic entrenchment relation, can be found in, e.g., [Ga¨r88, Sec. 4.6] and
[Han99b, Sec. 2.10].
In [Ga¨r88, Sec. 4.6] and [GM88] it is also clarified that the main motivation
underlying the introduction of concept of epistemic entrenchment is that it is used
to determine priorities among sentences in processes of contractions and revisions.
More precisely, the guiding idea regarding the use of an epistemic entrenchment
relation in order to explicitly define revision or contraction functions is simply that,
when a belief set K is revised or contracted, the sentences in K that are given up
are the ones which have the lowest degrees of epistemic entrenchment.
By convenience we now introduce some notation:
Notation 3.4.2 In what follows, given an E.E. relation ≤ as defined above, for any
α, β ∈ L we will denote the negation of α ≤ β by α 6≤ β.
The strict part of the binary relation ≤ is denoted by <, i.e.
∀α, β ∈ L, α < β if and only if α ≤ β and β 6≤ α,
and α 6< β shall denote the negation of α < β. It follows from the connectivity of ≤
(Observation 3.4.3-(i)) that
∀α, β ∈ L, α < β if and only if β 6≤ α. (3.1)
The notation α =E.E. β (for any two sentences α and β) will be used with the
following meaning:
∀α, β ∈ L, α =E.E. β if and only if α ≤ β and β ≤ α.
The negation of α =E.E. β will be denoted by α 6=E.E. β.
The following observation presents some further properties that are satisfied by
any E.E. relation:
Observation 3.4.3 ([GM88, Lemma 3]) If a binary relation ≤ satisfies (EE1),
(EE2) and (EE3) then the following properties also hold:
(i) For all α, β ∈ L, α ≤ β or β ≤ α (Connectivity).
(ii) For all α, β, δ ∈ L, if β ∧ δ ≤ α, then β ≤ α or δ ≤ α.
(iii) For all α, β ∈ L, α < β iff α ∧ β < β.
(iv) For all α, β, δ ∈ L,if δ ≤ α and δ ≤ β, then δ ≤ α ∧ β.
(v) For all α, β ∈ L, if α ≤ β, then α ≤ α ∧ β.
Now we proceed to what is the main goal of the present section, i.e. the presenta-
tion of the definition and axiomatic characterization of the epistemic entrenchment-
based contractions which have been introduced in [Ga¨r88, GM88].
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Definition 3.4.4 Let K be a belief set and ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation
with respect to K.
The ≤-based contraction on K is the contraction operation −≤ defined, for any
α ∈ L, by:62
K−≤α =
{ {β ∈ K : α < α ∨ β} , if 6` α
K , if ` α. (C−≤)
An operation − on K is an epistemic entrenchment-based contraction on K if
and only if there is an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K such that,
for all sentences α ∈ L, K−α = K−≤α.
Apart from presenting a way of defining a contraction operation based on an
epistemic entrenchment relation (by means of condition (C−≤)), Ga¨rdenfors and
Makinsson [Ga¨r88, GM88] have also exposed a way of proceeding to the converse
construction. More precisely, they have suggested the following condition to define
and epistemic entrenchment relation (≤) with respect to a belief set K by means of
a (given) contraction function (−) on K:
∀α, β ∈ L, α ≤ β iff α 6∈ K−α ∧ β or ` α ∧ β, (C≤)
The following two observations, obtained in [GM88],63 present more formally the
interrelation between conditions (C−≤) and (C≤).
Observation 3.4.5 ([GM88, Theorem 4]) Let K be a belief set and ≤ be an
epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K. Then the ≤-based contraction
function, which is uniquely determined by (C−≤), satisfies the basic and the supple-
mentary AGM postulates for belief set contraction (i.e. closure, inclusion, vacuity,
success, extensionality, recovery, conjunctive overlap, and conjunctive inclusion).
Furthermore, if − is the ≤-based contraction then condition (C≤) is satisfied.
Observation 3.4.6 ([GM88, Theorem 5]) Let K be a belief set. If − is a con-
traction function on K that satisfies the basic and the supplementary AGM postulates
for belief set contraction (i.e. closure, inclusion, vacuity, success, extensionality, re-
covery, conjunctive overlap, and conjunctive inclusion), then the ordering ≤ that is
uniquely determined by (C≤) satisfies (EE1)-(EE5). Furthermore, K−α = K−≤α
for any sentence α, where −≤ is the ≤-based contraction defined by condition (C−≤).
62In [GM88], condition (C−≤) is formulated in the following alternative (equivalent) way:
β ∈ K−≤α if and only if β ∈ K and either α < α ∨ β or ` α.
63To be more accurate we must note that Observations 3.4.5 and 3.4.6 are indeed, partially, a
consequence of [Gro88, Theorems 3 and 4] (see Observation A.2.3 (of the present thesis)). More
precisely, the axiomatic characterization of the E.E.-based contractions can be derived from the
combination of [Gro88, Theorems 3 and 4] and [Ga¨r88, Theorems 3.2 − 3.5] (see Observations
2.4.4 − 2.4.7 (of the present thesis)). Ga¨rdenfors [Ga¨r88] proved, in this way, a weaker version of
these two results which is stated in [Ga¨r88, Theorem 4.30]. A more detailed explanation of this
remark is presented in Section A.2 (of the Appendix).
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It follows immediately from the two observations above that the class of epistemic
entrenchment-based contractions coincides with the class of AGM contractions which
satisfy (also) the supplementary AGM postulates for contraction. Furthermore,
from those two results we can yet conclude that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the class of epistemic entrenchment relations and the class of the contraction
functions which satisfy the basic and the supplementary postulates for contraction.
This fact is more formally stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4.7 ([GM88, Corollary 6]) Let K be a belief set, ≤ be an epistemic
entrenchment relation with respect to K and − be a contraction function on K that
satisfies all the basic and supplementary AGM postulates for belief set contraction.
Then:
(i) If ≤ is the ordering determined from − by (C≤) then the ≤-based contraction
function −≤, determined by (C−≤), is identical to −.
(ii) If − coincides with the ≤-based contraction function −≤, determined by (C−≤),
then the epistemic entrenchment relation that is obtained from − by means of
(C≤) is identical to ≤.
We close this section with the following list of results concerning some properties
that are satisfied by any epistemic entrenchment relation and which will be useful
further ahead.
Observation 3.4.8 (see e.g. [Han99b, Observation 2.75]) Let ≤ be a relation
that satisfies transitivity (i.e., if α ≤ β and β ≤ δ, then α ≤ δ) and let < be defined
by α < β if and only if α ≤ β and not β ≤ α. Then ≤ also satisfies:
1. If α ≤ β and β < δ, then α < δ
2. If α < β and β ≤ δ, then α < δ
3. If α < β and β < δ, then α < δ (quasi-transitivity)
Observation 3.4.9 ([GR95, Lemma 4.2.1-(i)]) Let ≤ be a relation that satisfies
(EE1) and (EE2). Then it also satisfies:
If ` α ↔ α′ and ` β ↔ β′, then α ≤ β if and only if α′ ≤ β′. (Intersubstitutiv-
ity)64
Observation 3.4.10 ([Foo90]) 65
Let ≤ be a relation that satisfies (EE1), (EE2) and (EE3). Then it also satisfies:
If δ < α and δ < β, then δ < α ∧ β. (Conjunction up)66
64The denomination intersubstitutivity has been introduced in [Han99b, Observation 2.92]. In
[GR95, Lemma 4.2.1-(i)] this property has been presented with a slightly different formulation and
has been there called extensionality.
65This result is an immediate consequence of [GM88, Lemma 3− (i) and (ii)] (which appear in
the present thesis as Observation 3.4.3− (i) and (ii)).
66The designation conjunction up has been introduced in [Rot92c], where this property is also
thoroughly motivated and explained.
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Observation 3.4.11 ([Foo90]) Let ≤ be a relation that satisfies (EE1), (EE2) and
(EE5). If α ∈ Cn(∅) then for all δ ∈ L \ Cn(∅), δ < α, where < denotes the strict
part of ≤.
Proof. A proof for this observation, which differs from the one presented in [Foo90],
can be found in page 165.
Observation 3.4.12 67 Let K be a belief set and ≤ be a relation that satisfies (EE1)
and (EE4). Then α 6∈ K if and only if for all β ∈ K, α < β, where < denotes the
strict part of ≤.
Proof. A proof for this observation can be found in page 165.
Lemma 3.4.13 Let ≤ be a relation that satisfies (EE1), (EE2) and (EE3) and let
< denote the strict part of ≤. Then the following statements hold:
(i) If α < β ∨ δ and α < ε ∨ ¬β, then α < ε ∨ δ.
(ii) If α < α ∨ ¬β then β ≤ α.
(iii) If δ ≤ α, α < α ∨ β and δ < δ ∨ ¬α, then δ < δ ∨ β.
Proof. A proof for this lemma can be found in page 166.
67We notice that the left-to-right part of this statement is a slightly stronger version of [Han99b,
Observation 2.49− 1.].
Chapter 4
Interrelations Among Different
Models of AGM Contractions
In the previous chapter we have presented several constructive models for AGM
contractions as well as for AGM contractions satisfying the basic and the supple-
mentary AGM postulates for contraction (of belief sets). The present chapter is
dedicated to the exposition of some of the results so far presented in the literature
concerning the obtention of direct proofs of the equivalence between some of such
explicit definitions of contraction functions. In that respect we present more thor-
oughly (namely in Sections 4.1 and 4.2) the interrelations (between constructions)
which involve those classes of contraction functions that we will generalize in the
latter chapters of this thesis.
We start by clarifying, by means of the following two observations, that the differ-
ent ways of explicitly obtaining AGM contraction functions and AGM contractions
which satisfy the supplementary AGM postulates for contraction, presented in the
previous chapter, can essentially be divided in two classes, each of them containing
a set of equivalent definitions.
Observation 4.0.1 Let K be a belief set and − be a contraction function on K.
Then the following statements are equivalent:
1. − satisfies the basic AGM postulates for contraction, i.e closure, inclusion,
vacuity, success, extensionality and recovery.
2. − is a partial meet contraction.
3. − is a smooth (or saturated) kernel contraction.
Observation 4.0.2 Let K be a belief set and − be a contraction function on K.
Then the following statements are equivalent:
1. − satisfies the basic and the supplementary AGM postulates for contraction,
i.e closure, inclusion, vacuity, success, extensionality, recovery, conjunctive
overlap and conjunctive inclusion.
2. − is a transitively relational partial meet contraction.
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3. − is a safe contraction based on a regular and virtually connected hierarchy.
4. − is a system of spheres-based contraction.
5. − is an epistemic entrenchment-based contraction.
Notice that the above observations are immediate consequences of the results
presented in the previous chapter. More precisely, on the one hand Observation
4.0.1 follows from Observations 3.1.9, 3.2.7 and 3.2.8 while, on the other hand,
Observation 4.0.2 is a consequence of Observations 3.1.9, 3.1.10, 3.2.20, 3.3.9, 3.4.5
and 3.4.6.
As remarked above, all the equivalences stated in Observations 4.0.1 and 4.0.2
follow trivially from the axiomatic characterizations that we have introduced in the
previous chapter, for each of the contraction functions under consideration. However
in the literature, some equivalences between some of those different definitions of
contraction functions have been proven to hold in a direct way. In what follows we
indicate the references where some of those proofs have been originally presented.
In [AM86] Alchourro´n and Makinson have presented an explicit one-to-one cor-
respondence between the class of transitively relational partial meet contractions
and the class of safe contractions based on a regular and virtually connected hierar-
chy, when considering only contraction functions on theories that are finite modulo
logical equivalence.
The relationship between the transitively relational partial meet contractions
and the system of spheres-based contractions has been thoroughly investigated in
[Gro88]. In Section 4.1 we present the main tools and arguments used by Grove, in
that paper, to show in a direct way (rather than only by means of axiomatic char-
acterizations of such functions) that the transitively relational partial meet contrac-
tions and the system of spheres-based contractions define precisely the same class
of contraction functions.
A direct proof of the fact that any transitively relational partial meet contractions
is an epistemic entrenchment-based contraction and vice versa has been presented
by Rott in [Rot91].
Latter, in [Rot92b], Rott has also shown in a direct way that the class of safe
contractions coincides with the class of epistemic entrenchment-based contractions.
Finally, by combining some results of [Gro88], [Ga¨r88] and [PW95] it is possible
to establish a direct way of showing that the class of epistemic entrenchment-based
contractions coincides with the class of system of spheres-based contractions. In
Section 4.2 we present such a direct proof for that fact.
All the above mentioned interconnections relate two different kinds of contrac-
tion functions that satisfy the basic and the supplementary AGM postulates for
contraction. Now we make some brief remarks concerning some analogous results
concerning some different definitions of AGM contraction functions which do not
necessarily satisfy the supplementary AGM postulates for contraction. In this re-
spect firstly we recall that, as mentioned in Remark 3.2.14, it follows immediately
from the definitions of saturated kernel contraction and of safe contraction presented
in [Han94, Han99b] (see Definitions 3.2.6 and 3.2.13) that every safe contraction
function is a smooth (or saturated) kernel contraction. Secondly we remind that,
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according to Observation 3.2.8, a contraction function on a belief set is a smooth
(or saturated) kernel contraction on K if and only if it is a partial meet contrac-
tion. Furthermore, we note that in [Han94] the proof of the left-to-right part of
the latter mentioned equivalence is made in a direct way, however, the right-to-left
part is there proven by means of some known axiomatic characterizations for those
functions.
In Figures 4.1 and 4.2 we illustrate, by means of a diagram, those of the, above
mentioned, equivalences between different models for belief set contraction which
have so far been proven to hold, in a direct way. Furthermore, in such diagrams we
also indicate the references where each of those equivalences have been (directly)
shown to hold. Figure 4.1 presents the mentioned interconnections between different
constructions/definitions for AGM contractions and Figure 4.2 plays the same role
but concerning contraction functions which satisfy the basic and the supplementary
AGM postulates for contraction.
Figure 4.1: Diagram of some of the (so far) explicitly proven equivalences between
different modellings of AGM contraction functions.
Having in mind what are the goals of this work, we devote the following two
sections to the exposition of direct ways of showing that the class of transitively
relational partial meet contractions coincides with the class of system of spheres-
based contractions and that the classes of epistemic entrenchment-based contractions
and of system of spheres-based contractions are identical. Hence, in Section 4.1 we
shall show in a direct way that every transitively relational partial meet contraction
is a system of spheres-based contraction and vice versa, and in Section 4.2 we will
prove explicitly that every epistemic entrenchment-based contraction is a system of
spheres-based contraction and vice versa.
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Figure 4.2: Diagram of some of the (so far) explicitly proven equivalences between
different modellings of AGM contraction functions which satisfy (additionally) the
supplementary AGM postulates for contractions.
4.1 Possible Worlds Semantics for Partial Meet
Contraction and Interrelation Between Par-
tial Meet Contractions and System of Spheres-
based Contractions
As we have mentioned in Section 3.3, Grove [Gro88] has introduced the system of
spheres-based contractions (cf. Definition 3.3.7) with the intention of providing an
(alternative) explicit way of obtaining contraction functions that satisfy the basic
and supplementary AGM postulates for contraction.
Observation 3.3.9 assures that Grove’s goal has been achieved. Furthermore, as
we have stated in the end of the above mentioned section, an immediate consequence
of that observation is the fact that the class of system of spheres-based contractions
coincides with the class of transitively relational partial meet contractions.
In the present section, which is essentially based in [Gro88, Sec. 4] and [Han99b,
Sec. 3.23], we will start by presenting a noteworthy result consisting of a character-
ization of the partial meet contractions in general (rather than only the ones that
are transitively relational) in terms of possible worlds. Such result is often regarded
as providing a (possible worlds) semantics for partial meet contraction. Afterwards,
based on such possible worlds-based view of a partial meet contraction function, we
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shall expose in a direct way that a contraction function is a transitively relational
partial meet contraction if and only if it is a system of spheres-based contraction.
That is, we will expose, without making use of any axiomatic characterizations for
those contraction functions, that those two constructions are simply two alternative
methods for constructing the same (class of) contraction functions.
First of all we recall the main ideas underlying the concept of partial meet
contraction and the intuition behind the construction of contraction functions using
the possible worlds approach. On the one hand, the partial meet contraction of a
belief set K by a non-tautological sentence α is the result of the intersection of a
family of remainders chosen, by means of a selection function (see Definition 3.1.5),
from among all the elements of the remainder set K⊥α (see Definition 3.1.1). On
the other hand, in a possible worlds-based approach for belief set contraction, the
contraction of K by α, consists of the intersection of a family of possible worlds
which is the union of ‖K‖ with a subset of ‖¬α‖ (i.e. with a set composed of some
selected ¬α-worlds).
Having the above paragraph in mind, in order to show how a partial meet con-
traction can be obtained by means of a possible worlds-based method for construct-
ing contractions, we start by exposing, in the following observation, the very tight
interconnection between the sets K⊥α and ‖¬α‖.
Observation 4.1.1 (Grove’s bijection ([Gro88, Sec. 4])) Let K be a belief set
and α be a sentence such that α ∈ K. Then:
1. If X ∈ K⊥α, then there is some W ∈ ‖¬α‖ such that ‖X‖ = ‖K‖ ∪ {W}
(and, therefore, it follows from Observations 3.1.4 and 3.3.3-(a) that X =
Th(‖K‖ ∪ {W})).
2. If W ∈ ‖¬α‖, then X = Th(‖K‖ ∪ {W}) ∈ K⊥α and ‖X‖ = ‖K‖ ∪ {W}.
3. The function
g : ‖¬α‖ → K⊥α
W 7→ Th(‖K‖ ∪ {W})
is a bijection.
Throughout this text we will refer to the bijection introduced in the above ob-
servation (the function g) as Grove’s bijection. Such one-to-one correspondence
between the elements of K⊥α and the possible worlds in ‖¬α‖ leads to a possible
alternative definition for the remainder set K⊥α (see Definition 3.1.1) which we
present in the following remark.
Remark 4.1.2 Let K be a belief set, α be a sentence such that α ∈ K and X be set
of sentences. Then, it follows from the Observation 4.1.1 that X ∈ K⊥α if and only
if there is some W ∈ ‖¬α‖ such that X = Th(‖K‖∪{W}) (and ‖X‖ = ‖K‖∪{W}).
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Having this in mind we observe that the remainder set K⊥α (see Definition
3.1.1), can be defined in the following alternative way:68
K⊥α =
{ {Th(‖K‖ ∪ {W}) : W ∈ ‖¬α‖} , if α ∈ K
{K} , if α 6∈ K.
From another perspective we can say that, given a subset of ML of the form
‖K‖ ∪W ,
where W is a singleton set such that W ∩ ‖K‖ = ∅, there is some α ∈ K such that
X = Th(‖K‖ ∪W) ∈ K⊥α and ‖X‖ = ‖K‖ ∪W (in fact this holds for any α ∈ K
such that W ⊆ ‖¬α‖).
Given a belief set K and a sentence ϕ ∈ K \ Cn(∅), in Figure 4.3 we present a
possible graphical representation of the set of possible worlds for a remainder H ∈
K⊥ϕ. Moreover, we notice that, according to Grove’s bijection, in Figure 4.3, each
point (i.e. world) of the region ‖¬ϕ‖ corresponds to one and only one set (i.e.
remainder) in K⊥ϕ.
Figure 4.3: Possible graphical representation of the set ‖K‖ ∪ {W}, where K is a
belief set, ϕ ∈ K \ Cn(∅) and W ∈ ‖¬ϕ‖. The set of sentences H consisting of
the intersection of all the worlds in the shaded region belongs to K⊥ϕ and ‖H‖ =
‖K‖ ∪ {W}.
The above remark evidences that, given a sentence α ∈ K, a selection of some
of the remainders in K⊥α corresponds to a selection of some of the worlds in ‖¬α‖
and vice versa. Having this in mind and recalling that our first goal in this section
is to show how the partial meet contractions can be constructed by means of a pos-
sible worlds-based approach, we introduce in the following definition the concept of
propositional selection function. Further below such functions shall play in the con-
struction of partial meet contractions as intersections of families of possible worlds
the same role that is played by the selection functions in the definition of partial
meet contractions (Definition 3.1.6).
68Notice that if α ∈ Cn(∅) then {Th(‖K‖ ∪ {W}) : W ∈ ‖¬α‖} = ∅.
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Definition 4.1.3 ([Han99b, Definition 3.65]) LetM be a proposition. A propo-
sitional selection function for M is a function f such that for any sentence α:
(i) f(‖α‖) ⊆ ‖α‖.
(ii) If ‖α‖ 6= ∅ then f(‖α‖) 6= ∅.
(iii) If M∩ ‖α‖ 6= ∅, then f(‖α‖) =M∩ ‖α‖.
Finally we are in a position to present the following observation, which illustrates
how the partial meet contractions can be constructed following a possible worlds-
based approach.
Observation 4.1.4 ([Gro88]) Let K be a belief set. An operation − on K is a
partial meet contraction if and only if there is a propositional selection function f
for ‖K‖ such that for any sentence α:
K− α = Th(‖K‖ ∪ f(‖¬α‖)).
It is worth noticing that, from a different perspective we can say that the above
observation provides a possible worlds semantics to the partial meet contraction
operations, in the sense that it illustrates how the partial meet contractions can be
described in terms of possible worlds.
A straightforward corollary of Observation 4.1.4 is the following characterization
of maxichoice contractions and of the full meet contraction (Definition 3.1.7) in
terms of possible worlds:
Corollary 4.1.5 ([Gro88]) Let K be a belief set and f be a propositional selection
function for ‖K‖. If − is the contraction function on K such that for any sentence
α:
K− α = Th(‖K‖ ∪ f(‖¬α‖))
then the following statements hold:
1. the function − is a maxichioce contraction if and only if f is such that f(‖α‖)
contains at most one element, i.e., f(‖α‖) ⊆ ‖α‖ is either the empty set
(whenever ‖α‖ = ∅) or a singleton set (whenever ‖α‖ 6= ∅), for all sentences
α such that ‖K‖ ∩ ‖α‖ = ∅.
2. If f is the propositional selection function such that f(‖α‖) = ‖α‖, for all
sentences α such that ‖K‖ ∩ ‖α‖ = ∅, then − is the full meet contraction.
Next we make some remarks, which complement the above result, concerning the
possible worlds semantics for maxichoice contraction and for the full meet contrac-
tion, more precisely, in what follows we shall describe the composition of the sets
‖K−ϕ‖, when − is either a maxichoice contraction or the full meet contraction on
the belief set K and ϕ is an arbitrary sentence.
Regarding maxichoice contractions we notice that, given a belief set K and a
contraction function − on K, combining the above corollary with Observations
3.3.3− (a) and 4.1.1− 2., we can conclude that − is a maxichoice contraction if and
only if the following conditions are satisfied:
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(a) K − ϕ = Th(‖K‖) = K and, therefore, ‖K − ϕ‖ = ‖K‖, for all sentences ϕ
such that ` ϕ or ϕ 6∈ K.
(b) K−ϕ = Th(‖K‖∪f(‖¬ϕ‖)) and ‖K−ϕ‖ = ‖K‖∪f(‖¬ϕ‖), for all sentences
ϕ such that 6` ϕ and ϕ ∈ K, where f is a propositional selection function for
‖K‖ such that f(‖¬ϕ‖) = {W}, with W ∈ ‖¬ϕ‖.
Figure 4.3 can be seen as a possible graphical representation of the set ‖K−ϕ‖ =
‖K‖ ∪ f(‖¬ϕ‖) (which corresponds to the shaded region in the mentioned figure),
where K is a belief set, − is a maxichoice contraction function on K, ϕ ∈ K\Cn(∅),
W ∈ ‖¬ϕ‖ and f is a propositional selection function for ‖K‖ such that f(‖¬ϕ‖) =
{W}.
In what concerns the full meet contraction, we present in the following remark
the composition of the set ‖K ∼ ϕ‖, where K is a belief set, ∼ is the full meet
contraction on K and ϕ is an arbitrary sentence.
Remark 4.1.6 A contraction function ∼ is the full meet contraction on a belief set
K if and only if, for any ϕ ∈ L, K ∼ ϕ = Cn(K ∼ ϕ) and:
‖K ∼ ϕ‖ =
{ ‖K‖ ∪ ‖¬ϕ‖ , if ϕ ∈ K \ Cn(∅)
‖K‖ , otherwise .
Proof. A proof for this remark can be found in page 171.
Figure 4.4 contains a graphical representation of the set ‖K ∼ ϕ‖ = ‖K‖∪‖¬ϕ‖,
where K is a belief set, ∼ is the full meet contraction function on K and ϕ ∈
K \ Cn(∅). We also notice that, in these conditions, since K ∼ ϕ is a belief set, it
follows from Observation 3.3.3-(a) that, K ∼ ϕ consists of the intersection of all the
worlds included in the shaded region, i.e., K ∼ ϕ = Th(‖K‖ ∪ ‖¬ϕ‖).
Figure 4.4: Graphical representation of the set ‖K ∼ ϕ‖ = ‖K‖ ∪ ‖¬ϕ‖, where K
is a belief set, ∼ is the full meet contraction function on K and ϕ ∈ K \ Cn(∅).
The set K ∼ ϕ consists of the intersection of all the worlds included in the shaded
region.
4.1. POSSIBLE WORLDS SEMANTICS FOR PARTIAL MEET C. AND ... 65
At this point it is interesting to notice that the following observation, originally
presented in [AM82], emerges as an immediate consequence of the above remark.
Observation 4.1.7 ([AM82, Observation 2.1]) Let K be a belief set and ∼ be
the operator of full meet contraction on K. Then for all sentences ϕ ∈ L:
K ∼ ϕ =
{
K ∩ Cn(¬ϕ) , if ϕ ∈ K
K , if ϕ 6∈ K .
Proof. A proof for this observation, which differs from the one presented in [AM82],
can be found in page 172.
Above we have presented explicitly the composition of the set of possible worlds
for K−ϕ when − is either a maxichoice contraction or the full meet contraction on
the belief set K and ϕ is an arbitrary sentence. Next we consider the general case
of (any) partial meet contractions. That is, in what follows we clarify how the set
‖K− ϕ‖ is formed when − is an arbitrary partial meet contraction function on K.
Observation 4.1.8 (Based on [Gro88]) Let K be a belief set and − be a partial
meet contraction on K. Then, for any ϕ ∈ L:
1. If ` ϕ or ϕ 6∈ K, then ‖K−ϕ‖ = ‖K‖
2. If ϕ ∈ K \Cn(∅), then ‖K−ϕ‖ = ‖K‖ ∪M, where M is a non-empty subset
of ‖¬ϕ‖.
Proof. A proof for this observation can be found in page 173.
Figure 4.5 contains a possible graphical representation of the set ‖K−ϕ‖ =
‖K‖∪M, where − is a partial meet contraction on the belief set K, ϕ ∈ K \Cn(∅)
and M is a non-empty subset of ‖¬ϕ‖.
We have, thus, detailedly described partial meet contractions in terms of possible
worlds. Now we move to our second and last goal of the present section, namely the
clarification of the interrelation between partial meet contractions and the system
of spheres-based contractions.
In fact, in the end of Section 3.3 we have already anticipated that it follows
immediately from Observations 3.3.9, 3.1.9 and 3.1.10 that the class of system of
spheres-based contractions coincides with the class of transitively relational partial
meet contractions. However, we wish to show here how it is possible to conclude in
a direct way (rather than by means of representation theorems for each of those two
kinds of contractions) that a contraction function is a transitively relational partial
meet contraction if and only if it is a system of spheres-based contraction.
In this regard we start by noticing that, given a belief set K and a system of
spheres S centred on ‖K‖ it can be easily shown that the function f from {‖α‖ :
α ∈ L} to P(ML) defined by:69
f(‖α‖) =
{
fS(α) , if ‖α‖ 6= ∅
∅ , if ‖α‖ = ∅ ,
69Such a function f is called a sphere-based propositional selection function in [Han99b, Definition
3.73].
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Figure 4.5: Possible graphical representation of the set ‖K−ϕ‖ = ‖K‖ ∪M, where
− is a partial meet contraction on the belief set K, ϕ ∈ K \ Cn(∅) and M is a
non-empty subset of ‖¬ϕ‖.
for any sentence α, is a propositional selection function (cf. Definition 4.1.3) such
that for any sentence ϕ:
K−Sϕ = Th(‖K‖ ∪ f(‖¬ϕ‖)).
Therefore we can conclude immediately from Observation 4.1.4 that the S-based
contraction −S is a partial meet contraction.
The above reasoning proves, in a direct way, that every system of spheres-based
contraction is a partial meet contraction. However, the converse implication does not
hold, i.e., not every partial meet contraction is a system of spheres-based contraction.
Nevertheless, it is in that fact that rests one of the main virtues of Grove’s system of
spheres-based contractions. Indeed, the major achievement of Grove’s construction
rests in the fact that a contraction function on a belief set K is a system of spheres-
based contraction if and only if it is a transitively relational partial meet contraction
([Gro88, Sec. 4]).
In what remains of the present section, based in [Gro88, Sec. 4], we will show that
this indeed holds. More precisely, in what follows, making use of Grove’s bijection
(Observation 4.1.1-3), we will explicitly show how the systems of spheres can be
used to construct transitively relational partial meet contractions and vice versa.
Let K be a belief set and S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖. We start
by defining a relation v on K∆L = ⋃ε∈LK⊥ε50. Notice that if K = L is the
inconsistent belief set then K 6∈ K∆L = K∆K = ⋃ϕ∈KK⊥ϕ. On the other hand,
if K is a consistent belief set then K⊥ψ = {K} for any ψ ∈ L \K and it follows
that K∆L = (K∆K)∪{K}. Having the above in mind we first define v on the set
K∆K =
⋃
ϕ∈KK⊥ϕ. It follows from Grove’s bijection (Observation 4.1.1-3) that
K∆K =
⋃{Th(‖K‖∪{W}) : W ∈ML \ ‖K‖}. Now let G and H be two arbitrary
elements of K∆K, then G = Th(‖K‖ ∪ {W1}) and H = Th(‖K‖ ∪ {W2}) for some
W1,W2 ∈ ML \ ‖K‖. In these conditions, the relation v is, roughly speaking,
defined by stating that G v H if and only if W2 is at least as close to ‖K‖ as W1.
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Formally this can be written in the following way:
G v H iff
⋂
{M ∈ S : W2 ∈M} ⊆
⋂
{W ∈ S : W1 ∈ W}70.
As we have seen above, if K is the inconsistent belief set then K∆L = K∆K
and therefore the relation v is already defined on the whole set K∆L. On the other
hand, if K is a consistent belief set then K∆L = (K∆K) ∪ {K} and, in that case,
(so that it is defined on all of K∆L) we add the following condition to the definition
of the relation v:
J v K, for all J ∈ K∆L
Note that it follows from the conditions satisfied by S (see Definition 3.3.5) and
the transitivity of the set inclusion relation (⊆) that the above defined relation v
is a transitive (and connected) relation on K∆L. Hence, the selection function γ
for K defined by γ(K⊥α) = {B ∈ K⊥α : B′ v B for all B′ ∈ K⊥α} if α ∈
L \ Cn(∅), and γ(K⊥α) = K, if α ∈ Cn(∅), is transitively relational over K and
consequently the partial meet contraction generated by γ is a transitively relational
partial meet contraction (see Definition 3.1.8). Moreover, it is easily verified that
the transitively relational partial meet contraction thus obtained coincides with the
S-based contraction.
It is obvious that this process can be reversed, i.e., that starting with a transitive
relation associated to a given transitively relational partial meet contraction we can
obtain a system of spheres which determines the same contraction function as the
original one. For a given belief set K, such construction of a system of spheres
S centred on ‖K‖ from a marking-off relation v on K∆L, such that the S-based
contraction coincides with the transitively relational partial meet contraction based
on the relation v (according to Definition 3.1.8), is described in more detail in
[Gro88, Sec. 4]71.
From all the above we can conclude that the following observation holds:
Observation 4.1.9 ([Gro88, Sec. 4]) Let K be a belief set and − be a contraction
function on K. Then − is a transitively relational partial meet contraction if and
only if it is a system of spheres-based contraction.
Therefore, as remarked by Grove [Gro88, Sec. 4], the spheres’ based model
and the representations in terms of (transitively relational partial) meet contraction
functions are dual to each other, in the sense that their quite distinct forms are
essentially due to the fact that they use different ways of representing possible new
theories. In the spheres modelling such representation is based on subsets of ML
rather than actual theories as it is the case in [AGM85].
70Note that, for i ∈ {1, 2}, ⋂{M ∈ S : Wi ∈ M} ∈ S. Moreover, ⋂{M ∈ S : Wi ∈ M} is,
indeed, the smallest sphere in S containing the world Wi.
71In fact Grove’s [Gro88] construction of a system of spheres from a marking-off relation consists
of two steps: first ([Gro88, p. 160]) it is highlighted “that a system of spheres is really an ordering
on the set of worlds” that satisfies certain properties or, more precisely, that a system of spheres
induces an ordering (satisfying certain properties) on the set of worlds, and conversely. And
afterwards ([Gro88, Sec. 4]) Grove’s bijection is used to translate the marking-off relation v into
an ordering on the set of worlds which satisfies the required conditions for it to correspond to a
system of spheres.
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Having all the above in mind we notice that Figure 3.2 can be seen as a represen-
tation of a transitively relational partial meet contraction. Indeed, given a belief set
K, a system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖ and a sentence ϕ ∈ K\Cn(∅), according to
Observation 4.1.9, there is a transitively relational partial meet contraction − on K
such that K−ϕ = K−Sϕ = Th(‖K‖∪ fS(¬ϕ)), where −S is the S-based contraction
on K, and the indicated figure contains precisely a graphical representation of the
set ‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬ϕ), with K, S and ϕ in the mentioned conditions.
4.2 Interrelation Between System of Spheres-
-based Contractions and Epistemic Entrench-
ment-based Contractions
In this section we will essentially present some results revealing the very close connec-
tion between epistemic entrenchment-relations and systems of spheres. In particular,
we will show that such interconnection is strong to the point that, given a belief set
K, the class of the epistemic entrenchment-based contractions on K coincides with
the class of the system of spheres-based contractions on K.
Several results concerning such deep interconnection between systems of spheres
and epistemic entrenchment relations have been presented in the literature devoted
to the study and development of the AGM framework. In what follows we will
briefly mention some of the main of such results. In [PW95, Theorem 6.1] Peppas
and Williams presented an explicit condition, relating an epistemic entrenchment
and a system of spheres, under which two such structures yield the same revision
function. Having that result in mind it is also worth to remark here that combining
some results of [Gro88] and [Ga¨r88] it is possible to conclude that for any system of
spheres there is an epistemic entrenchment relation such that the above mentioned
condition holds and vice versa. Therefore, making use of all those results it can be
shown that the class of system of spheres-based revisions coincides with the class of
epistemic entrenchment-based revisions.72
Latter, in [RP99, Sec. 12], Rott and Pagnucco have shown that, given a belief set
K, for any system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖ there is an epistemic entrenchment
relation such that the S-based contraction coincides with the ≤-based contraction on
K, and vice versa. However, in the mentioned paper, the authors have not presented
explicitly a condition relating a system of spheres and an epistemic entrenchment
relation which is necessary and sufficient for the contraction functions based on each
of those two structures to be identical.
Our exposition in the present section results of a combination of the approaches of
[PW95] and [RP99]. Nevertheless, however it is inspired by the mentioned references,
the exposition that follows departs quite significantly from the presentations of each
of those two papers and all the proofs presented below are original (as well as the
72The revision functions here named system of spheres-based revisions (resp. epistemic
entrenchment-based revisions) are the ones that can be obtained from a system of spheres-based
contraction (see Definition 3.3.7) (resp. an epistemic entrenchment-based contraction (see Defini-
tion 3.4.4)), by means of the Levi identity (equation (2.1)).
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results to which such proofs correspond) and made explicitly (in the sense that they
do not make use of any of the results presented in the above mentioned works). As
mentioned above our main goal in the present section is to prove in a direct way
that the class of system of spheres-based contractions coincides with the class of
epistemic entrenchment-based contractions. We anticipate here that in what follows
such proof will be, loosely speaking, composed of two parts: On the one hand a
condition relating a system of spheres S and an epistemic entrenchment relation ≤
is presented which is necessary and sufficient to assure that the S-based contraction
and the ≤-based contraction are identical. On the other hand it is shown that, given
an arbitrary system of spheres S there is an epistemic entrenchment relation ≤ such
that S and ≤ satisfy the above mentioned condition and vice versa.
Finally, before moving on to the presentation of such proof, it is convenient to
emphasise here also that most of the results that we shall introduce in the present
section shall play a fundamental role further ahead (namely, in Chapter 8).
Now, as the first step towards the obtention of the proof pretended in the present
section we present, in the following observation, a way of defining an epistemic
entrenchment relation by means of a system of spheres:
Observation 4.2.1 ([Gro88, Ga¨r88]) Let K be a belief set and S be a system of
spheres centred on ‖K‖. If ≤ is the binary relation on L defined in the following
way:
∀α, β ∈ L, α ≤ β iff either S¬α ⊆ S¬β or ` β, (≤ −S)
then ≤ is an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K, i.e., ≤ satisfies
conditions (EE1)-(EE5).
Given a belief set K, Figure 4.6 contains a representation of a system of spheres
S centred on ‖K‖ and illustrates a situation in which α, β ∈ K \ Cn(∅) are two
sentences such that S¬α ⊆ S¬β (moreover, S¬α ⊂ S¬β) and, therefore, it holds that
α ≤ β (moreover, α < β), if ≤ is the E.E. relation defined from S by condition
(≤ −S).
In addition to being, as we have just seen, suitable to construct an E.E. relation
by means of a given system of spheres, we will see further ahead that condition
(≤ −S) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the S-based contraction to coincide
with the ≤-based contraction.
In order to show that, we start by presenting some results which introduce some
conditions equivalent to (≤ −S).
Observation 4.2.2 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖
and ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K. Then condition
(≤ −S) is satisfied if and only if
∀α, β ∈ L \ Cn(∅), α ≤ β iff S¬α ⊆ S¬β. (≤ −S′)
Proof. A proof for this observation can be found in page 173.
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Figure 4.6: Schematic representation of a system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖ (where
K is a belief set) illustrating a possible representation for the sets ‖¬α‖ and ‖¬β‖
in a situation when α, β ∈ L \ Cn(∅) are such that α ≤ β (more precisely α < β),
where ≤ is the E.E. relation defined from the S.S. S by means of condition (≤ −S).
Remark 4.2.3 According to Observation 4.2.2, condition (≤ −S′) is equivalent to
condition (≤ −S) when S is a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and ≤ is an epis-
temic entrenchment relation with respect to K, for a given belief set K.
Nevertheless, it is worth noticing that condition (≤ −S′) can not be used (instead
of condition (≤ −S)) for the purpose of defining (as it was done in Observation
4.2.1) an epistemic entrenchment relation by means of a system of spheres. This
is because if we used that conditions (rather than (≤ −S)), we would only obtain a
binary relation in L \Cn(∅). In other words, the binary relation thus defined would
not comprise any information concerning tautologies (i.e., tautologies would not be
in relation with any sentence).
The following observation introduces two more conditions which are equivalent to
condition (≤ −S′) and therefore, according to Observation 4.2.2, are also equivalent
to condition (≤ −S).
Lemma 4.2.4 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and
≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K. Then the following three
conditions are equivalent:
1. ∀α, β ∈ L\Cn(∅), α ≤ β ⇔ S¬α ⊆ S¬β (notice that this is condition (≤ −S′)).
2. ∀α, β ∈ L \ Cn(∅), α < β ⇔ S¬α ⊂ S¬β and α =E.E. β ⇔ S¬α = S¬β.
3. ∀α, β ∈ L \ Cn(∅), α < β ⇒ S¬α ⊂ S¬β and α =E.E. β ⇒ S¬α = S¬β.
Proof. A proof for this lemma can be found in page 174.
Now we introduce one more lemma concerning the interrelation between epis-
temic entrenchment orderings and systems of spheres which we will make use of, right
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afterwards, in the proof of a theorem that states the above mentioned connection
between condition (≤ −S) and the interrelation between E.E.-based contractions
and S.S.-based contractions.
Lemma 4.2.5 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and
≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K. If S and ≤ satisfy
condition (≤ −S), then for any α ∈ L \ Cn(∅) and any β ∈ L it holds that
α < α ∨ β iff fS(¬α) ⊆ ‖β‖.
Proof. A proof for this lemma can be found in page 175.
We are now in a position to prove the above mentioned fact that condition (≤ −S)
is a necessary and sufficient condition for the S-based contraction to coincide with
the ≤-based contraction, as it is formally stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 4.2.6 73 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖
and ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K. Then the ≤-based
contraction on K, −≤ (cf. condition (C−≤) in Definition 3.4.4), and the S-based
contraction on K, −S (cf. Definition 3.3.7), coincide, i.e.,
∀ϕ ∈ L, K−≤ϕ = K−Sϕ,
if and only if condition (≤ −S) is satisfied.
Proof. A proof for this theorem can be found in page 175.
At this point, combining Observation 4.2.1 and Theorem 4.2.6, we can conclude
that, given a belief set K and a system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖, we can define
an E.E. relation ≤ with respect to K, such that the ≤-based contraction on K
and the S-based contraction on K coincide (and, consequently, at this stage we
can already conclude that every system of spheres-based contraction is an epistemic
entrenchment-based contraction).
In the sequence we will show that the converse construction is also possible. That
is, given a belief set K and an E.E. relation ≤ with respect to K, we will show how
to define a system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖ such that the S-based contraction
on K is identical to the ≤-based contraction on K.74
73Notice that this theorem is equivalent to Theorem 6.1 of [PW95] - such equivalence is proven
in Section B.2 (of the Appendix). However, we must remark here that such proof makes use of the
representation theorems (more precisely of the construction-to-postulates part of those theorems)
for the system of spheres-based contractions and for epistemic entrenchment-based contractions.
Therefore, since it is our goal in the present section to prove that the classes of system of spheres-
based contractions and of epistemic entrenchment-based contractions coincide without making use
of axiomatic characterizations for such functions, here we present a direct proof for this theorem
(rather than using the mentioned equivalence between this result and Theorem 6.1 of [PW95]).
Notice also that the right-to-left part of this theorem is similar to Observation 3.76 of [Han99b].
74Notice that, alternatively, we could just show, based on the proof of [Gro88, Theorem 4], that
a system of spheres S in these conditions indeed exists, without however presenting its explicit
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We start by noticing that it follows from Theorem 4.2.6 that, to achieve our goal,
it is enough to assure that the given E.E. relation ≤ and the system of spheres S
that we shall define (based on it) satisfy condition (≤ −S).
Now we proceed to the construction of such a system of spheres (from an E.E.
relation).75
Let K be a belief set and ≤ be an E.E. relation with respect to K.
To each sentence αi ∈ L\Cn(∅) we associate a subsetWαi ofML (which, as we
shall see shortly, will be the smallest sphere - in the system of spheres that we are
about to present - intersecting ¬αi) defined by:
Wαi = ‖{α ∈ L : αi < α}‖. (4.1)
In the following remark we highlight some facts concerning the composition of
the set {α ∈ L : αi < α}76 on the right-hand-side of the above equation.
Remark 4.2.7 Let K be a belief set and ≤ be an E.E. relation with respect to K.
Then:
(i) If αi ∈ L \ Cn(∅) then {α ∈ L : αi < α} = K \ {α ∈ L : α ≤ αi}.
(ii) If αi ∈ L \K then {α ∈ L : αi < α} = K.
Proof. A proof for this remark can be found in page 177.
Now, before using the setsWαi to construct a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖,
we introduce some results that characterize them and show how such sets are related
among each other. Such results will play an important role in the rest of the present
section.
Lemma 4.2.8 Let ≤ be an E.E. relation with respect to a belief set K and αi, αj ∈
L \ Cn(∅). Then the following statements hold:
(i) If αi < αj then αj ∈ Th(Wαi) or, which is the same, Wαi ⊆ ‖αj‖.
(ii) Wαj ∩ ‖¬αj‖ 6= ∅.
Proof. A proof for this lemma can be found in page 178.
Lemma 4.2.9 Let ≤ be an E.E. relation with respect to a belief set K and αi, αj ∈
L \ Cn(∅). Then the following statements hold:
construction by means of ≤. However, if we followed this alternative way for proving that fact,
then we would not fully accomplish our main goal in the present section of proving that the
classes of S.S.-based contractions and of E.E.-based contractions coincide, without making use of
axiomatic characterization for such functions. This remark is explained and justified in further
detail in Section B.2 (of the Appendix).
75A similar construction has been presented by Rott and Pagnucco in [RP99, Sec. 12]. However,
there are some slight but noteworthy differences between their exposition and our presentation
below.
76A set of sentences of the form {α ∈ L : αi < α} has been called an E.E.-cut (or simply cut) in
[Rot91, p. 159]. Compare also with the (alternative) notion of cut introduced in [Gro88, p. 165],
which is dual to this one − cf. Observation A.2.4 of Section A.2 (of the Appendix).
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(i) αi =E.E. αj if and only if Wαi =Wαj .
(ii) αi < αj if and only if Wαi ⊂ Wαj .
Proof. A proof for this lemma can be found in page 178.
Remark 4.2.10 Let ≤ be an E.E. relation with respect to a belief set K and for
any αi ∈ L \ Cn(∅) let Wαi be the set defined in (4.1).
It follows from Lemma 4.2.8-(ii) that, for any αi ∈ L \ Cn(∅), it holds that
Wαi 6= ∅ and, equivalently, we have that {α ∈ L : αi < α} is a consistent set of
sentences, for any αi ∈ L \ Cn(∅).
Now consider the class S′ of subsets of ML defined by:
S′ = {Wαi : αi ∈ L \ Cn(∅)}.
The smallest (with respect to set inclusion) element in S′ is W⊥, where ⊥ stands
for an arbitrary contradiction. Indeed, it follows immediately from (EE2) that ⊥ ≤ δ
for any δ ∈ L so, from Lemma 4.2.9, we can conclude that W⊥ ⊆ Wδ for any
δ ∈ L \ Cn(∅).
Having the above in mind, from (EE4) and Lemma 4.2.9 we can conclude that,
if K is a consistent belief set, then Wαi =W⊥, for any sentence αi ∈ L \K.
Moreover, when K is a consistent belief set, if αi ∈ L \K then it follows from
Remark 4.2.7-(ii) and equation (4.1) that Wαi = ‖K‖.
Finally, it follows from the above stated facts that, if K is a consistent belief set,
then ‖K‖ =W⊥ (and is the smallest element in S′).
At last, in the following observation, given a belief set K and an epistemic
entrenchment relation ≤ with respect to K, we show that, making use of the sets
Wαi , it is possible to construct a system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖, such that ≤
and S satisfy condition (≤ −S).
Observation 4.2.11 Let K be a belief set, ≤ be an E.E. relation with respect to K,
and S′ be the class of subsets of ML defined by:
S′ = {Wαi : αi ∈ L \ Cn(∅)},
where, for any αi ∈ L \ Cn(∅), Wαi is the set defined in (4.1), i.e.,
Wαi = ‖{α ∈ L : αi < α}‖,
then the following statements hold:
(i) If K 6= L (i.e., K is a consistent belief set), then the set S = S′ ∪ {ML} is a
system of spheres centred on ‖K‖.
(ii) If K = L, then the set S = {∅} ∪ S′ ∪ {ML} is a system of spheres centred on
‖K‖.
Moreover, in both cases K 6= L and K = L, it holds that the (respective) thus
constructed system of spheres S and the given E.E. relation ≤ satisfy condition
(≤ −S).
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Proof. A proof for this observation can be found in page 179.
The main results of the present section can be summarized in the following
way: Given a belief set K, a system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖ and an epistemic
entrenchment relation ≤ with respect to K, Theorem 4.2.6 states that condition
(≤ −S) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the ≤-based contraction on K
and the S-based contraction on K to be identical. On the other hand Observations
4.2.1 and 4.2.11 assert that, given an arbitrary system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖
there is an epistemic entrenchment relation ≤ with respect to K such that condition
(≤ −S) is satisfied and vice versa, respectively. Thus, from all these results, we can
immediately conclude that every system of spheres-based contraction is an epistemic
entrenchment-based contraction and vice versa, as we formally state in the following
corollary:
Corollary 4.2.12 Let K be a belief set. An operation − on K is an epistemic
entrenchment-based contraction on K if and only if it is a system of spheres-based
contraction on K.
We must note here that the equivalence that is established in the above corollary
has already been stated as part of Obsevation 4.0.2, since, as we have clarified
immediately after the mentioned observation, such result is an obvious consequence
of the representation theorems for the epistemic entrenchment-based contraction (see
Observations 3.4.5 and 3.4.6) and for the system of spheres-based contraction (see
Observation 3.3.9). Nevertheless, it is worth emphasising that the results presented
in this section allow us to conclude in a direct way (rather than by means of the above
mentioned axiomatic characterizations) that the class of epistemic entrenchment-
based contractions on a belief set K coincides with the class of system of spheres-
based contractions on that same belief set.
Chapter 5
Multiple Contraction
This chapter is devoted to the presentation of some definitions and results concern-
ing an extension of the AGM framework which has been motivated by the awareness
of the need to develop models of theory contractions that covered the case of (simul-
taneous) contraction by several sentences (rather than just by one single sentence).
More precisely, in what follows we will expose some models which are essentially
generalizations of some of the explicit definitions of AGM contraction functions,
that were presented in the previous chapter, in order to account for the case of con-
tractions of a set by (not necessarily singleton) sets of sentences (rather than only
by a single sentence).
As it is clear from the two previous chapters as well as from the presentation
of the AGM model in Section 2.4, such model only accounted for changes (of a
belief set) by a single sentence. Since such model has acquired, immediately after its
publication, the status of standard model of belief change, most of the initial studies
of belief change considered also only change operations involving only one (single)
sentence. Nevertheless, not much time has passed until the need for extending the
AGM model to cover changes by sets of sentences was noticed by some researchers.
The idea of contraction by a set of sentences rather than by a single sentence
was introduced by Fuhrmann in [Fuh88], where the term multiple contraction was
originally proposed to designate such an operation.77 Hansson [Han89], Niedere´e
[Nie91], and Rott [Rot92a] also studied the theory of multiple change operations. A
survey of all these works was presented in [FH94], where Fuhrmann and Hansson
also introduce three ways of generalizing the belief sets partial meet (singleton)
contraction functions of [AGM85] to the contraction of belief sets by (non-singleton)
sets of sentences: the ⊥-based partial meet (⊥ −pm) contraction, the ∆-based partial
meet contraction and the ∠-based partial meet (∠− pm) contraction.
Previously, Hansson had already investigated generalizations of that kind, namely
in [Han89, Han91a], where two constructive methods for multiple contraction func-
tions of belief sets by finite (not necessarily singleton) sets were presented: the
simple partial meet contraction and the composite partial meet contraction. Then,
in [Han92, Han93, Han91a], the former of these models was extended to cover the
77Originally the term multiple contraction was introduced to designate contractions by non-
singleton sets. However, in this text we shall use such expression to refer to contractions by any
(not necessarily non-singleton) set of sentences.
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case of multiple contractions of sets of beliefs that are not (necessarily) closed un-
der logical consequence (i.e. of belief bases) by possibly infinite sets. In [Fuh97]
Fuhrmann presents a survey which compiles some of the above mentioned construc-
tions of multiple contraction functions.
To close this very brief summary of the initial studies on multiple contraction we
mention just one more reference, namely the paper [FSS03], presented several years
after the above mentioned ones, where Ferme´, Saez and Sanz presented two ways of
generalizing the (singleton) kernel contraction functions of [Han94] (cf. Subsection
3.2.1) to the case of the contraction of belief bases by any set of sentences.
In what follows we will summarize the main concepts and results that were
presented in the above mentioned works and analyse the interrelations among such
different approaches for multiple contraction.
5.1 Meaning and Motivation for Multiple Con-
traction
By multiple contraction of a belief set K by a set of sentences B we mean the removal
of the set B from K. However, this can be interpreted either as:
• the removal of all elements of B from K (i.e. meaning that the result, say
K÷[B], of the multiple contraction of K by B must be such that B∩K÷[B] =
∅).
or as
• the removal of at least one of the elements of B from K (i.e. meaning that the
result, say K÷〈B〉, of the multiple contraction of K by B must be such that
B 6⊆ K÷〈B〉).
In [FH94], a (multiple) contraction function of the first kind above described is
designated by package contraction whereas a contraction of the second type is called
choice contraction and in the present text we adopt those designations. In that same
paper, Fuhrmann and Hansson presented, for belief sets, two operations of the first
kind and one of the second kind. Concerning package contraction they suggested
the following operations: partial meet package contraction and subremainder con-
traction.78 Regarding choice contraction, they introduced the partial meet choice
contraction.79
Several arguments supporting the usefulness and necessity of multiple contraction
functions can be found in the literature, e.g. [Han89, Han91a, Nie91, FH94, Fuh97].
In this respect, in what follows we summarize some of the arguments providing
motivations for the consideration of package contractions which have been presented
in [FH94, pp. 43−44]. Thus, as it was remarked in the mentioned reference, a simple
78The designations used here were in fact introduced in [Han99b]. Originally, in [FH94], these
operations had been called ⊥-based partial meet (⊥ −pm) contraction and ∆-based partial meet
contraction, respectively.
79This designation was presented in [Han99b]. In [FH94] this operation had been called ∠-based
partial meet (∠− pm) contraction.
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evidence of the usefulness and the necessity of the study of package contractions is
the fact that the sets which are intuitively acceptable as possible results of the
package contraction of a theory K by a set of sentences, say {α, β}, are, in general,
different from every set which can be the result of either of the following operations:
1. contracting K by α ∧ β,
2. contracting K by α ∨ β,
3. first contracting by α and then (contracting the result of such contraction) by
β, or vice versa,
4. intersecting the results of contracting K by α and of contracting K by β.
Now we briefly expose the informal justifications presented in [FH94] for the
inadequateness of identifying the multiple contraction of K by {α, β} with any
of the above listed operations. Hence, in what concerns the first operation, to
conclude that its use is inadequate in this context it is enough to observe that to
remove a conjunction it suffices to remove one of the conjuncts. Regarding the
inappropriateness of the second operation we just remark that, however the removal
of a disjunction from a theory implies the removal of both disjuncts, the converse
does not hold, i.e. in order to remove the set {α, β} from K it is not necessary to
remove the sentence α∨β from K (to see that this is so it is enough to consider the
case when β = ¬α).80 Now, in order to clarify that the third operation is unsuitable
to be used as the definition of the multiple contraction of K by {α, β}, it is enough
to remark that, on the one hand, the result of first contracting by α and then by
β is not, in general, identical to that of first contracting by β and then by α, and,
on the other hand it is implicit in the notion of multiple contraction that, in such a
process, all the sentences to be contracted are treated equally.
Finally, to justify that the fourth above mentioned operation is also inadequate
to be adopted as the standard way of obtaining a set which is a suitable result
for the result of the (package) removal of the set {α, β} from K, Fuhrmann and
Hansson informally suggested that the set resulting of such operation may be too
small to represent the multiple contraction. However, in [FH94, pp. 62], the same
authors have presented a formal proof of such inadequateness by showing that one
of the constructive models of multiple contraction functions that were introduced
in that paper, namely the partial meet package contraction functions78 (which we
shall present in Section 5.3), are such that, in general, the result of the partial meet
package contraction of K by a set B is not identical to the set which results of the
intersection of the results of contracting K by each of the sentences in B.
Still regarding the exposition of some motivation for package contractions it
is convenient to remark here that, in [FH94, Sec. 12], it has also been stated
that, generally speaking, apart from the four above mentioned operations, any other
attempt of reducing the package contraction of a theory to a certain combination of
contractions by a single sentence shall fail.
80At this point it is worth to remark that in [Han91a, pp. 17] Hansson presents an example
illustrating that the result of the multiple contraction of K by {α, β} does not necessarily coincide
with the result of neither of the operations 1. and 2. above.
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The above exposition supports that it is pertinent and adequate to study the
operation of package contraction on its own, since such operation is independent of
the operation of contraction by a single sentence.
In what concerns the motivations exposed in the literature for the study of choice
contraction, we highlight the example provided in [FH94, pp. 44−45] to justify their
usefulness. Nevertheless, as remarked by Hansson [Han99b, pp. 134], the operation
of package contraction seems to be more interesting than that of choice contraction,
both from an intuitive and from a formal point of view. Such remark is more formally
supported by the fact that, contrary to what is the case with package contraction,
it holds that the operation of choice contraction can, at least in some cases, be
reduced to the operation of contraction by one single sentence. More precisely, it
can be shown that the operation of choice contraction that was introduced in [FH94],
namely the partial meet choice contraction79, is such that the operation of (partial
meet choice) contraction of a theory by any finite set of sentences B is similar to the
operation of partial meet contraction of such theory by the single sentence consisting
of the conjunction of all the elements of B ([FH94, Observation 17]).
At this point we must remark that, on the one hand the present thesis essentially
concerns the study of (the above mentioned) partial meet multiple contractions and,
on the other hand, all the results in that respect that we shall present only account
for the case of (multiple) contractions by finite sets. Hence, having the remarks
made in the above paragraph in mind, from this point onwards we shall only consider
multiple contractions of the package kind since that is the only one of the two kinds
that is interesting in the context of the partial meet modelling and considering only
contractions by finite sets.
Thus, throughout the rest of this text, the expression multiple contraction shall
be assumed to have the meaning which was above attributed to the expression
package contraction, i.e., in all that follows, by multiple contraction of a theory K
by a set of sentences B we mean the removal of all the elements of B from K.
More formally, the expression “multiple contraction function” (or simply “multiple
contraction”) will be used to designate a function81
÷ : TL × P(L) → TL
(K,B) 7→ K÷B ,
where the image of a pair (K,B) by ÷ is represented by K÷B and is a belief set
which is acceptable (in the context under consideration at the moment when such
a function is mentioned) as a possible result of the (multiple) contraction of the set
B from the belief set K. Such set shall, sometimes, be referred to as “the result
of the multiple contraction of K by B”. It is also convenient to remark here that,
throughout this text, almost every time a multiple contraction function is considered
that is done in a context where a certain belief set K was previously fixed and, in
such cases, we shall designate the multiple contraction function under consideration
by “multiple contraction function on K” (or simply “multiple contraction on K”).
81In general we shall use the symbol ÷ to denote such a function, however some variants of this
symbol (most of which shall be obtained simply by adding superscripts and/or subscripts to it)
shall also be sometimes used for that effect.
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Furthermore, in such situations, the multiple contraction under consideration will
be seen as a function
÷ : P(L) → TL
B 7→ K÷B ,
where the image of a set of sentences B by ÷, is a set which results of the (multiple)
contraction of the set B from K (according to the definition under consideration at
that moment for such operation) and is represented by K÷B.
Let PF(L) denote the set of finite subsets of L and K denote an arbitrary
(but fixed) belief set. Throughout this text, we will use the expression multiple
contraction by finite sets (respectively multiple contraction on K by finite sets) to
refer to a function ÷ : TL × PF(L) → TL (respectively ÷ : PF(L) → TL) whose
value for an argument (K,B) (resp. for any argument B) is a set that satisfies the
conditions that we have mentioned in the above paragraph that should be satisfied
by any set that can be accepted as the result of the multiple contraction of K by B.
The value of a multiple contraction by finite sets (respectively multiple contraction
on K by finite sets) ÷ for an argument (K,B) (resp. for an argument B) shall be
denoted by K÷B.
We notice that the above introduced notation and terminology are analogous to
the ones introduced in Section 2.3 (see page 25) to represent and refer to contractions
by a single sentence.
It is also convenient to note here that, given a belief set K and a sentence α,
the basic properties that are naturally expected to be satisfied by a set K−α which
is the result of the contraction of K by (the single sentence) α are precisely the
same requirements that a set K÷{α} should satisfy in order to be acceptable as a
possible result of the multiple contraction of K by the singleton set {α}. Having
this in mind, from this point onwards we shall often use the expression singleton
contraction to refer to a contraction by one single sentence. Nevertheless, whenever
we use only the term contraction we shall be referring also to a contraction by one
single sentence (unless it is obvious from the context that at that given moment
such term is being used as an abbreviation of multiple contraction).
5.2 Postulates for Multiple Contraction
In the present section we introduce a list of postulates for multiple contraction
and present some results revealing some of the interconnections among them. Such
postulates are essentially properties which are, in general, intuitively requirable from
a multiple contraction function. In the sequence those postulates will be used in the
axiomatic characterizations that we shall present for each of the multiple contraction
functions that we will consider in this thesis.
Hence, the following are some of the postulates which have been proposed in
the literature (e.g. [Han89, Han91a, Han92, FH94, FSS03]) as properties which
are naturally expectable from a multiple contraction function (or from a multiple
contraction function on a certain belief set K) ÷:82
82Notice, that the designations and formulations here presented for each of those postulates are
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• Package closure: K÷B is a belief set (i.e. K÷B = Cn(K÷B)).
• Package inclusion: K÷B ⊆ K.
• Package vacuity: If B ∩K = ∅, then K÷B = K.
• Package success: If B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅, then B ∩K÷B = ∅.
• Package extensionality: If for every sentence α in B there is a sentence β
in C such that ` α↔ β, and vice versa, then K÷B = K÷C.
• Package recovery: K ⊆ Cn((K÷B) ∪B).
• Finite Package recovery: If B is finite, then K ⊆ Cn((K÷B) ∪B).
• Package uniformity: If every subset X of K implies some element of B if
and only if X implies some element of C, then K÷B = K÷C.
• Package relevance: If β ∈ K and β 6∈ K÷B, then there is a set K ′ such
that K÷B ⊆ K ′ ⊆ K and B ∩ Cn(K ′) = ∅ but B ∩ Cn(K ′ ∪ {β}) 6= ∅.
• Package core-retainment: If β ∈ K and β 6∈ K÷B, then there is a set K ′,
such that K ′ ⊆ K and B ∩ Cn(K ′) = ∅ but B ∩ Cn(K ′ ∪ {β}) 6= ∅.
When these postulates are seen as properties of a multiple contraction function
÷ : TL × P(L) → TL (resp. a multiple contraction function on K, i.e. ÷ : P(L) →
TL), in each of the above formulations B and C are arbitrary sets of sentences and
K is an arbitrary (resp. fixed) belief set. On the other hand, in a situation when
the above postulates are considered as properties of a multiple contraction function
by finite sets ÷ : TL × PF(L) → TL (resp. a multiple contraction function on K by
finite sets ÷ : PF(L) → TL) then in the above formulations B and C are arbitrary
finite sets of sentences and K is an arbitrary (resp. fixed) belief set.
The postulates of P-closure, P-inclusion, P-vacuity, P-success, P-extensionality,
P-recovery and finite P-recovery are generalizations of the basic AGM postulates
(for contraction) that cover the case of multiple contraction and were originally
presented in [Han89]. Analogously, the postulates of P-uniformity and P-relevance
are generalizations of the postulates of uniformity and relevance for contraction
(presented in Observation 3.1.11) and have been introduced in [Han91a, Han92].83
The postulate of P-core-retainment generalizes the singleton contraction postulate of
core-retainment (presented in Observation 3.2.4) to the case of multiple contraction
and was originally introduced in [FSS03].
We close this section with some results presenting several interrelations among
postulates which shall be used further ahead (more precisely, in Chapter 9).
similar to the ones that can be found in [FH94, Han99b] which do not always coincide exactly with
the ones that were used in the reference where such postulate was originally introduced.
83A detailed exposition of the motivations that lead to the formulations above presented for each
of those postulates can be found in [FH94, Sections 5− 6].
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Lemma 5.2.1 ([FH94, Lemma 3 - 1.]) Let K be a belief set and ÷ be a multi-
ple contraction function on K. If ÷ satisfies P-inclusion and P-relevance, then it
satisfies P-closure.
Observation 5.2.2 ([FH94, Observation 10]) Let K be a belief set and ÷ be a
multiple contraction function on K. If ÷ satisfies P-relevance, then it satisfies finite
P-recovery.
Finally we observe that, it follows from the two above results that, if ÷ is a mul-
tiple contraction function on a belief set K that satisfies P-inclusion, P-uniformity
and P-relevance then it also satisfies P-closure, P-vacuity, P-extensionality and finite
P-recovery.
To see that this indeed holds let K be a belief set and ÷ be a multiple contraction
function on K that satisfies P-inclusion, P-uniformity and P-relevance. Then, it
follows immediately from Lemma 5.2.1 and Observation 5.2.2 that ÷ satisfies P-
closure and finite P-recovery. On the other hand, it is easy to check that P-vacuity
follows from P-relevance and that P-uniformity entails P-extensionality. Hence, we
can conclude that ÷ satisfies also P-vacuity and P-extensionality.
The following observation formally states the interrelation among postulates for
multiple contraction that we have just shown to hold.
Observation 5.2.3 Let K be a belief set and ÷ be a multiple contraction function
on K. If ÷ satisfies P-inclusion, P-uniformity and P-relevance then it also satisfies
P-closure, P-vacuity, P-extensionality and finite P-recovery.
5.3 Partial Meet Multiple Contraction
Partial meet multiple contractions84 are essentially the result of the generalization
of the partial meet contraction functions of [AGM85], presented in Section 3.1, to
the case of contractions by (possibly non-singleton) sets. This class of operations
has been the first explicit construction of multiple contractions and was introduced
in [Han89].
We start by recalling the concepts of remainders and of remainder set which were
already presented in Definition 3.1.1, since they play a central role in the definition
of partial meet multiple contraction. Thus, given a belief set K and a set of sentences
B, according to the above mentioned definition, the remainders of K, by B are the
maximal subsets of K that do not imply any element of B. Furthermore, the set
formed by all the remainders (of K, by B) is the remainder set of K by B (or the
remainder set of K modulo B) and is denoted by K⊥B.
84In [Han99b] these operations have been (more appropriately) designated by partial meet pack-
age contractions in order to be distinguished from the partial meet choice contractions but, since
in the present text we will only consider the first of this two kinds of operations, we will use the
more general designation partial meet multiple contractions. In [Han89] these operations had been
called simple partial meet contractions and in [FH94] they had been designated by ⊥-based partial
meet (⊥ −pm) contractions.
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Now we introduce the definition of package selection function, which is a straight-
forward generalization of the notion of selection function (presented in Definition
3.1.5).
Definition 5.3.1 ([Han89, FH94]) Let K be a belief set. A package selection
function for K is a function γ such that for all sets of sentences B:
1. If K⊥B is non-empty, then γ(K⊥B) is a non-empty subset of K⊥B, and
2. If K⊥B is empty, then γ(K⊥B) = {K}.
Finally we are in a position to introduce the definition of partial meet multiple
contraction which is a generalization of Definition 3.1.6 to the case of contractions
by sets of sentences.
Definition 5.3.2 (Partial meet multiple contraction [Han89, FH94]) Let K
be a set of sentences and γ be a package selection function for K. The partial meet
multiple contraction on K that is generated by γ is the operation ÷γ such that for
all sets of sentences B:
K÷γ B =
⋂
γ(K⊥B).
A multiple contraction function ÷ on K is a partial meet multiple contraction if
and only if there is some package selection function γ such that K÷B = K÷γB for
all sets of sentences B.
Finally we present, just as we did in the singleton case (see Definition 3.1.7), the
definition of two limiting particular cases of partial meet multiple contractions:
Definition 5.3.3 Let K be a belief set.
1. A multiple contraction function ÷ on K is a maxichoice multiple contraction
if and only if it is a partial meet multiple contraction generated by a package
selection function γ such that for all sets B, the set γ(K⊥B) has exactly one
element.
2. The full meet multiple contraction on K is the partial meet multiple contraction
·∼· that is generated by the package selection function γ such that for all sets
B, if K⊥B is non-empty, then γ(K⊥B) = K⊥B, i.e., the multiple full meet
contraction ·∼· is the contraction operation on K defined by:
K ·∼·B =
{ ⋂
K⊥B , if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅
K , if B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ ,
for all sets B.85
In Section 5.5 we shall expose an axiomatic characterization for the partial meet
multiple contraction of belief sets which was presented in [FH94].
85Notice that in the explicit definition of the full meet contraction that we have presented here
we have implicitly made use of the fact that, according to Observation 3.1.2, K⊥B 6= ∅ if and only
if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅.
5.4. KERNEL MULTIPLE CONTRACTION 83
5.4 Kernel Multiple Contraction
In this section we introduce another method for constructing multiple contractions
which is based on the operation of kernel (singleton) contraction presented in Sub-
section 3.2.1. More precisely, in what follows we present the definition of kernel
multiple contraction which is a generalization of the operation of kernel (singleton)
contraction (presented in Definition 3.2.3) that accounts for contractions by sets of
sentences. The class of kernel multiple contractions was originally introduced in
[FSS03].86
Analogously to what was done in the mentioned subsection, we start by intro-
ducing the definition of package kernel set of A with respect to B for any sets of
sentences A and B. Such set is formed by all the minimal subsets of A that imply
some element of B as it is more formally exposed in the following definition.
Definition 5.4.1 (Package Kernel Set [FSS03, Definition 8]) Let A and B be
two sets of sentences. The package kernel set of A with respect to B, denoted
A ⊥⊥P B is the set such that X ∈ A ⊥⊥P B if and only if:
1. X ⊆ A.
2. B ∩ Cn(X) 6= ∅.
3. If Y ⊂ X then B ∩ Cn(Y ) = ∅.
Next we present the definition of package incision function for (a set) A, which,
roughly speaking, is a function that selects at least one element from each one of
the sets in A ⊥⊥P B, for any set B. Such concept is more detailedly and formally
introduced in the following definition:
Definition 5.4.2 ([FSS03, Definition 10]) A function σ is an incision function
for A if and only if, for all sets B:
1. σ(A ⊥⊥P B) ⊆
⋃
A ⊥⊥P B.
2. If ∅ 6= X ∈ A ⊥⊥P B, then X ∩ σ(A ⊥⊥P B) 6= ∅.
We can now, finally, present the definition of kernel multiple contraction.87
Definition 5.4.3 (Kernel Multiple Contraction [FSS03, Definition 11]) Let
σ be an incision function for A. The kernel multiple contraction ≈σ for A based on
σ is defined as follows:
A≈σB = A \ σ(A ⊥⊥P B).
A multiple contraction function ÷ for A is a kernel multiple contraction if and
only if there is some package incision function σ for A such that A÷B = A≈σB for
all sets B.
In the following section we present the axiomatic characterization for the kernel
multiple contraction which was obtained in [FSS03].
86It is convenient to remark here that, just as it was the case for their singleton counterparts, the
original definition and corresponding representation theorems for the kernel multiple contraction
functions accounted for the (multiple) contraction of any set of sentences (not necessarily closed
under logical consequences).
87In [FSS03] such functions were denominated by kernel package contractions.
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5.5 Representation Theorems and Interrelation
Between Partial Meet and Kernel Multiple
Contraction of Belief Sets
In this section we present representation theorems for each one of the two kinds
of multiple contraction functions that were introduced in the two previous sections
and, afterwards, based on such characterizations and on the interrelations among
postulates, we clarify how those two classes of multiple contractions are related.
We start by exposing, in the following observation, the axiomatic characterization
for partial meet multiple contractions on belief sets which was presented in [FH94]:
Observation 5.5.1 ([FH94, Theorem 9]) 88
Let K be a belief set and ÷ be a multiple contraction function on K. Then ÷ is
a partial meet multiple contraction on K if and only if it satisfies the postulates of
P-inclusion, P-success, P-uniformity and P-relevance.
Since some of the postulates introduced in Section 5.2 were not mentioned in
the statement of the above observation, it is convenient to remark here that, ac-
cording to Lemma 5.2.1 and Observations 5.2.2 and 5.2.3, it follows from the above
axiomatic characterization, that a partial meet multiple contraction function on a
belief set satisfies (also) the postulates of P-closure, finite P-recovery, P-vacuity and
P-extensionality.
At this point it worth to mention yet that, in [Li98], Jun Li has proven that
partial meet multiple contraction functions in general do not satisfy the postulate
of P-recovery (in the infinite case). More precisely, according to [Li98, Observations
2.1 and 2.2], P-recovery does not hold neither for the full meet multiple contraction
nor for maxichoice multiple contraction.
It is now time to expose, in the following observation, the axiomatic charac-
terization for kernel multiple contraction that Ferme´, Saez and Sanz presented in
[FSS03].
Observation 5.5.2 ([FSS03, Theorem 6]) A multiple contraction function ÷ for
a set of sentences A is a kernel multiple contraction if and only if it satisfies the
postulates of P-inclusion, P-uniformity, P-core-retainment and
• P-success’: If B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅, then B ∩ Cn(A÷B) = ∅.89
88Similar results to the one stated in this observation can be found in [Han92, Theorem 1] and
[Han93, Theorem 1] (see also [Han91a], where those two papers were included and summarized
before they were published). In fact those two theorems are more general than the one that is
presented here since, they provide an axiomatic charatezization for the class of partial multiple
contraction functions on belief bases rather than (only) for (its subclass of) partial meet multiple
contractions on belief sets.
89It is convenient to notice here that in this observation by P-inclusion, P-uniformity and P-
core-retainment we mean the postulate whose formulation is identical to the formulation presented
in Section 5.2 for the postulate with the same name, with K replaced by A. On the other hand,
the formulation of the postulate of P-success’ present in this axiomatic characterization, is the
result of a slight modification of the statement of the postulate of P-success presented in Section
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Next we briefly highlight some interrelations among the postulates used in the
axiomatic characterizations presented in Observations 5.5.1 and 5.5.2, in order to be
able to obtain some result regarding the relationship between the classes of partial
meet multiple contractions and of kernel multiple contractions (on belief sets).
In all that follows we assume that ÷ is a multiple contraction function on a belief
set K.
We start by remarking that if ÷ satisfies P-success’ then it (also) satisfies P-
success, but the converse does not hold in general. However, making use of Lemma
5.2.1, it can be easily shown that if ÷ satisfies P-inclusion, P-relevance and P-success
then it (also) satisfies P-success’. Finally, we note that it is obvious that if ÷ satisfies
P-relevance then it (also) satisfies P-core-retainment.
Taking into account the above mentioned interrelations among postulates, we can
immediately conclude from Observations 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 that if ÷ is a partial meet
multiple contraction on a belief set K then it is (also) a kernel multiple contraction
on K. Therefore the following corollary holds:
Corollary 5.5.3 Let K be a belief set. Then every partial meet multiple contraction
function on K is a kernel multiple contraction function on K.
Furthermore, from the above mentioned interrelations among postulates it fol-
lows, additionally, that P-success can be replaced by P-success’ in the axiomatic
characterization for partial meet multiple contraction presented above. That is,
from the mentioned interrelations among postulates we can conclude that Observa-
tion 5.5.1 remains valid if we replace in its statement the postulate of P-success by
the postulate of P-success’.90
In Figure 5.1 we present a diagram that summarizes all the results included
in the present section, namely the axiomatic characterizations for the partial meet
multiple contractions on belief sets and for the kernel multiple contractions on belief
sets and the fact that the class of partial meet multiple contractions for belief sets is
contained in the class of kernel multiple contractions for belief sets. In this regard it
is convenient to clarify that the set of postulates associated, in that figure, to each
of the two mentioned operations constitutes indeed a possible axiomatic characteri-
zation for such operation, however, in the case of partial meet multiple contraction
the postulate of P-core-retainment is redundant in the axiomatic characterization
that is associated to that class of functions in such figure.
5.6 Related Works
In this section we shall make a very brief exposition of some works (other than
the ones already mentioned throughout the present chapter) where multiple change
5.2 which must be made in order to get a formulation that is adequate for a property of multiple
contractions of belief bases (notice that if ÷ is one such operation on a not logically closed set of
sentences A then it may not hold that A÷B = Cn(A÷B) for all sets B).
90Notice that, in this context, P-success’ designates the postulate whose formulation coincides
with the formulation presented in Observation 5.5.2 for the postulate with the same name, but
with A replaced by K.
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Figure 5.1: Diagram exposing axiomatic characterizations for the partial meet and
the kernel multiple contractions of belief sets and the interrelation between those two
classes of multiple contraction functions. In this diagram P-inclusion, P-uniformity,
P-relevance, P-core-retainment and P-success’ represent the postulates for multiple
contraction of belief sets so designated in the present text.
operations are studied. We must, however, notice that it is not our intention to
include here an exhaustive list of all the studies and results so far reported in the
literature which can be considered to be in some sense related to the topic of multiple
contraction. Rather, in the present section we shall mention only those works which
are more closely related to the investigation reported in Chapters 6 − 9 below.
Furthermore, at this point, we remark also that some of the natural topics of future
research (cf. Section 10.2) which arise from the study presented in this text consist
in the investigation of the interconnections as well as of the possible combinations
of the works that we shall refer in this section with the new contributions exposed
in the above mentioned chapters of the present thesis.
All the works that we shall mention throughout this section are concerned with
two kinds of multiple change operations which differ from multiple contraction. To
be more precise, those works are dedicated to the study of multiple revision − i.e.,
the generalization to the case of changes by sets of the operation of (singleton)
revision (mentioned in Section 2.3) − and of set contraction − a kind of multiple
change operation which differs from both multiple contraction and multiple revision.
Thus, we start by introducing some notation and terminology concerning such
kind of operations: Analogously to what is the case in what concerns revisions
of belief sets by a single sentence, given a belief set K, generally speaking, by a
multiple revision on K we mean a function, say ⊕, from P(L) to TL whose value at
an arbitrary set of sentences B, denoted K⊕B and which we refer to as the (result)
of the (multiple) revision ⊕ of K by B is a belief set such that, if possible, it (i)
contains the set B, (ii) is consistent, and (iii) contains as many sentences of K as it
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is possible.
At this point it is also convenient to remark that in what follows by the (result
of the) expansion of a belief set K by a set of sentences B we mean the belief set
Cn(K ∪B) which we shall represent by K+B.91
This section is organized as follows: In Subsection 5.6.1 we present a gener-
alization of the Levi identity (i.e. equation (2.1)) to the case of changes of be-
lief sets by sets of sentences proposed by Sven Ove Hansson ([Han91a, Han92]).
Then in Subsection 5.6.2 we introduce another kind of multiple change opera-
tions, namely the set contraction, which was presented by Dongmo Zhang [Zha96]
and we mention the constructive models for those functions that were exposed in
[Zha96, ZCZC97, ZF01, Pep]. Afterwards, in Subsection 5.6.3 we present a way
of defining multiple revision functions which is based on a system of spheres, that
was originally introduced by Pavlos Peppas [Pep04] and generalizes Grove’s [Gro88]
construction of system of spheres-based (singleton) revisions in order to account for
the revision of belief sets by sets of sentences.
5.6.1 Generalized Levi Identity
As we have mentioned in Section 2.3, Isaac Levi, in [Lev77], sustained that revision
should not be seen as a basic change operation but, rather, as an operation derived
from (the basic operations of) contraction and expansion, in the sense that the only
acceptable revision operations are those that can be obtained from some contraction
operations by means of the procedure described by equation (2.1) (latter designated
by Levi identity). Based on that idea Sven Ove Hansson, in [Han91a, Han92] (see
also [Han99b, Section 3.17]) proposed a way of generalizing the Levi identity to
the case of multiple change operations, i.e., in the mentioned references Hansson
proposed a way of defining a multiple revision function from any given multiple
contraction. In what follows we present such construction.
We start by recalling that, the idea underlaying the Levi identity is that in order
to revise a belief set K by a sentence α we should first obtain a subset of K which is
consistent with α and afterwards expand such set by α. The generalization of this
idea to the case of multiple change operations is quite straightforward: The (result
of the) multiple revision of a belief set K by a set of sentences B should be the result
of the expansion by B of a subset of K which is consistent with B.
However, the generalization of equation (2.1) to the multiple level is not that
immediate. In fact, the Levi identity consists of an equational description of the
above described two step process which is based on the fact that the result of the
removal of ¬α from K (i.e. any set K−¬α, where − is a contraction on K) is a
subset of K which is consistent with α. Nevertheless, there is not an equally obvious
(analogous) way of obtaining a subset of K which is consistent with a given set of
sentences B, i.e., it is not a trivial task to obtain, by means of a given multiple
91We must notice that this is a straightforward generalization to the case of changes (of belief
sets) by sets of sentences of the concept of expansion of a belief set by a single sentence presented
in Definition 2.2.1. For that reason and because there is no risk of ambiguity we shall use the same
terminology (expansion) and notation (+) to represent both the operation of expansion of a belief
set by a single sentence and the operation of expansion of a belief set by a set of sentences.
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contraction ÷ on K, a subset of K which is consistent with B.
Indeed, by analogy with what is the case in the singleton contraction level, given
a belief set K, an arbitrary set of sentences B and a multiple contraction ÷ on K,
in order to obtain, by means of ÷, a subset of K which is consistent with B, it
is necessary to start by generalizing the concept of negation (of a sentence) to the
case of sets of sentences. Or, to be more precise, it is necessary to find a way of
obtaining, for any given set of sentences B, another set of sentences, say ¬B, which
is such that the result of the multiple contraction of K by ¬B (i.e. K÷¬B) is (a
subset of K which is) consistent with B.
Having this in mind, in [Han91a, Han92, Han99b], given any set of sentences B,
Hansson showed that a set ¬B satisfying the above mentioned conditions, can be
obtained as described in the following definition:
Definition 5.6.1 ([Han91a],[Han92],[Han99b, Definition 3.35]) Let B be any
set of sentences. The negation of B, denoted ¬B, is the set (of sentences) such that
β ∈ ¬B if and only if β is either
1. ⊥
2. a negation of some sentence in B, or
3. a (finite) disjunction of sentences which are negations of elements of B.
Afterwards, making use of the above introduced concept of negation of a set (of
sentences), Hansson proposed, in [Han91a, Han92], the following straightforward
generalization of the Levi identity to the case of changes by sets:
K⊕B = Cn((K÷¬B) ∪B) (5.1)
In [Han91a] two alternative designations were used to refer to the above equation,
namely Levi identity for sets and generalized Levi identity. Throughout the present
text we shall use only the latter of those designations to refer to equation (5.1).
At this point it is also worth to remark that, for finite sets of sentences B, an
alternative simpler way of obtaining a set whose contraction from a belief set K is (a
subset of K) consistent with B was presented in [Han91a, Han92, Han99b]. Such a
set was designated by sentential negation of B in [Han99b] and is defined as follows:
Definition 5.6.2 ([Han91a],[Han92, Def. 11],[Han99b, Def. 3.36]) Let B be
any finite set of sentences. The sentential negation of B, denoted n(B), is the set
(of sentences) such that:
1. If B = ∅, then n(B) = {⊥}.
2. If B is a singleton set, B = {β}, then n(B) = {¬β}.
3. If B = {β1, . . . , βm} for some m > 1, then n(B) = {¬β1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬βm}.
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We must yet mention that in [Han99b] it was shown that if ÷ is a partial meet
multiple contraction on a belief set K, then the result of removing (by means of
that function) the negation of B, ¬B, coincides with the result of removing the
sentential negation of B, n(B), from K. This fact is more formally stated in the
following observation.
Observation 5.6.3 ([Han91a],[Han99b, Observation 3.37]) Let K be a belief
set and ÷ be a partial meet multiple contraction on K. Then, for any finite set of
sentences B, it holds that K÷¬B = K÷n(B).
5.6.2 Set Contraction
In this subsection we briefly present the notion of set contraction− a kind of multiple
change operation which was introduced by Dongmo Zhang, in [Zha96].92
The operation of set contraction can not be seen as a generalization to the case
of changes of belief sets by sets of sentences of any of the three basic operations of
change of belief sets (cf. Section 2.3). However we may say that it was inspired
by the Levi identity (i.e. equation (2.1)) which provides a method for defining
(singleton) revisions from (singleton) contractions. Indeed, given a belief set K, in
general, the expression set contraction on K designates a function, say 	 from P(L)
to TL whose output for an arbitrary argument B, denoted K	B, is a logically closed
subset of K which is consistent with the set B (i.e. (K	B) ∪ B is a consistent set
of sentences).
In [Zha96], the class of set contractions was defined as consisting of the family
of functions from TL × P(L) to TL that satisfied a certain set of eight postulates,
namely the postulates (	1)− (	8) listed in [ZF01, Subsection 2.2], which are essen-
tially a generalization for set contraction of the basic and the supplementary AGM
postulates for contraction.93 Later, in [ZCZC97], another postulate for set contrac-
tion was proposed, namely the postulate (	6S) (see, e.g., [ZF01, pp. 531]) which is
equivalent to (	6) in the presence of (	7) and (	8). Following [ZF01], throughout
this text we shall refer to the postulates (	1) − (	5) and (	6S) as the basic pos-
tulates for set contraction and to postulates (	7) and (	8) as the supplementary
postulates for set contraction.
In that same paper Zhang presented also the definition of set revision94 by in-
dicating a list of eight postulates, namely postulates (⊗1) − (⊗8) listed in [ZF01,
Subsection 2.1], whose satisfaction by a function ⊗ : TL×P(L)→ TL is a necessary
and sufficient condition for that function to be a set revision. Those postulates are
the result of the generalization to the case of revision by sets of sentences of the
basic and the supplementary AGM postulates for revision and, as it is remarked in
92The term set contraction which is currently used for designating the operations that we will
present in this subsection was proposed in [ZF01]. In [Zha96] those operations were designated by
general contractions.
93We must notice that the list of eight postulates for set contraction presented in [ZF01] consti-
tutes, in fact, a revised version of the one that was (originally) presented in [Zha96]. Nevertheless,
those two sets of postulates are equivalent.
94The term set revision is used as meaning the same as multiple revision. Such term was proposed
in [ZF01]. In [Zha96] those operations were designated by general revisions.
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[ZF01], that set of postulates is the result of the refinement by Lindstro¨m ([Lin91])
and Nayak ([Nay94]) of the list of postulates for multiple belief revision that was
introduced by Fuhrmann ([Fuh88]).
Still in [Zha96], based on the concept of set contraction Zhang proposed a gener-
alization of the Levi identity (i.e. equation (2.1)) which differs from the one proposed
by Hansson (that we have presented in the previous subsection). More precisely, in
the mentioned paper, it was shown that if 	 is a set contraction on a belief set K,
then the operation ⊗ defined, for any set of sentences B, by the following equation:
K⊗B = (K	B)+B (Def ⊗)
is a set revision on K.
Furthermore, given a set revision function ⊗ on K, in [Zha96] it was also shown
that the operation 	 obtained from it by means of the following generalization of
the Harper identity (i.e. equation (2.2)):
K	B = (K⊗B) ∩K (Def 	)
is a set contraction on K.
In the following observation the above mentioned facts are stated more formally
and detailedly:
Observation 5.6.4 ([Zha96]) The following statements hold:
(i) If the function 	 : TL ×P(L)→ TL satisfies the postulates (	1)− (	8), then
the function ⊗ : TL × P(L)→ TL obtained from 	 by means of equation (Def
⊗) satisfies the postulates (⊗1)− (⊗8) as well as the identity (Def 	).
(ii) If the function ⊗ : TL ×P(L)→ TL satisfies the postulates (⊗1)− (⊗8), then
the function 	 : TL × P(L)→ TL obtained from ⊗ by means of equation (Def
	) satisfies the postulates (	1)− (	8) as well as the identity (Def ⊗).
Other contribution of [Zha96] which is worth to mention here consists of a con-
structive model for set contraction which is based on the concept of nicely-ordered
partition (NOP) of a belief set (introduced in [Zha96, Definition 5.2]). Regarding
the latter mentioned concept, in that same paper, on the one hand it is shown that
a NOP is, in a certain sense, equivalent to an epistemic entrenchment ordering95
but, on the other hand, it is argued that the notion of NOP is more intuitive than
that of epistemic entrenchment.
Latter, in [ZCZC97], regarding the relationship between the operations of mul-
tiple contraction and of set contraction it was stated that a set contraction can be
defined by means of a partial meet multiple contraction (cf. Definition 5.3.2 and Ob-
servation 5.5.1) and, conversely a partial meet multiple contraction can be partially
defined in terms of a set contraction.
95More precisely, in [Zha96, Section 6] it is shown how a NOP can be obtained from a binary
relation ≤ on L satisfying the epistemic entrenchment postulates (EE1)−(EE3) (cf. Definition
3.4.1) and, conversely, it is exposed how a NOP can be used to define a binary relation ≤ on L
satisfying the epistemic entrenchment postulates (EE1)−(EE4).
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Before explicitly presenting the results on that respect that were exposed in
[ZCZC97] it is convenient to observe here that, as we have described in the previous
subsection, the generalization of the Levi identity to the case of multiple change
operations presented by Hansson is based on the concept of negation of a set of
sentences (cf. Definition 5.6.1) which was introduced with the goal of assuring
that, given a belief set K, a multiple contraction ÷ on K and any set of sentences
B, the result of the multiple contraction of K by ¬B (i.e. K÷¬B) would be (a
set of sentences) consistent with B while, on the other hand, the operation of set
contraction proposed by Zhang is such that the result of set contracting K by the
set B itself, i.e. K	B, is consistent with B.
Having remarked this, it is now time to paraphrase here two observations that
were presented (without however an associated proof) in the mentioned paper:
Observation 5.6.5 ([ZCZC97]) Let K be a belief set and ÷ be a partial meet
multiple contraction on K. Then the function 	 : P(L) → TL (on K) defined, for
any set of sentences B, by:
K	B = K÷
⇀
B,
where
⇀
B = {α ∈ L : ∃β1, . . . βn ∈ B(α = ¬β1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬βn)}, satisfies the basic
postulates for set contraction.96
Observation 5.6.6 ([ZCZC97]) Let P∨(L) = {B ∈ P(L) : ∀α, β ∈ B(α ∨ β ∈
B)}, K be a belief set and 	 : P(L)→ TL be a function on K that satisfies the basic
postulates for set contraction. Then the function ÷ : P∨(L) → TL (on K) defined,
for any set of sentences B ∈ P∨, by:
K÷B = K	
⇁
B,
where
⇁
B = {¬α : α ∈ B}, is a partial meet multiple contraction on K.
Afterwards, in [ZCZC97, ZF01], Zhang et al. introduced a partial meet model for
set contraction. The functions presented in that context consist of a generalization
to the case of set contraction of the partial meet (singleton) contractions. Moreover,
in those papers two representation theorems for those functions have been obtained,
one involving (only) the basic postulates for set contractions (see, e.g., [ZF01, The-
orem 3.13]) and another one involving the basic and the supplementary postulates
for set contractions (see, e.g., [ZF01, Theorem 3.26]).
Also in [ZCZC97, ZF01] a definition for NOP-based contractions was introduced
(see, e.g., [ZF01, Definition 4.4]) which differs from the one that had been originally
provided in [Zha96]. Moreover, in those references a representation theorem for such
functions has been presented (see, e.g., [ZF01, Theorem 4.19]) which asserts that a
function 	 : TL × P(L) → TL is a NOP-based contraction if and only if it satisfies
the (above mentioned) postulates (	1) − (	8) (for set contraction) as well as an
additional postulate, which, in the mentioned papers, has been designated by Limit
96At this point is worth to remark that for any non-empty set of sentences B it holds that
⇀
B = ¬B, where ¬B is the negation of B introduced in Definition 5.6.1.
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Postulate (for set contraction) and denoted by (	LP ). Such postulate is essentially
a principle concerning the relationship between the result of the set contraction of
a belief set by an infinite set and the results of the set contractions (of that same
belief set) by the finite subsets of that infinite set and its precise formulation can be
found in, e.g., [ZF01, pp. 548].
Recently, in [Pep], Pavlos Peppas has presented a constructive model for set
contraction which can be seen as a generalization of the NOP-based contraction
in the sense that the class of set contractions there introduced is axiomatically
characterized by the postulates (	1)−(	8) for set contraction proposed by Dongmo
Zhang that we have mentioned in the beginning of the present subsection. It is
convenient to emphasise here that, contrary to what is the case in what concerns
the representation theorem for the NOP-based contractions presented in [ZCZC97,
ZF01], the axiomatic characterization of the functions proposed by Peppas does not
include the limit postulate and, for that reason, we can conclude that the class of
such functions subsumes the one consisting of the NOP-based contractions.
The constructive model for set contraction proposed in [Pep] is based on the con-
cept of comparative possibility preorder which is, loosely speaking, a binary relation
6 on the set of nonempty sets of sentences, i.e. on P(L) \ {∅} that satisfies a set of
axioms, namely, conditions (CP1)−(CP6) listed in [Pep, Section 4]. In that same
paper it is remarked that comparative possibility preorders are a generalization of
the epistemic entrenchment relations (in the sense of being a preorder on sets of
sentences rather than (simply) a preorder on sentences). Furthermore it is there
shown that, if 6 is a comparative possibility preorder then the binary relation  on
L defined by the following condition:
α  β iff {¬β} 6 {¬α} (PE)
is an epistemic entrenchment (cf. [Pep, Theorem 2]).
Given a belief set K, making use of an arbitrary comparative possibility preorder
6 related to K, in [Pep] a function −˙ : P(L) \ {∅} → TL is defined by means of the
following condition:
α ∈ K−˙B iff α ∈ K and B ∪ {¬α} < B ∪ {α}. (PC)
Moreover, in the mentioned paper it was proven that the class of functions which
are defined from a comparative possibility preorder by means of the above condition
coincides with the class formed by all the functions 	 which satisfy postulates (	1)−
(	8) for set contraction. Part of the proof for such fact that is presented in [Pep]
makes use of the binary relation6 on P(L)\{∅} that is defined from a set contraction
−˙ on a belief set K by means of the following condition:
B 6 C iff C is consistent with K−˙(B g C) or B ` ⊥, (SP)
where B g C = {α ∨ β : B ` α and C ` β}.
The above described facts are more detailedly and formally stated in the following
observation:
Observation 5.6.7 ([Pep, Theorems 3− 5]) Let K be a belief set. The following
statements hold:
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1. If 6 is a comparative possibility preorder related to K then the function −˙
constructed from 6 via condition (PC) is a set contraction function satisfying
postulates (	1)− (	8) as well as condition (SP).
2. If −˙ is a set contraction function satisfying (	1)−(	8) then the binary relation
6 constructed from −˙ by means of condition (SP) is a comparative possibility
preorder related to K which satisfies condition (PC).97
In what follows we shall designate the set contraction function −˙ that is gen-
erated from a comparative possibility preorder 6 by means of condition (PC) by
6-based set contraction or, more generally, by comparative possibility preorder-based
set contraction.
According to the above observation the comparative possibility preorder-based
set contractions are axiomatically characterized by the postulates (	1) − (	8). In
particular this means that such functions are independent from the limit postulate.
Nevertheless, in [Pep], having in mind the relevance of such postulate (which is
included, in addition to postulates (	1) − (	8), in the axiomatic characterization
of the NOP-based contractions that was presented in [ZCZC97, ZF01]), Peppas
identified three properties that a comparative possibility preorder 6 must satisfy
in order that the 6-based set contraction satisfies the limit postulate (cf. [Pep,
Theorem 7]).
5.6.3 System of Spheres-based Multiple Revision
In this subsection we will briefly present the constructive model for multiple revi-
sion that was introduced by Pavlos Peppas in [Pep04]. Such model consists of a
generalization of the system of spheres-based method for constructing revisions (by
one single sentence) proposed by Grove (in [Gro88]) to account for revisions by any
nonempty set of sentences.98
We must start by remarking that, in the mentioned paper, a multiple revision
is defined as a function ⊕ : TL × (P(L) \ {∅})→ TL which satisfies a certain set of
eight postulates − namely the postulates (K ⊕ 1) − (K ⊕ 8) listed in [Pep04, pp.
365] − which are essentially the generalization to the case of multiple revision of the
basic and the supplementary AGM postulates for revision (by one single sentence)
presented in Subsection 2.4.2.99
In what follows we present the explicit construction of system of spheres-based
multiple revisions which was proposed by Peppas as well as the main results ob-
tained in [Pep04] regarding such class of functions, among which we emphasise a
representation theorem asserting that the mentioned class of functions coincides with
97This fact is shown to hold in [Pep, Proof of Theorem 4].
98In the mentioned paper it is remarked that if one extends the domain of such functions by
identifying the (result of the) revision by the empty set with the (result of the) revision by a
singleton containing a tautology then all the results that have been there presented remain valid.
99At this point it is worth to observe that the list of postulates for multiple revision (K ⊕ 1)−
(K⊕8) that is presented in [Pep04] coincides with the list of postulates for set revision (⊗1)−(⊗8)
which we have mentioned in the previous subsection.
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the class consisting of the functions which satisfy the above mentioned postulates
(K ⊕ 1)− (K ⊕ 8) (cf. Observation 5.6.8).100
Having in mind the definition of system of spheres-based revisions (by one single
sentence) proposed by Grove in [Gro88], given a belief set K and a system of spheres
S centred on ‖K‖, we are naturally led to define the S-based multiple revision on K
as the function ⊕S : P(L) \ {∅} → TL defined by:
K⊕S B =
{
Th(fS(B)) , if ‖B‖ 6= ∅
L , otherwise , (⊕S)
with fS(B) = ‖B‖ ∩ SB, where SB is the smallest sphere in S intersecting ‖B‖.
Nevertheless, the generalization of Grove’s construction is not as straightforward
as that. Indeed, in [Pep04] it is observed that, in order for the function ⊕S defined
by (⊕S) to satisfy the postulates (K ⊕ 1)− (K ⊕ 8) it is necessary that the system
of spheres S on which such definition is based satisfies the two following conditions:
For every nonempty consistent set of sentences B, there exists a small-
est sphere in S intersecting ‖B‖. (SM)
For every nonempty B ⊆ L, if there exists a smallest sphere SB in S in-
tersecting ‖B‖, then ‖B‖ ∩ SB is elementary . (SD)
The notion of elementary set of possible worlds that is mentioned in the formu-
lation of the latter condition above can be introduced as follows: A set U of possible
worlds is elementary if and only if it holds that ‖Th(U)‖ = U .
In [Pep04] the expression well ranked system of spheres was introduced to desig-
nate a system of spheres that satisfies conditions (SM) and (SD).
We are now in a position to present the following representation theorem, ob-
tained in [Pep04], which asserts that the class of functions defined from well ranked
systems of spheres by means of (⊕S) coincides with the class consisting of all func-
tions that satisfy the postulates (K ⊕ 1)− (K ⊕ 8).
Observation 5.6.8 ([Pep04, Theorems 5.1 and 5.2]) Let K be a belief set and
⊕ be a function (from P(L)\{∅} to TL). Then ⊕ satisfies postulates (K⊕1)−(K⊕8)
if and only if there exists a well ranked system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖ such
that, for any nonempty set of sentences B, it holds that K ⊕ B = K ⊕S B, where
K⊕S B is the belief set defined by equation (⊕S).
In what follows, given a belief set K, we shall use the expression system of
spheres-based multiple revision on K to designate any function ⊕ : P(L)\{∅} → TL
such that, for any nonempty set of sentences B, it holds that K ⊕ B = K ⊕S B,
where S is a well ranked system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and K ⊕S B is defined
from S by means of (⊕S).
Throughout this text, given a belief set K and a well ranked system of spheres
centred on ‖K‖, we shall refer to the function ⊕S defined by (⊕S) as the S-based
multiple revision on K. We shall also use the expression system of spheres-based
100We notice that, according to [Pep04, Footnote 8], Lindstro¨m ([Lin91]) was the first to state,
without proving it, that Grove’s results can be generalized to the case of multiple revision.
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multiple revision on K to designate any function that can be generated from a well
ranked system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ by means of (⊕S). It follows from the above
observation that the system of spheres-based multiple revisions on K are precisely
those (multiple revision) functions that satisfy postulates (K ⊕ 1)− (K ⊕ 8).
We close this subsection with the presentation of another interesting result ob-
tained in [Pep04], which consists of a way of defining multiple revisions by means of
revisions by one single sentence.
In this regard, Peppas started by remarking that, if ⊕ : TL × (P(L) \ {∅}) →
TL is a function that satisfies postulates (K ⊕ 1) − (K ⊕ 8), then the function
∗ : TL × (P(L) \ {∅}) → TL defined, for any belief set K and any sentence α
by K∗α = K⊕{α}, satisfies the basic and the supplementary AGM postulates for
revision (by one single sentence). In [Pep04] the function ∗ defined as exposed above
is designated by the restriction to sentences of the multiple revision function ⊕.
With the goal of presenting a way of constructing a multiple revision from a
revision by single sentences, Peppas started by remarking that it follows trivially
from condition (⊕S) that, if K is a belief set, ⊕ is a system of spheres-based multiple
revision on K, and ∗ is its restriction to sentences then, for any nonempty finite set
of sentences B, it holds that K⊕B = K∗∧B (where for a nonempty finite set of
sentences B,
∧
B denotes the conjunction of all elements of B).
However, the above identity is no longer valid when B is an infinite set of sen-
tences (since, by assumption, L does not contain infinite conjunctions). There-
fore, in [Pep04], a different way of reducing multiple revision (by infinite sets) to
revision by a single sentence had to be presented. In order to expose such re-
duction strategy we need to start by introducing the following notation: Given a
nonempty set of sentences B we shall use the notation
∧
f (B) to represent the set∧
f (B) = {
∧
F : F is a nonempty, finite subset of B}.
Given a multiple revision function ⊕ on a belief set K and its restriction to
sentences ∗, Peppas proposed the following identity as a reasonable property inter-
connecting those two functions:
K⊕B =
⋂
α∈∧f (B)
((K∗α)+B) . (⊕− ∗)
Nevertheless, in [Pep04] it was observed that not all multiple revision functions
satisfy the above condition. More precisely, in the mentioned paper it was shown
that, a system of spheres-based multiple revision ⊕ satisfies condition (⊕−∗) if and
only if it is generated, by means of (⊕S), from a well ranked system of spheres S
which (additionally) satisfies the following condition:
For every G ⊆ S,
⋃
G is elementary. (SF)
The above mentioned fact is more formally stated in the following observation:
Observation 5.6.9 ([Pep04, Theorem 6.1]) Let K be a belief set, S be a well
ranked system of spheres centred on ‖K‖, ⊕ be the S-based multiple revision on K,
and ∗ be its restriction to sentences. Then S satisfies (SF) if and only if ⊕ satisfies
(⊕− ∗).

Chapter 6
Possible Worlds Semantics for
Partial Meet Multiple Contraction
Functions
In this chapter our main goal is to obtain the possible worlds semantics for the
partial meet multiple contractions. To achieve that, we will start by finding out a
relation between the package remainder set of K by B and a certain set of possible
worlds, which is the analogous, in the multiple case, to the relation between a
singleton remainder set of K by α and the set ‖¬α‖, for each sentence α ∈ K,
that is expressed by Grove’s bijection (Observation 4.1.1-3). Afterwards, by making
use of such relation we present the characterization of the partial meet multiple
contractions in terms of possible worlds.
It is also worth to anticipate here that such results will play an essential role
in the following chapter, namely in what concerns the construction of a suitable
generalization of the definition of the S.S.-based (singleton) contractions to the mul-
tiple case. Indeed, having in mind that in the singleton case it was by means of the
characterization of the remainders (by a single sentence) in terms of possible worlds
(cf. Observation 4.1.1) that we have shown that every S.S.-based contraction is a
(transitively relational) partial meet contraction (cf. Observation 4.1.9), it seems
natural that, a first step when searching for the generalization of the S.S.-based
contraction to the case of multiple contractions (in a way that such new operation
is also a partial meet multiple contraction) should be to obtain the characterization
of the remainders by sets of sentences (rather than by a single sentence) in terms of
possible worlds.
Hence, in what follows we first introduce, in Section 6.1, the possible worlds
semantics for the remainders by (not necessarily singleton) sets of sentences. Af-
terwards, in Section 6.2, based on those results we investigate the possible worlds
semantics of the full meet multiple contraction. Finally, in Section 6.3 we present
the possible world semantics for the partial meet multiple contractions (in general).
The main results of the present chapter appear also in [RF].
97
98 CHAPTER 6. POSSIBLE WORLDS SEM. FOR PAR. MEET MULTIPLE C.
6.1 Possible Worlds Semantics for Package Re-
mainders
We start by observing that, in the singleton case, the main virtue and usefulness
of Grove’s bijection (Observation 4.1.1-3) consists in the fact that it provides us
with the possibility of defining and identifying remainders (by a single sentence) by
means of a possible worlds-based approach (cf. Remark 4.1.2).
In this section we will expand that possibility to the multiple case. In other
words we will investigate how remainders by sets of sentences (rather than by a
single sentence) − which are also designated by package remainders (e.g. in [FH94,
Definition 5]) − can be characterized in terms of possible worlds.
Let K be a belief set and B be a set of sentences. We start by noticing that it
follows immediately from Definition 3.1.1 that:
If B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅, then K⊥B = ∅.
On the other hand, in what concerns the case B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅, a rough analogy
with the singleton case (cf. Remark 4.1.2) might lead us to expect that, if B∩K 6= ∅,
it should be the case that if X ∈ K⊥B then ‖X‖ = ‖K‖ ∪W , where W ⊆ML is
a set composed of one and only one ¬αi-world for each αi ∈ B ∩K. Nevertheless
a more careful analysis shows that the generalization of Grove’s bijection to the
multiple case is not that straightforward since, as we will see further ahead, for
some X ∈ K⊥B and some αi ∈ B ∩K, the set ‖X‖ may contain more than one
¬αi-world.
However, the slightly weaker result that if X ∈ K⊥B then ‖X‖ = ‖K‖ ∪ N ,
where N contains at least one ¬αi-world for each αi ∈ B ∩K, can be shown to hold
if B is a finite set, as we can see in the following observation:
Observation 6.1.1 Let K be a belief set and B be a finite set of sentences such
that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. If X ∈ K⊥B then
‖X‖ = ‖K‖ ∪ N ,
where N ⊆ML is such that:
1. N ⊆ ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B}.
2. N ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 6= ∅, for all αi ∈ B ∩K.
Proof. A proof for this observation can be found in page 183.
Let K be a belief set and B be a finite set of sentences. The above result assures
that it holds that the set of possible worlds for any given remainder set X ∈ K⊥B,
with B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅, must contain at lest one ¬αi-world for each αi ∈ B ∩ K.
However, contrary to what is the case in the singleton version (where the set of
possible worlds for any given remainder set of K by ϕ, for some ϕ ∈ K \ Cn(∅),
must contain one and only one ¬ϕ-world (see Observation 4.1.1-1)), in the multiple
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case it may happen that, even for some αi ∈ B ∩ K101, there is more than one
¬αi-world included in ‖X‖.
Notwithstanding, in what follows we will see that if X ∈ K⊥B, then X =
Th(‖K‖ ∪W), for some W ⊆ML such that, on the one hand, W contains at least
one ¬αi-world for each αi ∈ B ∩K and, on the other hand, if W ∈ W then W is
the only ¬αj-world included in W , for some αj ∈ B ∩K. More precisely, we will
show that, given a belief set K and a finite set of sentences B, if X ∈ K⊥B, then
X = Th(‖K‖ ∪W), for some W ⊆ ⋃αi∈B ‖¬αi‖ such that:
(i) W ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 6= ∅, for all αi ∈ B ∩K.
(ii) If W ∈ W then there is some αi ∈ B ∩K such that W ∩ ‖¬αi‖ = {W}.
To see that this indeed holds, we start by formally introducing, in the following
definition, the set WK⊥B composed by all the sets of possible worlds that satisfy
conditions (i) and (ii) mentioned above.
Definition 6.1.2 Let K be a belief set and B be a set of sentences. We denote by
WK⊥B the subset of P (
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩K}) such that W ∈ WK⊥B if and only
if:
1. W ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 6= ∅, for all αi ∈ B ∩K.
2. If M ∈ W then there is some αj ∈ B ∩K such that W ∩ ‖¬αj‖ = {M}.
Figures 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 contain several possible graphical representations
of different sets of the form ‖K‖ ∪ W , with W ⊆ ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩ K}, for
some belief set K and some set of sentences B ⊆ K \ Cn(∅). The mentioned
figures illustrate four different situations in what concerns the set W . Figure 6.1
exemplifies a situation in which B = {α1, α2}, W ∈ WK⊥B and, furthermore, for
each αi ∈ B ∩K there is one and only one ¬αi-world in W . Figure 6.2 illustrates
a situation where B = {α1, α2, α3} and W ∈ WK⊥B, but there is one αi ∈ B ∩K
such that there is more than one ¬αi-world inW . Figure 6.3 represents an example
where B = {α1, α2} and W 6∈ WK⊥B because there is one world in W that is not
the only ¬αi-world for any αi ∈ B ∩K. Finally, Figure 6.4 represents an example
where B = {α1, α2, α3} andW 6∈WK⊥B becauseW does not contain any ¬αj-world
for some αj ∈ B ∩K.
Now, given a belief set K and a set of sentences B, we investigate the composition
of the set WK⊥B in each of the following possible situations concerning the set B:
(a) B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅, (b) B ∩K = ∅ and (c) B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ and B ∩K 6= ∅.
We start by introducing the following Lemma:
Lemma 6.1.3 Let K be a belief set, B be a finite set of sentences and N be a subset
of ML. If N ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 6= ∅, for all αi ∈ B ∩K, then there is some set N ′ such that
N ′ ⊆ N and N ′ ∈WK⊥B.102
101Note that if αi ∈ B \K it can obviously be the case that there is more than one ¬αi-world
included in ‖K‖.
102Notice that from N ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 6= ∅, for all αi ∈ B ∩K, it follows that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. Indeed,
assume by reductio that there is some αj ∈ B ∩ Cn(∅). Then, on the one hand αj ∈ B ∩K and,
on the other hand ‖¬αj‖ = ∅. Hence, there is some αj ∈ B ∩K such that N ∩ ‖¬αj‖ = ∅, which
is a contradiction.
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Figure 6.1: Graphical representation of a set of possible worlds of the form ‖K‖∪W ,
with W ∈WK⊥B, where K is a belief set and B = {α1, α2} ⊆ K \ Cn(∅).
Figure 6.2: Graphical representation of a set of possible worlds of the form ‖K‖∪W ,
with W ∈WK⊥B, where K is a belief set and B = {α1, α2, α3} ⊆ K \ Cn(∅).
Proof. A proof for this lemma can be found in page 184.
Making use of the above lemma we can conclude that the set WK⊥B is composed
as indicated in the following observation.
Observation 6.1.4 Let K be a belief set and B be a finite set of sentences. Then
the following statements hold:
1. B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ if and only if WK⊥B = ∅.
2. B ∩K = ∅ if and only if WK⊥B = {∅}.
3. B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ and B ∩K 6= ∅ if and only if WK⊥B 6= ∅ and ∅ 6∈WK⊥B.
Proof. A proof for this observation can be found in page 185.
6.1. POSSIBLE WORLDS SEMANTICS FOR PACKAGE REMAINDERS 101
Figure 6.3: Graphical representation of a set of possible worlds of the form ‖K‖∪W ,
with W 6∈WK⊥B, where K is a belief set and B = {α1, α2} ⊆ K \ Cn(∅).
Figure 6.4: Graphical representation of a set of possible worlds of the form ‖K‖∪W ,
with W 6∈WK⊥B, where K is a belief set and B = {α1, α2, α3} ⊆ K \ Cn(∅).
At this point it is convenient to notice that in the special case K = Cn(∅) it
holds, for any finite set of sentences B, that either WK⊥B = ∅ or WK⊥B = {∅}.
This fact is explained in more detail in the following remark:
Remark 6.1.5 Let K = Cn(∅) and B be a finite set of sentences. Then it follows
immediately from Observation 6.1.4 above that:
1. B ∩K 6= ∅ if and only if WK⊥B = ∅.
2. B ∩K = ∅ if and only if WK⊥B = {∅}.
Having defined the set WK⊥B, for a belief set K and any set of sentences B and,
moreover, analysed its composition for different situations concerning the set B, in
the following theorem we present the relation between WK⊥B and K⊥B.
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Theorem 6.1.6 Let K be a belief set and B be a finite set of sentences. Then:
1. If W ∈WK⊥B then X = Th(‖K‖ ∪W) ∈ K⊥B.
2. If X ∈ K⊥B then there is some W ∈WK⊥B such that X = Th(‖K‖ ∪W).
Proof. A proof for this theorem can be found in page 186.
An immediate consequence of the above observation is the fact that there is a
surjective function from WK⊥B to K⊥B, for any belief set K and any finite set
of sentences B, as stated in the following corollary. Throughout this chapter such
surjection will play an analogous role to the one played by Grove’s bijection (see
Observation 4.1.1) in the singleton case.
Corollary 6.1.7 Let K be a belief set and B be a finite set of sentences. Then the
function
t : WK⊥B → K⊥B
W 7→ Th(‖K‖ ∪W)
is surjective.
Let K be a belief set and B be a finite set of sentences. By means of the above
presented surjective function from WK⊥B to K⊥B we can obtain the definition of
the latter of these sets in terms of possible worlds that is presented in the following
corollary (which, to some extent, generalizes Remark 4.1.2 to the multiple contrac-
tion case).
Corollary 6.1.8 Let K be a belief set and B be a finite set of sentences. Then
K⊥B = {Th(‖K‖ ∪W) :W ∈WK⊥B}.
The following remark clarifies why and how the the surjective function introduced
in Corollary 6.1.7 can be seen as a generalization of Grove’s bijection (Observation
4.1.1-3) to the multiple case.
Remark 6.1.9 Notice that the function t introduced in Corollary 6.1.7 above can be
seen as a generalization of the function g presented in Observation 4.1.1-3 (Grove’s
bijection) to the case of remainders of K by (not necessarily singleton) sets of sen-
tences B. This is true in the sense that, whenever B is a singleton set (such that
B ∩K 6= ∅), the function t coincides with the function g. To see this, let ϕ be an
arbitrary sentence such that ϕ ∈ K and consider on the one hand Grove’s bijection
g : ‖¬ϕ‖ → K⊥ϕ (as defined in Observation 4.1.1-3) and, on the other hand the
function t : WK⊥{ϕ} → K⊥{ϕ} defined in Corollary 6.1.7. It follows from Defini-
tion 6.1.2 that WK⊥{ϕ} = {{W} : W ∈ ‖¬ϕ‖}. Hence, if we identify each world
W ∈ ‖¬ϕ‖ with the singleton set {W}, then the set ‖¬ϕ‖ is identified with the set
WK⊥{ϕ}, i.e. the functions g and t can be regarded as having the same domain. On
the other hand, since K⊥ϕ = K⊥{ϕ}, then r and t also have the same codomain.
And finally, it additionally holds that g(W ) = Th(‖K‖∪ {W}) = t({W}), for every
W ∈ ‖¬ϕ‖ (or, equivalently, for every {W} ∈WK⊥{ϕ}).
Observe also that from the above we can conclude that the function t is a bijective
function whenever B is a singleton set.
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At this point it is worth noticing that, since any partial meet multiple contraction
is, roughly speaking, given by intersections of remainders, the above results will play
a very relevant role in the remaining of this work. More precisely, in what remains
of the present chapter we will make use of the above presented possible worlds-based
characterization of the remainders by sets of sentences to obtain the possible worlds
semantics for the partial meet multiple contractions.
6.2 Possible Worlds Semantics for Full Meet Mul-
tiple Contraction
Having in mind, our goal of obtaining the characterization of the partial meet mul-
tiple contractions in terms of possible worlds, we will start by considering, in this
section, the limiting case of the full meet multiple contraction (see Definition 5.3.3).
More precisely, by making use of the surjective function between the sets WK⊥B
and K⊥B, for a belief set K and a finite set of sentences B, presented in Corol-
lary 6.1.7, we will show how the full meet multiple contraction by finite sets can
be defined when considering a possible worlds-based approach. Afterwards, as a
consequence of such characterization of the full meet multiple contraction in terms
of possible worlds, we will obtain a syntactic formula for the full meet multiple
contraction by finite sets which generalizes the result of Observation 4.1.7 to the
multiple contraction case. Additionally, we will identify which worlds compose the
set ‖K ·∼· C‖ for any finite set of sentences C, where ·∼· is the full meet multiple
contraction on K.
We start by recalling that, according to Definition 5.3.3, the full meet multiple
contraction ·∼· on a belief set K is such that K ·∼·B = K, if B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅, and
K ·∼·B =
⋂
K⊥B, if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. Hence, having in mind Corollary 6.1.8, we can
easily show that the following observation holds:
Observation 6.2.1 Let K be a belief set and ·∼· be the full meet multiple contraction
on K. Then
K ·∼·B =
⋂(
‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
WK⊥B
))
= K ∩
(⋂(⋃
WK⊥B
))
, 103
for all finite sets of sentences B.
Proof. A proof for this observation can be found in page 187.
Having seen this, we will now investigate which worlds are included in the set⋃
WK⊥B, for any belief set K and any finite set of sentences B.
Observation 6.2.2 Let K be a belief set and B a set of sentences. Then:
1. If B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ or B ∩K = ∅ then ⋃WK⊥B = ∅.
103Notice that, in the case
⋃
WK⊥B = ∅, the identity
⋂
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃WK⊥B)) = (⋂ ‖K‖) ∩
(
⋂
(
⋃
WK⊥B)) is valid due to the fact that Th(∅) =
⋂ ∅ = L (according to Definition 3.3.2).
Furthermore note that, in that case, K ∩ (⋂ (⋃WK⊥B)) = K ∩ L = K.
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2.
⋃
WK⊥B ⊆
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩K}.
3. If B ∩K = ∅, then ⋃WK⊥B = ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩K}.
4. If K = Cn(∅) then ⋃WK⊥B = ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩K}.
Proof. A proof for this observation can be found in page 188.
From the above observation we can conclude that there are several conditions
on K and B under which it holds that
⋃
WK⊥B =
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩ K}.
However this identity does not hold in general. In fact, we will start our study of
the composition of the set
⋃
WK⊥B for any belief set K and any finite set B such
that B∩Cn(∅) = ∅ and B∩K 6= ∅104 by clarifying, by means of (the counterexample
provided within the proof of) the following observation that, in general, provided
that K 6= Cn(∅)105, it does not hold that ⋃WK⊥B = ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩K} (even
if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅106).
Observation 6.2.3 Let K a belief set and B be a set of sentences such that K 6=
Cn(∅) and B ∩K 6= ∅. Then:
1. It may not hold that
⋃
WK⊥B =
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩ K} (whether or not
B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅106).
2. If M is a world such that
(i) M ∈ ‖¬αj‖ for some αj ∈ B ∩K,
(ii) M 6∈ ‖¬αl‖ for every αl ∈ B \ {αj}, and
(iii) there is some αr ∈ B ∩K such that ‖¬αr‖ ⊂ ‖¬αj‖
then M 6∈ ⋃WK⊥B.
Proof. A proof for this observation can be found in page 188.
Figure 6.5 contains a possible graphical representation of a situation where the
world M , there represented, satisfies the conditions stated in Point 2. of the above
observation and, therefore, it is such that M ∈ ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩K} but M 6∈⋃
WK⊥B, for a belief set K and a finite set of sentences B such that K 6= Cn(∅)
and B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅.
Having seen this, at this point all we can say regarding the explicit description
of the worlds that compose the set
⋃
WK⊥B, for any belief set K and any finite set
104The case B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ or B ∩K = ∅ has already been considered in Observation 6.2.2-1..
105See Observation 6.2.2-4..
106Notice that if B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ then it can be trivially shown that, in general, ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈
B ∩K} 6⊆ ⋃WK⊥B . Indeed, assume K is a belief set such that K 6= Cn(∅) and let αl ∈ K \Cn(∅)
and B be any finite set of sentences such that αl ∈ B and B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅. Then, on the one
hand, according to Observation 6.1.4-1., WK⊥B = ∅ and on the other hand, from ‖¬αl‖ 6= ∅
and ‖¬αl‖ ⊆
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩ K} if follows that ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩ K} 6= ∅. Hence⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩K} 6⊆ ⋃WK⊥B(= ∅).
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Figure 6.5: Graphical representation of ML highlighting a possible world
M ∈ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩K}) \ (⋃WK⊥B), where K is a belief set and B =
{α1, α2, α3} ⊆ K \ Cn(∅).
of sentences B, is that
⋃
WK⊥B ⊆
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩K} and that, in some cases,
such inclusion is indeed a proper inclusion. Furthermore we have already identified
in Point 2. of the above observation some sufficient conditions for a world M of⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩K} not to belong to ⋃WK⊥B.
Hence, given a belief set K and a finite set of sentences B, in order to find out
which worlds of the set
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩K} are indeed included in ⋃WK⊥B,
we shall start by finding a way of defining a subset of
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩ K}
that does not contain any world M satisfying (simultaneously) conditions (i)−(iii)
mentioned in Point 2. of the above observation (and which, therefore, does not
belong to
⋃
WK⊥B).
Having this in mind, we now notice that, if we consider a subset B′ of B consisting
of those and only those sentences αi in B such that for any sentence αj ∈ B,
it holds that ‖¬αj‖ 6⊂ ‖¬αi‖, then the set
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B′ ∩K} is a subset of⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B∩K} in the desired conditions, i.e., if M ∈ ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B′∩K}
then M does not simultaneously satisfy the conditions (i)−(iii) mentioned above.
Taking this into account, in what follows we will show that the subset of
⋃{‖¬αi‖ :
αi ∈ B ∩K} just introduced above coincides indeed with the set
⋃
WK⊥B.
In order to do that we start by introducing the definition of normalization of a
set of sentences B, which, for a given set of sentences B, is indeed nothing more
than its subset B′ that we have already anticipated above.
Definition 6.2.4 (Normalization of a set of sentences) Let B be a set of sen-
tences. The normalization of B is the subset BN ⊆ B, defined in the following
way:107
BN = {αi ∈ B : For all αj ∈ B it holds that ‖¬αj‖ 6⊂ ‖¬αi‖}.
107An alternative (but equivalent) definition for the set BN , which does not make use of the
notion of possible world can be found in Definition F.2.8
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Next, we introduce a couple of lemmas that we will make use of later on when
proving that
⋃
WK⊥B =
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩ K}, for any belief set K and any
finite set of sentences B.
Lemma 6.2.5 Let B be a finite set of sentences. If αl ∈ B and αl 6∈ BN then there
is some αk ∈ BN such that ‖¬αk‖ ⊂ ‖¬αl‖.
Proof. A proof for this lemma can be found in page 189.
Lemma 6.2.6 Let K be a belief set, B be a finite set of sentences such that B ∩
Cn(∅) = ∅ and f : {‖α‖ : α ∈ L and 6` ¬α} → P(ML) be a function such that if
α ∈ L and 6` ¬α then ∅ 6= f(‖α‖) ⊆ ‖α‖.
If Bf ⊆ B is such that:
(i) If αj ∈ Bf then f(‖¬αk‖) = f(‖¬αj‖) or f(‖¬αk‖) 6⊂ ‖¬αj‖, for all αk ∈ Bf ;
(ii) For all αl ∈ B ∩K there is some αm ∈ Bf ∩K such that f(‖¬αm‖) ⊆ ‖¬αl‖;
then
1. For every world M ∈ ⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf ∩K} there is some subset WM ⊆⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf ∩K}, such that M ∈ WM and WM ∈WK⊥B;
2. {W ∈ WK⊥B : W ⊆
⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf ∩K}} 6= ∅ and ⋃{W ∈ WK⊥B :
W ⊆ ⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf ∩K}} = ⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf ∩K}.
Proof. A proof for this lemma can be found in page 190.
The following observation is an immediate consequence of the two lemmas above:
Observation 6.2.7 Let K be a belief set, B be a finite set of sentences such that
B∩Cn(∅) = ∅. Then ⋃{W ∈WK⊥B :W ⊆ ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN∩K}} = ⋃{‖¬αi‖ :
αi ∈ BN ∩K}.
Proof. A proof for this observation can be found in page 191.
We are now in a position to explicitly indicate which worlds compose the set⋃
WK⊥B, for any belief set K and any finite set of sentences B.
Observation 6.2.8 Let K be a belief set and B be a finite set of sentences. Then⋃
WK⊥B =
⋃
{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}.
Proof. A proof for this observation can be found in page 192.
Now we observe that, combining the identity just presented in the above obser-
vation with the result of Observation 6.2.1 we can obtain the characterization of the
full meet multiple contraction presented in the following corollary (of Observations
6.2.1 and 6.2.8):108
108Notice that such characterization generalizes the result of [AM82, Observation 2.1] (presented
in Observation 4.1.7 of the present thesis) to the multiple contraction case.
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Corollary 6.2.9 Let K be a belief set and ·∼· be the operator of full meet multiple
contraction on K. Then, under the assumption that
⋂ ∅ = L,109 it holds that
K ·∼·B =
⋂(
‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}
))
= K ∩
(⋂
{Cn(¬αi) : αi ∈ BN ∩K}
)
,
for all finite sets of sentences B.110
Proof. A proof for this corollary can be found in page 192.
Next we introduce one last observation concerning the full meet multiple con-
traction, that explicitly indicates which worlds compose the set ‖K ·∼·B‖, where K
is a belief set, ·∼· is the operator of full meet multiple contraction on K and B is a
finite set of sentences.
Observation 6.2.10 Let K be a belief set and ·∼· be the operator of full meet multiple
contraction on K. Then
‖K ·∼·B‖ = ‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
WK⊥B
)
= ‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}
)
,
for all finite sets of sentences B.
Proof. A proof for this observation can be found in page 193.
To close this section we remind the example illustrated in Figure 6.5 and present
the set ‖K ·∼·B‖ where K and B are, respectively, a belief set and a (finite) set of
sentences satisfying the conditions proposed in the mentioned example, and ·∼· is the
operator of full meet multiple contraction on K.
Hence, we start by observing that in the situation represented by the mentioned
figure it holds that K is a belief set such that K 6= Cn(∅) andB = {α1, α2, α3}, where
α1, α2 and α3 are three sentences in K \Cn(∅) such that ‖¬α2‖ ⊂ ‖¬α1‖, ‖¬α2‖ 6⊂
‖¬α3‖ and ‖¬α3‖ 6⊂ ‖¬α2‖. In these conditions we have, according to Definition
6.2.4, that BN = {α2, α3} (notice that α1 6∈ BN , because ‖¬α2‖ ⊂ ‖¬α1‖). Then it
109Notice that this is a natural assumption and, nonetheless, it is analogous to (and consistent
with) the stipulation that Th(∅) = ⋂ ∅ = L introduced in Definition 3.3.2. More precisely, the
only difference between the two situations is the fact that, while in the mentioned definition the
empty set ∅ is seen as the empty subset of ML (cf. Footnote 57), in the present context it is seen
as the empty subset of P(L). Indeed, for any belief set K and any set of sentences B, we have
that {Cn(¬αi) : αi ∈ BN ∩K} ⊆ P(L), hence, in the present context, whenever it is the case that
{Cn(¬αi) : αi ∈ BN ∩K} = ∅ we shall regard such empty set ∅ as a subset of P(L), i.e. ∅ ⊆ P(L).
Therefore it follows that
⋂ ∅ = {α : ∀M ∈ ∅, α ∈ M} = {α : ∀M ∈ (∅ ∩ P(L)), α ∈ M} = {α ∈
L : ∀M ∈ ∅, α ∈ M} = L (where this last equality holds due to the fact that, for any α ∈ L, the
condition “∀M ∈ ∅, α ∈M” is vacuously true).
110Notice that, on the one hand, if B ∩ K = ∅ then BN ∩ K = ∅ and therefore K ∩
(
⋂{Cn(¬αi) : αi ∈ BN ∩K}) = K ∩ (⋂ ∅) = K ∩ L = K (where we have made use of the as-
sumption that
⋂ ∅ = L). On the other hand, if B ∩Cn(∅) 6= ∅ then, according to Definition 6.2.4,
BN = B ∩ Cn(∅) ⊆ Cn(∅), from which we can conclude that Cn(¬αi) = L, for all αi ∈ BN ∩K,
and, consequently, K ∩⋂{Cn(¬αi) : αi ∈ BN ∩K} = K ∩ L = K.
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follows from Corollary 6.2.9 that K ·∼·B =
⋂
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K})) =⋂
(‖K‖∪‖¬α2‖∪‖¬α3‖). Furthermore, according to Observation 6.2.10, ‖K ·∼·B‖ =
‖K‖ ∪ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}) = ‖K‖ ∪ ‖¬α2‖ ∪ ‖¬α3‖.
Figure 6.6 contains a possible graphical representation of the situation presented
above (notice that the sets ‖¬α1‖, ‖¬α2‖, ‖¬α3‖ and ‖K‖ are represented in pre-
cisely the same positions as in Figure 6.5 in order to allow for a direct comparison
between the two illustrations). The shaded region in Figure 6.6 highlights the set
‖K ·∼·B‖ = ‖K‖ ∪ (
⋃
WK⊥B) = ‖K‖ ∪ (
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}). Hence, as we
have already noticed above, the set K ·∼·B consists of the intersection of all the worlds
included in that region.
Figure 6.6: Graphical representation of ML highlighting the region ‖K ·∼·B‖ =
‖K‖ ∪ (⋃WK⊥B) = ‖K‖ ∪ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}), where K is a belief set,
B = {α1, α2, α3} ⊆ K \ Cn(∅).
6.3 Possible Worlds Semantics for Partial Meet
Multiple Contractions (the General Case)
Now that we have thoroughly exposed the characterization in terms of possible
worlds of the full meet multiple contraction, in this last section of the present chap-
ter, we turn our attention to the obtention of the possible worlds semantics of the
partial meet multiple contractions in general.
We start by using Observation 6.2.10 to obtain a superset of the set ‖K÷B‖,
where K is a belief set, ÷ is a partial meet multiple contraction on K and B is a
finite set of sentences:
Observation 6.3.1 Let K be a belief set. If an operation ÷ is a partial meet mul-
tiple contraction on K then
‖K÷B‖ ⊆ ‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}
)
,
for all finite sets of sentences B.
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Proof. A proof for this observation can be found in page 194.
Our next goal is to obtain the characterization of the partial meet multiple
contraction functions in terms of possible worlds. In order to do that we will start by
proving that, given a belief set K, it holds that K⊥B = K⊥C iff WK⊥B = WK⊥C ,
for any finite sets of sentences B and C. However, to that we will need to make use
of the following results:
Lemma 6.3.2 Let K be a belief set and B be a finite set of sentences. Then
WK⊥B = WK⊥(BN∩K).
Proof. A proof for this lemma can be found in page 194.
Lemma 6.3.3 Let K be a belief set and G and H be two finite sets of sentences.
If every subset X of K implies some element of G if and only if X implies some
element of H, then for all βi ∈ GN ∩ K there is some ςi ∈ HN ∩ K such that
‖βi‖ = ‖ςi‖.
Proof. A proof for this lemma can be found in page 195.
Observation 6.3.4 Let K be a belief set and B and C be two finite sets of sentences.
Then:
K⊥B = K⊥C iff WK⊥B = WK⊥C .
Proof. A proof for this observation can be found in page 195.
Combining Lemma 6.3.2 with Observation 6.3.4 and having in mind the repre-
sentation of remainders in terms of possible worlds (i.e. the surjection from WK⊥B
to K⊥B presented in Corollary 6.1.7) we can conclude that the remainder set of
K by B coincides with the remainder set of K by BN ∩ K. Therefore K÷B is
identical to K÷(BN ∩K) whenever ÷ is a partial meet multiple contraction. Thus,
we are now in a position to present the characterization of the partial meet multiple
contractions by finite sets in terms of possible worlds.
In order to do that we need the following concept of propositional package selec-
tion function (which has been adapted from Definition 4.1.3).
Definition 6.3.5 (Based on [Han99b, Definition 3.65]) Let K be a belief set.
A propositional package selection function for ‖K‖ is a function f such that for all
sets of sentences B:
1. f(WK⊥B) ⊆WK⊥B.
2. If WK⊥B 6= ∅ then f(WK⊥B) 6= ∅.
We can now present the last and main result of the present chapter, which pro-
vides the characterization of partial meet multiple contractions in terms of possible
worlds.
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Theorem 6.3.6 Let K be a belief set. An operation ÷ is a partial meet multiple
contraction on K by finite sets if and only if there is a propositional package selection
function f for ‖K‖ such that:
K÷B = Th
(
‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
f(WK⊥B)
))
,
for any finite set of sentences B.
Proof. A proof for this theorem can be found in page 196.
Using the above theorem and Theorem 6.1.6 it can be easily shown that if f
is a propositional package selection function for ‖K‖ such that, for any set of sen-
tences B, f(WK⊥B) contains at most one element, then the operation ÷ defined
by K÷B = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ f(WK⊥B))), for any sets of sentences B, is a maxichoice
multiple contraction on K. On the other hand, it is also worth noticing that it fol-
lows immediately from Observation 6.2.1 that the operation ·∼· of full meet multiple
contraction on K is such that K ·∼·B = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (
⋃
f(WK⊥B))), where f is the
propositional package selection function for ‖K‖ defined by f(WK⊥B) = WK⊥B, for
all sets of sentences B.
The facts mentioned in the above paragraph are more detailedly and formally
stated in the following corollary which provides us with a characterization for maxi-
choice and full meet multiple contractions, in terms of propositional package selection
functions.
Corollary 6.3.7 Let K be a belief set and ÷ be a multiple contraction function on
K. Then:
1. ÷ is a maxichoice multiple contraction on K by finite sets if and only if, for
all finite sets of sentences B, K÷B = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ f(WK⊥B))), where f
is a propositional package selection function f for ‖K‖ such that f(WK⊥B)
contains at most one element (i.e., f is such that f(WK⊥B) = ∅ whenever
WK⊥B = ∅, and f(WK⊥B) is a singleton subset of WK⊥B if WK⊥B 6= ∅), for
any finite set of sentences B.
2. ÷ is the full meet multiple contraction on K by finite sets if and only if, for
all finite sets of sentences B, K÷B = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ f(WK⊥B))), where f is
the propositional package selection function for ‖K‖ defined by f(WK⊥B) =
WK⊥B, for all finite sets of sentences B.
At this point it is interesting to observe that Theorem 6.3.6 and the above
corollary can be regarded also as alternative definitions for partial meet and for
maxichoice and full meet multiple contractions, which are based on the concept
of propositional package selection function rather than on the concept of package
selection function (cf. Definitions 5.3.2 and 5.3.3).
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6.4 Summary
In this chapter we have presented the possible worlds semantics for the partial meet
multiple contraction that generalizes the possible worlds semantics for partial meet
(singleton) contraction presented in [Gro88, Han99b] (which we have exposed in
Section 4.1).
To be more precise we have shown (cf. Theorem 6.1.6) that every remainder
X ∈ K⊥B is such that X = Th(‖K‖ ∪ W) for some set of possible worlds W
such that (i) W contains at least one ¬αi-world for every αi ∈ B ∩K and (ii) for
every world in W there is a sentence α ∈ B ∩ K for which that one is the only
¬α-world inW . Subsequently (cf. Theorem 6.3.6) we have proven that partial meet
multiple contractions can be defined by means of intersections of sets of the form
‖K‖ ∪ (⋃M), where M consists of a selection of sets of possible worlds that satisfy
the above conditions (i) and (ii).
In particular, we have also characterized in terms of possible worlds the upper
and lower bounds of that class of functions, i.e., the full meet multiple contraction
and the maxichoice multiple contractions (cf. Corollary 6.3.7).

Chapter 7
System of Spheres-based Multiple
Contraction Functions
In this chapter we will generalize Grove’s construction of a S.S.-based contraction
to the multiple case. More precisely, we will propose a way of constructing multiple
contraction functions that generalizes the definition of the S.S.-based (singleton)
contractions introduced in [Gro88] to the case when we wish to remove from a belief
set a (possibly non-singleton) set of sentences rather than only a single sentence.
Furthermore, having in mind that in the singleton case the S.S.-based contractions
are partial meet contractions (cf. Observation 4.1.9), it is our goal that the new
multiple contraction functions that we shall propose constitute a subclass of the
class of partial meet multiple contractions.
More formally, in what follows our goal is to define, for any belief set K and any
system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖, a multiple contraction operation ÷S on K −
which we will designate by S-based multiple contraction on K − such that:
1. it generalizes (to the multiple contraction level) Grove’s S-based (singleton)
contraction −S (cf. Definition 3.3.7), in the sense that, on the one hand ÷S
is defined for (possibly non-singleton) sets of sentences (rather than only for
single sentences) and, on the other hand, for any sentence α it holds that
K÷S{α} = K−Sα.
2. it is a partial meet multiple contraction (cf. Definition 5.3.2).
We will start by defining the operation ÷S on K for the trivial case when the
set B to be removed from K is such that B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅. Recall that, given a set
B in the mention conditions, if ÷ is a partial meet multiple contraction on K then
K÷B = K. Hence, since we want ÷S to be a partial meet multiple contraction, we
must define K÷SB = K, for all sets B such that B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅.111
111Notice that such definition is also compatible with the other requirement that we wish this
new operation to fulfil, namely that if B = {α} then K÷SB = K−Sα. To see this, and noticing
that so far we have only defined K÷SB for sets B that contain some tautology, let B = {α} be a
singleton set in these conditions. Then it follows on the one hand that ` α and therefore, according
to Definition 3.3.7, K−Sα = K and, on the other hand, according to our proposal for the (partial)
definition of the operation ÷S, K÷SB = K. Hence we can conclude that for any singleton set B
113
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Having seen this it is clear that, given a belief set K and a system of spheres S
centred on ‖K‖, the S-based multiple contraction on K ÷S that we wish to construct
(i.e., an operation that satisfies conditions 1. and 2. mentioned above) must be
defined by K÷SB = K, for all sets B such that B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅. However, as we
will see below, it is not that obvious how we shall define K÷SB for sets B such that
B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ in order that ÷S fulfils the desired properties 1. and 2. introduced
above.
The remaining of this chapter will be organized in the following way: We consider
a belief set K and a system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖ and we start by presenting,
in Section 7.1, those that seem to be the most intuitively natural proposals for the
definition of the S-based multiple contraction on K. However, we accompany those
proposals with counterexamples which show that such operations actually do not
fulfil the above mentioned requirements.
Afterwards, in Section 7.2 we present a way of constructing a function which
satisfies the desired properties, and which, for that reason, we shall adopt as the
definition of S-based multiple contraction on K.
Most of the results of this chapter have been included also in [FR].
7.1 Unsuccessful Proposals
Keeping in mind that, given a belief set K and a system of spheres S centred on
‖K‖, our main goal in the present chapter is to construct a multiple contraction
function that generalizes the S-based (singleton) contraction on K and which is a
partial meet multiple contraction, in this section we intend to show that the more
intuitively appealing ways of constructing such a function are in fact inappropriate
regarding the fulfilment of the desired requirements.
Before moving on it is convenient to observe that since, as we have seen above,
if ÷S is an operation that satisfies the desired conditions then K÷SB = K, for all
sets B such that B ∩Cn(∅) 6= ∅, in all that follows we only need to investigate how
shall K÷SB be defined for sets B such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅.
7.1.1 First Unsuccessful Proposal
Taking all the above into consideration, given a belief set K and a system of spheres
S centred on ‖K‖, it only remains to obtain a suitable definition of K÷SB for sets
B such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. Having this in mind, since we want ÷S to satisfy
K÷S{ϕ} = K−Sϕ, and recalling that if 6` ϕ then K−Sϕ = Th(‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬ϕ)), one
might be tempted to define K÷SB = Th
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈B fS(¬αi))), for all sets B
such that B ∩Cn(∅) = ∅. However, as we will see right away, the operation ÷S thus
defined is not a partial meet multiple contraction.
So, assume K is a belief set and S is a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and let
such that B ∩Cn(∅) 6= ∅ it indeed holds that K÷SB = K−Sα, where ÷S is the operation defined,
for such sets, as we proposed above, α ∈ Cn(∅) is the (only) sentence such that B = {α} and −S
is the S-based (singleton) contraction on K (cf. Definition 3.3.7).
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÷1S be the operation on K defined by
K÷1S B =
{
Th
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈B fS(¬αi))) , if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅
K , if B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅.
for any set of sentences B. In what follows we will show that ÷1S is not a partial
meet multiple contraction.
Remark 7.1.1 Notice that, given a belief set K and a system of spheres S centred
on ‖K‖ and having in mind Definition 3.3.7, the above proposed operation ÷1S on K
can be equivalently defined in the following (alternative) way:112
K÷1S B =
{ ⋂
αi∈B K−Sαi , if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅
K , if B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅,
where −S is the S-based (singleton) contraction.113
It follows immediately from the definition of ÷1S that if B = {α} then K ÷1S
B = K−Sα. However, the following simple counterexample, which is based on
the example illustrated in Figure 6.5, shows that ÷1S is not a partial meet multiple
contraction on K.114
Counterexample 7.1.2 Let K be a belief set and B = {α1, α2, α3} be a set of
sentences such that B ⊆ K \Cn(∅) and consider the system of spheres S centred on
‖K‖ defined by S = {‖K‖,ML}. Notice that, in these conditions, it follows from
Definition 3.3.5 that fS(¬α1) = ‖¬α1‖, fS(¬α2) = ‖¬α2‖ and fS(¬α3) = ‖¬α3‖.
Furthermore, assume that the sentences α1, α2 and α3 are such that ‖¬α2‖ ⊂ ‖¬α1‖,
‖¬α2‖ 6⊂ ‖¬α3‖, ‖¬α3‖ 6⊂ ‖¬α2‖ and ‖¬α1‖ \ (‖¬α2‖ ∪ ‖¬α3‖) 6= ∅.
Then, according to the definition of ÷1S proposed above, we have that K÷1S B =
Th(‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬α1)∪ fS(¬α2)∪ fS(¬α3)) =
⋂
(‖K‖ ∪ ‖¬α1‖ ∪ ‖¬α2‖ ∪ ‖¬α3‖). And
from this we can conclude that ‖¬α1‖ ⊆ ‖K÷1S B‖.
Hence, since ‖¬α1‖∩‖K‖ = ∅ and ‖¬α1‖ \ (‖¬α2‖∪‖¬α3‖) 6= ∅, it follows that
‖K÷1S B‖ 6⊆ (‖K‖ ∪ ‖¬α2‖ ∪ ‖¬α3‖).
Now observe that, as we have seen in the end of Section 6.2, in the above condi-
tions, BN = {α2, α3}. Therefore ‖K ÷1S B‖ 6⊆ (‖K‖ ∪ (
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}))
and, according to Observation 6.3.1, we can conclude that ÷1S is not a partial meet
multiple contraction.
Figure 7.1 contains a possible graphical representation of the situation presented
in this counterexample. The shaded region in that figure represents the set ‖K‖ ∪
112Notice that this is the case because, whenever B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ it holds that ⋂αi∈BK−Sαi =⋂
αi∈B (Th (‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬αi))) =
⋂
αi∈B (
⋂
(‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬αi))) =
⋂(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈B fS(¬αi))) =
Th
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈B fS(¬αi))).
113Based on a ranking theoretic approach Spohn [Spo10] suggested a multiple contraction function
very similar to operation ÷1S.
114An alternative justification for the fact that a multiple contraction function ÷ on a belief set K
defined by K÷B = ⋂αi∈BK−αi, for all sets of sentences B, where − is a partial meet (singleton)
contraction operation on K, is not, in general, a partial meet multiple contraction on K, can be
found in [FH94, p. 62].
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αi∈B fS(¬αi)
)
. Then, according to the definition of the operation ÷1S, the set
K ÷1S B consists of the intersection of all the worlds highlighted there and so every
world in that region belongs to ‖K÷1S B‖. Noticing that in the mentioned figure the
sets ‖¬α1‖, ‖¬α2‖, ‖¬α3‖ and ‖K‖ are represented in precisely the same positions
as in Figure 6.6 (in which the shaded region corresponds to the set ‖K ·∼·B‖), a direct
comparison between such two figures allows us to observe that some of the worlds in
‖K÷1SB‖ do not belong to ‖K ·∼·B‖ (namely the worlds in ‖¬α1‖\ (‖¬α2‖∪‖¬α3‖))
and from this we can immediately conclude that the operation ÷1S is not a partial
meet multiple contraction.
Figure 7.1: Graphical representation of ML highlighting the region ‖K‖ ∪(⋃
αi∈B fS(¬αi)
)
, where K 6= Cn(∅) is a belief set, S = {‖K‖,ML} and B =
{α1, α2, α3} ⊆ K \ Cn(∅). (A more detailed explanation of the situation illustrated
by this figure can be found in Counterexample 7.1.2.)
Still having in mind the previous counterexample we notice that, in those con-
ditions, according to Observation 6.2.10, if ·∼· is the operator of full meet multiple
contraction on K, then ‖K ·∼·B‖ = ‖K‖ ∪ (
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}) = ‖K‖ ∪
‖¬α2‖ ∪ ‖¬α3‖ (cf. Figure 6.6). Hence, it is not surprising that the function ÷1S
proposed above is not a partial meet multiple contraction.
Indeed, given a finite set B, we already know from Observation 6.3.1 that the
worlds in ML \ (‖K‖ ∪ (
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K})) do not belong to ‖K÷B‖, for
any partial meet multiple contraction ÷ on K.
So, given that we want the S-based multiple contraction ÷S to be a partial
meet multiple contraction, if we define K÷SB as an intersection of a set of possible
worlds then (at least in the case when B is finite) we must avoid that the worlds in
ML \ (‖K‖ ∪ (
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K})) are included in the set of possible worlds
that we choose to intersect to originate the set K÷SB.
7.1.2 Second Unsuccessful Proposal
Taking into account both the definition of the operation ÷1S and the last para-
graph of the previous subsection, given a belief set K and a system of spheres
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S centred on ‖K‖, we are led to consider an operation similar to operation ÷1S
but with the following slight difference: in case B is a set of sentences such that
B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ the contraction of K by B is given by the intersection of all the
worlds in ‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈BN fS(¬αi)) rather than the intersection of all the worlds in
‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈B fS(¬αi)).
More formally, let K be a belief set and S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖
we will now take into consideration the operation ÷2S on K defined in the following
way:
K÷2S B =
{
Th
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈BN fS(¬αi))) , if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅
K , if B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅.
Noticing that whenever B is a singleton set BN = B, we can conclude immedi-
ately from the above definition that if B = {α} then K÷2SB = K−Sα. Nevertheless,
by means of the following counterexample we will show that, as it was the case with
operation ÷1S, the operation ÷2S is not a partial meet multiple contraction on K
either.
Counterexample 7.1.3 Let K be a belief set, B = {α1, α2, α3} be a set of sentences
such that B ⊆ K \ Cn(∅) and β be a sentence in K \ Cn(∅). Assume also that
the sentences α1, α2, α3 and β are such that ‖¬α2‖ ⊂ ‖¬α1‖, ‖¬α2‖ 6⊂ ‖¬α3‖,
‖¬α1‖ 6⊂ ‖¬α3‖, ‖¬α3‖ 6⊂ ‖¬α2‖, ‖¬α2‖ ∩ ‖¬α3‖ 6= ∅, ‖¬α3‖ ∩ ‖¬β‖ = ∅ and
‖¬α2‖ ∩ ‖¬β‖ 6= ∅.115
Furthermore, let S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ such that:
(i) fS(¬α3) ⊂ ‖¬α2‖ and fS(¬α2)∩‖¬β‖ 6= ∅ (notice that, since we are assuming
that ‖¬α3‖ ∩ ‖¬β‖ = ∅, from this two conditions, it follows that fS(¬α2) \
fS(¬α3) 6= ∅).
(ii) ‖Th(‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬α2) ∪ fS(¬α3))‖ = ‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬α2) ∪ fS(¬α3).116
Notice that, in the above conditions we have that BN = {α2, α3}. Therefore,
according to the definition of ÷2S, it follows that K ÷2S B = Th(‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬α2) ∪
fS(¬α3)) =
⋂
(‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬α2) ∪ fS(¬α3)).
Now assume by reductio that the operation ÷2S is a partial meet multiple con-
traction on K. Then, combining Theorem 6.3.6, Definition 6.3.5, Observation 6.1.4-
1. and the fact that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅, we can conclude that there is some MB ⊆
WK⊥B such that MB 6= ∅ and K ÷2S B = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (
⋃
MB)). Consequently,
‖K‖ ∪ (⋃MB) ⊆ ‖K ÷2S B‖ and, taking condition (ii) above into account, we
obtain that ‖K‖ ∪ (⋃MB) ⊆ ‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬α2) ∪ fS(¬α3). Moreover, noticing that
from MB ⊆ WK⊥B it follows that (
⋃
MB) ∩ ‖K‖ = ∅ (since, according to Defini-
tion 6.1.2, (
⋃
WK⊥B) ∩ ‖K‖ = ∅), we can additionally conclude that (
⋃
MB) ⊆
fS(¬α2) ∪ fS(¬α3).
115Notice that here the conditions ‖¬α2‖ 6⊂ ‖¬α3‖ and ‖¬α1‖ 6⊂ ‖¬α3‖ are redundant. Indeed, on
the one hand ‖¬α2‖ 6⊂ ‖¬α3‖ follows immediately from ‖¬α3‖∩ ‖¬β‖ = ∅ and ‖¬α2‖∩ ‖¬β‖ 6= ∅,
and on the other hand, from ‖¬α2‖ ⊂ ‖¬α1‖ and ‖¬α2‖ 6⊂ ‖¬α3‖ we can conclude that ‖¬α1‖ 6⊂
‖¬α3‖.
116Notice that to see that there is in fact some system of spheres S that satisfies this condition it
is enough to observe that ‖Th(‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬α2) ∪ fS(¬α3))‖ ⊆ ‖K‖ ∪ ‖¬α2‖ ∪ ‖¬α3‖.
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Furthermore, it holds that (
⋃
MB) ⊆ fS(¬α3). Indeed, to see this, it is enough
to notice that, since fS(¬α3) ⊂ ‖¬α2‖, if M ∈ fS(¬α2) \ fS(¬α3)117 then it follows
immediately from Definition 6.1.2 that there is no W ∈ WK⊥B such that W ⊆
fS(¬α2) ∪ fS(¬α3) and M ∈ W.
Having seen this we are now in a position to show that the above made assumption
that the operation ÷2S is a partial meet multiple contraction on K indeed leads to a
contradiction.
In fact, on the one hand, from β ∈ K, ‖¬α3‖ ∩ ‖¬β‖ = ∅, (
⋃
MB) ⊆ fS(¬α3) ⊆
‖¬α3‖ and K ÷2S B = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (
⋃
MB)) we can conclude that β ∈ K ÷2S B.
However, on the other hand, since K ÷2S B =
⋂
(‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬α2) ∪ fS(¬α3)) and
fS(¬α2)∩‖¬β‖ 6= ∅ (see condition (i) above), it follows that β 6∈ K÷2SB. Therefore,
we can conclude that ÷2S is not a partial meet multiple contraction on K, as we wished
to clarify.
In Figure 7.2 we present a possible graphical representation of the situation de-
scribed in the present counterexample. The shaded region represents the set ‖K‖ ∪(⋃
αi∈BN fS(¬αi)
)
. Hence, according to the definition of ÷2S, the intersection of all
the worlds in that region originates the set K ÷2S B. Furthermore we have above
assumed by hypothesis that ‖K÷2S B‖ consists precisely of the worlds highlighted in
that figure. An attentive observation of such figure allows us to immediately conclude
that the worlds in fS(¬α2) (and, in particular, the worlds in fS(¬α2)∩‖¬β‖) can not
belong to (
⋃
MB) for any MB ⊆WK⊥B such that (
⋃
MB) ⊆ fS(¬α2)∪fS(¬α3). Ad-
ditionally, combining this evidence with, on the one hand Theorem 6.3.6, and on the
other hand the above mentioned facts that K÷2S B = Th
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈BN fS(¬αi)))
and ‖K÷2S B‖ = ‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
αi∈BN fS(¬αi)
)
, we can conclude that ÷2S is not a partial
meet multiple contraction.
In the referred figure the sets ‖¬α1‖, ‖¬α2‖, ‖¬α3‖ and ‖K‖ have been repre-
sented in precisely the same positions that in Figure 7.1 so that the differences in
the constructions of each of the operations ÷1S and ÷2S are easier to observe just by
comparing those two figures. However, we must notice that, when making such com-
parison, it must be taken into account that the underlying system of spheres is not
the same in both of those representations. More precisely, in Figure 7.1 the shaded
region represents the set ‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈B fS(¬αi)), with S = {‖K‖,ML}, while the
highlighted region in Figure 7.2 corresponds to the set ‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈BN fS(¬αi)) for
some S 6= {‖K‖,ML}.
Observing the above counterexample, we notice that, the reason why the pro-
posed operation ÷2S is not a partial meet multiple contraction is analogous to the
reason why the full meet multiple contraction of a belief set K by a set B is not,
in general, given simply by the intersection of ‖K‖ with all the ¬αi-worlds for all
αi ∈ B∩K, i.e., in general, K ·∼·B 6=
⋂(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈B∩K ‖¬αi‖)) (cf. Observations
6.2.3 and 6.2.10).
Indeed, and analogously to what was the case exposed in Counterexample 7.1.2,
it has been illustrated in Counterexample 7.1.3 that, for some belief sets K there is a
system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖ and a finite set of sentences B such that the set
117Notice that in the present conditions if M ∈ fS(¬α2) \ fS(¬α3) then M 6∈ ‖¬α3‖.
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Figure 7.2: Graphical representation of a system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖ for a
belief set K 6= Cn(∅). The shaded region highlights the set ‖K‖∪(⋃αi∈BN fS(¬αi)),
where B = {α1, α2, α3} ⊆ K \Cn(∅). (A more detailed explanation of the situation
illustrated by this figure can be found in Counterexample 7.1.3.)
‖K÷2SB‖ includes some worlds that do not belong to anyW ∈WK⊥B∩P(‖K÷2SB‖).
Such fact together with Theorem 6.3.6 allows us to conclude that the operation ÷2S
is not, in general, a partial meet multiple contraction on K.
Having the previous paragraph in mind, we notice that in order that the S-based
multiple contraction ÷S is a partial meet multiple contraction, if for a belief set
K and a finite set of sentences B, K÷SB is defined as the intersection of a set
of possible worlds then it seems that the set of possible worlds that shall be used
for that matter must be a subset of the one that was correspondingly used in the
definition of the operation ÷2S.
More precisely, given a belief set K, a system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖ and
a set of sentences B such that B ∩Cn(∅) = ∅, according to the definition of ÷2S, the
set K ÷2S B is given by the intersection of the worlds in ‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
αi∈BN fS(¬αi)
)
.
However, from the above exposed, we conclude that when defining K÷SB as the
intersection of a set of possible worlds, in a way that the S-based multiple contraction
÷S is a partial meet multiple contraction on K, such set of possible worlds must,
in general, be a proper subset of ‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈BN fS(¬αi)) at least in the case when
B is finite. To be more exact, from all the above we are led to conjecture that (at
least when B is finite) the set K÷SB should be defined as the intersection of the
set of possible worlds that results of removing from ‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈BN fS(¬αi)) all the
worlds that do not belong to any W ∈WK⊥B ∩ P(‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
αi∈BN fS(¬αi)
)
).
In particular we may notice, from Counterexample 7.1.3 that, if B = {αi, αj} ⊂
K and αi, αj are such that ‖¬αi‖ 6⊂ ‖¬αj‖, ‖¬αj‖ 6⊂ ‖¬αi‖, but fS(¬αi) ⊂ ‖¬αj‖
and fS(¬αj) \ fS(¬αi) 6= ∅ then, when defining the S-based multiple contraction
÷S we must prevent that the worlds in fS(¬αj) \ fS(¬αi) are included in the set of
possible worlds that we choose to intersect to originate K÷SB.
Hence, we might expect that it would be enough to define the operation ÷S
in the same way that we have defined operation ÷2S with the only difference that
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whenever B is a set of sentences such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ then K÷SB is given by
the intersection of the worlds that remain in the set obtained by discarding from the
set of worlds that are intersected to define K÷2SB all the worlds in fS(¬αj)\fS(¬αi)
whenever αj ∈ B ∩ K and αi ∈ B are such that fS(¬αi) ⊂ ‖¬αj‖ and fS(¬αj) \
fS(¬αi) 6= ∅. However, in the following subsection we will show that the operation
defined in that way is not, in general, a partial meet multiple contraction either.
7.1.3 Third Unsuccessful Proposal
In the sequence of the discussion presented in the end of the previous subsection,
in what follows, given a belief set K and a system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖, we
will introduce an operation ÷3S on K such that, for any set of sentences B satisfying
B∩Cn(∅) = ∅, the set K÷3SB is given by the intersection of a set of possible worlds
which is a subset of ‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈BN fS(¬αi)) and does not contain any worlds that
do not belong to any W ∈WK⊥B ∩ P(‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
αi∈BN fS(¬αi)
)
).
Let K be a belief set and S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖. Having
in mind the last paragraph of the previous subsection we start by defining, for any
given set of sentences B, the following subset BS,1 ⊆ B:
BS,1 = {αi ∈ B : ∀αk ∈ B \ Cn(∅) (fS(¬αk) = fS(¬αi) or fS(¬αk) 6⊂ ‖¬αi‖)}.118
Now let ÷3S be the operation defined on K by119
K÷3S B =
{
Th
(
‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
αi∈BS,1 fS(¬αi)
))
, if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅
K , if B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅.
First we notice that, just as it was the case with the two operations presented in
the two previous subsections, the operation ÷3S also satisfies the following condition:
if B = {α} then K ÷3S B = K−Sα (observe that whenever B is a singleton set
BS,1 = B).
Nonetheless, this construction also fails to be a partial meet multiple contraction,
as we can conclude from the following counterexample:
Counterexample 7.1.4 Let K be a belief set and B = {α1, α2, α3} be a set of
sentences such that B ⊆ K \ Cn(∅). Assume also that the sentences α1, α2 and α3
are such that ‖¬α2‖ ∩ ‖¬α1‖ 6= ∅, ‖¬α1‖ \ ‖¬α2‖ 6= ∅, ‖¬α3‖ ∩ ‖¬α1‖ = ∅ and
‖¬α3‖∩ ‖¬α2‖ 6= ∅. Furthermore, let S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ such
that fS(¬α2) ⊂ fS(¬α1), fS(¬α3) ⊂ ‖¬α2‖, fS(¬α3) 6= fS(¬α2), fS(¬α2) 6⊂ ‖¬α3‖
and fS(¬α1) 6⊂ ‖¬α3‖.120
118Notice that, if B ⊆ (K \ Cn(∅)) and S = {‖K‖,ML} then BS,1 = BN (since, in that case,
∀αk ∈ K \ Cn(∅) fS(¬αk) = ‖¬αk‖). However, in general, neither BS,1 ⊆ BN nor BN ⊆ BS,1.
119Notice that whenever B is finite and B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ it can be shown that ⋃αi∈BS,1 fS(¬αi) ⊆⋃
αi∈BN fS(¬αi).
120Notice that the three latter conditions are redundant in the present context. Indeed, on the
one hand, fS(¬α1) 6⊂ ‖¬α3‖ follows immediately from ‖¬α3‖ ∩ ‖¬α1‖ = ∅ and, on the other hand,
from fS(¬α2) ⊂ fS(¬α1) and ‖¬α3‖ ∩ ‖¬α1‖ = ∅ we can conclude that fS(¬α2) 6⊂ ‖¬α3‖ and
fS(¬α3) 6= fS(¬α2).
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Notice that, in the above conditions we obtain that BS,1 = {α3}, and consequently,
according to the definition of ÷3S, it follows that K÷3S B = Th(‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬α3)).
But then, since α1 ∈ K and fS(¬α3) ⊆ ‖α1‖ we can conclude that α1 ∈ K÷3S B.
On the other hand, if ÷ is a partial meet multiple contraction on K then, combin-
ing Theorem 6.3.6, Definition 6.3.5, Observation 6.1.4-1., we can conclude that (since
B is such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅) there is some W ∈WK⊥B such that W ⊂ ‖K÷B‖.
Then, since according to Definition 6.1.2 the set W is such that W ∩‖¬αi‖ 6= ∅ for
all αi ∈ B ∩K, we can conclude that αi 6∈ K÷B for all αi ∈ B ∩K.121
Therefore, the fact that α1 ∈ B ∩K and α1 ∈ K ÷3S B, proves that ÷3S is not a
partial meet multiple contraction on K.
The situation described in this example is represented in Figure 7.3. There, the
shaded region represents the set ‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
αi∈BS,1 fS(¬αi)
)
. Hence, according to the
definition of ÷3S, the set K÷3SB consists of the intersection of all the worlds in that
region. Noticing that none of the worlds highlighted in that figure is a ¬α1-world
we immediately conclude that α1 ∈ K ÷3S B. Combining this observation with the
fact that it follows from Definition 5.3.2 (and also from Theorem 6.3.6) that, in this
circumstances, if ÷ is a partial meet multiple contraction on K then αi 6∈ K÷B for
all αi ∈ B ∩K, we obtain that ÷3S is not a partial meet multiple contraction on K.
Figure 7.3: Graphical representation of a system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖
for a belief set K 6= Cn(∅), where the shaded region highlights the set ‖K‖ ∪(⋃
αi∈BS,1 fS(¬αi)
)
, with B = {α1, α2, α3} ⊆ K \ Cn(∅). (A more detailed expla-
nation of the situation illustrated by this figure can be found in Counterexample
7.1.4.)
From the above counterexample we notice that, roughly speaking, contrary to
what happened in the first two operations that we have proposed, the operation ÷3S
121We must notice that this paragraph is nothing more than the proof, made by means of the
characterization of the partial meet multiple contractions in terms of possible worlds, that the
partial meet multiple contractions satisfy the postulate of P-Success, which is a quite well known
fact (cf. Observation 5.5.1).
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fails to be a partial meet multiple contraction not because the set ‖K÷3SB‖ contains
more worlds than it should, but because it has too few worlds.
Indeed, the problem with the above proposed operation ÷3S on a belief set K is
that, for some sets B such that B ∩Cn(∅) = ∅, the set of worlds whose intersection
defines the set K÷3S B does not include enough worlds from the set
⋃
αi∈B fS(¬αi).
Recall that, given a belief set K, we wanted the operation ÷3S on K to be such
that, for all sets B satisfying B ∩Cn(∅) = ∅, the set K÷3S B would be given by the
intersection of all the worlds of a subset of ‖K‖∪(⋃αi∈BN fS(¬αi)) (which, according
to the definition of the operation ÷2S in the previous subsection, is the set of worlds
that are intersected to define K÷2SB). More precisely, we constructed the operation
÷3S in a way that, for any given set B such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅, the set of worlds
whose intersection defines the set K÷3S B is the subset of ‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
αi∈BN fS(¬αi)
)
obtained by discarding from this latter set all the worlds in fS(¬αj) \ fS(¬αi) for
some αj ∈ B∩K and αi ∈ B such that fS(¬αi) ⊂ ‖¬αj‖ and fS(¬αj)\fS(¬αi) 6= ∅.
However, what we can realize from Counterexample 7.1.4 is that, whenever αi and αj
are sentences in the just mentioned conditions, the worlds in fS(¬αj)\fS(¬αi) should
indeed not be included in the set of possible worlds whose intersection originates the
set K÷3S B but only if, on the other hand, it is assured that after discarding those
worlds there is some ¬αj-world left on that set (whose intersection is used to define
the set K÷3S B). In the next section we will present a way of constructing a set of
possible worlds satisfying these conditions.
7.2 System of Spheres-based Multiple Contrac-
tions
We start this section by recalling that, given a belief set K and a system of spheres
S centred on ‖K‖, our main goal in the present chapter is to define an operation
÷S which, on the one hand, is a partial meet multiple contraction and, on the other
hand, is such that for all sentences α ∈ L it holds that K÷S{α} = K−Sα, where −S
is the S-based (singleton) contraction.
Having this in mind, we have clarified in the beginning of this chapter that for sets
B such that B∩Cn(∅) 6= ∅ the operation ÷S must be defined by K÷SB = K. Never-
theless, it is not that clear how shall÷S be defined for setsB such thatB∩Cn(∅) = ∅.
In the previous section we have proposed several alternative (and somehow intu-
itively appealing) ways of defining such set K÷SB for sets B in those conditions,
however, we have also shown there that, although all the proposed operations ÷1S,
÷2S and ÷3S are such that if B = {α} then K ÷1S B = K ÷2S B = K ÷3S B = K−Sα,
none of them is, in general, a partial meet multiple contraction on K.
All the, above mentioned, proposed operations on a belief set K had the following
common characteristic: For any set B such that B∩Cn(∅) = ∅, the image of B under
each of those functions is defined as the intersection of a certain set of possible worlds
which is a subset of ‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈B fS(¬αi)). More precisely, in all those proposals
such set of possible worlds (whose intersection defines the image of B under that
function) has the form ‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈B′ fS(¬αi)) where B′ is a subset of B.
Namely, the first operation we have proposed - ÷1S - consists of the function
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defined in the above mentioned way, with B′ = B, then in the definition of operation
÷2S we have taken B′ to be the normalization of B - BN - and finally in the definition
of ÷3S we have considered B′ = BS,1, where the set BS,1 has been defined with
the specific goal of assuring that the set ‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
αi∈BS,1 fS(¬αi)
)
is a subset of
‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈BN fS(¬αi)). However, as we have observed in the end of the previous
section, contrary to what was the case with operation ÷2S (and also with operation
÷1S), it follows from Counterexample 7.1.4 that operation ÷3S fails to be a partial
meet multiple contraction not because the set of possible worlds whose intersection
defines K÷3S B, for each set B such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅, has too many worlds, but
because (at least for finite sets B) such set has, in general, too few worlds.
Hence, considering a belief set K and a system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖,
and holding on to the idea of defining such operation ÷S in a way that, for any sets
B such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅, the set K÷SB is given by an intersection of a set of
possible worlds of the form ‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈B′ fS(¬αi)) with B′ ⊆ B, from the above
we can conclude that such set B′ must be such that ‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
αi∈BS,1 fS(¬αi)
)
⊆
‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈B′ fS(¬αi)) ⊆ ‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈BN fS(¬αi)).
Having this in mind, in what follows, considering a belief set K and a system of
spheres S centred on ‖K‖, we will start by finding out a systematic way of defining,
for any given set B such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅, a subset BS ⊆ B such that:
• ‖K‖∪
(⋃
αi∈BS,1 fS(¬αi)
)
⊆ ‖K‖∪(⋃αi∈BS fS(¬αi)) ⊆ ‖K‖∪(⋃αi∈BN fS(¬αi)).
• The operation ÷S defined by K÷SB = K if B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅, and K÷SB =
Th
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈BS fS(¬αi))) if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ is a partial meet multiple
contraction on K.
So, let B be a set of sentences such that B∩Cn(∅) = ∅. In order to find out how
to define a set BS ⊆ B such that the above conditions hold, it is convenient to start
by understanding in more detail why the set ‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
αi∈BS,1 fS(¬αi)
)
contains, in
general, too few worlds (or, from another point of view, why the set BS,1 contains,
in general, too few sentences) for the operation ÷3S, defined in the previous section,
to be a partial meet multiple contraction on K.
We may observe from its definition, that the set BS,1 is, roughly speaking,
obtained from B by discarding from it all the sentences αr for which there is
some other sentence αs in B such that fS(¬αs) ⊂ ‖¬αr‖ and fS(¬αs) 6= fS(¬αr).
However, as we have seen in Counterexample 7.1.4, for some sets B, such defini-
tion of BS,1 leads to a situation in which for some αt ∈ B \ BS,1 it holds that(
‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
αi∈BS,1 fS(¬αi)
))
∩‖¬αt‖ = ∅ (and, therefore, αt ∈ K÷3SB, which yields
that, in that case, ÷3S is not a partial meet multiple contraction on K). Indeed,
as it can be seen in the mentioned counterexample (where we have shown α1 ∈ B
but
(
‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
αi∈BS,1 fS(¬αi)
))
∩ ‖¬α1‖ = ∅), such a situation occurs whenever
αt ∈ B \ BS,1 is such that (i) αt ∈ B ∩K, (ii) there is only one sentence in B, say
αq, which is, roughly speaking, responsible for the fact that αt 6∈ BS,1, (iii) for all
αp ∈ B \ {αt, αq} it holds that fS(¬αp) ∩ ‖¬αt‖ = ∅ and (iv) αq 6∈ BS,1.
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Hence, having in mind the way how, for any set B such that B ∩Cn(∅) = ∅, the
set BS,1 is obtained as well as the reason (exposed by means of Counterexample 7.1.4)
why such set is, in general, too small for our purposes, we are led to assume that,
given an arbitrary set B satisfying B∩Cn(∅) = ∅, the set BS ⊆ B that we are looking
for shall be a superset of BS,1 such that, whenever it holds that fS(¬αs) ⊂ ‖¬αr‖
and fS(¬αs) 6= fS(¬αr), for two sentences αr, αs ∈ B∩K, then the sentence αr does
not belong to the set BS, but only as long as it is also somehow assured (by the way
BS is defined) that at least one of the sentences αq ∈ B such that fS(¬αq) ⊂ ‖¬αr‖
and fS(¬αq) 6= fS(¬αr) belongs to that set BS. In other words, for any given set
B not containing tautologies, it appears that the subset BS of B that we wish to
define should be constructed in a way that, if αr, αs ∈ B ∩K are two sentences in
the above described conditions then they do not simultaneously belong to BS but,
on the other hand, BS must be such that for all sentences αl ∈ (B ∩K) \ BS there
is some αk ∈ BS such that fS(¬αk) ⊂ ‖¬αl‖ and fS(¬αk) 6= fS(¬αl).
More formally, based on the above considerations, we are led to the following
conjecture:
Conjecture 7.2.1 Let K be a belief set and S be a system of spheres centred on
‖K‖. If for any set of sentences B such that B ∩Cn(∅) = ∅ the set BS ⊆ B is such
that the following conditions hold:
(i) if αr ∈ BS then fS(¬αs) 6⊂ ‖¬αr‖ or fS(¬αs) = fS(¬αr), for all αs ∈ BS,
(ii) for all αl ∈ (B ∩K) \ BS there is some αk ∈ BS such that fS(¬αk) ⊂ ‖¬αl‖
and fS(¬αk) 6= fS(¬αl),
then the operation ÷S on K defined by:
K÷SB =
{
Th
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈BS fS(¬αi))) , if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅
K , if B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ ,
for any set of sentences B, is a partial meet multiple contraction on K.
Having the above conjecture in mind, given a belief set K and a system of spheres
S centred on ‖K‖ in the following definition we present a way of systematically
obtaining, for any finite set of sentences B, a subset BS such that, whenever B ∩
Cn(∅) = ∅, the conditions (i) and (ii) above are satisfied. Afterwards, based on that
same conjecture, we will make use of the constructed sets BS to present a possible
definition for the S.S.-based multiple contractions.
At this point we start by remarking that condition (i) above presents in some
sense a necessary condition for an element αr of B to belong to BS (namely: for
all αs ∈ BS it holds that fS(¬αs) = fS(¬αr) or fS(¬αs) 6⊂ ‖¬αr‖). We will use
that condition as our guideline towards the definition of a set BS in the desired
conditions. Taking this into account and observing that the condition imposed to
be satisfied by all elements of BS is recurring (in the sense that it makes reference
to the set BS itself) we are led to believe that the definition of BS shall follow an
iterative procedure.
Having this in mind we suggest the following construction for the set BS:
122
122Further below we provide a more detailed explanation of the intuition behind this definition.
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Definition 7.2.2 Let K be a belief set and S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖.
Consider a finite set of sentences B = {α1, . . . , αn} such that B \ Cn(∅) 6= ∅.
Denote by C1, . . . , Cm the (different) equivalence classes in the quotient set of
(B \ Cn(∅)) by v, i.e. {C1, . . . , Cm} = (B \ Cn(∅))/v, where v is the equivalence
relation on B \ Cn(∅) defined by:
∀α, β ∈ B \ Cn(∅), α v β iff S¬α = S¬β.
Moreover, assume that the equivalence classes C1, . . . , Cm are ordered according
to the following condition:
If 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m then ∀αr ∈ Ci ∀αs ∈ Cj S¬αs ⊂ S¬αr .
Now consider the following list of subsets of B:
B0 = B ∩ Cn(∅)
C ′1 = C1
C ′′1 = {αi ∈ C ′1 : ∀αj ∈ C ′1 fS(¬αj) 6⊂ fS(¬αi)}
B1 = C
′′
1
Moreover, if m > 1 for all l ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, let C ′l , C ′′l and Bl be the sets defined
by:
C ′l = {αi ∈ Cl : ∀αj ∈ Bl−1 fS(¬αj) 6⊂ ‖¬αi‖};
C ′′l = {αi ∈ C ′l : ∀αj ∈ C ′l fS(¬αj) 6⊂ fS(¬αi)};
Bl = Bl−1 ∪ C ′′l .
The S-based filtration of B is the set BS = Bm.
If D is a set of sentences such that D ⊆ Cn(∅) then the S-based filtration of D
is the empty set, i.e. DS = ∅.
The following observation presents an alternative (equivalent) way of defining
the sets C ′2, . . . , C
′
m, C
′′
1 , . . . , C
′′
m introduced in the above definition.
Observation 7.2.3 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖
and B be a finite set of sentences such that B \ Cn(∅) 6= ∅. Furthermore, let
C1, . . . , Cm, C
′
1, . . . , C
′
m, C
′′
1 , . . . , C
′′
m, B1, . . . , Bm be the subsets of B constructed as
we described in the above definition. Then:
(a) For all l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} it holds that C ′′l = {αi ∈ C ′l : ∀αj ∈ C ′l (fS(¬αj) =
fS(¬αi) or fS(¬αj) 6⊂ ‖¬αi‖)}.
(b) If m > 1 then for all l ∈ {2, . . . ,m} the following identity is satisfied: C ′l =
{αi ∈ Cl : ∀αj ∈ Bl−1 (fS(¬αj) = fS(¬αi) or fS(¬αj) 6⊂ ‖¬αi‖)}.
Proof. A proof for this observation can be found in page 199.
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Given a belief set K, a system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖ and a finite set of
sentences B, in what follows we will expose the intuition behind the above definition
of the S-based filtration of B. In order to do that we must start by remarking that
our intention when proposing the above definition was that the set BS ⊆ B should
be such that, whenever B is a set that does not contain any tautology, the following
conditions are satisfied:
(i) If αj ∈ BS then fS(¬αk) = fS(¬αj) or fS(¬αk) 6⊂ ‖¬αj‖, for all αk ∈ BS.
(ii) For all αl ∈ (B ∩K) \ BS there is some αm ∈ BS such that fS(¬αm) ⊂ ‖¬αl‖
and fS(¬αm) 6= fS(¬αl).
If we were only interested in the fulfilment of condition (i) above, then it would be
enough to define BS = {αi ∈ B : ∀αk ∈ B \Cn(∅) (fS(¬αk) = fS(¬αi) or fS(¬αk) 6⊂
‖¬αi‖)}, however, if BS was defined in that way then condition (ii) would not, in
general, be satisfied. Indeed, as we have concluded with the help of Counterexample
7.1.4, given a set B = {αp, αq, αr} ⊆ K \ Cn(∅), if the sentences αp, αq and αr are
such that fS(¬αq) ⊂ ‖¬αp‖, fS(¬αq) 6= fS(¬αp), fS(¬αr) ⊂ ‖¬αq‖, fS(¬αr) 6=
fS(¬αq), fS(¬αr) 6⊆ ‖¬αp‖ and fS(¬αp) 6⊆ ‖¬αr‖ then, if BS was defined as above
suggested, in this case, we would obtain BS = {αr}. Hence, it would hold that
αp ∈ (B ∩K) \BS and fS(¬αr) 6⊆ ‖¬αp‖ and, therefore, condition (ii) would not be
satisfied.
We can observe that, in the above described situation, condition (ii) is not sat-
isfied essentially because, among other facts, it holds that fS(¬αq) ⊂ ‖¬αp‖ and
fS(¬αr) ⊂ ‖¬αq‖, while, on the other hand, fS(¬αr) 6⊆ ‖¬αp‖. Roughly speaking,
in those conditions, what happens is that the sentence αq ∈ B, which is responsible
for the non-inclusion of αp in BS, does not belong to the set BS either, and that
fact (together with the remaining circumstances) causes that for all αm ∈ BS ∩K it
holds that fS(¬αm) 6⊆ ‖¬αl‖.
Now notice that, given two sentences α and β in L\Cn(∅), it follows immediately
from Definition 3.3.5 that if fS(¬α) ⊂ ‖¬β‖ then S¬β ⊆ S¬α. On the other hand, if
S¬α = S¬β and fS(¬α) ⊂ ‖¬β‖ then fS(¬α) ⊆ fS(¬β).
Hence, we can conclude that conditions fS(¬αq) ⊂ ‖¬αp‖, fS(¬αr) ⊂ ‖¬αq‖ and
fS(¬αr) 6⊆ ‖¬αp‖ can only hold simultaneously as long as S¬αq ⊂ S¬αr .
Therefore, from all the above we can observe that:
1. Given a set of sentences B such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅, in order to assure
that the set BS ⊆ B satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) above, then it must be
defined in a way which imposes that a sentence αi ∈ B only belongs to BS
if fS(¬αk) = fS(¬αi) or fS(¬αk) 6⊂ ‖¬αi‖, for all sentences αk which are,
themselves, elements of BS (but not necessarily for all sentences of B).
2. If C is a finite set such that C ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ and for some D ∈ S it holds that
S¬αi = D, for all αi ∈ C ∩ K, and CS = {αi ∈ C : ∀αk ∈ C (fS(¬αk) =
fS(¬αi) or fS(¬αk) 6⊂ ‖¬αi‖)} then the conditions obtained from (i) and (ii),
by replacing, in each of those clauses, B by C, are satisfied.123
123Notice that a rigorous proof that this indeed holds can be trivially obtained by combining
Observation 7.2.3 and Lemma 7.2.5
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3. If α and β are two sentences such that S¬α ⊂ S¬β then fS(¬α) 6⊂ ‖¬β‖.
Since it is based in the facts listed above, we are now in a position to explain the
idea behind the definition of the S-based filtration of a set B (Definition 7.2.2). For
that purpose in what follows we assume that B is a finite set such that B\Cn(∅) 6= ∅
and describe how the set BS is obtained as well as the motivations behind such
procedure.
The first concern underlying such definition has to do with point 1. above and
consists in constructing the set BS a the result of a sequence of steps (rather than
by a single step definition) in order to assure that at each stage of that construc-
tion we only prevent from being included in BS those sentences αi ∈ B such that
fS(¬αk) 6= fS(¬αi) and fS(¬αk) ⊂ ‖¬αi‖, for some sentence αk ∈ B which is
somehow guaranteed to be such that it will belong to the set BS when its ongoing
construction is finished.
So, as it can be seen from its definition above, in order to construct the set BS we
start by partitioning B in several classes B0, C1, . . . , Cm, where B0 = B∩Cn(∅) and
for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} the class Ci is such that if αr ∈ Ci then for all αs ∈ B\Cn(∅)
it holds that αs ∈ Ci if and only if S¬αs = S¬αr (hence m ≥ 1 is uniquely determined
by the set B and the system of spheres S). Furthermore, given two such classes Ci
and Cj, if i < j, αr ∈ Ci and αs ∈ Cj then S¬αs ⊂ S¬αr .
In the above conditions we have that, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} the class Ci is such
that if αr ∈ Ci and i < j, with j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, then for all αs ∈ Cj it holds that
fS(¬αs) 6⊂ ‖αr‖. Hence, if αp ∈ C1 then fS(¬αq) = fS(¬αp) or fS(¬αq) 6⊂ ‖¬αp‖,
for all αq ∈ B \ (B0 ∪C1). However, there can be some sentences αl ∈ C1 for which
it does not hold that fS(¬αm) = fS(¬αl) or fS(¬αm) 6⊂ ‖¬αl‖, for all αm ∈ C1.
So, naturally, the next step in the construction of the set BS consists in obtaining
the subset of C1 defined by C
′′
1 = {αi ∈ C ′1 : ∀αj ∈ C ′1 fS(¬αj) 6⊂ fS(¬αi)},
where C ′1 = C1.
124 It follows immediately from its construction and some of our
remarks above that the set C ′′1 is such that, on the one hand, if αp ∈ C ′′1 then
fS(¬αq) = fS(¬αp) or fS(¬αq) 6⊂ ‖¬αp‖, for all αq ∈ C ′′1 ∪(B \(B0∪C1)) and, on the
other hand, for all αl ∈ C1 \C ′′1 there is some αm ∈ C ′′1 such that fS(¬αm) 6= fS(¬αl)
and fS(¬αm) ⊂ ‖¬αl‖123. At this point we define the set B1 = C ′′1 , which is the set
of sentences of C1 that we will include in the set BS. Indeed, if B \ (B0 ∪ C1) = ∅
(or, equivalently, if m = 1) then the set BS is simply defined by BS = B1.
If, instead, B \ (B0∪C1) 6= ∅ (or, equivalently, if m > 1), the next phase consists
in choosing which sentences of C2 shall be included in the set BS. We do this in
two steps. First we consider the set C ′2 = {αi ∈ C2 : ∀αj ∈ B1 fS(¬αj) 6⊂ ‖¬αi‖}125
which consists of the subset of C2 such that αi ∈ C ′2 if and only if αi ∈ C2 and
fS(¬αj) 6⊂ ‖¬αi‖ (or fS(¬αj) = fS(¬αi)), for all αj ∈ B1 ∪ (B \ (B0 ∪ C1 ∪ C2)).
Moreover, we also have that if αl ∈ C2 \ C ′2 then there is some αm ∈ B1 such that
fS(¬αm) 6= fS(¬αl) and fS(¬αm) ⊂ ‖¬αl‖. However there may be some sentence
αk ∈ C ′2 such that fS(¬αh) ⊂ ‖¬αk‖ and fS(¬αh) 6= fS(¬αk) for some αh ∈ C ′2.
124Notice that, according to Observation 7.2.3, C ′′1 = {αi ∈ C ′1 : ∀αj ∈ C ′1 (fS(¬αj) =
fS(¬αi) or fS(¬αj) 6⊂ ‖¬αi‖)}.
125Notice that, according to Observation 7.2.3, C ′2 = {αi ∈ C2 : ∀αj ∈ B1 (fS(¬αj) =
fS(¬αi) or fS(¬αj) 6⊂ ‖¬αi‖)}.
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Hence, secondly we must obtain the subset C ′′2 ⊆ C ′2 which represents to C ′2 the
same that the set C ′′1 represented to C
′′
1 , i.e. C
′′
2 = {αi ∈ C ′2 : ∀αj ∈ C ′2 fS(¬αj) 6⊂
fS(¬αi)}. Afterwards we define B2 = B1 ∪ C ′′2 . Therefore B2 is a subset of C1 ∪ C2
such that (a) if αi ∈ B2 then fS(¬αj) = fS(¬αi) or fS(¬αj) 6⊂ ‖¬αi‖, for all
αj ∈ B2∪(B\(B0∪C1∪C2)) and (b) for all αl ∈ (C1∪C2)\B2 there is some αm ∈ B2
such that fS(¬αm) 6= fS(¬αl) and fS(¬αm) ⊂ ‖¬αl‖. Now, if B \ (B0∪C1∪C2) = ∅
(or, equivalently, if m = 2) then we just define BS = B2. Otherwise, we obtain the
set B3 by applying to the class C3 the same procedure (with the necessary obvious
adaptations) that we have just described above regarding the class C2, and we go on
repeating this process until we have obtained the set Bm. Then, finally, we define
BS = Bm and we are done.
Next we will prove that, given a belief set K and a system of spheres S centred
on ‖K‖, if B is a finite set of sentences such that B∩Cn(∅) = ∅ and BS is the above
defined S-based filtration of B then conditions (i) and (ii) of Conjecture 7.2.1 are
indeed satisfied.
We start by showing, in the following observation, that the first of the two just
mentioned conditions holds:
Observation 7.2.4 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖
and B be a finite set of sentences. If αi ∈ BS, then fS(¬αt) = fS(¬αi) or fS(¬αt) 6⊂
‖¬αi‖, for all αt ∈ BS.
Proof. A proof for this observation can be found in page 199.
Given a belief set K and a system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖ the above ob-
servation presents a property satisfied by all the elements in the S-based filtration
of a finite set of sentences B. From another point of view we can say that such
property comprises a necessary condition for a sentence of B to belong to BS. Next
we introduce a lemma which we will use immediately afterwards for (a) providing a
necessary condition for an element of a finite set B, such that B ∩Cn(∅) = ∅, to be
left out from its S-based filtration BS, and (b) proving that the second one of the
above mentioned conditions is also satisfied.
Lemma 7.2.5 Let K be a belief set and S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖.
Assume C = {α1, . . . , αn} ⊆ L \ Cn(∅), with n ≥ 1 is a non-empty finite set of
sentences such that S¬α1 = · · · = S¬αn, and, for each αj ∈ C let Cαj be the set
defined by Cαj = {αk ∈ C : fS(¬αk) ⊂ fS(¬αj)}.
If αj ∈ C and Cαj 6= ∅ then there is some αl ∈ Cαj such that Cαl = ∅.
Proof. A proof for this lemma can be found in page 200.
Given a belief set K, a system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖ and a finite set
of sentences B such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅, we are now in a position to prove the
following observation, which on the one hand presents a property satisfied by all
the elements of B that do not belong to its S-based filtration BS, and on the other
hand immediately yields that the above mentioned condition (ii) of Conjecture 7.2.1
holds.
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Observation 7.2.6 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖
and B be a finite set of sentences such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. If αj ∈ B \ BS, then
there is some αl ∈ BS such that fS(¬αl) ⊂ ‖¬αj‖ and fS(¬αl) 6= fS(¬αj).
Proof. A proof for this observation can be found in page 201.
We may see that the above observation yields a sufficient condition for an element
of a finite set of sentences B, such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅, to be kept in the set BS.
More precisely, from the above result we can conclude that, given a belief set K, a
system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖ and a set B in the mentioned conditions, the
property satisfied by the elements of BS presented in Observation 7.2.4 is not only
a necessary but also a sufficient condition for an element in B to belong also to its
S-based filtration BS. This is more formally stated in the following Corollary (of
Observations 7.2.4 and 7.2.6).
Corollary 7.2.7 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖, B
be a (non-empty) finite set of sentences such that B∩Cn(∅) = ∅ and αi be a sentence
in B. Then αi ∈ BS if and only if for all αt ∈ BS it holds that fS(¬αt) = fS(¬αi)
or fS(¬αt) 6⊂ ‖¬αi‖.
At this point it is also worth to remark that the fact exposed in Observation
7.2.6 assures that, whenever B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅, the set ⋃αi∈BS fS(¬αi) contains some¬αj-world for all sentences αj ∈ B and, consequently, if the operation ÷S is defined
as suggested in Conjecture 7.2.1 then the set K÷SB does not contain any elements
from B.
Now, having in mind the above mentioned conjecture and noticing that it follows
from Observations 7.2.4 and 7.2.6 that, for any set of sentences B such that B ∩
Cn(∅) = ∅, if BS is the S-based filtration of B then BS ⊆ B and conditions (i) and
(ii) of the mentioned conjecture are satisfied, we are naturally led to suggest the
following definition for the system of spheres-based multiple contractions by finite
sets:
Definition 7.2.8 (System of Spheres-based multiple contractions) Let K be
a belief set and S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖. The S-based multiple con-
traction on K by finite sets is the multiple contraction function ÷S defined by:
K÷SB =
{
Th
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈BS fS(¬αi))) , if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅
K , if B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ ,
for any finite set of sentences B and where BS is the S-based filtration of B.
An operator ÷ on K is a system of spheres-based multiple contraction on K by
finite sets if and only if there is a system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖ such that
K÷B = K÷SB, for any finite set of sentences B.
Shortly we will show that the above defined system of spheres-based multiple
contractions by finite sets fulfil our initial main goal for this chapter, i.e. that, given
a belief set K and a system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖, the S-based multiple
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contraction on K by finite sets ÷S is a partial meet multiple contraction and, on the
other hand, it is such that for all sentences α ∈ L it holds that K÷S{α} = K−Sα,
where −S is the S-based (singleton) contraction.
However, before proceeding to prove the above mentioned facts, we need to
introduce some auxiliary results.
We start by presenting the following result which is an obvious consequence of
Observations 7.2.4 and 7.2.6.
Observation 7.2.9 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖
and B be a finite set of sentences such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. If BS is the S-based
filtration of B, then:
(i) If αj ∈ BS then fS(¬αi) = fS(¬αj) or fS(¬αi) 6⊂ ‖¬αj‖, for all αi ∈ BS;
(ii) For all αl ∈ B ∩K there is some αk ∈ BS ∩K such that fS(¬αk) ⊆ ‖¬αl‖.
Proof. A proof for this observation can be found in page 202.
Now we present a lemma which shall be very useful in some of the following
proofs.
Lemma 7.2.10 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and
B be a set of sentences such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. If BS is a subset of B such that:
(i) If αj ∈ BS then fS(¬αk) = fS(¬αj) or fS(¬αk) 6⊂ ‖¬αj‖, for all αk ∈ BS, and
(ii) For all αl ∈ B ∩K there is some αm ∈ BS ∩K such that fS(¬αm) ⊆ ‖¬αl‖,
then {W ∈ WK⊥B : W ⊆
⋃
αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi)} 6= ∅, and
⋃{W ∈ WK⊥B : W ⊆⋃
αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi)} =
⋃
αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi).
Proof. A proof for this lemma can be found in page 202.
Combining Observation 7.2.9 with the above lemma we can obtain the following
result which interrelates the set WK⊥B and the S-based filtration BS of B, for any
finite set of sentences B.
Observation 7.2.11 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on
‖K‖ and B be a finite set of sentences such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. If BS is the
S-based filtration of B, then {W ∈ WK⊥B : W ⊆
⋃
αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi)} 6= ∅, and⋃{W ∈WK⊥B :W ⊆ ⋃αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi)} = ⋃αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi).
Proof. A proof for this observation can be found in page 203.
Given a belief set K and a system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖ the following lem-
mas present some properties concerning the normalization and the S-based filtration
of a set of sentences as well as their interrelation.
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Lemma 7.2.12 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and
G and H be two finite sets of sentences. If every subset X of K implies some element
of G if and only if X implies some element of H, then for all βi ∈ (GN ∩K)S there
is some ςi ∈ (HN ∩K)S such that ‖βi‖ = ‖ςi‖.
Proof. A proof for this lemma can be found in page 203.
Lemma 7.2.13 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and
B be a finite set of sentences. Then:
(i) BN ∩K = (B ∩K)N .
(ii) BS ∩K = (B ∩K)S.
(iii) (BN)S = (BS)N .
(iv)
⋃
αi∈BS fS(¬αi) =
⋃
αi∈(BS)N fS(¬αi).
Proof. A proof for this lemma can be found in page 203.
We are finally in a position to present the following main result of the present
chapter which confirms that every system of spheres-based multiple contraction is a
partial meet multiple contraction.
Theorem 7.2.14 Let K be a belief set and S be a system of spheres centred on
‖K‖. Then the S-based multiple contraction on K by finite sets is a partial meet
multiple contraction on K by finite sets.
Proof. A proof for this theorem can be found in page 204.
At this point we recall Conjecture 7.2.1 to say that, by making some small
modifications to the proof of the above presented theorem, we can easily obtain a
proof for the following result whose statement is a slightly modified version of the
statement of such conjecture.
Theorem 7.2.15 Let K be a belief set and S be a system of spheres centred on
‖K‖. Suppose that for any finite set of sentences B satisfying B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ the
set BS is a subset of B such that the following conditions hold:
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(i) If αj ∈ BS then fS(¬αk) = fS(¬αj) or fS(¬αk) 6⊂ ‖¬αj‖, for all αk ∈ BS;
(ii) For all αl ∈ B ∩K there is some αm ∈ BS ∩K such that fS(¬αm) ⊆ ‖¬αl‖;
(iii) For any finite set of sentences C satisfying C ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅, if every subset X
of K implies some element of B if and only if X implies some element of C,
then for all βi ∈ (BN ∩K)S there is some ςi ∈ (CN ∩K)S such that ‖βi‖ = ‖ςi‖;
126We notice that condition (ii) below coincides with condition (ii) of Observation 7.2.9 rather
than with condition (ii) of Conjecture 7.2.1. Furthermore, we remark that it is easy to check (cf.
Proof of Observation 7.2.9) that if a set BS satisfies condition (ii) of the mentioned conjecture then
it also satisfies condition (ii) of the statement of the present theorem.
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(iv) BS ∩K = (B ∩K)S;
(v) (BN)S = (BS)N ;
(vi)
⋃
αi∈BS fS(¬αi) =
⋃
αi∈(BS)N fS(¬αi).
Then the multiple contraction function ÷S on K defined by:
K÷SB =
{
Th
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈BS fS(¬αi))) , if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅
K , if B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ ,
for any finite set of sentences B, is a partial meet multiple contraction on K by
finite sets.
Proof. A proof for this theorem can be found in page 205.
It is now time to highlight that the above defined system of spheres-based multi-
ple contractions fulfil the other main requirement that we wished from such opera-
tions, namely that they would generalize Grove’s system of spheres-based (singleton)
contractions. That fact is more detailedly and formally stated in the following ob-
servation, which follows immediately from Definitions 3.3.7 and 7.2.8.
Observation 7.2.16 Let K be a belief set and S be a system of spheres centred on
‖K‖. If ÷S is the S-based multiple contraction by finite sets and −S is the S-based
(singleton) contraction, then:
• For any finite set of sentences B such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ it holds that:
K÷SB =
⋂
αi∈BS
K÷S{αi} =
⋂
αi∈BS
K−Sαi,
where BS is the S-based filtration of B.
• The identity K÷S{α} = K−Sα is satisfied for any sentence α ∈ L.
Now, with the goal of clarifying the idea behind Definitions 7.2.2 and 7.2.8, we
present an example illustrating the obtention of the set K÷SB, where K is a belief
set, S is a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖, B is a finite set such that B∩Cn(∅) = ∅
and ÷S is the S-based multiple contraction on K by finite sets.
Example 7.2.17 Let K be a belief set and B = {α1, α2, α3} be a set of sentences
such that B ⊆ K \ Cn(∅). Assume also that the sentences α1, α2 and α3 are such
that ‖¬α1‖ \ ‖¬α3‖ 6= ∅, ‖¬α2‖ \ ‖¬α3‖ 6= ∅ and ‖¬α3‖ ∩ (‖¬α2‖ \ ‖¬α1‖) 6= ∅.
Furthermore, let S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ such that S¬α1 = S¬α2 ⊂
S¬α3, fS(¬α3) ⊂ ‖¬α2‖ and fS(¬α3) 6⊂ ‖¬α1‖. 127
Having this conditions in mind, our next step will be the construction of the
S-based filtration BS of the set B. We start by remarking that B \ Cn(∅) = B =
{α1, α2, α3} 6= ∅. So, according to the process of construction of BS described in
Definition 7.2.2, in this specific case we have that:
127Notice that all these conditions are subsumed by the conditions imposed on K, B, α1, α2, α3
and S in the context of Counterexample 7.1.4. That is, if K, B, α1, α2, α3 and S satisfy the
conditions stated in the mentioned counterexample then they also satisfy the above requirements.
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• B0 = B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅.
• (B \Cn(∅))/v is composed of two equivalence classes (and, therefore, m = 2):
C1 = {α3} and C2 = {α1, α2}.
• B1 = C ′′1 = C ′1 = C1 = {α3}
• C ′2 = {α1} (notice that α2 6∈ C ′2 because fS(¬α3) ⊂ ‖¬α2‖).
• C ′′2 = C ′2 = {α1}.
• BS = B2 = B1 ∪ C ′′2 = {α1, α3}.
Hence, according to Definition 7.2.8, in the above conditions we have that K÷SB
= Th
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈BS fS(¬αi))) = Th(‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬α1) ∪ fS(¬α3)), where ÷S is the
S-based multiple contraction on K by finite sets.
In Figure 7.4 we present a possible graphical representation of the situation de-
scribed in the present example. The shaded region there represents the set ‖K‖ ∪(⋃
αi∈BS fS(¬αi)
)
. Therefore, as we have mentioned above, according to Definition
7.2.8, the set K÷SB is given by the intersection of all the worlds in that region.
Notice also that, having in mind that if K, B, α1, α2, α3 and S satisfy the con-
ditions stated in Counterexample 7.1.4 then they also satisfy the requirements of the
present example (cf. Footnote 127), in the referred figure we have represented the
sets ‖¬α1‖, ‖¬α2‖, ‖¬α3‖ and ‖K‖ as well as the underlying system of spheres
S in precisely the same positions that in Figure 7.3 so that the differences in the
constructions of each of the sets K ÷3S B and K÷SB are easier to observe just by
comparing those two figures. In particular we can notice that, in Figure 7.3 the
shaded region represents the set ‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
αi∈BS,1 fS(¬αi)
)
= ‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬α3), while
the highlighted region in Figure 7.4 corresponds to the set ‖K‖∪ (⋃αi∈BS fS(¬αi)) =‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬α1) ∪ fS(¬α3).
Figure 7.4: Graphical representation of a system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖
for a belief set K 6= Cn(∅), where the shaded region highlights the set ‖K‖ ∪(⋃
αi∈BS fS(¬αi)
)
, with B = {α1, α2, α3} ⊆ K \ Cn(∅).
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7.3 Summary
In the present chapter we have introduced, in Definition 7.2.8, a new class of multiple
contraction functions − the system of spheres-based multiple contractions − which
are a generalization (cf. Observation 7.2.16) to the case of contraction by (possi-
bly non-singleton) sets of sentences of Grove’s system of spheres-based contraction
functions.
Having in mind that in the singleton contraction level the S.S.-based contractions
are transitively relational partial meet contractions (in fact, those two classes of
singleton contraction function are identical and constitute a subclass of the class
of partial meet contractions), we are led to expect that the S.S.-based multiple
contraction functions that we have presented are transitively relational partial meet
multiple contractions.
Nevertheless, in the present thesis we have only focused in assuring that the
new class of multiple contractions proposed was a subclass of the class of partial
meet multiple contractions (cf. Theorem 7.2.14). We leave it as subject of future
work to investigate if (as it is suggested by the analogy with the singleton case) it
holds, additionally, that the S.S.-based multiple contractions are indeed transitively
relational partial meet multiple contractions.
Chapter 8
Epistemic Entrenchment-based
Multiple Contraction Functions
In this chapter our main goal is to introduce a new class of multiple contraction func-
tions, namely the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions which gener-
alize the epistemic entrenchment-based (singleton) contractions [Ga¨r88, GM88] to
the case of contractions by (possibly non-singleton) sets of sentences rather than by
a single sentence. Furthermore, having in mind that in the singleton contraction
level the class of S.S.-based contractions coincides with the class of E.E.-based con-
tractions (cf. Corollary 4.2.12), it is also our intention that the class of E.E.-based
multiple contractions that we shall introduce coincides with the class of S.S.-based
multiple contractions that has been presented in the previous chapter.
Before moving on to the search for an explicit definition for such a class of multi-
ple contraction functions we notice that such investigation shall be essentially based
on the results presented in Section 4.2 which show the very tight interconnection be-
tween Systems of Spheres and Epistemic Entrenchment relations and, furthermore,
between S.S.-based (singleton) contractions and E.E.-based (singleton) contractions,
as well as on the definition of the S.S.-based multiple contractions introduced in Sec-
tion 7.2.
We start by noticing that it follows from Observations 4.2.1 and 4.2.11 that
for every epistemic entrenchment relation ≤ there is a system of spheres S such
that condition (≤ −S) is satisfied and, conversely, for every system of spheres S
there is an epistemic entrenchment relation ≤ for which that same condition holds.
Therefore, in order to assure that the class of epistemic entrenchment-based multiple
contractions that we shall define coincides with the class of system of spheres-based
multiple contractions it is enough to assure that given an arbitrary E.E. relation
≤ the definition proposed for the ≤-based multiple contraction ÷≤ is such that it
coincides with the S-based multiple contraction ÷S, where S is any system of spheres
such that ≤ and S satisfy condition (≤ −S).
Now, let K be a belief set, ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect
to K and S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ such that ≤ and S satisfy
condition (≤ −S) (cf. Observation 4.2.11). Having in mind the argument exposed
in the previous paragraph, in what follows we investigate how the S-based multiple
contraction can be defined (exclusively) by means of ≤.
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In other words, we want to define an operation ÷≤ on K whose construction is
based uniquely on the E.E. relation ≤ (instead of on the system of spheres S) but
which, on the other hand, is such that for all finite sets B:
K÷≤B = K÷SB
So, let B be an arbitrary finite set of sentences. Recalling the definition of the
S-based multiple contraction (see Definition 7.2.8) we immediately observe that in
order to define the set K÷SB in terms of the E.E. relation ≤ our first step must
be to find a way of defining the set BS − the S-based filtration of B (see Definition
7.2.2) − by means of the relation ≤ rather than by means of the system of spheres
S. If B is such that B ⊆ Cn(∅) then BS = ∅. So, in what follows we assume
B \ Cn(∅) 6= ∅.
Now, recalling the definition of the sets C1, . . . , Cm, C
′
1, . . . , C
′
m, C
′′
1 , . . . , C
′′
m,
B1, . . . , Bm − the subsets of B considered in the process of construction of BS
described in Definition 7.2.2 − and having in mind Lemma 4.2.5 we can see that the
following lemma will be helpful in order to reformulate the definition of the above
mentioned subsets of B in terms of ≤.
Lemma 8.0.1 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and
α, β ∈ L \ Cn(∅). Then the following statements hold:
(i) If S¬β ⊂ S¬α then
fS(¬α) 6⊂ ‖¬β‖ iff fS(¬α) 6⊆ ‖¬β‖.
(ii) If S¬α = S¬β then
fS(¬α) 6⊂ fS(¬β) iff (fS(¬α) 6⊆ ‖¬β‖ or fS(¬β) ⊆ ‖¬α‖).
Proof. A proof for this lemma can be found in page 207.
From Lemmas 4.2.5 and 8.0.1 we can conclude that the following observation
holds:
Observation 8.0.2 Let K be a belief set and ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment re-
lation with respect to K and S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ such that
condition (≤ −S) holds. Furthermore, let B be a finite set of sentences such that
B \Cn(∅) 6= ∅ and C1, . . . , Cm, C ′1, . . . , C ′m, C ′′1 , . . . , C ′′m, B1, . . . , Bm be the subsets of
B constructed as described in Definition 7.2.2. Then:
(a) For all l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} it holds that
C ′′l = {αi ∈ C ′l : ∀αj ∈ C ′l fS(¬αj) 6⊆ ‖¬αi‖ or fS(¬αi) ⊆ ‖¬αj‖}
= {αi ∈ C ′l : ∀αj ∈ C ′l αj ∨ ¬αi ≤ αj or αi < αi ∨ ¬αj}.
(b) If m > 1 then for all l ∈ {2, . . . ,m} the following identities are satisfied:
C ′l = {αi ∈ Cl : ∀αj ∈ Bl−1 fS(¬αj) 6⊆ ‖¬αi‖};
= {αi ∈ Cl : ∀αj ∈ Bl−1 αj ∨ ¬αi ≤ αj}.
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Having in mind the definition of the S-based filtration of B (see Definition 7.2.2)
− BS − the above presented facts suggest that such set can be alternatively defined
as presented in the following definition (provided that ≤ is an epistemic entrench-
ment relation such that S and ≤ satisfy condition (≤ −S)).
Definition 8.0.3 Let K be a belief set and ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation
with respect to K.
Consider a finite set of sentences B = {α1, . . . , αn} such that B \ Cn(∅) 6= ∅.
Denote by C1, . . . , Cm the (different) equivalence classes in the quotient set of
(B \ Cn(∅)) by v, i.e. {C1, . . . , Cm} = (B \ Cn(∅))/v, where v is the equivalence
relation on B \ Cn(∅) defined by:
∀α, β ∈ B \ Cn(∅), α v β iff α =E.E. β,
Moreover, assume that the equivalence classes C1, . . . , Cm are ordered according
to the following condition:
If 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m then ∀αr ∈ Ci ∀αs ∈ Cj αs < αr.
Now consider the following list of subsets of B:
B0 = B ∩ Cn(∅)
C ′1 = C1
C ′′1 = {αi ∈ C ′1 : ∀αj ∈ C ′1 αj ∨ ¬αi ≤ αj or αi < αi ∨ ¬αj}
B1 = C
′′
1
(8.1)
Moreover, if m > 1 for all l ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, let C ′l , C ′′l and Bl be the sets defined
by:
C ′l = {αi ∈ Cl : ∀αj ∈ Bl−1 αj ∨ ¬αi ≤ αj};
C ′′l = {αi ∈ C ′l : ∀αj ∈ C ′l αj ∨ ¬αi ≤ αj or αi < αi ∨ ¬αj};
Bl = Bl−1 ∪ C ′′l .
The ≤-based filtration of B is the set B≤ = Bm.
If D is a set of sentences such that D ⊆ Cn(∅) then the ≤-based filtration of D
is the empty set, i.e. D≤ = ∅.
It follows immediately from Observation 8.0.2 and condition (≤ −S) that the
identity BS = B≤ holds. This fact is more formally stated in the following observa-
tion:
Observation 8.0.4 Let K be a belief set, B be a finite set of sentences and ≤ be
an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K and S be a system of spheres
centred on ‖K‖ such that condition (≤ −S) holds. Then
BS = B≤,
where BS is the S-based filtration of B (cf. Definition 7.2.2) and B≤ is the ≤-based
filtration of B (cf. Definition 8.0.3).
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Now that we have seen how to define the set BS in terms of the epistemic en-
trenchment relation ≤, it only remains to investigate how the ≤-based multiple
contraction ÷≤ on K shall be defined in order that K÷≤B = K÷SB, where ÷S is
the S-based multiple contraction on K.
If B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ then it follows immediately from the definition of ÷S that
÷≤ must be such that K÷≤B = K. Now assume B is a set of sentences such
that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. In order to gain some insight on how the K÷≤B shall be
defined in this case, we start by observing that, having in mind the definitions of
the ≤-based singleton contraction (Definition 3.4.4) and of the S-based singleton
contraction (Definition 3.3.7), it follows from Theorem 4.2.6 that, if ϕ is a sentence
such that 6` ϕ, then {β ∈ K : ϕ < ϕ ∨ β} = Th(‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬ϕ)).
Taking this into account and reminding the definition of the S-based multiple
contraction ÷S (Definition 7.2.8), we can observe that, for such a set B, it holds
that K÷SB = Th
(
‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
αj∈BS fS(¬αj)
))
=
⋂ {Th (‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬αj)) : αj ∈ BS}
=
⋂ {{β ∈ K : αj < αj ∨ β} : αj ∈ BS} = {β ∈ K : ∀αj ∈ B≤ αj < αj ∨ β} (notice
that in this last equality we have made use of the above proven fact that BS = B≤).
Having this in mind we are led to define the ≤-based multiple contraction as
follows:
Definition 8.0.5 (Epistemic Entrenchment-based multiple contractions)
Let K be a belief set and ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to
K. The ≤-based multiple contraction on K by finite sets is the multiple contraction
function ÷≤ defined by:
K÷≤B =
{ {β ∈ K : ∀αj ∈ B≤ αj < αj ∨ β} , if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅
K , if B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ , (CM÷≤)
for any finite set of sentences B and where B≤ is the ≤-based filtration of B.
An operator ÷ on K is an epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contraction
on K by finite sets if and only if there is an epistemic entrenchment relation ≤ with
respect to K, such that K÷B = K÷≤B, for any finite set of sentences B.
Next we prove that the above definition is adequate in the sense that the class
of multiple contraction functions there introduced satisfies the required properties.
More precisely, in what follows we show that the class of epistemic entrenchment-
based multiple contractions:
• Generalizes to the multiple contraction level the class of epistemic entrenchment-
based singleton contractions (cf. Definition 3.4.4).
• Coincides with the class of the system of spheres-based multiple contractions
(cf. Definition 7.2.8).
The following theorem asserts that if S and ≤ satisfy condition (≤ −S) then the
S-based multiple contraction coincides with the ≤-based multiple contraction.
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Theorem 8.0.6 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖
and ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K. If ≤ and S satisfy
condition (≤ −S) then, for any finite set of sentences B,
K÷≤B = K÷SB,
where ÷≤ is the ≤-based multiple contraction on K and ÷S is the S-based multiple
contraction on K.
Proof. A proof for this theorem can be found in page 208.
The next observation, which is is an immediate consequence of Definitions 3.4.4
and 8.0.5, formally states that that the ≤-based multiple contraction of a belief set
K by a finite set of sentences B consists of the intersection of the results of the
≤-based singleton contractions of K by each of the sentences of B≤. Therefore,
in particular, we can conclude that, as desired, the epistemic entrenchment-based
multiple contractions are indeed a generalization of the epistemic entrenchment-
based (singleton) contractions.
Observation 8.0.7 Let K be a belief set and ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment re-
lation with respect to K. If ÷≤ is the ≤-based multiple contraction by finite sets and
−≤ is the ≤-based (singleton) contraction, then:
• For any finite set of sentences B such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ it holds that:
K÷≤B =
⋂
αi∈B≤
K÷≤{αi} =
⋂
αi∈B≤
K−≤αi,
where B≤ is the ≤-based filtration of B.
• The identity K÷≤{α} = K−≤α is satisfied for any sentence α.
At this point we can observe that the converse of the statement of Theorem 8.0.6
is also satisfied and, therefore, the following stronger result, which generalizes (to
the multiple contractions case) Theorem 4.2.6 also holds.
Corollary 8.0.8 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and
≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K. Then, for any finite set
of sentences B,
K÷≤B = K÷SB,
if and only if ≤ and S satisfy condition (≤ −S).
Proof. A proof for this corollary can be found in page 208.
The next theorem points out that the class of epistemic entrenchment-based
multiple contractions coincides with the class of systems of spheres-based multiple
contractions. In fact, having Theorem 8.0.6 in mind and recalling that given a
system of spheres S there is an epistemic entrenchment relation≤ such that condition
(≤ −S) holds, and vice versa (see Observations 4.2.1 and 4.2.11), we can conclude
that the following theorem holds:
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Theorem 8.0.9 Let K be a belief set. A multiple contraction function on K by
finite sets of sentences is a system of spheres-based multiple contraction on K if and
only if it is an epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contraction on K.
Combining the above theorem with Theorem 7.2.14 we can immediately conclude
that all epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions are also partial meet
multiple contractions, as stated in the following corollary:
Corollary 8.0.10 Let K be a belief set. An epistemic entrenchment-based multiple
contraction on K by finite sets is a partial meet multiple contraction on K by finite
sets.
In summary, in the present chapter we have introduced, in Definition 8.0.5 a
new class of multiple contraction operations − the E.E.-based multiple contractions
− which: (a) is formed by a kind of multiple contraction functions which are, as
we have clarified in Observation 8.0.7, a generalization of the E.E.-based (singleton)
contractions introduced in [Ga¨r88, GM88] (and which we have presented in Section
3.4) to the case of contraction by sets of sentences and (b) coincides with the class of
S.S.-based multiple contractions (cf. Theorem 8.0.9), analogously to what is the case
in what concerns the interrelation between the singleton contraction counterparts
of such two classes of functions.
Chapter 9
An Axiomatic Characterization for
the System of Spheres-based and
the Epistemic Entrenchment-based
Multiple Contraction Functions
Our main goal in the present chapter is to obtain an axiomatic characterization for
the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contraction and, by means of Theorem
8.0.9, also for the system of spheres-based multiple contraction.
First of all we recall the following condition, proposed by Ga¨rdenfors and Makins-
son [Ga¨r88, GM88] to define an epistemic entrenchment relation ≤ with respect to
a given belief set K by means of a given contraction function − on K:
∀α, β ∈ L, α ≤ β iff α 6∈ K−α ∧ β or ` α ∧ β. (C≤)
Such condition plays a central role in the obtention of the axiomatic character-
ization presented in [GM88] for the epistemic entrenchment-based (singleton) con-
traction. More precisely, we note that the proof of the postulates-to-construction
part of such characterization (cf. Observation 3.4.6) presented in the mentioned
paper consists essentially of the following two phases: (i) showing that whenever
− satisfies all the basic and supplementary AGM postulates for belief set contrac-
tion the ordering ≤ defined by (C≤) satisfies (EE1)-(EE5) and (ii) proving that the
≤-based (singleton) contraction coincides with −.
Based on Ga¨rdenfors and Makinsson’s proposal, given a belief set K we introduce
the following condition which defines a binary relation on L by means of a given
multiple (rather than singleton) contraction function ÷ on K:
∀α, β ∈ L, α ≤ β iff α 6∈ K÷{α ∧ β} or ` α ∧ β. (CM≤)
As it can be easily foreseen, such condition will play, in the process of obtaining
an axiomatic characterization for the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple con-
tractions, an analogous role to the one that has been played by condition (C≤) in
the derivation of the homologous result at the singleton level.
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 9.1 we introduce
all the postulates that shall be necessary for the desired characterization and show
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that the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions satisfy such postulates.
Afterwards, in Section 9.2, we show that any multiple contraction function that
satisfies those postulates is an epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contraction.
Finally, we close the chapter presenting, in Section 9.3, the pretended representation
theorem for the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contraction and the system
of spheres-based multiple contraction and some concluding remarks.
9.1 Construction-to-postulates
We start this section by recalling the following list of multiple contraction postulates
that have been introduced in Section 5.2 and which will be mentioned and used in
what follows:
• Package closure: K÷B = Cn(K÷B).
• Package inclusion: K÷B ⊆ K.
• Package vacuity: If B ∩K = ∅, then K÷B = K.
• Package success: If B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅, then B ∩K÷B = ∅.
• Package extensionality: If for every sentence α in B there is a sentence β
in C such that ` α↔ β, and vice versa, then K÷B = K÷C.
• Package recovery: K ⊆ Cn((K÷B) ∪B).
• Package uniformity: If every subset X of K implies some element of B if
and only if X implies some element of C, then K÷B = K÷C.
• Package relevance: If β ∈ K and β 6∈ K÷B, then there is a set K ′ such
that K÷B ⊆ K ′ ⊆ K and B ∩ Cn(K ′) = ∅ but B ∩ Cn(K ′ ∪ {β}) 6= ∅.
We notice that the above postulates consist of properties (requirable) of a mul-
tiple contraction ÷ on a belief set K. Furthermore, since throughout the present
chapter we will consider only multiple contraction functions by finite sets, we will
assume that the sets B and C occurring in the statements of the above postulates
represent arbitrary finite sets of sentences.
Before moving on it is convenient to remark here that the present chapter we will
frequently make use Observation 5.2.3, according to which, if a multiple contraction
function ÷ on K (by finite sets) satisfies P-inclusion, P-success, P-uniformity and
P-relevance then it satisfies all the above introduced postulates.128
At this point it is convenient to notice that, making use of some of the results
included in Chapters 5 and 8 (some of which are, on their turn, a consequence of
some results from Chapter 7), we can easily conclude that all the above introduced
postulates are satisfied by any epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contraction.
128Notice that, throughout the present chapter the expression P-recovery refers to the same
postulate that was designated by finite P-recovery in Section 5.2 and, in particular, in the statement
of Observation 5.2.3.
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To see this, bearing in mind the above paragraph, it is enough to observe that,
since all epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions are partial meet mul-
tiple contractions (cf. Corollary 8.0.10) it follows immediately from the axiomatic
characterization of the partial meet multiple contraction presented in Observation
5.5.1 that the following observation holds:
Observation 9.1.1 Let K be a belief set and ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment re-
lation with respect to K. Then the ≤-based multiple contraction ÷ on K satisfies
P-inclusion, P-success, P-uniformity and P-relevance.
The fact that all epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions satisfy the
postulates mentioned in the statement of Observation 9.1.1 is essential in all that
follows towards the presentation of an axiomatic characterization for such opera-
tions.
For that matter, since above we have asserted only in an indirect way that
the mentioned observation holds, with the goal of clarifying (that and) how the
representation theorem for the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions
that we present further below can be obtained in a direct way, we devote Section F.2
(of the Appendix) to the presentation of a proof of Observation 9.1.1 which does not
rely on the results concerning the interrelations between the partial meet multiple
contractions and the system of spheres-based multiple contractions and between
these latter operations and the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions
(presented in Chapters 7 and 8, respectively).
In what follows we introduce a few more multiple contraction postulates which
will be needed for the axiomatic characterization (that we shall present further
ahead) of the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions and show that
such operations satisfy those postulates.
Since the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions are a general-
ization of their singleton contractions counterparts (in the sense of Observation
8.0.7) it is natural to seek inspiration for the axiomatic characterization of these
multiple contraction operations in the analogous characterization for the epistemic
entrenchment-based singleton contraction proposed in [Ga¨r88, GM88].
Thus, we start by observing that, apart from the basic AGM postulates (whose
multiple contraction analogues we have already proven above to be satisfied by all
epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions), the axiomatic characterization
proposed by Ga¨rdenfors and Makinsson [Ga¨r88, GM88] included the supplementary
AGM postulates:
• Conjunctive overlap/Intersection: K−α ∩ K−β ⊆ K−α ∧ β (for any
α, β ∈ L);
• Conjunctive inclusion/Conjunction: If α 6∈ K−α ∧ β, then K−α ∧ β ⊆
K−α, for any belief set K (for any α, β ∈ L);
and, moreover, in the proof of the postulates-to-construction part of such representa-
tion theorem, those two postulates are fundamental to assure that the binary relation
≤ defined from a contraction function − (satisfying the basic and supplementary
144 CHAPTER 9. AN AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATION FOR ...
AGM postulates), by means of condition (C≤), is an epistemic entrenchment relation
with respect to K.
Furthermore, we also recall that in the beginning of the present chapter, based on
condition (C≤) (proposed in [Ga¨r88, GM88]), we have introduced condition (CM≤)
with the intention that the binary relation ≤ defined, by means of it, from a given
multiple (rather than from a singleton) contraction operation ÷, is an epistemic
entrenchment relation with respect to K, regarded that the multiple contraction
function ÷ satisfies certain properties.
Therefore, having in mind that:
(a) Condition (CM≤) can be obtained from condition (C≤) simply by replacing
in this latter condition K−α ∧ β by K÷{α ∧ β} (for any α, β ∈ L).
(b) In [GM88] to prove that the binary relation ≤ defined by (C≤) was an epis-
temic entrenchment relation it has been necessary to require that the con-
traction function − satisfied, among others, the postulates of Conjunctive
overlap/Intersection and Conjunctive inclusion/Conjunction.
we are led to expect that, in order to assure that the binary relation on L defined
by (CM≤) is an epistemic entrenchment relation, it may be necessary (or, at least,
useful) to impose that the multiple contraction function ÷ satisfies the following
postulates of Package conjunctive overlap/Package intersection and Package con-
junctive inclusion/Package conjunction:129
• Package conjunctive overlap/Package intersection: K÷{α}∩K÷{β} ⊆
K÷{α ∧ β} (for any α, β ∈ L).
• Package conjunctive inclusion/Package conjunction: If α 6∈ K÷{α ∧ β},
then K÷{α ∧ β} ⊆ K÷{α} (for any α, β ∈ L).
The following observation, which can be straightforwardly proven, states more
formally some of the above exposed facts and presents some results which materialize
the intuition that has driven the proposal of the postulates of Package conjunctive
overlap/Package intersection and Package conjunctive inclusion/Package conjunc-
tion as well as their formulations.
Observation 9.1.2 Let K be a belief set and − and ÷ be, respectively, a singleton
contraction function on K and a multiple contraction function on K such that for
all sentences α it holds that K−α = K÷{α}. Then:
(i) Conditions (C≤) and (CM≤) are equivalent, that is, they define the same bi-
nary relation (≤) on L.
129Notice that the statements of Package conjunctive overlap/Package Intersection and Package
conjunctive inclusion/Package Conjunction are obtained simply by replacing in the statements of
the postulates of Conjunctive overlap/Intersection and Conjunctive inclusion/Conjunction, respec-
tively, every reference to a result of a (singleton) contraction of the form K−δ by K÷{δ}, for any
sentence δ ∈ L.
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(ii) − satisfies Conjunctive overlap/Intersection (respectively, Conjunctive inclu-
sion/Conjunction) if and only if ÷ satisfies Package conjunctive overlap/
Package intersection (respectively, Package conjunctive inclusion/Package con-
junction).
(iii) If ÷ satisfies P-closure, P-inclusion, P-vacuity, P-success, P-recovery, P-
extensionality, then − satisfies closure, inclusion, vacuity, success, recovery,
extensionality, respectively.
Combining the above observation with Observations 8.0.7 and 3.4.5 we can easily
conclude that the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions satisfy the
two latter introduced multiple contraction postulates as well as condition (CM≤).
Observation 9.1.3 Let K be a belief set and ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment re-
lation with respect to K. Then the ≤-based multiple contraction ÷ on K satisfies
P-conjunctive overlap/P-intersection, P-conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction as well
as the condition (CM≤).
Proof. A proof for this observation can be found in page 209.
We have thus shown that the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions
satisfy the multiple contraction analogues of all the basic and supplementary AGM
postulates for belief set contraction. Nevertheless, to be able to provide an axiomatic
characterization for the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions we still
need to introduce one more multiple contraction postulate.
To be in a position to formulate such postulate we must start by showing that the
binary relation ≤ defined by condition (CM≤) is an epistemic entrenchment relation
with respect to K as long as the multiple contraction ÷ on K satisfies P-inclusion,
P-success, P-uniformity, P-relevance, P-conjunctive overlap/P-intersection and P-
conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction.
Observation 9.1.4 Let K be a belief set. If ÷ is a multiple contraction function
on K that satisfies P-inclusion, P-success, P-uniformity, P-relevance, P-conjunctive
overlap/P-intersection and P-conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction, then the binary
relation ≤ defined from ÷ by means of condition (CM≤) is an epistemic entrench-
ment relation with respect to K.
Proof. A proof for this observation can be found in page 209.
Having the above observation in mind we can now proceed to formulate the last
postulate which will be necessary for the axiomatic characterization of the epistemic
entrenchment-based multiple contractions that we shall present further ahed. Such
postulate is somehow suggested by the fact that K÷≤B =
⋂
αi∈B≤ K÷≤{αi}, for
any finite set of sentences B such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ (cf. Observation 8.0.7), and
its formulation is the following:
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• Package singleton reduction: For any finite set B such that B∩Cn(∅) = ∅,
if ÷ satisfies P-inclusion, P-success, P-uniformity, P-relevance, P-conjunctive
overlap/P-intersection and P-conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction then
K÷B = ⋂αi∈B≤÷ K÷{αi}, where ≤÷ is the epistemic entrenchment relation
with respect to K defined by
α ≤÷ β if and only if α 6∈ K÷{α ∧ β} or ` α ∧ β,
and B≤÷ is the ≤÷-based filtration of B.
Remark 9.1.5 Notice that the need to include in the above formulation of the pos-
tulate of P-singleton reduction the condition that ÷ satisfies some other multiple
contraction postulates is due to the fact that, since we have only assured that the
binary relation ≤ defined from ÷ by means of condition (CM≤) is an epistemic
entrenchment relation as long as ÷ satisfies those other postulates (cf. Observation
9.1.4), it only makes sense to refer to the ≤÷-based filtration of a finite set of sen-
tences (cf. Definition 8.0.3), which is used in the formulation of such postulate, if
the multiple contraction operation ÷ satisfies those extra postulates.
However, since throughout the remainder of this text whenever we refer to (or
make use of) the postulate of P-singleton reduction that shall be done in settings
where the remaining above mentioned postulates are (or are assumed to be) also
satisfied, to lighten the writing we can (abdicating of some rigour) use the following
lighter formulation of that postulate:
• Package singleton reduction: For any finite set B such that B∩Cn(∅) = ∅,
it holds that K÷B = ⋂αi∈B≤÷ K÷{αi}, where ≤÷ is the epistemic entrench-
ment relation with respect to K defined by
α ≤÷ β if and only if α 6∈ K÷{α ∧ β} or ` α ∧ β,
and B≤÷ is the ≤÷-based filtration of B.
Loosely speaking to say that a certain multiple contraction function ÷ satisfies
the postulate of P-singleton reduction is to say that the result of the (multiple)
contraction of K by any finite set B can be obtained by intersecting the results of
the singleton contractions (by means of that same multiple contraction function) of
K by some appropriately chosen sentences of B (more precisely, the sentences in the
≤÷-based filtration of B).
Having introduced such postulate for multiple contraction function, we now pro-
ceed to show that such property is satisfied by all epistemic entrenchment-based
multiple contractions.
Observation 9.1.6 Let K be a belief set and ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment re-
lation with respect to K. Then the ≤-based multiple contraction ÷ on K satisfies
P-singleton reduction.
Proof. A proof for this observation can be found in page 210.
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9.2 Postulates-to-construction
In this section we show that if a multiple contraction function ÷ on K satisfies P-
inclusion, P-success, P-uniformity, P-relevance, P-conjunctive overlap/P-intersection,
P-conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction and P-singleton reduction then it is an epis-
temic entrenchment-based multiple contraction. To be more precise, we will see
that, in those conditions, ÷ coincides with the ≤-based multiple contraction ÷≤
on K where ≤ is the epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K defined by
condition (CM≤).130
The following result settles the second step of the proof of the postulates to
construction part of the axiomatic characterization for the epistemic entrenchment-
based multiple contractions that we will present in the next section.131
Observation 9.2.1 Let K be a belief set, ÷ be a multiple contraction function on
K that satisfies P-inclusion, P-success, P-uniformity, P-relevance, P-conjunctive
overlap/P-intersection, P-conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction and P-singleton re-
duction and ≤ be the epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K defined by
condition (CM≤).130 Then K÷B = K÷≤B, for any finite set B, where ÷≤ is the
≤-based multiple contraction on K defined by (CM÷≤).
Proof. A proof for this observation can be found in page 210.
9.3 Representation Theorems and Concluding Re-
marks
In this section we essentially summarize and reorganize the main results obtained
in the previous ones in order to present more clearly and explicitly an axiomatic
characterization for the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions and,
consequently, also for the system of spheres-based multiple contractions.
Thus, Theorems 9.3.1 and 9.3.2 below show that the epistemic entrenchment-
based multiple contractions can be axiomatically charaterized by the postulates
of P-inclusion, P-success, P-uniformity, P-relevance, P-conjunctive overlap/P-
intersection, P-conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction and P-singleton reduction and,
moreover, they show how to define an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect
to a belief set K by means of a multiple contraction function ÷ on K satisfying the
above mentioned postulates, and vice versa.132
The following theorem basically groups in one single statement the facts already
exposed in Observations 9.1.1, 9.1.3 and 9.1.6.
130Notice that Observation 9.1.4 assures that whenever the above conditions hold the binary
relation ≤ thus defined is indeed an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K.
131It is worth clarifying at this point that the first step of such proof consists of demonstrating
that the above mentioned binary relation ≤ (defined from ÷ by means of condition (CM≤)) is in
fact an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K, which is taken care of by Observation
9.1.4.
132Notice that Theorems 9.3.1 and 9.3.2, can be seen as generalizations to the case of multiple
contraction of Observations 3.4.5 and 3.4.6, respectively
148 CHAPTER 9. AN AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATION FOR ...
Theorem 9.3.1 Let K be a belief set and ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment re-
lation with respect to K. Then the ≤-based multiple contraction ÷ on K sat-
isfies P-inclusion, P-success, P-uniformity, P-relevance, P-conjunctive overlap/P-
intersection, P-conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction, P-singleton reduction as well
as Condition (CM≤).
Now, gathering Observations 9.1.4 and 9.2.1 we obtain the theorem below, which
exposes that any multiple contraction function÷ satisfying the postulates mentioned
in the formulation of Theorem 9.3.1 is an epistemic entrenchment-based multiple
contraction, by presenting an explicit definition (based on ÷) of an epistemic en-
trenchment relation ≤ such that ÷ coincides with the ≤-based multiple contraction
÷≤.
Theorem 9.3.2 Let K be a belief set and ÷ be a multiple contraction function
on K that satisfies P-inclusion, P-success, P-uniformity, P-relevance, P-conjunctive
overlap/P-intersection, P-conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction and P-singleton re-
duction. Then the binary relation ≤ defined from ÷ by means of condition (CM≤)
is an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K, and K÷B = K÷≤B, for
any finite set B, where ÷≤ is the ≤-based multiple contraction ÷≤ on K defined by
(CM÷≤).
At this point it is worth remarking that it follows immediately from Theorems
9.3.1 and 9.3.2 that conditions (CM÷≤) and (CM≤) are equivalent in the sense of
the following Corollary (which can be seen as a generalization to the case of multiple
contraction of Corollary 3.4.7):
Corollary 9.3.3 Let K be a belief set, ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with
respect to K and ÷ be a multiple contraction function on K that satisfies P-inclusion,
P-success, P-uniformity, P-relevance, P-conjunctive overlap/P-intersection, P-
conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction and P-singleton reduction. Then:
(i) If ≤ is the binary relation defined from ÷ by (CM≤) then the ≤-based multiple
contraction function ÷≤, determined by (CM÷≤), is identical to ÷.
(ii) If ÷ coincides with the ≤-based contraction function ÷≤, determined by
(CM÷≤), then the epistemic entrenchment relation that is obtained from ÷
by means of (CM≤) is identical to ≤.
We close this chapter with the following theorem, which essentially intercon-
nects Theorems 8.0.9, 9.3.1 and 9.3.2. Roughly speaking, such theorem results of
gathering and reformulating the main results of the present and the previous chap-
ter, namely that: the class of epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions
coincides with the class of system of spheres-based multiple contractions and both
those classes of multiple contraction functions can be axiomatically characterized by
the postulates of P-inclusion, P-success, P-uniformity, P-relevance, P-conjunctive
overlap/P-intersection, P-conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction, P-singleton reduc-
tion.
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Theorem 9.3.4 Let K be a belief set and ÷ be a multiple contraction function on
K. Then the following statements are equivalent:
1. ÷ is a system of spheres-based multiple contraction on K.
2. ÷ is an epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contraction on K.
3. ÷ satisfies P-inclusion, P-success, P-uniformity, P-relevance, P-conjunctive
overlap/P-intersection, P-conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction, P-singleton re-
duction.
In summary, in the present chapter we have obtained a representation theorem
for the class of E.E.-based multiple contractions (which we introduced in Chapter
8) and also for the class of S.S.-based multiple contractions (presented in Chapter
7), given that, according to Theorem 8.0.9, those two classes of multiple contrac-
tion functions are identical. Thus, as stated in Theorem 9.3.4, it holds that those
functions can be axiomatically characterized by the multiple contraction postu-
lates of P-inclusion, P-success, P-uniformity, P-relevance, P-conjunctive overlap/P-
intersection, P-conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction and P-singleton reduction. The
first four of such postulates are precisely the postulates included in the well known
axiomatic characterization of the partial meet multiple contraction that we have re-
called in Observation 5.5.1. The postulates of P-conjunctive overlap/P-intersection
and P-conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction are straightforward adaptations of the
supplementary AGM postulates for contraction to the case of multiple contraction.
Finally, the postulate of P-singleton reduction is a less intuitive property which,
however, was necessary in our proof of the postulates-to-construction part of the
mentioned representation theorem. Nevertheless, in spite of its arguably unnatural
formulation, such postulate was intuitively motivated by our observations clarifying
that and how both the E.E.-based multiple contractions and the S.S.-based multi-
ple contractions can be reduced to (or, in other words, defined by means of) the
corresponding singleton contraction operations. Furthermore, in support of that
postulate we may yet remark that it can be straightforwardly noticed that its trans-
lation into a singleton contraction postulate results in a property which is trivially
satisfied by any AGM contraction which satisfies both the basic and the supplemen-
tary AGM postulates for contraction.

Chapter 10
Conclusion
This final chapter of the present text is devoted to the presentation of a brief sum-
mary of the main results achieved in this work and of some potential topics for
future investigation.
In Section 10.1 we highlight the main contributions of this thesis and situate
them in the context of the general picture of the Logic of Theory Change.
Then, in Section 10.2 we list some (potential) topics for future investigation
which arise naturally from the research reported in the present thesis and in some
related works that can be found in the literature (namely the ones that we have
described in Section 5.6).
10.1 Summary
The AGM model of belief change is considered the standard model in the Logic
of Theory Change. In such framework essentially three kinds of changes are con-
sidered, namely expansions, contractions and revisions. However, in their seminal
paper [AGM85], Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson have considered only expan-
sions and contractions as basic operations and treated revisions as being operations
which are derived from those two. Such option was taken in accordance with the ar-
guments presented by Levi [Lev77] supporting that all acceptable revision functions
can be obtained by a two steps procedure consisting of a contraction followed by an
expansion, as described in equation (2.1), which is, nowadays, commonly known as
the Levi identity.
Therefore, in particular, the class of contraction functions proposed in the AGM
framework has acquired a crucial role in the study of the Logic of Theory Change.
In fact such class of functions has been characterized in several different (however
equivalent) ways. Among those different characterizations we emphasize the fol-
lowing three constructive models of AGM contraction functions: partial meet con-
tractions ([AGM85]), system of spheres-based contractions ([Gro88]) and epistemic
entrenchment-based contractions ([Ga¨r88, GM88]). Each of those models was de-
scribed in Chapter 3 and, furthermore, in Chapter 4 we exposed the well known
facts that the two latter mentioned models can be seen as two alternative ways of
defining the same class of contraction functions and that, on the other hand, the
class of S.S.-based contractions (or E.E.-based contractions) coincides with the class
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of transitively relational partial meet contractions, which is a (proper) subclass of
the class of partial meet contractions.
In Figure 10.1 we present a diagram exposing all the above mentioned interrela-
tions among the three models and indicating the references where such interrelations
have been proven to hold (in a direct way).
Figure 10.1: Diagram of the known interrelations among the models of partial meet
contraction, system of spheres-based contraction and epistemic entrenchment-based
contraction with the indication of the references where each of those interconnections
was originally proven to hold, in a direct way.
At this point we remark that the direct proof for the fact that the class of system
of spheres-based contractions is identical to the class of epistemic entrenchment-
based contractions, that we have presented in Section 4.2 is an original (although
minor) contribution of the present thesis (which we have obtained by combining
some results from each of the following three works [Gro88, Ga¨r88, PW95]). We
must, however, notice here that such result itself was already very well known and,
furthermore, even a direct proof for it was already presented in [RP99]. Thus, the
originality of the contribution of this thesis in that regard rests exclusively in the
fact that the (direct) proof for that result that is presented here differs from any
other proof for that fact which was, until now, presented in the literature.
Not very long after the AGM model was introduced several researchers pointed
out the need for the obtention of generalizations and extensions of such model.
In particular, some studies regarding the generalization of the operation of theory
contraction to the case of contractions of theories by sets of sentences (rather than
only by one single sentence) have been subsequently presented in the literature (e.g.
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[Fuh88, Han91a, Nie91, FH94, FSS03]).
However, until know, only one of the three constructive models of singleton con-
traction functions that we have mentioned above, had been generalized to the case
of multiple contraction, namely the model of partial meet contraction, whose gen-
eralization to the case of contractions by sets of sentences is known as partial meet
multiple contraction and was presented in [Han89, FH94]. Taking that into account,
our main goal in the present thesis was to generalize the other two models, i.e. the
S.S.-based contractions and the E.E.-based contractions models to the case of mul-
tiple contraction. Having in mind the known interrelation between those models in
the singleton contraction level, it was our intention that the new models of multiple
contraction functions that we would present, namely the system of spheres-based
multiple contractions and the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions,
were such that:
1. The class of S.S.-based multiple contractions coincided with the class of E.E.-
based multiple contractions.
2. Every S.S.-based multiple contraction (and, equivalently, every E.E.-based
multiple contraction) was a partial meet multiple contraction.
3. Given a belief set K, a system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖ (resp. an epistemic
entrenchment ≤ with respect to K) the S-based (resp. ≤-based) multiple con-
traction on K was a generalization of the S-based (resp. ≤-based) contraction
on K in the sense that, on the one hand it accounted for contractions of K by
sets of sentences rather than only by a single sentence and, on the other hand,
for any sentence α, the S-based (resp. ≤-based) multiple contraction of K by
the singleton set {α} coincided with the S-based (resp. ≤-based) contraction
of K by the (single sentence) α.
With the above exposed goal in mind we started our quest for an adequate
definition for each of those two new classes of functions by obtaining, in Chapter
6, a characterization of the partial meet multiple contractions in terms of possible
worlds. To be more precise, in the mentioned chapter we first identified which
propositions (i.e. sets of possible worlds) correspond to the set of possible worlds of
a remainder (cf. Theorem 6.1.6) and afterwards, based on that result, we exposed, in
Theorem 6.3.6, how the partial meet multiple contractions can be described in terms
of possible worlds. Such characterization of the partial meet multiple contraction
generalizes the possible worlds semantics for partial meet (singleton) contraction
presented in [Gro88, Han99b] (which we exposed in Section 4.1). Another result
obtained in that same chapter which is also worth to be mentioned here is the
characterization of the full meet multiple contraction that we have presented in
Corollary 6.2.9.
As we have stated above, the main motivation that underlaid the obtention of
the above mentioned description of the partial meet multiple contractions in terms
of possible worlds was the intention of subsequently using such a characterization as
a starting point towards the finding of a suitable way of constructing a partial meet
multiple contraction by means of systems of spheres. Thus, as it was expectable,
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the main contribution of the succeeding Chapter 7 was precisely the presentation, in
Definition 7.2.8, of a way of constructing system of spheres-based multiple contrac-
tions which satisfy the requirements that we had in mind. However, such definition
is quite unintuitive and is based on the very technical concept of S-based filtration
of a set of sentences (where S is a system of spheres) which we have introduced
in Definition 7.2.2. For that reason, in that chapter, with the goals of motivating
the construction of system of spheres-based multiple contractions that we have there
presented and of clarifying how that definition was reached, we have introduced such
definition as the result of successive modifications to previous (and more intuitive)
constructions (with those modifications being naturally suggested by the reasons
why each of the previously proposed constructions give rise to operations which are
not partial meet multiple contractions). Regarding the main results of Chapter 7
we must mention here Theorem 7.2.14 and Observation 7.2.16 which confirm that
the multiple contraction operations proposed in Definition 7.2.8 indeed satisfy the
requirements 2. − 3. that we have stated in the beginning of the present section.
Moreover, in Observation 7.2.16 it is also exposed that, given a belief set K and a
system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖, the S-based multiple contraction of K by a
finite set of sentences B can be reduced to the intersection of the results of some S-
based (singleton) contractions of K by certain (adequately chosen single) sentences
of B.
Having presented a definition for the S.S.-based multiple contractions satisfying
the required conditions, in order to fulfil the goals that we have stated above, it
remained only to present a definition for the E.E.-based multiple contractions which
was such that conditions 1. and 3. listed above were satisfied. Thus, in Chapter 8,
making use of the tight interconnection between systems of spheres and epistemic
entrenchment relations (that we exposed in Section 4.2) we presented a definition for
the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions (namely, Definition 8.0.5)
which we have proven, cf. Theorem 8.0.9, to be such that the class of those functions
coincides with the class of system of spheres-based multiple contractions. Addition-
ally we have shown that, as stated in Observation 8.0.7, for any epistemic entrench-
ment relation ≤, the ≤-based multiple contraction satisfies property 3. above and,
moreover, analogously to what we have mentioned to be the case in what concerns
S.S.-based multiple contractions, the ≤-based multiple contraction of K by a finite
set of sentences B can be reduced to the intersection of the results of some ≤-based
(singleton) contractions of K by certain (adequately chosen single) sentences of B.
Thus, in Chapters 7 and 8 we have obtained, as we wished, the generalization
to the case of multiple contraction of the classes of S.S.-based and E.E.-based con-
tractions and, furthermore, we have assured that the definitions proposed for such
generalizations were such that the interrelation between the corresponding singleton
contraction classes was preserved in the multiple contractions level. In Figure 10.2
we present a diagram which represents the main definitions and results presented in
chapters 7 and 8. We notice that such diagram highlights those among the defini-
tions and results illustrated by the diagram in Figure 10.1 which we have generalized
to the multiple contraction level in Chapters 7 and 8.
Finally, we dedicated Chapter 9 to the presentation of a representation theo-
rem for the classes of E.E.-based multiple contraction and of S.S.-based multiple
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Figure 10.2: Diagram highlighting the results that we have proven to hold concern-
ing the interrelations among the newly proposed classes of system of spheres-based
multiple contraction and epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contraction and the
standard model of partial meet multiple contraction.
contractions. Such an axiomatic characterization is exposed in Theorems 9.3.1 and
9.3.2. We close that chapter with the presentation of Theorem 9.3.4, which follows
from the combination of the two above mentioned theorems and Theorem 8.0.9 and,
therefore, summarizes the central results of chapters 8 and 9, namely by stating that
the newly introduced classes of E.E.-based multiple contractions and of S.S.-based
multiple contractions are identical and providing an axiomatic characterization for
such functions.
10.2 Future Work
In this section we present a list of topics of (potential) future research which arise
naturally in the sequence of the investigation reported in the present thesis and of
the comparison of the definitions and results here obtained with the analogous ones
presented in the main related works that can be found in the literature (namely the
ones that we have described in Section 5.6). Thus, the mentioned list of (plausible)
subsequent future work topics is the following:
1. To investigate if (as it is suggested by the analogy with the singleton case)
the S.S.-based multiple contractions (or, equivalently, the E.E.-based multi-
ple contractions) are transitively relational partial meet multiple contractions.
That is, to verify if, given a belief set K and an arbitrary S.S.-based multiple
contraction ÷S on K, it is possible to define a transitive relation v on the set⋃
B⊆LK⊥B such that the multiple contraction ÷S coincides with the partial
meet multiple contraction generated by the package selection function γ de-
fined, for all sets of sentences B, by γ(K⊥B) = {K} if B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅, and
156 CHAPTER 10. CONCLUSION
by the marking-off identity:
γ(K⊥B) = {X ∈ K⊥B : X ′ v X for all X ′ ∈ K⊥B},
if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅.
In that regard we anticipate here that the first intuitive step towards the
definition of such a binary relation v shall be the translation of the definition
of the S.S.-based multiple contractions to the language of remainders by means
of the relation between sets of possible worlds and remainders that we have
exposed in Theorem 6.1.6.
At this point it is worth to remark also that proving that the S.S.-based multi-
ple contractions (and, equivalently, the E.E.-based multiple contractions) are
transitively relational partial meet multiple contractions can be seen as gener-
alizing to the case of contraction by (possibly non-singleton) sets of sentences
Grove’s direct proof of the fact that every S.S.-based (singleton) contraction is
a transitively relational partial meet (singleton) contraction (cf. Section 4.1).
2. To investigate the converse relation to the one mentioned in the previous point.
That is, to find out if every transitively relational partial meet multiple con-
traction by finite sets is a S.S.-based multiple contraction (and an E.E.-based
multiple contraction). We remark here that a possible first step for investi-
gating if that interrelation between classes of multiple contraction functions
holds (as well as the one mentioned in the previous point) is to obtain an
axiomatic characterization for the transitively relational partial meet multiple
contractions by finite sets, which is also an interesting topic for future research
on its own right.
3. If one of the two previous points is proven not to hold, then another inter-
esting topic of research arises, namely to find a definition and an axiomatic
characterization for a (different) class of multiple contraction functions which:
• Generalizes the class of S.S.-based singleton contraction functions (resp.
the class of E.E.-based singleton contraction functions) to the case of
contractions by sets of sentences (rather than by a single sentence).
• Coincides with the class of transitively relational partial meet multiple
contractions.
4. An adequate start for the potential future quest for a different definition of
S.S.-based multiple contractions may be the attempt to obtain a proof for the
converse of Theorem 7.2.15 or some similar result.
5. To find a more natural postulate than the postulate of P-singleton reduction
which can be used instead of that one in an axiomatic characterization for S.S.-
based multiple contractions (and E.E.-based multiple contractions) alternative
to the one that we have presented in Theorem 9.3.4.
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6. Additionally (or alternatively) to the research suggested in the previous point
it would be interesting to obtain a more general class than the class of S.S.-
based (and E.E.-based) multiple contractions which is axiomatically character-
ized by all the postulates included in the axiomatic characterization presented
in Theorem 9.3.4 except for the postulate of P-singleton reduction.
7. To find a definition and an axiomatic characterization for a class of multi-
ple contraction functions which generalizes the class of S.S.-based singleton
contraction functions to the case of contractions by possibly infinite sets of
sentences (rather than only by finite sets).
Regarding this goal, on the one hand, we must remark that it may be conve-
nient to start the search for such generalization (of the definitions and results
concerning the S.S.-based multiple contraction that we have presented in Chap-
ter 7) by the investigation of the possible world semantics of the partial meet
multiple contractions by (possibly) infinite sets, since the characterization of
the partial meet multiple contractions in terms of possible worlds that we have
presented in Chapter 6 only accounts for partial meet multiple contractions
by finite sets.
On the other hand, we notice that such a definition may be based on the one
that we have presented for S.S.-based multiple contractions by finite sets (i.e.
Definition 7.2.8). However we must take the following fact into account: Given
a finite set of sentences B such that B \ Cn(∅) 6= ∅, the set C1 which appears
in Definition 7.2.2 (of the set BS − the S-based filtration of B) is the least
element of the quotient set (B \ Cn(∅)) by v (the binary relation introduced
in the mentioned definition) when we consider (on that set) the total order 4
defined by:
For all U, V ∈ (B \ Cn(∅))/v U 4 V iff ∀αr ∈ U ∀αs ∈ V S¬αs ⊆ S¬αr .
(10.1)
On the other hand, if B is an infinite set then it may happen that the quotient
set (B\Cn(∅))/v is also infinite and, furthermore, it may be the case that there
is not a least element of that set under the total order 4 defined by condition
(10.1). Thus, since the first step of the process of construction of the S-based
filtration of a set B (presented in Definition 7.2.2) consists precisely in the
determination of the least element (under 4) of the set (B \Cn(∅))/v, in that
case it is impossible to obtain the set BS (in fact, and for that reason, the
S-based filtration of a set is only defined for finite sets B).
Having the above in mind, we notice that if S is a system of spheres which
satisfies the following condition
For all sets of sentences C ⊆ L \ Cn(∅) the quotient set C/v
contains a least element under 4, (10.2)
then the definition of S-based filtration of a set of sentences can be extended
to the case of infinite sets of sentences by making a slight modification to
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Definition 7.2.2.133 Additionally we may observe at this point that, as long
as BS is defined for any (possibly infinite) set of sentences B such that B \
Cn(∅) 6= ∅, it holds that the function ÷S introduced in Definition 7.2.8 is
also defined for any (possibly infinite) set of sentences B and, therefore, the
function thus defined becomes a natural candidate to be the S-based multiple
belief contraction (by possibly infinite sets of sentences).
Notice that the idea of using only a subclass of the class of all the systems
of spheres in the process of defining the S.S.-based multiple contractions by
(possibly infinite) sets of sentences is analogous to the one followed in [Pep04]
where the S-based multiple revision ⊕S is defined by equation (⊕S) but only for
systems of spheres S which satisfy conditions (SM) and (SD) (cf. Subsection
5.6.3).
8. (Assuming that the goal described in the previous point is achieved) To obtain
a definition for a class of multiple contraction functions which generalizes the
class of E.E.-based singleton contraction functions to the case of contractions
by possibly infinite sets of sentences (rather than only by finite sets) and is
identical to the class of S.S.-based multiple contraction functions obtained as
a result of the investigation suggested in the previous point.
We notice that such goal can be achieved by an analogous procedure to the
one that we have used in Chapter 8 to obtain the definition of the E.E.-
based multiple contractions, which was based essentially on the definition of
the S.S.-based multiple contractions (introduced in Chapter 7) and on the
tight interconnection between systems of spheres and epistemic entrenchment
relations (which we have exposed in Section 4.2).
9. To obtain an explicit definition as well as an axiomatic characterization for
the class consisting of functions 	 : TL × P(L) → TL which are such that for
any belief set K and any set of sentences B:
K	B = K÷¬B, (10.3)
where ÷ is a S.S.-based multiple contraction on K (or, equivalently, an E.E.-
based multiple contraction on K) and ¬B is the negation of B introduced in
Definition 5.6.1. Furthermore, to investigate the interrelation between that
class of functions and each one of the two classes of set contraction functions
proposed in [ZF01], namely the partial meet set contractions and the NOP-
based contractions, and with the class of comparative possibility preorder-based
set contractions which was introduced in [Pep] (cf. Subsection 5.6.2).
We notice that proceeding in such a way we would be somehow obtaining a
possible-worlds semantics for set contractions. Or, more precisely, we would
be characterizing the set contractions in terms of systems of spheres.
133We notice that, in particular, if L is a finitely generated propositional language (i.e. a propo-
sitional language generated from a finite alphabet) then the set of all possible worlds ML is finite
and, consequently, in that case, any system of spheres is also finite. Therefore, in particular, in
such a context condition (10.2) is satisfied by any system of spheres S.
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10. To obtain an explicit definition as well as an axiomatic characterization for
the multiple contraction functions ÷ : TL × P(L) → TL which are such that,
for any belief set K and any set of sentences B:
K÷B = K	¬B, (10.4)
where 	 is a NOP-based contraction (resp. a comparative possibility preorder-
based set contraction) and ¬B is the negation of B introduced in Definition
5.6.1. And, additionally to study the interrelation between the class of such
multiple contraction functions and the class of E.E.-based multiple contrac-
tions (and S.S.-based multiple contractions).
11. The obtention of the above mentioned axiomatic characterizations and inter-
relations might also be useful towards the achievement of a more general result
interconnecting multiple contractions and set contractions which extends the
results stated in Observations 5.6.5 and 5.6.6 presented in Subsection 5.6.2
(that were originally stated, without proof, in [ZCZC97]). In this respect we
remark that an attentive analysis of the concepts of set contraction and of
multiple contraction and of the definition of negation of a set of sentences (cf.
Definition 5.6.1) as well as of the motivation that underlaid the suggestion of
such definition leads to the following conjecture, which would be worth proving
or refuting in some future research.
Conjecture 10.2.1 134 The following statements hold:135
(i) If the function ÷ : TL×P(L)→ TL satisfies the postulates of P-inclusion,
P-success, P-uniformity, P-relevance, P-conjunctive overlap/P-intersec-
tion, P-conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction, P-singleton reduction, then
the function 	 : TL × P(L) → TL defined from ÷ by means of equation
(10.3) satisfies the postulates (	1)− (	8) listed in [ZF01, Subsection 2.2]
as well as the identity (10.4).
(ii) If the function 	 : TL × P(L) → TL satisfies the postulates (	1) − (	8)
listed in [ZF01, Subsection 2.2], then the function ÷ : TL × P(L) → TL
obtained from 	 by means of equation (10.4) satisfies the postulates of P-
inclusion, P-success, P-uniformity, P-relevance, P-conjunctive overlap/P-
intersection, P-conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction, P-singleton reduc-
tion and the identity (10.3).
The attempt to find a proof for the above conjecture seems to be an appropriate
starting point for the search of a satisfactory result concerning the interrelation
134We notice that, however the statement of this conjecture is similar to the result that arises
from the combination of Observations 5.6.5 and 5.6.6 (presented without proof in [ZCZC97]), it is
considerably more embracing than that one.
135The list of postulates for multiple contraction included in each of the two following statements
are the ones which occur in the axiomatic characterization that we have presented in Theorem
9.3.4. Nevertheless, the research that may be made in the sequence of some of the above listed
points may suggest that a different set of multiple contraction postulates should be considered in
the statement of this conjecture.
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between the two mentioned kinds of multiple change operations (i.e. multiple
contractions and set contractions).
Regarding such interrelation it would also be interesting to identify a multi-
ple contraction postulate which: (a) is satisfied by any multiple contraction
function obtained, by means of equation (10.4), from a set contraction which
satisfies the limit postulate (for set contraction), and (b) is such that the set
contraction defined from a multiple contraction function which satisfies it, by
means of equation (10.3) satisfies the limit postulate (for set contraction).
12. To obtain an explicit definition as well as an axiomatic characterization for
the functions ÷ : TL × P(L) → TL which are such that for any belief set K
and any set of sentences B:
K÷B = K ∩ (K⊕¬B), (10.5)
where ⊕ is a S.S.-based multiple revision ⊕ on K (cf. Subsection 5.6.3) and
¬B is the negation of B introduced in Definition 5.6.1. And, subsequently, to
investigate the relationship between that class of multiple contraction functions
and the class of S.S.-based multiple contractions.
At this point we observe that equation (10.5) introduced above is a generaliza-
tion to the case of changes by (possibly non-singleton) sets of sentences of the
Harper identity (i.e. equation (2.2)). Having this in mind, in the sequence, we
shall designate such equation by generalized Harper identity.
13. Vice versa, to obtain an explicit definition as well as an axiomatic charac-
terization for the multiple revision functions ⊕ : TL × P(L) → TL that are
obtained from a S.S.-based multiple contraction ÷ by means of the general-
ized Levi identity (equation (5.1)) and to investigate the relationship between
that class of multiple revision functions and the class of S.S.-based multiple
revisions introduced in [Pep04] (cf. Subsection 5.6.3).
14. A possible first step towards the obtention of the above mentioned axiomatic
characterizations and interrelations (and which is, furthermore, an interesting
topic of research on its own right) may be the clarification of whether the
following conjecture is true or false:
Conjecture 10.2.2 The following statements hold:135
(i) If the function ÷ : TL×P(L)→ TL satisfies the postulates of P-inclusion,
P-success, P-uniformity, P-relevance, P-conjunctive overlap/P-intersec-
tion, P-conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction, P-singleton reduction, then
the function ⊕ : TL×P(L)→ TL defined from ÷ by means of the general-
ized Levi identity (equation (5.1)) satisfies the the eight multiple revision
postulates presented in [ZF01, Subsection 2.1] (and in [Pep04, Section 5])
and equation (10.5).
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(ii) If the function ⊕ : TL×P(L)→ TL satisfies the the eight multiple revision
postulates presented in [ZF01, Subsection 2.1] (and in [Pep04, Section
5]), then the function ÷ : TL × P(L) → TL obtained from ⊕ by means
of the generalized Harper identity (equation (10.5)) satisfies the postu-
lates of P-inclusion, P-success, P-uniformity, P-relevance, P-conjunctive
overlap/P-intersection, P-conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction, P-single-
ton reduction as well as the identity (5.1).
We notice that the above conjecture is based on the results regarding the
interrelation between set contraction and multiple revision that were stated in
Observation 5.6.4 and on the assumption that Conjecture 10.2.1 above holds.
In fact, it follows from Observation 5.6.4 that if Conjecture 10.2.1 is true then
Conjecture 10.2.2 also holds. Therefore, on the one hand, the confirmation of
Conjecture 10.2.1 immediately implies the confirmation of Conjecture 10.2.2
and, on the other hand, the refutation of the latter conjecture immediately
entails the refutation of the former one.
Furthermore, we also notice here that the statement of Conjecture 10.2.2 is a
generalization to the case of multiple change operations of some of the results
that we have presented in Subsection 2.4.3 regarding the relationship between
AGM (singleton) revisions and contractions that is highlighted by Levi and
Harper identities (i.e. equations (2.1) and (2.2), respectively).
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Appendix A
Appendix of Chapter 3
A.1 Proofs of Chapter 3
In this section we present the proofs for the results presented throughout Chapter 3
which we have not found in the literature. We also present a proof for Observation
3.4.11 which differs from the one that was provided in [Foo90], where that result
was originally presented.
For commodity of the reader, throughout this section, before each of those proofs
we include the statement of the result that such proof refers to.
Observation 3.4.11 ([Foo90]) Let ≤ be a relation that satisfies (EE1), (EE2) and
(EE5). If α ∈ Cn(∅) then for all δ ∈ L \ Cn(∅), δ < α, where < denotes the strict
part of ≤.
Proof. Assume ` α. It follows from (EE2) that ∀ε ∈ L, ε ≤ α.
Now let δ ∈ L \ Cn(∅). Hence, δ ≤ α. Now assume by reductio that α ≤ δ,
then, by (EE1), ∀ε ∈ L, ε ≤ δ and, from (EE5) we conclude that ` δ, which
contradicts δ 6∈ Cn(∅). Hence, we have that α 6≤ δ and we can conclude that
∀δ ∈ L \ Cn(∅), δ < α as we wished to prove.
Observation 3.4.12 Let K be a belief set and ≤ be a relation that satisfies (EE1)
and (EE4). Then α 6∈ K if and only if for all β ∈ K, α < β, where < denotes the
strict part of ≤.
Proof. Left-to-right: Let α 6∈ K. It follows from (EE4) that α ≤ ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L.
Now let β ∈ K and assume by reductio that β ≤ α. Then it follows from (EE1)
that β ≤ ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L and by (EE4) we obtain that β 6∈ K which contradicts our
hypothesis. Therefore we can conclude that, for all β ∈ K, α < β.
Right-to-left: Assume that for all β ∈ K, α < β. Then it follows immediately
that α 6∈ K. Indeed, assume by reductio that α ∈ K. Then it follows from the
hypothesis that α < α which is absurd.
Lemma 3.4.13 Let ≤ be a relation that satisfies (EE1), (EE2) and (EE3) and let
< denote the strict part of ≤. Then the following statements hold:
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(i) If α < β ∨ δ and α < ε ∨ ¬β, then α < ε ∨ δ.
(ii) If α < α ∨ ¬β then β ≤ α.
(iii) If δ ≤ α, α < α ∨ β and δ < δ ∨ ¬α, then δ < δ ∨ β.
Proof. (i) Let α < β ∨ δ and α < ε ∨ ¬β. From the former condition and the fact
that β ∨ δ ` β ∨ δ∨ ε, making use of (EE2), (EE1) and Observation 3.4.8, we obtain
that α < β ∨ δ ∨ ε. On the other hand, using the same arguments, α < ε ∨ ¬β and
ε ∨ ¬β ` ¬β ∨ ε ∨ δ yield α < ¬β ∨ ε ∨ δ.
From the latter condition and α < β∨δ∨ε it follows by Observation 3.4.10, that
α < (¬β ∨ ε∨ δ)∧ (β ∨ δ ∨ ε). Hence, from ` (¬β ∨ ε∨ δ)∧ (β ∨ δ ∨ ε)↔ ε∨ δ and
intersubstitutivity (Observation 3.4.9) we obtain that α < ε∨ δ and this finishes the
proof.
(ii) Let α < α∨¬β. Then, since ` (α∨β)∧ (α∨¬β)↔ α, by intersubstitutivity
(Observation 3.4.9) we have that α ∨ ¬β 6≤ (α ∨ β) ∧ (α ∨ ¬β). Hence, from (EE3)
we can conclude that α ∨ β ≤ (α ∨ β) ∧ (α ∨ ¬β). Then, again making use of
intersubstitutivity (Observation 3.4.9), we obtain that α ∨ β ≤ α. On the other
hand (EE2) gives us that β ≤ α∨β. Finally, by (EE1), from the last two conditions
we can conclude that β ≤ α, and this finishes the proof.
(iii) Assume δ ≤ α, α < α ∨ β and δ < δ ∨ ¬α
From δ ≤ α and α < α ∨ β it follows, by (EE1) and Observation 3.4.8, that
δ < α ∨ β. From this last condition and δ < δ ∨ ¬α, it follows by Lemma 3.4.13-(i)
that δ < δ ∨ β.
A.2 The Second Modelling in [Gro88] and Its
Interrelation With the Epistemic Entrench-
ment-based Contractions
The goal of this section is to present the class of revision functions introduced by
Grove in [Gro88, Sec. 3] and to expose the interrelation between such class and
the class of the E.E.-based contractions (presented in Section 3.4). Namely, in the
present section we shall show that the class of E.E.-based contraction functions coin-
cides with the class of the contraction functions which can be obtained by applying
the Harper Identity (i.e. equation (2.2)) to one of the revision functions of the
mentioned class proposed by Grove.
Furthermore, after disclosing such interconnection, we will make use of it to
clarify the remark that we have made in Footnote 63 on page 54, regarding the fact
that part of the results stated in Observations 3.4.5 and 3.4.6 is in fact a consequence
of [Gro88, Theorems 3 and 4](see Observation A.2.3 below) and [Ga¨r88, Theorems
3.2 - 3.5] (see Observations 2.4.4− 2.4.7 (of the present thesis)).
In [Gro88, Sec. 3], for any given belief set K, Grove suggested a way of ordering
the sentences in L which can be used to decide what sentences shall be removed
from or added to K whenever some belief change process occurs.
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More precisely, for that purpose, Grove suggested the use of a relation Gro on
L satisfying the following conditions:136
(Gro1) Gro is connected.137
(Gro2) Gro is transitive.
(Gro3) If ` α→ β ∨ δ, then either βGroα or δGroα.
(Gro4) If K 6= K⊥ then α is Gro-minimal (∀β ∈ L αGroβ) if and only if ¬α 6∈ K.
(Gro5) α is Gro-maximal (∀β ∈ L βGroα) if and only if ` ¬α.
Remark A.2.1 In [Gro88] the statement of property (Gro4) does not include the
condition that K 6= K⊥. However, in [Mey99, Footnote 5] it is noted that with-
out such condition [Gro88, Theorem 4] (see Observation A.2.3 below) does not hold
for the case K = K⊥. Furthermore, Meyer [Mey99, Footnote 5] also remarks that
[Ga¨r88, Lemma 4.27] (see Observation A.2.4-(ii) below) only holds if the above men-
tioned condition is included in such statement.
Throughout this text, given a belief set K, we will use the expression Grovean
relation with respect to K to designate a binary relation Gro on L that satisfies
conditions (Gro1)−(Gro5) above.
After introducing the above mentioned class of binary relations, Grove [Gro88,
Sec. 3] remarked that, given a belief set K, the Grovean relations with respect to K
“are, in a strong sense, equivalent to systems of spheres centred on ‖K‖”. Indeed
the following fact is stated in [Gro88, p. 164] (as well as in [Ga¨r88, p. 95]): Given
a system of spheres S centred on ‖K‖ the relation S defined by:138
For all α, β ∈ L α S β iff Sα ⊆ Sβ (A.1)
is a Grovean relation with respect to K.
Furthermore, given a belief set K and a Grovean relation Gro with respect to
K, Grove proposed a way of defining a Gro-based revision on K and obtained an
axiomatic characterization of the revision functions of that kind:
Definition A.2.2 ([Gro88]) Let K be a belief set and Gro be a Grovean relation
with respect to K. The Gro-based revision on K is the operation ∗Gro defined, for
any α ∈ L, by:139
K∗Groα =
{ {β ∈ L : (α ∧ β) ≺Gro (α ∧ ¬β)} , if 6` ¬α
K⊥ , if ` ¬α ,
136The notation Gro is not the one that has been used in [Gro88]. There, such relation has been
denoted by ≤ but here we use an alternative notation to avoid confusion with the notation we have
adopted to represent an E.E.-relation.
137It is noted in [Gro88, Footnote 1] that (Gro1) can be derived from (Gro2) and (Gro3).
138Here it must be noted that in [Gro88] if α ∈ L is such that ‖α‖ = ∅ then Sα is taken to be
ML.
139In fact in his definition Grove did not consider the case ` ¬α. However, as it is explained in
further detail in [Mey99, Footnote 6], that is clearly a necessary part of the definition.
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where ≺Gro denotes the strict part of the binary relation Gro.
An operation ∗ on K is a Grovean relation-based revision on K if and only if
there is a Grovean relation Gro with respect to K such that, for all sentences α ∈ L,
K∗α = K∗Groα.
Observation A.2.3 ([Gro88, Theorems 3 and 4]) 140
Let K be a belief set. An operation ∗ on K is a Grovean relation-based revision
on K if and only if it satisfies the basic and the supplementary AGM postulates for
belief set revision.
To emphasize the strength of the interrelation between systems of spheres and
Grovean relations it is worth noticing that the proof of the above observation (or,
more precisely, of [Gro88, Theorems 3 and 4]), presented in [Gro88], is based on the
axiomatic characterization of the S.S.-based revisions141 which is provided in that
same paper ([Gro88, Theorems 1 and 2]). More precisely, the proof of the right-
to-left part of this observation is based on the possibility of defining, by means of
condition (A.1), a Grovean relation from a system of spheres. And, on the other
hand, the proof of the left-to-right part is based on the construction of a system of
spheres S from a Grovean relation Gro in such a way that the Gro-based revision
coincides with the S-based revision142.
Now that we have seen how the Grovean relations and the Systems of Spheres are
related, having in mind the well known interrelation between these latter structures
and the Epistemic Entrenchment relations (cf. Section 4.2), it is not surprising that
Grovean relations and epistemic entrenchment relations are very closely related as
well. In fact, as we will see right away, Grovean relations and E.E. relations (cf.
Definition 3.4.1) are, in a certain sense, dual to each other.143
To clarify this latter statement we start by presenting the following results of
[Ga¨r88, Sec. 4.8] which show that (and how) it is possible to define a Grovean
relation from an Epistemic Entrenchment relation and vice versa.
Observation A.2.4 ([Ga¨r88, Lemmas 4.26 and 4.27]) 144
Let K be a belief set. Then:
(i) If Gro is a Grovean relation with respect to K then the relation ≤Gro defined
by:
For all α, β ∈ L α ≤Gro β iff ¬αGro¬β (A.2)
is an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K.
140The right-to-left part of this observation corresponds to [Gro88, Theorem 3] and the left-to-right
part corresponds to [Gro88, Theorem 4].
141Here, by S.S.-based revisions we mean the revision functions which can be seen as resulting
from applying the Levi Identity (equation (2.1)) to some S.S.-based contraction.
142Here, by S-based revision we mean the revision functions which results of applying the Levi
Identity (equation (2.1)) to the S-based contraction.
143Notice that we have already made reference to this fact in Footnote 61 on page 52.
144Statement (i) of this Observation corresponds to [Ga¨r88, Lemma 4.26] and Statement (ii)
corresponds to [Ga¨r88, Lemma 4.27].
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(ii) If ≤ is an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K then the relation
≤ defined by:
For all α, β ∈ L, α ≤ β iff ¬α ≤ ¬β (A.3)
is a Grovean relation with respect to K.
The following couple of observations reveals the strong connection between the
E.E.-based contractions and the Grovean relation-based revisions.
Observation A.2.5 ([Ga¨r88, Lemma 4.28]) Let K be a belief set, Gro be a
Grovean relation with respect to K, ∗Gro be the Gro-based revision and ≤Gro be the
E.E.-relation defined from Gro by condition (A.2). Then the contraction function
− on K defined from ∗Gro by means of the Harper Identity (i.e. equation (2.2))
coincides with the ≤Gro-based contraction −≤Gro , i.e.,
For all α ∈ L, K−α = K−≤Gro α.
Observation A.2.6 ([Ga¨r88, Lemma 4.29]) Let K be a belief set, ≤ be an epis-
temic entrenchment relation with respect to K, −≤ be the ≤-based contraction and
≤ be the Grovean relation defined from ≤ by condition (A.3). Then the revision
function ∗ on K defined from −≤ by means of the Levi Identity (i.e. equation (2.1))
coincides with the ≤-based revision ∗≤, i.e.,
For all α ∈ L, K∗α = K ∗≤ α.
Remark A.2.7 Combining the two above observations with Observations A.2.4 and
2.4.8 we can immediately conclude that the class of epistemic entrenchment-based
contractions coincides with the class of contraction functions which are obtained by
applying the Harper Identity (i.e. equation (2.2)) to some Grovean relation-based
revision.
From the above remark, we can immediately conclude that, as we have stated
in Footnote 63 on page 54, part of the facts stated in Observations 3.4.5 and 3.4.6
(namely, the part consisting of the axiomatic characterization of the E.E.-based
contractions) follows essentially from [Gro88, Theorems 3 and 4] (see Observation
A.2.3 above) and [Ga¨r88, Theorems 3.2 - 3.5] (see Observations 2.4.4 − 2.4.7 (of
the present thesis)). Indeed, having in mind Remark A.2.7, as it is mentioned in
[Ga¨r88, p. 96], combining the just mentioned Observation A.2.3 and Observations
2.4.4 − 2.4.8 it follows immediately that the following representation theorem for
E.E.-based contractions holds:
Observation A.2.8 ([Ga¨r88, Theorem 4.30]) Let K be a belief set. An opera-
tion − on K is an epistemic entrenchment-based contraction on K if and only if it
satisfies the basic and the supplementary AGM postulates for belief set contraction.
We close this section with the explanation of the remark that we have made in
Footnote 74 on page 71 based on the results that we have introduced above.
Let K be a belief set and ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect
to K. In the mentioned footnote we have stated that, based on the proof of [Gro88,
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Theorem 4] (i.e., the left-to-right part of Observation A.2.3), it is possible to prove
that there is a S.S. S centred on ‖K‖ such that the ≤-based contraction on K and
the S-based contraction on K coincide. Now we show how that can be done. So, let
−≤ be the ≤-based contraction and ∗ be the revision function on K defined from
−≤ by means of the Levi Identity (i.e. equation (2.1)). According to Observation
A.2.6, the revision function ∗ coincides with the ≤-based revision ∗≤ , where ≤
is the Grovean relation defined from ≤ by condition (A.3).
On the other hand, as we have mentioned in the paragraph immediately below
Observation A.2.3, the proof of the left-to-right part of that theorem (i.e. of [Gro88,
Theorem 4]) presents a way a of constructing a system of spheres S from a given
Grovean relation Gro in such a way that the Gro-based revision coincides with the
S-based revision142. So, we can conclude that there is a system of spheres, say S,
such that the ≤-based revision ∗≤ coincides with the S-based revision142 ∗S.
Hence, it follows that the revision function ∗ coincides with the S-based revi-
sion142 ∗S. Therefore, the contraction function defined from ∗ by means of the
Harper Identity (i.e. equation (2.2)) coincides with the function that is obtained in
the same way from ∗S.
But, since ∗ is the revision function defined from −≤ by means of the Levi
Identity and (according to Footnote 142) ∗S is the revision function which results of
applying the Levi Identity to the S-based contraction −S, recalling that, according
to their respective axiomatic characterizations, −≤ and −S satisfy the basic AGM
postulates for contraction, it follows immediately from Observation 2.4.8 that the
contraction function obtained from ∗ by means of the Harper Identity is the ≤-based
contraction −≤ and the contraction function that is obtained in the same way from
∗S is the S-based contraction −S.
Therefore, we can conclude that the system of spheres S is such that such that
the ≤-based contraction −≤ on K and the S-based contraction −S on K coincide,
and this proves our point.
We must notice, however, that in the above reasoning we have made use of the
axiomatic characterizations (more precisely of the construction-to-postulates part
of those characterizations) of the system of spheres-based contractions and of the
epistemic entrenchment-based contractions. Therefore, if we had used the above
reasoning to prove that ≤-based contraction −≤ on K and the S-based contraction
−S on K coincide instead of proceeding as we have done in Section 4.2, we would
not have obtained a direct proof (in the sense of not making use of representation
theorems at all) for that fact, as it was our intention.
Appendix B
Appendix of Chapter 4
B.1 Proofs of Chapter 4
In this section we present the proofs for the results presented throughout Chapter 4
which we have not found in the literature. We also present a proof for Observation
4.1.7 which differs from the one that was provided in [AM82], where that result was
originally presented.
For commodity of the reader, throughout this section, before each of those proofs
we include the statement of the result that such proof refers to.
Remark 4.1.6 A contraction function ∼ is the full meet contraction on a belief set
K if and only if, for any ϕ ∈ L, K ∼ ϕ = Cn(K ∼ ϕ) and:
‖K ∼ ϕ‖ =
{ ‖K‖ ∪ ‖¬ϕ‖ , if ϕ ∈ K \ Cn(∅)
‖K‖ , otherwise .
Proof. Let K be a belief set and ∼ be the full meet contraction on K. Then,
according to Definition 3.1.7, K ∼ ϕ = K, if ` ϕ, and K ∼ ϕ = ⋂K⊥ϕ, if
6` ϕ. Hence, if ` ϕ or ϕ 6∈ K then K ∼ ϕ = K and, if 6` ϕ and ϕ ∈ K then
K ∼ ϕ = ⋂{X : X ∈ K⊥ϕ}.
Therefore, it follows trivially that ‖K ∼ ϕ‖ = ‖K‖ for all sentences ϕ such that
` ϕ or ϕ 6∈ K.
Thus, it remains only to show that ‖K ∼ ϕ‖ = ‖K‖ ∪ ‖¬ϕ‖ if ϕ ∈ K \ Cn(∅).
To see that this indeed holds, let ϕ ∈ K \Cn(∅). Then, it follows from Observation
4.1.1-3 (and Remark 4.1.2) that K ∼ ϕ = ⋂{Th(‖K‖ ∪ {W}) : W ∈ ‖¬ϕ‖}.
Then, since, according to Observation 4.1.1-2, for each W ∈ ‖¬ϕ‖ the set X =
Th(‖K‖ ∪ {W}) is a belief set such that ‖X‖ = ‖K‖ ∪ {W}, we have that K ∼ ϕ
is also a belief set such that K ∼ ϕ ⊆ Th(‖K‖ ∪ {W}) for all W ∈ ‖¬ϕ‖ and
it follows from Observation 3.3.3-(e) that
⋃
W∈‖¬ϕ‖(‖K‖ ∪ {W}) ⊆ ‖K ∼ ϕ‖, i.e.,
‖K‖ ∪ ‖¬ϕ‖ ⊆ ‖K ∼ ϕ‖. To finish this part of the proof, next we show that
‖K ∼ ϕ‖ ⊆ ‖K‖ ∪ ‖¬ϕ‖. Let M be a world such that M ∈ ML \ (‖K‖ ∪ ‖¬ϕ‖).
We will show that M 6∈ ‖K ∼ ϕ‖. Since M ∈ ML, from M 6∈ ‖¬ϕ‖ it follows
that ϕ ∈ M and from M 6∈ ‖K‖ we can conclude that there is some β ∈ K such
that ¬β ∈ M . Hence ¬ϕ ∨ β 6∈ M . On the other hand, since β ∈ K, it holds that
¬ϕ ∨ β ∈ H, for every H ∈ K⊥ϕ and consequently ¬ϕ ∨ β ∈ K ∼ ϕ. So, we can
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conclude that M 6∈ ‖K ∼ ϕ‖. Thus, it holds that ‖K ∼ ϕ‖ = ‖K‖ ∪ ‖¬ϕ‖, for any
ϕ ∈ K \ Cn(∅).
Now we prove that the converse implication holds. Let ∼ be a contraction
function on a belief set K such that, for any ϕ ∈ L, K ∼ ϕ = Cn(K ∼ ϕ) and
‖K ∼ ϕ‖ =
{ ‖K‖ ∪ ‖¬ϕ‖ , if ϕ ∈ K \ Cn(∅)
‖K‖ , otherwise .
Then, since K ∼ ϕ = Cn(K ∼ ϕ), it follows from Observation 3.3.3−(a) that
K ∼ ϕ =
{
Th(‖K‖ ∪ ‖¬ϕ‖) , if ϕ ∈ K \ Cn(∅)
K , otherwise
.
Finally, having in mind Observation 4.1.1-3 (and Remark 4.1.2) as well as Defi-
nition 3.1.1, from the above we can conclude that
K ∼ ϕ =
{ ⋂
K⊥ϕ , if 6` ϕ
K , if ` ϕ, ,
and, according to Definition 3.1.7, this proves that ∼ is the full meet contraction on
K, as we wished to show.
Observation 4.1.7 ([AM82, Observation 2.1]) Let K be a belief set and ∼ be
the operator of full meet contraction on K. Then for all sentences ϕ ∈ L:
K ∼ ϕ =
{
K ∩ Cn(¬ϕ) , if ϕ ∈ K
K , if ϕ 6∈ K .
Proof. Let K be a belief set and ∼ be the operator of full meet contraction on K.
First we notice that, if ϕ 6∈ K it follows immediately from Definition 3.1.7 that
K ∼ ϕ = K.
Hence, it remains to show that if ϕ ∈ K then K ∼ ϕ = K ∩ Cn(¬ϕ). So, let
ϕ ∈ K. We will consider separately the two cases ϕ ∈ Cn(∅) and ϕ 6∈ Cn(∅).
Case 1, ϕ ∈ Cn(∅). Then, on the one hand it follows from Definition 3.1.7 that
K ∼ ϕ = K and, on the other hand we have that Cn(¬ϕ) = L. Therefore it holds
that K ∼ ϕ = K ∩ Cn(¬ϕ), as we wished to prove.
Case 2, ϕ 6∈ Cn(∅). Then ϕ ∈ K \ Cn(∅) and, according to Remark 4.1.6, it
holds that ‖K ∼ ϕ‖ = ‖K‖∪ ‖¬ϕ‖. On the other hand, since K ∼ ϕ is a belief set,
it follows from Observation 3.3.3-(a) that K ∼ ϕ = ⋂ ‖K ∼ ϕ‖. Hence, we have
that K ∼ ϕ = ⋂(‖K‖ ∪ ‖¬ϕ‖) = (⋂ ‖K‖) ∩ (⋂ ‖¬ϕ‖) = K ∩ Cn(¬ϕ), and this
finishes the proof.
Observation 4.1.8 (Based on [Gro88]) Let K be a belief set and − be a partial
meet contraction on K. Then, for any ϕ ∈ L:
1. If ` ϕ or ϕ 6∈ K, then ‖K−ϕ‖ = ‖K‖
2. If ϕ ∈ K \Cn(∅), then ‖K−ϕ‖ = ‖K‖ ∪M, where M is a non-empty subset
of ‖¬ϕ‖.
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Proof. Let K be a belief set and − be a partial meet contraction on K. Then,
according to Definition 3.1.6, K−ϕ = K, if ` ϕ, and K−ϕ = ⋂ γ(K⊥ϕ), where
γ(K⊥ϕ) is a non-empty subset of K⊥ϕ, if 6` ϕ.
Hence, if ` ϕ or ϕ 6∈ K then ‖K−ϕ‖ = ‖K‖, and we can conclude that point 1.
in the statement of the observation holds.
Now we assume that ϕ ∈ K \ Cn(∅). In order to show that 2. also holds we
only need to show that ‖K−ϕ‖ = ‖K‖ ∪ M, where M is a non-empty subset
of ‖¬ϕ‖. In order to prove that such identity indeed holds we start by recalling
that, in this case, according to Remark 4.1.6, if ∼ is the full meet contraction on
K then ‖K ∼ ϕ‖ = ‖K‖ ∪ ‖¬ϕ‖. Therefore, since K ∼ ϕ and K−ϕ are belief
sets (because they are the result of the intersection of a family of belief sets), and
observing that K ∼ ϕ ⊆ K−ϕ, we can conclude from Observation 3.3.3-(e) that
‖K−ϕ‖ ⊆ ‖K‖∪‖¬ϕ‖. On the other hand, there is at least one set H in K⊥ϕ such
that K−ϕ ⊆ H. Such a set H is a belief set (see Observation 3.1.4) and it holds
that ‖H‖ = ‖K‖ ∪ {W} for some ¬ϕ-world W (according to Observation 4.1.1-1).
So, again from Observation 3.3.3-(e) it follows that the set ‖K−ϕ‖ contains ‖K‖
and at least one ¬ϕ-world. Therefore from all the above we can conclude that,
if − is a partial meet contraction and ϕ ∈ L is such that ϕ ∈ K \ Cn(∅) then
‖K−ϕ‖ = ‖K‖ ∪M, where M is a non-empty subset of ‖¬ϕ‖.
Observation 4.2.2 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖
and ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K. Then condition
(≤ −S) is satisfied if and only if
∀α, β ∈ L \ Cn(∅), α ≤ β iff S¬α ⊆ S¬β. (≤ −S′)
Proof. Assume the conditions mentioned in the statement of the observation hold.
We will prove that condition (≤ −S) is satisfied if and only if condition (≤ −S′)
is also satisfied.
First we assume that condition (≤ −S′) holds and show that condition (≤ −S)
is also satisfied, i.e., that for any α, β ∈ L, α ≤ β if and only if either S¬α ⊆ S¬β or
` β. We will prove this by double implication.
(⇒) Let α, β be any two sentences such that α ≤ β. We must show that either
S¬α ⊆ S¬β or ` β. In order to do that, assume 6` β. Then it also holds that 6` α.
Indeed, assume by reductio that ` α. It follows from (EE2) that ∀φ ∈ L, φ ≤ α
and, since α ≤ β, we obtain by (EE1) that ∀φ ∈ L, φ ≤ β. Finally, according to
(EE5), it follows that ` β which is a contradiction. Hence, α, β ∈ L\Cn(∅) and we
can conclude, by (≤ −S′), that S¬α ⊆ S¬β.
(⇐) Let α, β be any two sentences such that either S¬α ⊆ S¬β or ` β.
Case 1, S¬α ⊆ S¬β. Then α, β 6∈ Cn(∅) and it follows from (≤ −S′) that α ≤ β.
Case 2, ` β. Then it follows immediately from (EE2) that α ≤ β.
The other direction is obvious since it follows immediately from condition (≤ −S)
that, for any α, β ∈ L \ Cn(∅), α ≤ β if and only if S¬α ⊆ S¬β, i.e. that condition
(≤ −S′) is satisfied.
Lemma 4.2.4 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and
≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K. Then the following three
conditions are equivalent:
174 APPENDIX B. APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 4
1. ∀α, β ∈ L\Cn(∅), α ≤ β ⇔ S¬α ⊆ S¬β (notice that this is condition (≤ −S′)).
2. ∀α, β ∈ L \ Cn(∅), α < β ⇔ S¬α ⊂ S¬β and α =E.E. β ⇔ S¬α = S¬β.
3. ∀α, β ∈ L \ Cn(∅), α < β ⇒ S¬α ⊂ S¬β and α =E.E. β ⇒ S¬α = S¬β.
Proof. 1.⇒ 2. Assume 1. holds and let α, β be two arbitrary sentences in L\Cn(∅).
We start by showing that α < β ⇔ S¬α ⊂ S¬β.
α < β
⇔ α ≤ β and β 6≤ α
⇔ S¬α ⊆ S¬β and S¬β 6⊆ S¬α (by 1.)
⇔ S¬α ⊂ S¬β.
Now we show that α =E.E. β ⇔ S¬α = S¬β
α =E.E. β
⇔ α ≤ β and β ≤ α
⇔ S¬α ⊆ S¬β and S¬β ⊆ S¬α (by 1.)
⇔ S¬α = S¬β.
2.⇒ 3. This implication is immediate.
3. ⇒ 1. Assume 3. holds and let α, β be two arbitrary sentences in L \ Cn(∅).
We must show that α ≤ β ⇔ S¬α ⊆ S¬β.
(⇒)
α ≤ β
⇔ α < β or β =E.E. α
⇒ S¬α ⊂ S¬β or S¬α = S¬β (by 3.)
⇔ S¬α ⊆ S¬β.
(⇐) Let S¬α ⊆ S¬β. Then either S¬α ⊂ S¬β or S¬α = S¬β.
Case 1, S¬α ⊂ S¬β.
S¬α ⊂ S¬β
⇒ S¬β 6⊂ S¬α
⇒ β 6< α (by 3.)
⇔ α ≤ β (by connectivity (Observation 3.4.3 - (i))).
Case 2, S¬α = S¬β.
S¬α = S¬β
⇒ S¬α 6⊂ S¬β and S¬β 6⊂ S¬α
⇒ α 6< β and β 6< α (by 3.)
⇔ β ≤ α and α ≤ β (by connectivity (Observation 3.4.3 - (i)))
⇒ α ≤ β.
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Lemma 4.2.5 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and
≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K. If S and ≤ satisfy
condition (≤ −S), then for any α ∈ L \ Cn(∅) and any β ∈ L it holds that
α < α ∨ β iff fS(¬α) ⊆ ‖β‖.
Proof. Assume K, S, ≤, α and β are in the conditions introduced in the statement
of the lemma. We must show that α < α ∨ β if and only if fS(¬α) ⊆ ‖β‖. To do
that, we consider two cases separately.
Case 1, ` α ∨ β. Then, on the one hand, ‖¬α ∧ ¬β‖ = ∅ which is equivalent to
‖¬α‖ ∩ ‖¬β‖ = ∅. Hence ‖¬α‖ ⊆ ‖β‖ and, consequently, in particular, fS(¬α) ⊆
‖β‖. On the other hand it follows immediately from Observation 3.4.11 that α <
α ∨ β. Therefore we can trivially conclude that α < α ∨ β ⇔ fS(¬α) ⊆ ‖β‖.
Case 2, 6` α ∨ β.
(⇒) Let α < α∨β. It follows from (≤ −S) and Lemma 4.2.4 that S¬α ⊂ S¬α∧¬β.
Now let W ∈ fS(¬α). Then W ∈ ‖¬α‖ and W ∈ S¬α. Assume, by reductio, that
W ∈ ‖¬β‖, then W ∈ ‖¬α‖∩‖¬β‖ = ‖¬α∧¬β‖ and from this we can conclude that
S¬α∧¬β ⊆ S¬α, which contradicts S¬α ⊂ S¬α∧¬β. Hence W 6∈ ‖¬β‖, so W ∈ ‖β‖.
Therefore fS(¬α) ⊆ ‖β‖.
(⇐) Let fS(¬α) ⊆ ‖β‖. We must show that α < α ∨ β. But, since condition
(≤ −S) holds, according to Lemma 4.2.4, in order to prove that, it is enough to
verify that S¬α ⊂ S¬α∧¬β. That S¬α ⊆ S¬α∧¬β follows immediately from the fact
that all {¬α∧¬β}-worlds are {¬α}-worlds. Now assume by reductio that S¬α∧¬β ⊆
S¬α, then S¬α∧¬β = S¬α. Hence S¬α ∩ ‖¬α ∧ ¬β‖ 6= ∅, which is equivalent to
S¬α ∩ ‖¬α‖ ∩ ‖¬β‖ 6= ∅, which contradicts S¬α ∩ ‖¬α‖ ⊆ ‖β‖.
Theorem 4.2.6 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖
and ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K. Then the ≤-based
contraction on K, −≤ (cf. condition (C−≤) in Definition 3.4.4), and the S-based
contraction on K, −S (cf. Definition 3.3.7), coincide, i.e.,
∀ϕ ∈ L, K−≤ϕ = K−Sϕ,
if and only if condition (≤ −S) is satisfied.
Proof. Assume K, S and ≤ are in the conditions introduced in the statement of
the theorem. We must show that ∀ϕ ∈ L, K−≤ϕ = K−Sϕ if and only if condition
(≤ −S) holds.
Right-to-left: Assume that S and ≤ satisfy condition (≤ −S) and let ϕ be an
arbitrary sentence of L. We will prove that K−≤ϕ = K−Sϕ.
Case 1, ` ϕ. Then, according to Definitions 3.4.4 and 3.3.7, K−≤ϕ = K−Sϕ = K
and we are done.
Case 2, 6` ϕ. Then, according to Definitions 3.4.4 and 3.3.7, in this case, K−≤ϕ =
K−Sϕ if and only if
{β ∈ K : ϕ < ϕ ∨ β} = Th(‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬ϕ)).
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So, in what follows, we prove such equality of sets:
β ∈ {β ∈ K : ϕ < ϕ ∨ β}
iff β ∈ K and ϕ < ϕ ∨ β
iff β ∈
⋂
‖K‖ and fS(¬ϕ) ⊆ ‖β‖ (by Observation 3.3.3-(a) and
Lemma 4.2.5)
iff β ∈
⋂
‖K‖ and β ∈
⋂
fS(¬ϕ)
iff β ∈
⋂
(‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬ϕ))
iff β ∈ Th(‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬ϕ))
Left-to-right: Assume that ∀ϕ ∈ L, K−≤ϕ = K−Sϕ. We must prove that
condition (≤ −S) holds. In order to do that, according to Lemma 4.2.4, it is enough
show that S and ≤ satisfy condition 3. of the mentioned lemma, which is equivalent
to
∀α, β ∈ L \ Cn(∅), S¬α 6⊂ S¬β ⇒ α 6< β and S¬α 6= S¬β ⇒ α 6=E.E. β.
Hence, let α and β be two arbitrary elements of L \Cn(∅). We start by proving
that S¬α 6⊂ S¬β ⇒ α 6< β. So, let S¬α 6⊂ S¬β. It follows that β 6∈ K−≤β ∧ α.
Indeed:
S¬α 6⊂ S¬β
⇒ S¬β ⊆ S¬α
⇒ S¬β∨¬α = S¬β
⇒ fS(¬(β ∧ α)) 6⊆ ‖β‖
⇒ β 6∈
⋂
(‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬(β ∧ α)))
⇒ β 6∈ K−Sβ ∧ α
iff β 6∈ K−≤β ∧ α (by the hypothesis).
Therefore, according to Definition 3.4.4, we have that β 6∈ {β ∈ K : (β ∧ α) <
(β ∧ α) ∨ β}.
Now we consider two cases:
Case 1, β 6∈ K. Then it follows from (EE4) that β ≤ α. Consequently α 6< β.
Case 2, β ∈ K. Then (β∧α) 6< (β∧α)∨β and by making use of intersubstitutivity
(Observation 3.4.9) we obtain that β∧α 6< β. Hence, from condition (3.1) it follows
that β ≤ β ∧ α. Finally, since β ∧ α ` α, from (EE2) and (EE1) we can conclude
that β ≤ α. Therefore α 6< β.
Having seen this, it remains to prove that S¬α 6= S¬β ⇒ α 6=E.E. β. So, let
S¬α 6= S¬β. Then either S¬α ⊂ S¬β or S¬β ⊂ S¬α. We assume without loss of
generality that S¬β ⊂ S¬α. Since ‖K‖ ⊆ S¬β (according to Definition 3.3.5), it
follows that ‖K‖ ⊂ S¬α. Hence α ∈
⋂ ‖K‖. Moreover, given that Th(‖K‖) = K
(according to Observation 3.3.3-(a)), we can conclude that α ∈ K.
Finally we show that it follows from S¬β ⊂ S¬α that α 6=E.E. β. Again, we need
to consider separately the cases β 6∈ K and β ∈ K.
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Case 1, β 6∈ K. Then, since α ∈ K, it follows immediately from Observation
3.4.12 that β < α. Therefore we can conclude that α 6≤ β. Consequently α 6=E.E. β.
Case 2, β ∈ K.
S¬β ⊂ S¬α
⇒ S¬β∨¬α = S¬β ⊂ S¬α
⇒ fS(¬β ∨ ¬α) ⊆ ‖¬β‖ and fS(¬β ∨ ¬α) ∩ ‖¬α‖ = ∅
⇒ β 6∈
⋂
(‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬(β ∧ α))) and α ∈
⋂
(‖K‖ ∪ fS(¬(β ∧ α)))
(given that α ∈
⋂
‖K‖)
⇒ β 6∈ K−Sβ ∧ α and α ∈ K−Sβ ∧ α
iff β 6∈ K−≤β ∧ α and α ∈ K−≤β ∧ α (by the hypothesis)
⇒ (β ∧ α) 6< (β ∧ α) ∨ β and (β ∧ α) < (β ∧ α) ∨ α (given that β ∈ K)
⇒ β ∧ α 6< β and β ∧ α < α (by intersubstitutivity (Observation 3.4.9))
⇒ β ≤ β ∧ α and β ∧ α < α (by condition (3.1))
⇒ β < α (by (EE1) and Observation 3.4.8)
⇒ α 6=E.E. β (by condition (3.1))
Remark 4.2.7 Let K be a belief set and ≤ be an E.E. relation with respect to K.
Then:
(i) If αi ∈ L \ Cn(∅) then {α ∈ L : αi < α} = K \ {α ∈ L : α ≤ αi}.
(ii) If αi ∈ L \K then {α ∈ L : αi < α} = K.
Proof. Let K be a belief set and ≤ be an E.E. relation with respect to K. In what
follows we prove that conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied:
(i) Assume αi ∈ L\Cn(∅). We start by showing that {α ∈ L : αi < α} ⊆ K. To
see this, let ϕ be an arbitrary sentence in L\K. It follows from (EE4) that ϕ ≤ αi.
Therefore αi 6< ϕ and, consequently, ϕ 6∈ {α ∈ L : αi < α}. Hence, we can conclude
that {α ∈ L : αi < α} ⊆ K.
Having seen this, we now show that it holds that {α ∈ L : αi < α} = K \ {α ∈
L : α ≤ αi}. Indeed:
ϕ ∈ K \ {α ∈ L : α ≤ αi}
iff ϕ ∈ K and ϕ 6∈ {α ∈ L : α ≤ αi}
iff ϕ ∈ K and ϕ 6≤ αi
iff ϕ ∈ K and αi < ϕ (according to 3.1)
iff ϕ ∈ K ∩ {α ∈ L : αi < α}
iff ϕ ∈ {α ∈ L : αi < α} (since, as we have seen above, {α ∈ L : αi < α} ⊆ K).
(ii) Let αi ∈ L \K, we must prove that {α ∈ L : αi < α} = K. From (i) above
we can conclude that {α ∈ L : αi < α} ⊆ K. On the other hand, it follows from
Observation 3.4.12 that K ⊆ {α ∈ L : αi < α} and this finishes the proof.
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Lemma 4.2.8 Let ≤ be an E.E. relation with respect to a belief set K and αi, αj ∈
L \ Cn(∅). Then the following statements hold:
(i) If αi < αj then αj ∈ Th(Wαi) or, which is the same, Wαi ⊆ ‖αj‖.
(ii) Wαj ∩ ‖¬αj‖ 6= ∅.
Proof. Assume the conditions introduced in the statement of the lemma hold.
(i) Let αi < αj. Then αj ∈ {α ∈ L : αi < α} and, according to the construction
(4.1) of the set Wαi , it follows that αj ∈
⋂Wαi and this finishes the proof.
(ii) According to (4.1), Wαj = ‖{α ∈ L : αj < α}‖. Assume by reductio that
Wαj ∩ ‖¬αj‖ = ∅. Then {α ∈ L : αj < α} ` αj. Since αj 6∈ Cn(∅), we have that
{α ∈ L : αj < α} 6= ∅ and it follows by compactness that there is a non-empty finite
set D = {δ1, . . . , δn} such that D ⊆ {α ∈ L : αj < α} and δ1 ∧ · · · ∧ δn ` αj. Now,
on the one hand it follows from (EE2) that δ1 ∧ · · · ∧ δn ≤ αj. On the other hand,
by making use of (EE1) and (EE3) we can easily obtain by induction that there is
some δi ∈ D such that δi ≤ δ1 ∧ · · · ∧ δn. Hence, by making use of (EE1), we can
conclude that there is some δi ∈ {α ∈ L : αj < α} such that δi ≤ αj which is a
contradiction. Hence Wαj ∩ ‖¬αj‖ 6= ∅, as we wished to prove.
Lemma 4.2.9 Let ≤ be an E.E. relation with respect to a belief set K and αi, αj ∈
L \ Cn(∅). Then the following statements hold:
(i) αi =E.E. αj if and only if Wαi =Wαj .
(ii) αi < αj if and only if Wαi ⊂ Wαj .
Proof. Assume the conditions introduced in the statement of the lemma hold.
We start by proving the left to right part of both the statements (i) and (ii), i.e.
the following conditionals:
(i ⇒) If αi =E.E. αj then Wαi =Wαj .
(ii ⇒) If αi < αj then Wαi ⊂ Wαj .
(i ⇒) Let αi =E.E. αj. Then it follows immediately from (EE1) and Observation
3.4.8 that {α ∈ L : αi < α} = {α ∈ L : αj < α} and, according to equation (4.1),
we can conclude that Wαi =Wαj .
(ii ⇒) Let αi < αj. Then it follows immediately from (EE1) and Observation
3.4.8 that {α ∈ L : αj < α} ⊂ {α ∈ L : αi < α}. Therefore, according to equation
(4.1), it holds that Wαi ⊆ Wαj . On the other hand, since from Lemma 4.2.8 it
follows that Wαi ⊆ ‖αj‖ and Wαj ∩ ‖¬αj‖ 6= ∅, we can conclude that Wαj 6⊆ Wαi .
Hence Wαi ⊂ Wαj , as we wished to prove.
Now we prove:
(i ⇐) If Wαi =Wαj then αi =E.E. αj.
(ii ⇐) If Wαi ⊂ Wαj then αi < αj.
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(i ⇐) Let Wαi = Wαj . Then, on the one hand, Wαi 6⊂ Wαj and it follows from
(ii ⇒), already proven above, that αi 6< αj. Hence, from connectivity (Observation
3.4.3 - (i)) we obtain that αj ≤ αi. On the other hand Wαj 6⊂ Wαi and reasoning
analogously we obtain αi ≤ αj. Therefore αi =E.E. αj, as required.
(ii ⇐) Let Wαi ⊂ Wαj . Then Wαj 6⊆ Wαi and it follows from (i ⇒) and (ii
⇒) that αj 6≤ αi. Hence, by connectivity (Observation 3.4.3 - (i)), we obtain that
αi < αj, and this finishes the proof.
Observation 4.2.11 Let K be a belief set, ≤ be an E.E. relation with respect to K,
and S′ be the class of subsets of ML defined by:
S′ = {Wαi : αi ∈ L \ Cn(∅)},
where, for any αi ∈ L \ Cn(∅), Wαi is the set defined in (4.1), i.e.,
Wαi = ‖{α ∈ L : αi < α}‖,
then the following statements hold:
(i) If K 6= L (i.e., K is a consistent belief set), then the set S = S′ ∪ {ML} is a
system of spheres centred on ‖K‖.
(ii) If K = L, then the set S = {∅} ∪ S′ ∪ {ML} is a system of spheres centred on
‖K‖.
Moreover, in both cases K 6= L and K = L, it holds that the (respective) thus
constructed system of spheres S and the given E.E. relation ≤ satisfy condition
(≤ −S).
Proof. Let K, ≤ and S′ be as above stated.
(i) Let K be a consistent belief set. In what follows we prove that the set
S = S′ ∪ {ML} is a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖.
First of all we notice that, by construction, S ⊆ P(ML). Now we must show
that it satisfies conditions (S1) - (S4) of Definition 3.3.5.
(S1) First notice that ML is such that for any X ∈ S it holds that X ⊆ ML.
Now let U and V be any two elements of S′. Then there are two sentences αi, αj ∈ L\
Cn(∅) such that U =Wαi and V =Wαj . It follows from connectivity (Observation
3.4.3 - (i)) that αi ≤ αj or αj ≤ αi. So, according to Lemma 4.2.9, Wαi ⊆ Wαj or
Wαj ⊆ Wαi , that is, U ⊆ V or V ⊆ U . Hence, for any R,S ∈ S, it holds that R ⊆ S
or S ⊆ R.
(S2) Since K is consistent there is some αi ∈ L \ Cn(∅) such that αi 6∈ K.
And in that case, as we have observed in Remark 4.2.10, it holds that Wαi = ‖K‖.
Therefore we can conclude that ‖K‖ ∈ S.
Now we show that for any U ∈ S it holds that ‖K‖ ⊆ U .
On the one hand it is immediate that ‖K‖ ⊆ ML. On the other hand, it follows
from Remark 4.2.7-(i) that, for any αj ∈ L \ Cn(∅), {α ∈ L : αj < α} ⊆ K.
Therefore, ‖K‖ ⊆ ‖{α ∈ L : αj < α}‖, which is to say that ‖K‖ ⊆ Wαj . Hence for
any V ∈ S′, ‖K‖ ⊆ V .
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(S3)ML ∈ S by construction.
(S4) Let ϕ be any sentence of L. And assume there is some element in S that
intersects ‖ϕ‖. We must show that there is a smallest element in S intersecting ‖ϕ‖.
First we notice that it follows from ‖ϕ‖ 6= ∅ that ¬ϕ ∈ L\Cn(∅) and consequently
the set W¬ϕ (defined by (4.1)) is in S.
Now we show that W¬ϕ is the smallest element in S intersecting ‖ϕ‖. In order
to do that we first notice that it follows from Lemma 4.2.8-(ii) that W¬ϕ ∩‖ϕ‖ 6= ∅.
It remains to show that any element of S that is (strictly) contained in W¬ϕ does
not intersect ‖ϕ‖. For that purpose, let H be an arbitrary element of S such that
H ⊂ W¬ϕ. SinceML 6⊂ W¬ϕ, we have that H ∈ S′, so there is some αh ∈ L\Cn(∅)
such that H = Wαh . From Wαh ⊂ W¬ϕ it follows, according to Lemma 4.2.9-(ii),
that αh < ¬ϕ. Finally, applying Lemma 4.2.8-(i), we conclude that Wαh ⊆ ‖¬ϕ‖.
Therefore H ∩ ‖ϕ‖ = ∅ as we wished to prove.
(ii) Let K = L be the inconsistent belief set. We must prove that the set
S = {∅} ∪ S′ ∪ {ML} is a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖.
Just as in the above proof of (i) we start by noticing that, by construction, S ⊆
P(ML). Now we must show that it satisfies conditions (S1) - (S4) from Definition
3.3.5.
(S1) It was shown in the above proof of (i) that, for any two elements of U ,V ∈
S′∪{ML}, it holds that U ⊆ V or V ⊆ U . On the other hand, ∅ ⊆ X for any X ∈ S.
Therefore we can conclude that R ⊆ S or S ⊆ R, for any R,S ∈ S.
(S2) Since K = L is the inconsistent belief set, we have that ‖K‖ = ∅. Therefore
‖K‖ ∈ S by construction, and it follows trivially that ‖K‖ ⊆ U , for any U ∈ S.
(S3)ML ∈ S by construction.
(S4) Let ϕ be any sentence of L. And assume there is some element in S that
intersects ‖ϕ‖. Reasoning just as we did in the proof of (i) above, we obtain that
W¬ϕ ∈ S andW¬ϕ∩‖ϕ‖ 6= ∅. Now, in order to show thatW¬ϕ is the smallest element
in S intersecting ‖ϕ‖, we take an arbitrary element H of S such that H ⊂ W¬ϕ and
we prove that H ∩ ‖ϕ‖ = ∅. We have to consider two cases:
Case 1, H = ∅. Then it follows trivially that H ∩ ‖ϕ‖ = ∅.
Case 2, H 6= ∅. Then, it can be shown just as in the above proof of (i) that
H ∩ ‖ϕ‖ = ∅.
Now we prove that in both cases K 6= L and K = L, it holds that the (respective)
system of spheres S and the given E.E. relation ≤ satisfy condition (≤ −S).
As we have seen in the respective proofs of (S4) for each case, in both cases,
we have that, for any consistent sentence ϕ, Sϕ = W¬ϕ (according to the notation
introduced in Definition 3.3.5).
Hence, it follows from Lemma 4.2.9 that, for any α, β ∈ L \Cn(∅) it holds that:
(i) α =E.E. β if and only if S¬α = S¬β.
(ii) α < β if and only if S¬α ⊂ S¬β.
From this, taking Observation 4.2.2 and Lemma 4.2.4 into account, we can con-
clude that, in both cases K 6= L and K = L, it holds that ≤ and (the respective) S
satisfy condition (≤ −S), and this finishes the proof.
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B.2 Interrelation Between Theorem 4.2.6 and
[PW95, Theorem 6.1]
In Footnote 73 on page 71 we have remarked that Theorem 4.2.6 is equivalent to
Theorem 6.1 of [PW95]. The main purpose of the present section is to clarify that
remark.
Peppas and Williams, in their paper [PW95], have shown (see [PW95, Theorem
6.1]) that, given a belief set K, if S is a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and ≤
is an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K, then the S-based revision
on K and the ≤-based revision on K coincide145 if and only if ≤ and S satisfy the
following condition:
For every α, β ∈ L \ Cn(∅), such that 6` ¬α and 6` ¬β, α ≤ β iff S¬α ⊆ S¬β.
(B.1)
In order to show that the above mentioned Theorem 6.1 of [PW95] is indeed
equivalent to Theorem 4.2.6 we start by observing, in the following lemma, that
condition (B.1) is satisfied if and only if condition (≤ −S) holds.
Lemma B.2.1 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and
≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K. Then the conditions
(B.1) and (≤ −S) are equivalent.146
Proof. Assume the conditions mentioned in the statement of the lemma hold.
We start by noticing that it follows from Observation 4.2.2 that, in order to
show that the conditions (B.1) and (≤ −S) are equivalent it is enough to prove that
condition (B.1) is satisfied if and only if condition (≤ −S′) is also satisfied.
It is obvious that if condition (≤ −S′) is satisfied then condition (B.1) also holds.
Now we show that the reverse implication is also true.
Assume condition (B.1) is satisfied, and let α, β be two arbitrary elements of
L \ Cn(∅). We must show that α ≤ β if and only if S¬α ⊆ S¬β. When 6` ¬α
and 6` ¬β, this follows immediately from condition (B.1). Now we consider the
remaining cases: ` ¬α or ` ¬β.
Case 1, ` ¬α. Then, on the one hand we have that ¬β ` ¬α, which is equivalent
to α ` β, and it follows from (EE2) that α ≤ β. On the other hand, since ` ¬α
it holds that ¬α ∈ U for any U ∈ ML. Therefore, according to (S2) and to the
definition of S¬α (see Definition 3.3.5), it holds that S¬α ⊆ U for any U ∈ S \ {∅},
which is to say that S¬α is the smallest non-empty sphere in S. Hence, in particular,
given that 6` β, we have that S¬α ⊆ S¬β. So, in this case, it trivially holds that
α ≤ β if and only if S¬α ⊆ S¬β.
145The revision functions on K here named S-based revision and ≤-based revision on K are the
ones that can be obtained from the S-based contraction (see Definition 3.3.7) and the ≤-based
contraction (see condition (C−≤) in Definition 3.4.4) on K, respectively, by means of the Levi
Identity (equation (2.1)).
146Notice, however, that condition (B.1) can not be used (instead of condition (≤ −S)) for the
purpose of defining (as it was done in Observation 4.2.1) an epistemic entrenchment relation by
means of a system of spheres. Observe that the justification for this statement is similar to the
one that we have presented in Remark 4.2.3 to explain why condition (≤ −S′) can not be used to
define an epistemic entrenchment relation by means of a system of spheres.
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Case 2, ` ¬β. Since we have above taken care of the case ` ¬α, in what follows
we assume 6` ¬α.
Given that ` ¬β, we start by noticing that, according to (S2) and to the definition
of S¬β (see Definition 3.3.5), it holds that S¬β ⊆ U for any U ∈ S \ {∅}, which is to
say that S¬β is the smallest non-empty sphere in S. On the other hand, since ` ¬β,
we have that, for any φ ∈ L, β ` φ, and, from (EE2) we obtain that β ≤ φ for any
φ ∈ L.
Now let S¬α ⊆ S¬β. We must show that α ≤ β. From the above remarks, and the
fact that we are assuming 6` ¬α, we can conclude that S¬β ⊆ Sα. Hence, S¬α ⊆ Sα
and, since 6` α and 6` ¬α, it follows from (B.1) that α ≤ ¬α. Therefore, making use
of (EE3) and (EE1), we obtain that α ≤ α ∧ ¬α. Finally, since α ∧ ¬α ` β, using
(EE2) and (EE1) we can conclude that α ≤ β, as required.
For the other direction, let α ≤ β. Since, as we have seen above, β ≤ φ for any
φ ∈ L, by making use of (EE1) we obtain that α ≤ φ for any φ ∈ L. Therefore, in
particular, we have that α ≤ ¬α, and, since 6` α and 6` ¬α, condition (B.1) gives
us that S¬α ⊆ Sα. Now, recalling that S¬β is the smallest non-empty sphere in S,
we notice that at least one of the equalities S¬α = S¬β and Sα = S¬β holds. But
then, because S¬α ⊆ Sα, in either case we have that S¬α ⊆ S¬β, and this finishes the
proof.
Now, having the above lemma in mind, we can immediately conclude that the
statement of [PW95, Theorem 6.1] can be rewritten in the following way:
Observation B.2.2 (Reformulation of [PW95, Theorem 6.1]) Let K be a be-
lief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment
relation with respect to K. Then the S-based revision on K and the ≤-based revision
on K coincide145 if and only if ≤ and S satisfy condition (≤ −S).
Hence, in order to conclude that [PW95, Theorem 6.1] and Theorem 4.2.6 are
equivalent, it is enough to note that, given a belief set K, a system of spheres
S centred on ‖K‖ and an epistemic entrenchment relation ≤ with respect to K,
the S-based contraction coincides with the ≤-based contraction on K if and only
if the S-based revision coincides with the ≤-based revision145 on K. Indeed, on
the one hand, as mentioned in Footnote 145, the S-based revision and the ≤-based
revision on K are obtained from the S-based contraction and the≤-based contraction
on K, respectively, by means of the Levi Identity (i.e. equation (2.1)). On the
other hand, since, according to their respective axiomatic characterizations, the ≤-
based contraction and the S-based contraction satisfy the basic AGM postulates
for contraction, it follows from Observation 2.4.8 that the S-based contraction and
the ≤-based contraction on K are in fact the contraction functions which result of
applying the Harper Identity (i.e. equation (2.2)) to the S-based revision and to the
≤-based revision on K, respectively.
Therefore, we can conclude that Observation B.2.2 and Theorem 4.2.6 are equiv-
alent, and this fact immediately yields that Theorem 4.2.6 and [PW95, Theorem 6.1]
are also equivalent which is precisely what we intended to expose in the present sec-
tion.
Appendix C
Proofs of Chapter 6
In this chapter we present proofs for most of the results presented throughout Chap-
ter 6. For commodity of the reader before each of those proofs we include the
statement of the result that it corresponds to.
Observation 6.1.1 Let K be a belief set and B be a finite set of sentences such
that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. If X ∈ K⊥B then
‖X‖ = ‖K‖ ∪ N ,
where N ⊆ML is such that:
1. N ⊆ ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B}.
2. N ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 6= ∅, for all αi ∈ B ∩K.
Proof. Let K be a belief set, B be a set of sentences such that B ∩Cn(∅) = ∅, and
X be an element of the remainder set K⊥B. We must show that ‖X‖ = ‖K‖ ∪N ,
where N ⊆ML is such that conditions 1. and 2. in the statement of the observation
are satisfied.
We start by noticing that to prove that this is indeed the case it is enough to
show that:
(i) ‖K‖ ⊆ ‖X‖.
(ii) ‖X‖ ⊆ ‖K‖ ∪ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B}).
(iii) ‖X‖ ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 6= ∅, for all αi ∈ B.
If B ∩K = ∅ then X = K and conditions (i)-(iii) are trivially satisfied. Hence,
now we assume that B ∩K 6= ∅ and show that conditions (i)-(iii) hold in this case
too.
(i) Recall that, according to Observation 3.1.4, the remainder X is a belief set.
Since K is also a belief set and recalling that it follows from the definition of K⊥B
that X ⊆ K, using Observation 3.3.3-(e), we can conclude that ‖K‖ ⊆ ‖X‖. Hence
condition (i) holds.
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(ii) Let M be an arbitrary element of ‖X‖. We must prove that M ∈ ‖K‖ ∪
(
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B}). Assume by reductio that M 6∈ (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B})),
then there is some δ ∈ K such that ¬δ∧∧B ∈M , where ∧B denotes the conjunc-
tion of all elements of B (recall that by hypothesis B is finite). Therefore, because
M is consistent, it follows that δ ∨ ¬∧B 6∈ M . Then, on the one hand, from
M ∈ ‖X‖ it follows that δ ∨¬∧B 6∈ X and, on the other hand, since δ ∈ K and K
is a belief set, we have that δ ∨¬∧B ∈ K. So we it holds that δ ∨¬∧B ∈ K \X.
Now, we notice that, since X ∈ K⊥B, it follows from Definition 3.1.1 that there
is some αj ∈ B such that αj ∈ Cn(X ∪ {δ ∨¬
∧
B}). Then, by deduction it follows
that (¬δ∧∧B)∨αj ∈ Cn(X). But, from αj ∈ B it follows that (¬δ∧∧B)∨αj ↔ αj.
Therefore we obtain that αj ∈ Cn(X), which contradicts the fact that X ∈ K⊥B.
Hence we can conclude that M ∈ ‖K‖∪(⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B}) as we wished to prove.
(iii) Let αi ∈ B and assume by reductio that ‖X‖ ∩ ‖¬αi‖ = ∅. Then it follows
that αi ∈ Cn(X) which is a contradiction since, according to Definition 3.1.1, it
holds that Cn(X)∩B = ∅. Therefore we have that ‖X‖∩‖¬αi‖ 6= ∅, for all αi ∈ B,
which is to say that condition (iii) holds.
Lemma 6.1.3 Let K be a belief set, B be a finite set of sentences and N be a subset
of ML. If N ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 6= ∅, for all αi ∈ B ∩K, then there is some set N ′ such that
N ′ ⊆ N and N ′ ∈WK⊥B.102
Proof. Assume K and B are in the conditions stated above and let N ⊆ ML be
such that N ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 6= ∅, for all αi ∈ B ∩ K. We will prove that there is some
set N ′ such that N ′ ⊆ N and N ′ ∈ WK⊥B. In order to do that we will consider
separately the cases B ∩K = ∅ and B ∩K 6= ∅.
Case 1, B∩K = ∅. Then it is enough to define N ′ = ∅ and it follows immediately
that, on the one handN ′ ⊆ N and, on the other hand, it also holds thatN ′ ∈WK⊥B.
Indeed, if N ′ = ∅ and B ∩K = ∅, then the following conditions are vacuously true:
1. If αi ∈ B ∩K then N ′ ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 6= ∅.
2. If M ∈ N ′ then there is some αj ∈ B ∩K such that N ′ ∩ ‖¬αj‖ = M .
Therefore, according to Definition 6.1.2, we can conclude that N ′ ∈WK⊥B.
Case 2, B ∩K 6= ∅. For each αi ∈ B ∩K let Mαi be one (arbitrarily chosen)
world in N ∩ ‖¬αi‖ (recall that N ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 6= ∅, for all αi ∈ B ∩K) and consider
the set N0 = {Mαi : αi ∈ B ∩K}.
Notice that, since B is finite, B∩K also is and, therefore, we may assume without
loss of generality that N0 = {M1, . . . ,Mn}, for some natural number n ≥ 1 (because
B ∩K 6= ∅).
Next, for each m ∈ {1, . . . n}, let Nm be the set defined in the following way:
Nm =
{ Nm−1 \ {Mm} , if Nm−1 ∩ ‖¬αp‖ 6= {Mm} forall αp ∈ B ∩K
Nm−1 , if Nm−1 ∩ ‖¬αq‖ = {Mm} forsome αq ∈ B ∩K .
It follows immediately from the above construction that the set Nn satisfies the
following conditions:
• Nn ⊆ N ⊆
⋃
αi∈(B∩K) ‖¬αi‖.
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• Nn ∩ ‖¬αk‖ 6= ∅, for all αk ∈ B ∩K.
• If Mi ∈ Nn then there is some αq ∈ B ∩K such that Nn ∩ ‖¬αq‖ = {Mi}.
Hence, N ′ = Nn is a set in the required conditions, i.e., N ′ is such that N ′ ⊆ N
and, according to Definition 6.1.2, N ′ ∈WK⊥B.
Observation 6.1.4 Let K be a belief set and B be a finite set of sentences. Then
the following statements hold:
1. B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ if and only if WK⊥B = ∅.
2. B ∩K = ∅ if and only if WK⊥B = {∅}.
3. B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ and B ∩K 6= ∅ if and only if WK⊥B 6= ∅ and ∅ 6∈WK⊥B.
Proof. Assume K is a belief set and B is a finite set of sentences. We start by
noticing that in order to prove that the three statements 1.-3. introduced in the
above observation are satisfied it is enough to show that:
(i) If B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ then WK⊥B = ∅.
(ii) If B ∩K = ∅ then WK⊥B = {∅}.
(iii) If B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ and B ∩K 6= ∅ then WK⊥B 6= ∅ and ∅ 6∈WK⊥B.
Now we prove that (i)-(iii) hold.
(i) Let B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅. We will prove that WK⊥B = ∅. Let αj ∈ B ∩ Cn(∅).
Then αj ∈ B ∩K and ‖¬αj‖ = ∅. Hence, there is no W such that W ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 6= ∅,
for all αi ∈ B ∩K. Therefore WK⊥B = ∅.
(ii) Let B ∩K = ∅. We will prove that WK⊥B = {∅}. From B ∩K = ∅ it follows
that {‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩K} = ∅ and then, by Definition 6.1.2, the set WK⊥B is such
that WK⊥B ⊆ P(∅) = {∅}. Therefore either WK⊥B = ∅ or WK⊥B = {∅}. On the
other hand, given that B ∩K = ∅, we have that conditions:
1. ∅ ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 6= ∅, for all αi ∈ B ∩K.
2. If M ∈ ∅ then there is some αj ∈ B ∩K such that W ∩ ‖¬αj‖ = M .
are trivially satisfied. Hence, according to Definition 6.1.2, ∅ ∈ WK⊥B. Therefore
we can conclude that WK⊥B = {∅}, for every B such that B ∩K = ∅.
(iii) Let B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ and B ∩K 6= ∅. We will first prove that WK⊥B 6= ∅.
Since B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅, for every αi ∈ B ∩K we have that ‖¬αi‖ 6= ∅. Having this
in mind, for each αi ∈ B ∩ K let Mαi be one (arbitrarily chosen) ¬αi-world and
consider the set N = {Mαi : αi ∈ B∩K}. It follows immediately from Lemma 6.1.3
that there is some set N ′ such that N ′ ⊆ N and N ′ ∈ WK⊥B. Hence WK⊥B 6= ∅.
Now we show that ∅ 6∈ WK⊥B. Let αj be an arbitrary sentence of B ∩K (notice
that, given that B ∩K 6= ∅ there is such a sentence). Then, since ∅ ∩ ‖¬αj‖ = ∅, it
follows from Definition 6.1.2 that ∅ 6∈WK⊥B.
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Theorem 6.1.6 Let K be a belief set and B be a finite set of sentences. Then:
1. If W ∈WK⊥B then X = Th(‖K‖ ∪W) ∈ K⊥B.
2. If X ∈ K⊥B then there is some W ∈WK⊥B such that X = Th(‖K‖ ∪W).
Proof. Let K be a belief set and B be a finite set of sentences. Now we prove the
two statements above.
1. We must prove that if W ∈WK⊥B, then X = Th(‖K‖ ∪W) ∈ K⊥B.
We will consider three cases separately:
Case 1, B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅. Then, according to Observation 6.1.4-1., it holds that
WK⊥B = ∅ and therefore it is vacuously true that ifW ∈WK⊥B then Th(‖K‖∪W) ∈
K⊥B.
Case 2, B ∩K = ∅. Then, by Observation 6.1.4-2., we have that WK⊥B = {∅}.
On the other hand K⊥B = {K} (according to Definition 3.1.1). Hence, it follows
immediately from the fact that Th(‖K‖ ∪ ∅) = Th(‖K‖) = K (by Observation
3.3.3-(a)) that if W ∈WK⊥B then Th(‖K‖ ∪W) ∈ K⊥B.
Case 3, B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ and B ∩ K 6= ∅. We start by noticing that, in this
case, according to Observation 6.1.4-3., WK⊥B 6= ∅ and ∅ 6∈ WK⊥B. Having this
in mind, let W be an arbitrary element of WK⊥B. We have that Th(‖K‖ ∪ W) =⋂
(‖K‖ ∪ W) = (⋂ ‖K‖) ∩ (⋂W) = K ∩ (⋂W). Hence, we have to prove that
K∩ (⋂W) ∈ K⊥B. Therefore, according to Definition 3.1.1, we have to prove that
(i) K ∩ (⋂W) ⊆ K
(ii) Cn (K ∩ (⋂W)) ∩B = ∅
(iii) If β ∈ K \ (K ∩ (⋂W)) then Cn ((K ∩ (⋂W)) ∪ {β}) ∩B 6= ∅.
Condition (i) is trivially satisfied. Regarding (ii), let αi be an arbitrary element
of B, we will show that αi 6∈ Cn (K ∩ (
⋂W)). In order to do that we consider two
cases separately:
Case 3.1, αi ∈ B \K. Then αi 6∈ Cn(K)(= K) and from K ∩ (
⋂W) ⊆ K we
can immediately conclude that αi 6∈ Cn (K ∩ (
⋂W)).
Case 3.2, αi ∈ B ∩K. Then, according to Definition 6.1.2, there is some world
M ∈ W such that M ∈ ‖¬αi‖. Therefore αi 6∈ Cn(M)(= M) and from K∩(
⋂W) ⊆
M we obtain that αi 6∈ Cn (K ∩ (
⋂W)).
Finally we prove (iii). Let β ∈ K \ (K ∩ (⋂W)). Then β ∈ K and β 6∈ (⋂W).
Hence there is some M ∈ W such that β 6∈ M . Therefore, because M ∈ ML,
it holds that ¬β ∈ M . Since M ∈ W , according to Definition 6.1.2, there is
some αj ∈ B ∩ K such that W ∩ ‖¬αj‖ = {M}. Now, from ¬β ∈ M , αj ∈ K
and αj ∈ Wi, for every Wi ∈ W \ M , it follows that ¬β ∨ αj ∈ (K ∩ (
⋂W)).
Therefore αj ∈ Cn ((K ∩ (
⋂W)) ∪ {β}), and then Cn ((K ∩ (⋂W)) ∪ {β})∩B 6= ∅
as required.
2. We must prove that if X ∈ K⊥B then there is some W ∈ WK⊥B such that
X = Th(‖K‖ ∪W).
Again we consider three cases separately:
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Case 1, B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅. Then it follows from Definition 3.1.1 that K⊥B = ∅.
Therefore it is vacuously true that if X ∈ K⊥B then there is some W ∈ WK⊥B
such that X = Th(‖K‖ ∪W).
Case 2, B ∩K = ∅. Let X ∈ K⊥B. Since, according to Definition 3.1.1, in this
case, it holds that K⊥B = {K}, then X = K. On the other hand, by Observation
6.1.4-2., we have that WK⊥B = {∅}. Observing that Th(‖K‖ ∪ ∅) = Th(‖K‖) = K
(by Observation 3.3.3-(a)), we can conclude that W = ∅ is such that W ∈ WK⊥B
and X = Th(‖K‖ ∪W), as required.
Case 3, B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ and B ∩ K 6= ∅. Let X ∈ K⊥B. It follows from
Observation 6.1.1 that ‖X‖ = ‖K‖∪N , whereN ⊆ML is such thatN∩‖¬αi‖ 6= ∅,
for all αi ∈ B ∩K.
Therefore, noticing that it follows from Observations 3.1.4 and 3.3.3-(a) that
X = Th(‖X‖), we can conclude that X = Th(‖K‖ ∪ N ).
On the other hand, in the above conditions, according to Lemma 6.1.3, there is
some set N ′ such that N ′ ⊆ N and N ′ ∈WK⊥B.
Let X ′ = Th(‖K‖ ∪ N ′). To finish the proof it is enough to show that X =
X ′. Now, to see that this is indeed the case, we start by observing that, since
‖K‖∪N ′ ⊆ ‖K‖∪N , it follows from Observation 3.3.3-(d) that X = Th(‖K‖∪N ) ⊆
Th(‖K‖ ∪ N ′) = X ′. Furthermore, according to point 1. proven above, because
N ′ ∈ WK⊥B, we also have that X ′ ∈ K⊥B. Hence, in particular it holds that
X ′ ⊆ K and Cn(X ′)∩B = ∅. From this and the fact that X ∈ K⊥B it follows that
X 6⊂ X ′. Therefore, since X ⊆ X ′, we can conclude that X = X ′, and this finishes
the proof.
Observation 6.2.1 Let K be a belief set and ·∼· be the full meet multiple contraction
on K. Then
K ·∼·B =
⋂(
‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
WK⊥B
))
= K ∩
(⋂(⋃
WK⊥B
))
, 103
for all finite sets of sentences B.
Proof. Let K be a belief set and ·∼· be the full meet multiple contraction on K.
To show that the identities K ·∼·B =
⋂
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃WK⊥B)) = K∩(⋂ (⋃WK⊥B))
hold for all finite sets of sentences B we will consider two cases separately.
Case 1, B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. Then, according to Corollary 6.1.8 it follows that
K ·∼·B =
⋂{Th(‖K‖ ∪ W) : W ∈ WK⊥B} = ⋂{⋂(‖K‖ ∪ W) : W ∈ WK⊥B} =⋂
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃WK⊥B)) = (⋂ ‖K‖) ∩ (⋂ (⋃WK⊥B)) = K ∩ (⋂ (⋃WK⊥B)).103
Case 2, B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅. Then we have on the one hand that K ·∼·B = K
(according to Definition 5.3.3), and on the other hand that WK⊥B = ∅ (according
to Observation 6.1.4-1.) and, consequently,
⋃
WK⊥B = ∅.
Therefore, in this case, we only need to show to show that K =
⋂
(‖K‖ ∪ ∅)
and K = K∩ (⋂ ∅). But, the former identity follows immediately from Observation
3.3.3-(a), and the latter equality is an obvious consequence of our assumption that
Th(∅) = ⋂ ∅ = L (see Definition 3.3.2).
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Observation 6.2.2 Let K be a belief set and B a set of sentences. Then:
1. If B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ or B ∩K = ∅ then ⋃WK⊥B = ∅.
2.
⋃
WK⊥B ⊆
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩K}.
3. If B ∩K = ∅, then ⋃WK⊥B = ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩K}.
4. If K = Cn(∅) then ⋃WK⊥B = ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩K}.
Proof. 1. Follows immediately from Observation 6.1.4-1. and 2..
2. According to Definition 6.1.2, WK⊥B ⊆ P (
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩K}), which
implies immediately that
⋃
WK⊥B ⊆
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩K}.
3. Follows immediately from 1..
4. Assume K = Cn(∅) and let B be any finite set. Then, on the one hand, it
follows immediately from Remark 6.1.5 that
⋃
WK⊥B = ∅ and, on the other hand,⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩K} = ∅ (since if αj ∈ B ∩K then αj ∈ Cn(∅) and therefore
‖¬αj‖ = ∅). Therefore
⋃
WK⊥B =
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩K}.
Observation 6.2.3 Let K a belief set and B be a set of sentences such that K 6=
Cn(∅) and B ∩K 6= ∅. Then:
1. It may not hold that
⋃
WK⊥B =
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩ K} (whether or not
B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅106).
2. If M is a world such that
(i) M ∈ ‖¬αj‖ for some αj ∈ B ∩K,
(ii) M 6∈ ‖¬αl‖ for every αl ∈ B \ {αj}, and
(iii) there is some αr ∈ B ∩K such that ‖¬αr‖ ⊂ ‖¬αj‖
then M 6∈ ⋃WK⊥B.
Proof. To prove that the statement 1. in the above observation holds, in what
follows we will present an example of a world M such that M ∈ ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈
B ∩K} but M 6∈ ⋃WK⊥B, for a belief set K and a finite set of sentences B such
that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅.
Hence, let K be a belief set and α1, α2, α3 be three sentences such that α1, α2, α3 ∈
K \ Cn(∅) (notice that in that case it follows immediately that K 6= Cn(∅)105).
Furthermore, assume that ‖¬α2‖ ⊂ ‖¬α1‖, ‖¬α2‖ 6⊂ ‖¬α3‖, ‖¬α3‖ 6⊂ ‖¬α2‖ and
‖¬α1‖\(‖¬α2‖∪‖¬α3‖) 6= ∅ and let M be an arbitrary element of ‖¬α1‖\(‖¬α2‖∪
‖¬α3‖).
Now we notice that, in the above conditions, if we consider the set of sentences
B = {α1, α2, α3} then it is obvious that M ∈
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩K}. However,
on the other hand, M 6∈ ⋃WK⊥B. Indeed assume by reductio that there is some
W ∈ WK⊥B such that M ∈ W . Then, according to Definition 6.1.2, there is some
αj ∈ B∩K such thatW∩‖¬αj‖ = {M}. Therefore, since B∩K = B = {α1, α2, α3}
and M 6∈ ‖¬α2‖ ∪ ‖¬α3‖, it must be the case that W ∩ ‖¬α1‖ = {M}. But, also
from Definition 6.1.2 it follows that there must be some world N ∈ W ∩ ‖¬α2‖ and
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then, because ‖¬α2‖ ⊂ ‖¬α1‖, we conclude that N ∈ W ∩‖¬α1‖ which contradicts
W ∩ ‖¬α1‖ = {M} (since from N ∈ ‖¬α2‖ and M 6∈ ‖¬α2‖ it follows immediately
that N 6= M).
Therefore, for a belief set K and a set of sentences B in the above conditions
it holds that
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩ K} 6⊆ ⋃WK⊥B and consequently ⋃WK⊥B 6=⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩K}.
It is worth to mention here that Figure 6.5 contains a possible graphical represen-
tation of the situation presented above, highlighting a world M ∈ ‖¬α1‖ \ (‖¬α2‖∪
‖¬α3‖) which, as we have seen above, is such that M ∈ (
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩K}) \
(
⋃
WK⊥B).
To finish this proof we just remark that from the example presented above we
can immediately conclude that point 2. of the above observation holds.
Lemma 6.2.5 Let B be a finite set of sentences. If αl ∈ B and αl 6∈ BN then there
is some αk ∈ BN such that ‖¬αk‖ ⊂ ‖¬αl‖.
Proof. Let B be a finite set of sentences and αl be a sentence such that αl ∈
B \ BN . It follows from the definition of BN that there is some αs ∈ B such that
‖¬αs‖ ⊂ ‖¬αl‖. If αs ∈ BN this ends the proof. Assume αs 6∈ BN , then using the
same arguments, there is some αs1 ∈ B such that ‖¬αs1‖ ⊂ ‖¬αs‖. Now, on the
one hand, if αs1 ∈ BN this ends the proof because under this conditions we have
that ‖¬αs1‖ ⊂ ‖¬αl‖. On the other hand, if αs1 6∈ BN , reasoning in an analogous
way we can find a αs2 ∈ B which is related to αs1 in precisely in the same way that
αs1 was related to αs and so on.
Now consider the sequence of sentences (δn) defined in the following way δ1 = αs,
δ2 = αs1 , δ3 = αs2 , . . ., where the next terms of this sequence are the consecutive
elements of B obtained using the process just described.
Note that ‖¬δj‖ 6⊆ ‖¬δi‖ whenever j < i.
Since B is finite there must be some δm ∈ B such that for all αj ∈ B, if
‖¬αj‖ ⊆ ‖¬δm‖, then ‖¬δm‖ ⊆ ‖¬αj‖, which means that δm ∈ BN .
And it follows from the construction of the sequence (δn) that ‖¬δm‖ ⊂ ‖¬αl‖,
and this ends the proof.
Lemma 6.2.6 Let K be a belief set, B be a finite set of sentences such that B ∩
Cn(∅) = ∅ and f : {‖α‖ : α ∈ L and 6` ¬α} → P(ML) be a function such that if
α ∈ L and 6` ¬α then ∅ 6= f(‖α‖) ⊆ ‖α‖.
If Bf ⊆ B is such that:
(i) If αj ∈ Bf then f(‖¬αk‖) = f(‖¬αj‖) or f(‖¬αk‖) 6⊂ ‖¬αj‖, for all αk ∈ Bf ;
(ii) For all αl ∈ B ∩K there is some αm ∈ Bf ∩K such that f(‖¬αm‖) ⊆ ‖¬αl‖;
then
1. For every world M ∈ ⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf ∩K} there is some subset WM ⊆⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf ∩K}, such that M ∈ WM and WM ∈WK⊥B;
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2. {W ∈ WK⊥B : W ⊆
⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf ∩K}} 6= ∅ and ⋃{W ∈ WK⊥B :
W ⊆ ⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf ∩K}} = ⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf ∩K}.
Proof. Let K, B, and f be a belief set, a finite set of sentences and a function,
respectively, satisfying the conditions mentioned in the statement of the lemma.
And assume that Bf ⊆ B is such that conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied. In what
follows we show that 1. and 2. hold.
1. Case 1, B ∩ K = ∅. Then, since Bf ⊆ B, it holds that Bf ∩ K = ∅ and,
consequently,
⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf ∩K} = ∅. Hence 1. is vacuously true.
Case 2, B ∩ K 6= ∅. Let αj be an arbitrary element of Bf ∩ K and M be an
arbitrary element of f(‖¬αj‖). We will now construct a set WM that satisfies the
above mentioned conditions.
First we prove that if αl ∈ B ∩K∩M then
⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf ∩K}∩‖αj‖∩
‖¬αl‖ 6= ∅. In order to do that, let αl be an arbitrary element of B ∩K∩M . Then
from (ii), it follows that there is some αm ∈ Bf ∩K such that f(‖¬αm‖) ⊆ ‖¬αl‖.
Furthermore, in these conditions, it holds that f(‖¬αm‖) 6⊆ ‖¬αj‖. To prove
this, in what follows we will show first that (a) f(‖¬αm‖) 6= ‖¬αj‖ and afterwards
that (b) f(‖¬αm‖) 6⊂ ‖¬αj‖.
Regarding (a), to see that, in fact, f(‖¬αm‖) 6= ‖¬αj‖ it is enough to notice
that M 6∈ f(‖¬αm‖) and M ∈ ‖¬αj‖. Indeed, on the one hand, since αl ∈ M it
follows that M 6∈ ‖¬αl‖ and therefore, because f(‖¬αm‖) ⊆ ‖¬αl‖, we obtain that
M 6∈ f(‖¬αm‖). On the other hand, from M ∈ f(‖¬αj‖) and f(‖¬αj‖) ⊆ ‖¬αj‖ it
follows that M ∈ ‖¬αj‖, and we are done.
Now we prove (b), i.e., that f(‖¬αm‖) 6⊂ ‖¬αj‖. First we notice that, since M ∈
f(‖¬αj‖), from M 6∈ f(‖¬αm‖) (already proven above) it follows that f(‖¬αm‖) 6=
f(‖¬αj‖). Then, observing that, because αm ∈ Bf , according to (i) it holds that
f(‖¬αm‖) = f(‖¬αj‖) or f(‖¬αm‖) 6⊂ ‖¬αj‖, we can conclude that f(‖¬αm‖) 6⊂
‖¬αj‖, as we wished to show.
Hence, from the above we can conclude that if αl ∈ B ∩ K ∩M it holds that⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf ∩K} ∩ ‖αj‖ ∩ ‖¬αl‖ 6= ∅.
Now we are in a position to show that there is a set WM ⊆
⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈
Bf ∩K}, such that M ∈ WM and WM ∈WK⊥B.
In order to see that, let W be the set defined by W = {M} ∪ {Mαl : αl ∈
B ∩ K ∩ M}, where for each αl ∈ B ∩ K ∩ M , Mαl is an arbitrary element of⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf∩K}∩‖αj‖∩‖¬αl‖. SinceW ⊆ML is such thatW∩‖¬αk‖ 6=
∅ for all αk ∈ B ∩K, it follows immediately from Lemma 6.1.3 that there is some
set W ′ such that W ′ ⊆ W and W ′ ∈WK⊥B.
Furthermore, W ′ ⊆ ⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf ∩ K} and M ∈ W ′. Indeed, that
W ′ ⊆ ⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf ∩ K} follows immediately from W ′ ⊆ W and W ⊆⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf ∩K}. On the other hand, from W ′ ⊆ W and the fact that
W ∩‖¬αj‖ = {M}, recalling that W ′ ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 6= ∅, for all αi ∈ B ∩K (according to
Definition 6.1.2), we can conclude that M ∈ W ′.
Hence, if we defineWM =W ′ thenWM ⊆
⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf∩K}, M ∈ WM
and WM ∈WK⊥B, as required.
Thus, we have just shown that, for every world M ∈ ⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf ∩K}
there a setWM ⊆
⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf∩K} such thatM ∈ WM andWM ∈WK⊥B.
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2. Case 1, B ∩K = ∅. Then, according to Observation 6.1.4-2., WK⊥B = {∅}.
Hence, {W ∈WK⊥B :W ⊆
⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf ∩K}} = {∅} 6= ∅.
On the other hand, since Bf ⊆ B, it holds that Bf ∩K = ∅ and, consequently,⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf ∩K} = ⋃ ∅ = ∅. Therefore ⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf ∩K} =⋃{W ∈WK⊥B :W ⊆ ⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf ∩K}}(= ∅).
Case 2, B ∩ K 6= ∅. Then, from (ii) we can conclude that Bf ∩ K 6= ∅ and
it follows immediately from 1. (already proven above) that {W ∈ WK⊥B : W ⊆⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf ∩ K}} 6= ∅. To finish this proof it is enough to observe
that it follows immediately from 1. that
⋃{W ∈ WK⊥B : W ⊆ ⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈
Bf ∩K}} =
⋃{f(‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ Bf ∩K}.
Observation 6.2.7 Let K be a belief set, B be a finite set of sentences such that
B∩Cn(∅) = ∅. Then ⋃{W ∈WK⊥B :W ⊆ ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN∩K}} = ⋃{‖¬αi‖ :
αi ∈ BN ∩K}.
Proof. Let K be a belief set and B be a finite set of sentences such that B∩Cn(∅) =
∅. We must show that ⋃{W ∈ WK⊥B : W ⊆ ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩ K}} =⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}.
As will see right away, such identity is an immediate consequence of Lemma
6.2.6.
Consider the function f : {‖α‖ : α ∈ L and 6` ¬α} → P(ML) defined by
f(‖α‖) = ‖α‖, and let Bf = BN (where BN is the normalization of B).
It obviously holds that if α ∈ L and 6` ¬α then ∅ 6= f(‖α‖) ⊆ ‖α‖ and that
Bf ⊆ B. Now we prove that conditions (i) and (ii) of Lemma 6.2.6 are satisfied,
i.e., that:
(i) If αj ∈ BN then f(‖¬αk‖) = f(‖¬αj‖) or f(‖¬αk‖) 6⊂ ‖¬αj‖, for all αk ∈ BN
.
(ii) For all αl ∈ B ∩K there is some αm ∈ BN ∩K such that f(‖¬αm‖) ⊆ ‖¬αl‖.
Indeed, condition (i) follows immediately from Definition 6.2.4. Now we show
that condition (ii) also holds. Let αl be an arbitrary element of B ∩ K, we must
show that there is some αm ∈ BN ∩K such that ‖¬αm‖ ⊆ ‖¬αl‖ (since f(‖¬αm‖) =
‖¬αm‖). To prove this we consider two cases:
Case 1, αl ∈ BN . Then αl ∈ BN ∩K and ‖¬αl‖ ⊆ ‖¬αl‖, and we are done.
Case 2, αl 6∈ BN . Then, it follows from Lemma 6.2.5 that there is some αm ∈ BN
such that ‖¬αm‖ ⊂ ‖¬αl‖. On the other hand, from αl ∈ K and ‖¬αm‖ ⊂ ‖¬αl‖ we
can conclude that αm ∈ K. Hence, we have that αm ∈ BN ∩K and ‖¬αm‖ ⊆ ‖¬αl‖,
as required.
Hence, we can conclude from Lemma 6.2.6 that
⋃{W ∈WK⊥B :W ⊆ ⋃{‖¬αi‖ :
αi ∈ BN ∩K}} =
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}, and this finishes the proof.
Observation 6.2.8 Let K be a belief set and B be a finite set of sentences. Then⋃
WK⊥B =
⋃
{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}.
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Proof. Let K be a belief set and B be a finite set of sentences. We must show that⋃
WK⊥B =
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}.
First of all we show that the above identity is trivially satisfied whenever B ∩
Cn(∅) 6= ∅ or B ∩K = ∅.
In order to do that we start by recalling that, according to Observation 6.1.4-1.
and 2., in either of those cases it holds that
⋃
WK⊥B = ∅. Moreover, if B ∩K = ∅
or B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅, then it also holds that ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K} = ∅. Indeed,
on the one hand if B ∩K = ∅ then, since BN ⊆ B, we have that BN ∩K = ∅ and
it follows immediately that
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩ K} = ∅. On the other hand if
B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ we obtain, according to Definition 6.2.4, that BN = B ∩ Cn(∅) ⊆
Cn(∅), and therefore, since Cn(∅) ⊆ K, it follows that BN ∩ K = BN ⊆ Cn(∅).
Hence, for all αi ∈ BN ∩ K, ‖¬αi‖ = ∅, and from this we can conclude that⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K} = ∅.
Hence, from the above we can conclude that, if B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ or B ∩K = ∅
then
⋃
WK⊥B =
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K} = ∅.
Having seen this, in what remains of this proof we assume B is a finite set of
sentences such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ and B ∩K 6= ∅, and we prove the equality of
sets stated in the observation by double inclusion.
(⊆) Let M ∈ ⋃WK⊥B. Then there is some W ∈WK⊥B such that M ∈ W . So,
according to Definition 6.1.2, it holds that:
(i) W ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 6= ∅, for all αi ∈ B ∩K
(ii) There is some αj ∈ B ∩K such that W ∩ ‖¬αj‖ = {M}.
Now we consider two cases:
Case 1, αj ∈ BN . Then, αj ∈ BN ∩ K and M ∈ ‖¬αj‖. Therefore we can
conclude that M ∈ ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}, and we are done.
Case 2, αj 6∈ BN . Then, it follows from Lemma 6.2.5 that there is some αk ∈ BN
such that ‖¬αk‖ ⊂ ‖¬αj‖. So, from (i) and (ii) we can conclude that M ∈ ‖¬αk‖.
Furthermore, from αj ∈ K and ‖¬αk‖ ⊂ ‖¬αj‖ we can conclude that αk ∈ K (since
from ‖¬αj‖ ∩ ‖K‖ = ∅ and ‖¬αk‖ ⊂ ‖¬αj‖ it follows that ‖¬αk‖ ∩ ‖K‖ = ∅).
Hence, M ∈ ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}, as required.
(⊇) This inclusion is an immediate consequence of Observation 6.2.7, and we are
done.
Corollary 6.2.9 Let K be a belief set and ·∼· be the operator of full meet multiple
contraction on K. Then, under the assumption that
⋂ ∅ = L,109 it holds that
K ·∼·B =
⋂(
‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}
))
= K ∩
(⋂
{Cn(¬αi) : αi ∈ BN ∩K}
)
,
for all finite sets of sentences B.110
Proof. Let K be a belief set and ·∼· be the operator of full meet multiple contraction
on K.
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That K ·∼·B =
⋂
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K})) follows immediately from
the facts that K ·∼·B =
⋂
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃WK⊥B)) (according to Observation 6.2.1) and⋃
WK⊥B =
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K} (according to Observation 6.2.8).
It remains to show that the identity
⋂
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K})) =
K ∩ (⋂{Cn(¬αi) : αi ∈ BN ∩K}) also holds. To do that we start by noticing that⋂
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K})) = (⋂ ‖K‖)∩ (⋂ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}))
= K ∩ (⋂ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K})).
Hence, observing that
⋂
(
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}) = ⋂ {(⋂ ‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈
BN ∩K} =
⋂{Cn(¬αi) : αi ∈ BN∩K}, we can conclude that⋂ (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ :
αi ∈ BN ∩K})) = K ∩ (
⋂{Cn(¬αi) : αi ∈ BN ∩K}) (under the assumption that⋂ ∅ = L), as we wished to show.
Observation 6.2.10 Let K be a belief set and ·∼· be the operator of full meet multiple
contraction on K. Then
‖K ·∼·B‖ = ‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
WK⊥B
)
= ‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}
)
,
for all finite sets of sentences B.
Proof. Assume the conditions in the statement of the observation hold.
We start by noticing that the equality of sets ‖K‖ ∪ (⋃WK⊥B) = ‖K‖ ∪
(
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}) follows immediately from Observation 6.2.8.
On the other hand, according to Corollary 6.2.9, it holds that K ·∼·B =
⋂
(‖K‖∪
(
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K})). Therefore it follows that ‖K‖∪ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN∩
K}) ⊆ ‖K ·∼·B‖.
Hence it only remains to prove that ‖K ·∼·B‖ ⊆ ‖K‖∪(
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}).
To show that this indeed holds we consider two cases.
Case 1, B ∩K = ∅. Then, according to Definition 5.3.3, it holds that K ·∼·B =
K. Therefore ‖K ·∼·B‖ = ‖K‖ and it follows immediately that ‖K ·∼·B‖ ⊆ ‖K‖ ∪
(
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}).
Case 2, B ∩ K 6= ∅. We start by observing that, in this case it holds that
BN ∩K 6= ∅. Indeed, since B ∩K 6= ∅ there is some αi ∈ B ∩K. Now, if αi ∈ BN
then αi ∈ BN ∩K and we can immediately conclude that BN ∩K 6= ∅. Otherwise,
if αi ∈ BN then it follows from Lemma 6.2.5 that there is some αk ∈ BN such that
‖¬αk‖ ⊂ ‖¬αi‖. On the other hand, from αi ∈ K and ‖¬αk‖ ⊂ ‖¬αi‖ we can
conclude that αk ∈ K. Hence, αk ∈ BN ∩K and consequently BN ∩K 6= ∅.
Next we prove that ‖K ·∼·B‖ ⊆ ‖K‖ ∪ (
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}).
Let M ∈ ‖K ·∼·B‖ and assume by reductio that M 6∈ ‖K‖ ∪ (
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN
∩K}). Then there is some δ ∈ K such that ¬δ∧∧(BN∩K) ∈M (where ∧(BN∩K)
denotes the conjunction of all elements of BN ∩K147) and therefore, because M is
consistent, δ ∨ ¬∧(BN ∩K) 6∈M .
On the other hand, since δ ∨¬∧(BN ∩K) ∈ ⋂ (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K})) =
K ·∼·B, it follows that M 6∈ ‖K ·∼·B‖, which contradicts our hypothesis.
Hence we can conclude that M ∈ ‖K‖ ∪ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}), and this
finishes the proof.
147Notice that since B is finite and BN ⊆ B, it follows that BN ∩K is finite.
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Observation 6.3.1 Let K be a belief set. If an operation ÷ is a partial meet mul-
tiple contraction on K then
‖K÷B‖ ⊆ ‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}
)
,
for all finite sets of sentences B.
Proof. Let K be a belief set, B be any finite set of sentences and ÷ be a partial
meet multiple contraction on K.
We must show that ‖K÷B‖ ⊆ ‖K‖ ∪ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}) .
First we notice that it follows immediately from Definitions 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 that
K ·∼·B ⊆ K÷B, where ·∼· is the operator of full meet multiple contraction on K. On
the other hand, since, according to Observation 3.1.4, every remainder is a belief set,
having in mind the above mentioned definitions and the fact that the intersection
of belief sets is a belief set, it follows that K ·∼·B and K÷B are belief sets. Hence,
by Observation 3.3.3-(e), we can conclude that ‖K÷B‖ ⊆ ‖K ·∼·B‖.
Finally, since ‖K ·∼·B‖ = ‖K‖∪ (
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}) (according to Obser-
vation 6.2.10), we can conclude that ‖K÷B‖ ⊆ ‖K‖ ∪ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩K}),
as we wished to show.
Lemma 6.3.2 Let K be a belief set and B be a finite set of sentences. Then
WK⊥B = WK⊥(BN∩K).
Proof. Let K be a belief set and B be a finite set of sentences. We will show that
WK⊥B = WK⊥(BN∩K).
(⊆) Let W ∈ WK⊥B. We must show that W ∈ WK⊥(BN∩K). Hence, according
to Definition 6.1.2, we must prove that:
(i) W ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 6= ∅, for all αi ∈ BN ∩K.
(ii) If M ∈ W then there is some αj ∈ BN ∩K such that W ∩ ‖¬αj‖ = {M}.
Condition (i) follows immediately from W ∈ WK⊥B and Definition 6.1.2. Now
let M be an arbitrary element of W . To show that (ii) holds it we must prove that
there is some αj ∈ BN∩K such thatW∩‖¬αj‖ = {M}. SinceW ∈WK⊥B, we have
that there is some αi ∈ B∩K such thatW∩‖¬αi‖ = {M}. If αi ∈ BN we are done.
Now we assume that αi 6∈ BN . Then, it follows from Lemma 6.2.5 that there is some
αk ∈ BN such that ‖¬αk‖ ⊂ ‖¬αi‖. Hence, since W ∩ ‖¬αk‖ 6= ∅ (according to
Definition 6.1.2), fromW∩‖¬αi‖ = {M} we can conclude thatW∩‖¬αk‖ = {M}.
(⊇) LetW ∈WK⊥(BN∩K). Then conditions (i) and (ii) above are satisfied. Next,
in order to show that W ∈WK⊥B, we prove that:
1. W ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 6= ∅, for all αi ∈ B ∩K.
2. If M ∈ W then there is some αj ∈ B ∩K such that W ∩ ‖¬αj‖ = {M}.
Condition 1. follows immediately from (i) and Lemma 6.2.5. On the other hand
condition 2. is an obvious consequence of (ii) and the fact that BN ∩K ⊆ B ∩K.
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Lemma 6.3.3 Let K be a belief set and G and H be two finite sets of sentences.
If every subset X of K implies some element of G if and only if X implies some
element of H, then for all βi ∈ GN ∩ K there is some ςi ∈ HN ∩ K such that
‖βi‖ = ‖ςi‖.
Proof. Let K be a belief set and G and H be two finite sets of sentences. Assume
that every subset X of K implies some element of G if and only if X implies some
element of H and let βi ∈ GN ∩K. We only need to show that there is an element
of HN ∩K which is logically equivalent to βi. Since {βi} ⊆ K and {βi} ` βi ∈ G,
it follows from the hypothesis that there is some ςi ∈ H such that {βi} ` ςi. Then,
by deduction we have that ` βi → ςi which is equivalent to ‖¬ςi‖ ⊆ ‖¬βi‖. Since
K is a belief set, we can conclude that ςi ∈ K, hence, proceeding analogously,
we can conclude that there is some βj ∈ G such that ‖¬βj‖ ⊆ ‖¬ςi‖. Then we
have that ‖¬βj‖ ⊆ ‖¬βi‖, and from the fact that βi ∈ GN we can conclude that
‖¬βj‖ = ‖¬βi‖. So, it holds that ‖¬βi‖ = ‖¬ςi‖.
It remains to prove that ςi ∈ HN ∩K. We already have that ςi ∈ H∩K. To show
that ςi ∈ HN we must prove that for all ςj ∈ H it holds that if ‖¬ςj‖ ⊆ ‖¬ςi‖ then
‖¬ςi‖ ⊆ ‖¬ςj‖. So, let ςj ∈ H be such that ‖¬ςj‖ ⊆ ‖¬ςi‖. Since ‖¬βi‖ = ‖¬ςi‖,
it follows that ‖¬ςj‖ ⊆ ‖¬βi‖. Reasoning as above we can conclude that there is
some βl ∈ G such that ‖¬βl‖ ⊆ ‖¬ςj‖. Then we have that ‖¬βl‖ ⊆ ‖¬βi‖, and
again from the fact that βi ∈ GN we obtain that ‖¬βl‖ = ‖¬βi‖, which allows us to
conclude that ‖¬ςi‖ ⊆ ‖¬ςj‖ as required.
Observation 6.3.4 Let K be a belief set and B and C be two finite sets of sentences.
Then:
K⊥B = K⊥C iff WK⊥B = WK⊥C .
Proof. Let K be a belief set and B and C be two finite sets of sentences. We must
show that K⊥B = K⊥C iff WK⊥B = WK⊥C .
Left-to-right: Let K⊥B = K⊥C. We must show that WK⊥B = WK⊥C . But
since, according to Lemma 6.3.2, this last equality is equivalent to WK⊥(BN∩K) =
WK⊥(CN∩K), it is enough to show the latter of these identities.
Since K⊥B = K⊥C, it holds that every subset X of K implies some element
of B if and only if X implies some element of C (according to Observation 3.1.3).
Therefore, it follows from Lemma 6.3.3 and Definition 6.1.2 that WK⊥(BN∩K) =
WK⊥(CN∩K), and we are done.
Right-to-left: Let WK⊥B = WK⊥C . It follows immediately from Corollary 6.1.8
that K⊥B = K⊥C.
Theorem 6.3.6 Let K be a belief set. An operation ÷ is a partial meet multiple
contraction on K by finite sets if and only if there is a propositional package selection
function f for ‖K‖ such that:
K÷B = Th
(
‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
f(WK⊥B)
))
,
for any finite set of sentences B.
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Proof. Let K be a belief set.
Right-to-left We start by showing that if ÷ is an operation such that, for all
finite sets B, K÷B = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ f(WK⊥B))), where f is a propositional package
selection function for ‖K‖, then ÷ is a partial meet multiple contraction on K by
finite sets.
So, let÷ be a contraction operation on K in the mentioned conditions. According
to Definition 5.3.2, in order to show that ÷ is a partial meet multiple contraction
by finite sets we must show that there is some package selection function γ for K,
such that for all finite sets B, K÷B = ⋂ γ(K⊥B).
Let γ be the operator defined, by γ(K⊥B) = {K} if K⊥B = ∅, and γ(K⊥B) =
{Th(‖K‖ ∪W) :W ∈ f(WK⊥B)} if K⊥B 6= ∅. In what follows we will show that:
(a) γ is a package selection function for K, and
(b) K÷B = ⋂ γ(K⊥B), for all finite sets B.
In order to prove (a) we start by observing that γ is a (well-defined) function.
Indeed, it follows immediately from Observation 6.3.4 and the definition of γ above
that if K⊥C = K⊥B then γ(K⊥C) = γ(K⊥B), therefore we can conclude that γ
is a function. Now we must prove that γ is a package selection function for K.
Since, by the definition of γ, if K⊥B = ∅ then γ(K⊥B) = {K}, it follows from
Definition 5.3.1 that, in order to prove that (a) holds, it only remains to show that
if K⊥B 6= ∅ then ∅ 6= γ(K⊥B) ⊆ K⊥B. Hence, let B be such that K⊥B 6= ∅.
We start by noticing that since K⊥B 6= ∅, it follows from Observation 3.1.2 that
B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. So, by Observation 6.1.4-1., we obtain that WK⊥B 6= ∅ and,
therefore, according to Definition 6.3.5 it holds that ∅ 6= f(WK⊥B) ⊆WK⊥B. On the
other hand, by Theorem 6.1.6-1., it follows from f(WK⊥B) ⊆WK⊥B that Th(‖K‖∪
W) ∈ K⊥B, for all W ∈ f(WK⊥B). Hence we can conclude that γ(K⊥B) =
{Th(‖K‖ ∪W) :W ∈ f(WK⊥B)} is a non-empty subset of K⊥B.
Therefore, γ is a package selection function for K.
It is now time to prove that (b) also holds. Hence, let B be an arbitrary finite
set. We will show that K÷B = ⋂ γ(K⊥B). In order to that we consider two cases.
Case 1, B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅. Then, from Observation 6.1.4-1. we can conclude that
WK⊥B = ∅. Therefore, according to Definition 6.3.5 we have that f(WK⊥B) = ∅.
Hence, it follows that K÷B = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ f(WK⊥B))) = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ ∅)) =
Th(‖K‖). Then, since according to Observation 3.3.3-(a) Th(‖K‖) = K, we can
conclude that, if B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ then K÷B = K. On the other hand, having
in mind Observation 3.1.2, according to the definition of the function γ proposed
above, we have that if B∩Cn(∅) 6= ∅ then γ(K⊥B) = {K}. Therefore, in this case,
K÷B = ⋂ γ(K⊥B).
Case 2, B ∩Cn(∅) = ∅. Then, it follows from Observation 3.1.2 that K⊥B 6= ∅,
and, therefore, according to the definition of the function γ proposed above it holds
that γ(K⊥B) = {Th(‖K‖ ∪W) :W ∈ f(WK⊥B)}.
On the other hand, we have that K÷B = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ f(WK⊥B))) = ⋂ (‖K‖∪
(
⋃
f(WK⊥B))) =
⋂ {⋂ (‖K‖ ∪W) :W ∈ f(WK⊥B)} = ⋂{Th(‖K‖ ∪ W) : W ∈
f(WK⊥B)}.
Hence, we can conclude that in this case it also holds that K÷B = ⋂ γ(K⊥B),
as we wished to show.
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Finally from (a) and (b) we can conclude that ÷ is a partial meet multiple
contraction on K by finite sets and this finishes the first part of the present proof.
Left-to-right Now we show that if ÷ is a partial meet multiple contraction on K
by finite sets, then there exists a propositional package selection function f for ‖K‖
such that K÷B = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ f(WK⊥B))), for every finite set B.
So, let ÷ be a partial meet multiple contraction on K by finite sets. First of all
we notice that it follows from Definition 5.3.2 that there is some package selection
function γ for K, such that for all finite sets B, K÷B = ⋂ γ(K⊥B). Moreover,
it follows from Definition 5.3.1 and Observation 3.1.2 that if B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ then
γ(K⊥B) = {K}, and if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ then ∅ 6= γ(K⊥B) ⊆ K⊥B.
Having this in mind, let f be defined in the following way: f(WK⊥B) = ∅ if
B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ and f(WK⊥B) = {WX ∈WK⊥B : X = Th(‖K‖ ∪WX) ∈ γ(K⊥B)}
if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. We will now show that:
(i) f is a propositional package selection function for ‖K‖.
(ii) K÷B = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ f(WK⊥B))), for all finite sets B.
In order to prove (i) we start by observing that, since when WK⊥B = WK⊥C ,
it follows from Observation 6.3.4 and the definition of f above that f(WK⊥B) =
f(WK⊥C), we can conclude that f is a (well-defined) function. Now, to show that f
is a propositional package selection function for ‖K‖, we must prove that f satisfies
conditions 1. and 2. of Definition 6.3.5. But 1., i.e. f(WK⊥B) ⊆ WK⊥B, follows
immediately from the definition of f . Now we show that 2. is also satisfied, i.e. that
if WK⊥B 6= ∅ then f(WK⊥B) 6= ∅. Assume that WK⊥B 6= ∅. Then it follows from
Observation 6.1.4-1. that B∩Cn(∅) = ∅ and therefore, as we have already seen above
we have that, on the one hand f(WK⊥B) = {WX ∈WK⊥B : X = Th(‖K‖ ∪WX) ∈
γ(K⊥B)}, and on the other hand γ(K⊥B) 6= ∅. Hence, by Theorem, 6.1.6-2., we
can conclude that f(WK⊥B) 6= ∅.
Therefore f is a propositional package selection function for ‖K‖.
Having seen this, it only remains to show that (ii) also holds. Let B be an
arbitrary finite set. Since K÷B = ⋂ γ(K⊥B), we will prove that (ii) is satisfied by
showing that
⋂
γ(K⊥B) = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ f(WK⊥B))). In order to that we consider
two cases.
Case 1, B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅. Then, as we have already seen above, γ(K⊥B) = {K}
and, consequently,
⋂
γ(K⊥B) = ⋂{K} = K. On the other hand, from Obser-
vation 6.1.4-1. we can conclude that WK⊥B = ∅. Therefore, since f is a propo-
sitional package selection function for ‖K‖ (already proven above), according to
Definition 6.3.5, it holds that f(WK⊥B) = ∅. Hence, it follows that K÷B =
Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ f(WK⊥B))) = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ ∅)) = Th(‖K‖) = K (where this last
equality is justified by Observation 3.3.3-(a)). Therefore, in this case (B∩Cn(∅) 6= ∅)
it holds that K÷B = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ f(WK⊥B))).
Case 2, B∩Cn(∅) = ∅. Then, it follows from Theorem 6.1.6-2. and from the defi-
nition of f that {X : X ∈ γ(K⊥B)} = {Th(‖K‖∪WX) :WX ∈ f(WK⊥B)}. There-
fore, we obtain that
⋂
γ(K⊥B) = ⋂{X : X ∈ γ(K⊥B)} = ⋂{Th(‖K‖ ∪ WX) :
WX ∈ f(WK⊥B)} =
⋂{⋂(‖K‖ ∪ WX) : WX ∈ f(WK⊥B)} = ⋂ (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ f(WK⊥B)))
= Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ f(WK⊥B))), and this finishes the proof.

Appendix D
Proofs of Chapter 7
In this chapter we present proofs for most of the results presented throughout Chap-
ter 7. For commodity of the reader before each of those proofs we include the
statement of the result that it refers to.
Observation 7.2.3 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖
and B be a finite set of sentences such that B \ Cn(∅) 6= ∅. Furthermore, let
C1, . . . , Cm, C
′
1, . . . , C
′
m, C
′′
1 , . . . , C
′′
m, B1, . . . , Bm be the subsets of B constructed as
we described in the above definition. Then:
(a) For all l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} it holds that C ′′l = {αi ∈ C ′l : ∀αj ∈ C ′l (fS(¬αj) =
fS(¬αi) or fS(¬αj) 6⊂ ‖¬αi‖)}.
(b) If m > 1 then for all l ∈ {2, . . . ,m} the following identity is satisfied: C ′l =
{αi ∈ Cl : ∀αj ∈ Bl−1 (fS(¬αj) = fS(¬αi) or fS(¬αj) 6⊂ ‖¬αi‖)}.
Proof. (a) follows immediately from the fact that, for all l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, given
αi, αj ∈ C ′l , it holds that if fS(¬αi) 6⊆ fS(¬αj) then fS(¬αi) 6⊂ ‖¬αj‖ (because
S¬αi = S¬αj).
On the other hand, (b) is an immediate consequence of the fact that, if m > 1
and l ∈ {2, . . . ,m} then from αi ∈ Cl and αj ∈ Bl−1 it follows that S¬αi ⊂ S¬αj and,
consequently, fS(¬αj) 6= fS(¬αi).
Observation 7.2.4 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖
and B be a finite set of sentences. If αi ∈ BS, then fS(¬αt) = fS(¬αi) or fS(¬αt) 6⊂
‖¬αi‖, for all αt ∈ BS.
Proof. Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and B be a
finite set of sentences.
We must show that if αi ∈ BS, then fS(¬αt) = fS(¬αi) or fS(¬αt) 6⊂ ‖¬αi‖, for
all αt ∈ BS.
Case 1, B ⊆ Cn(∅). Then, according to Definition 7.2.2, BS = ∅ and it follows
that it is vacuously true that if αi ∈ BS, then fS(¬αt) = fS(¬αi) or fS(¬αt) 6⊂ ‖¬αi‖,
for all αt ∈ BS.
Case 2, B\Cn(∅) 6= ∅. Then, let C1, . . . , Cm, C ′1, . . . , C ′m, C ′′1 , . . . , C ′′m, B1, . . . , Bm
be the subsets of B considered in the process of construction of the set BS described
in Definition 7.2.2.
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Now we consider an arbitrary element αi of BS and show that for all αt ∈ BS it
holds that fS(¬αt) = fS(¬αi) or fS(¬αt) 6⊂ ‖¬αi‖.
In order to see that, assume by reductio that there is some αt ∈ BS such that
fS(¬αt) 6= fS(¬αi) and fS(¬αt) ⊂ ‖¬αi‖. From the latter condition and Definition
3.3.5 it follows that S¬αi ⊆ S¬αt .
Case 2.1, S¬αi = S¬αt . Then, there is some class Cl such that αi, αt ∈ Cl. Since
αi, αt ∈ BS we must have αi, αt ∈ C ′l . But, in that case, from fS(¬αt) 6= fS(¬αi)
and fS(¬αt) ⊂ ‖¬αi‖ we conclude that αi 6∈ C ′′l (cf. Observation 7.2.3−(a)), which
contradicts αi ∈ BS.
Case 2.2, S¬αi ⊂ S¬αt . Then, there are two classes Cl and Cm, with l < m such
that αt ∈ Cl and αi ∈ Cm. Since αt ∈ BS we have that αt ∈ C ′′l . Hence, from C ′′l ⊆
Bl ⊆ Bm−1 we can conclude that αt ∈ Bm−1. But then, from fS(¬αt) 6= fS(¬αi)
and fS(¬αt) ⊂ ‖¬αi‖ it follows that αi 6∈ C ′m (cf. Observation 7.2.3−(b)), which
contradicts αi ∈ BS.
Lemma 7.2.5 Let K be a belief set and S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖.
Assume C = {α1, . . . , αn} ⊆ L \ Cn(∅), with n ≥ 1 is a non-empty finite set of
sentences such that S¬α1 = · · · = S¬αn, and, for each αj ∈ C let Cαj be the set
defined by Cαj = {αk ∈ C : fS(¬αk) ⊂ fS(¬αj)}.
If αj ∈ C and Cαj 6= ∅ then there is some αl ∈ Cαj such that Cαl = ∅.
Proof. Assume K, S, C and Cαj , for each αj ∈ C, are as mentioned in the statement
of the lemma.
Let αj ∈ C be such that Cαj 6= ∅. We must show that there is some αl ∈ Cαj
such that Cαl = ∅.
First notice that it follows immediately from the definition of Cαi for each αi ∈ C
that for any αr ∈ C, if αr ∈ Cαj then Cαr ⊂ Cαj .
In what follows, given a finite set S, #S denotes the number of elements of S.
Now, in order to prove that there is some αl ∈ Cαj such that Cαl = ∅ we start
by noticing that, since ∅ 6= Cαj ⊂ C (note that αj ∈ C \ Cαj), we have that
1 ≤ #Cαj < n. Now we proceed according to the following (finite) sequence of
steps:
Step 1: Pick some αj1 ∈ Cαj . As we have seen above we have that Cαj1 ⊂ Cαj ,
hence 0 ≤ #Cαj1 < n− 1.
Step 2: If #Cαj1 = 0 we have that Cαj1 = ∅ and then we can take αl = αj1 and
this finishes the proof. Otherwise, pick some αj2 ∈ Cαj1 . Then Cαj2 ⊂ Cαj1 , hence
0 ≤ #Cαj2 < n− 2.
...
Step i: If #Cαj(i−1) = 0 we have that Cαj(i−1) = ∅ and then we can take αl =
αj(i−1) and this finishes the proof. Otherwise, pick some αji ∈ Cαj(i−1) . Then
Cαji ⊂ Cαj(i−1) , hence 0 ≤ #Cαji < n− i.
...
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Suppose after n − 2 steps the above described process has not finished yet.
Furthermore, assume that #Cαj(n−2) 6= 0. Since, by construction, 0 ≤ #Cαj(n−2) <
n− (n− 2) = 2, we can conclude that Cαj(n−2) is a singleton set. Then, at step n− 1
we pick the only element of Cαj(n−2) , which we denote by αj(n−1), and from the fact
that Cαj(n−1) ⊂ Cαj(n−2) it must be the case that Cαj(n−1) = ∅.
Hence, after at most n steps the process must have finished. That is, at most at
step n we must find some αl ∈ Cαj such that Cαl = ∅ as we wished to prove.
Observation 7.2.6 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖
and B be a finite set of sentences such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. If αj ∈ B \ BS, then
there is some αl ∈ BS such that fS(¬αl) ⊂ ‖¬αj‖ and fS(¬αl) 6= fS(¬αj).
Proof. Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and B be a
finite set of sentences such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅.
We must show that if αj ∈ B \ BS, then there is some αl ∈ BS such that
fS(¬αl) ⊂ ‖¬αj‖ and fS(¬αl) 6= fS(¬αj).
We start by noticing that, if B = ∅ then the above condition is vacuously true.
Hence, in what remains of this proof we assume that B 6= ∅. So, it follows that
B \ Cn(∅) 6= ∅. Then, let C1, . . . , Cm, C ′1, . . . , C ′m, C ′′1 , . . . , C ′′m, B1, . . . , Bm be the
subsets of B considered in the process of construction of the set BS described in
Definition 7.2.2.
Now we consider an arbitrary element αj of B \BS and show that there is some
αl ∈ BS such that fS(¬αl) ⊂ ‖¬αj‖ and fS(¬αl) 6= fS(¬αj).
We will consider separately the two possibilities αj ∈ C1 or αj ∈ Cn, with
1 < n ≤ m.
Case 1, αj ∈ C1. Then, since by construction C1 = C ′1, it holds that αj ∈ C ′1.
On the other hand, from αj 6∈ BS it follows that αj 6∈ C ′′1 . Hence, there is some
αk ∈ C ′1 such that fS(¬αk) ⊂ fS(¬αi).
Now we notice that, since B is finite, by construction we have that C ′1 is finite
and for any αr, αs ∈ C ′1 it holds that S¬αr = S¬αs . Then, according to Lemma 7.2.5,
there is some αl ∈ C ′1 such that fS(¬αl) ⊂ fS(¬αj) and for all αm ∈ C ′1 it holds that
fS(¬αm) 6⊂ fS(¬αl).
Taking the latter stated fact into account we can conclude, according to the
definition of C ′′1 , that αl ∈ C ′′1 and, consequently, αl ∈ BS. Finally we note that
from fS(¬αl) ⊂ fS(¬αj) it follows immediately that fS(¬αl) ⊂ ‖¬αj‖ and fS(¬αl) 6=
fS(¬αj) as it was required.
Case 2, αj ∈ Cn, with 1 < n ≤ m. From αj 6∈ BS it follows that αj 6∈ C ′′n, and
we have to consider the two possibilities αj 6∈ C ′n or αj ∈ C ′n.
Case 2.1, αj 6∈ C ′n. Then there is some αl ∈ Bn−1 such that fS(¬αl) ⊂ ‖¬αj‖.
Furthermore, since Bn−1 ⊆ BS, it holds that αl ∈ BS.
On the other hand, it follows from the construction of Bn−1 and Cn that S¬αj ⊂
S¬αl and, therefore, according to Definition 3.3.5 it holds that fS(¬αl) ∩ S¬αj = ∅.
Hence, since ∅ 6= fS(¬αj) ⊆ S¬αj , we can conclude that fS(¬αl) 6= fS(¬αj), and this
finishes the proof.
Case 2.2, αj ∈ C ′n. Then, since αj 6∈ C ′′n, there is some αk ∈ C ′n such that
fS(¬αk) ⊂ fS(¬αj). Reasoning as we did in Case 1 above we can conclude that
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there is some αl ∈ BS such that fS(¬αl) ⊂ ‖¬αj‖ and fS(¬αl) 6= fS(¬αj) as we
wished to prove.
Observation 7.2.9 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖
and B be a finite set of sentences such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. If BS is the S-based
filtration of B, then:
(i) If αj ∈ BS then fS(¬αi) = fS(¬αj) or fS(¬αi) 6⊂ ‖¬αj‖, for all αi ∈ BS;
(ii) For all αl ∈ B ∩K there is some αk ∈ BS ∩K such that fS(¬αk) ⊆ ‖¬αl‖.
Proof. Assume K, S, C and B are as mentioned in the statement of the observation
and let BS be the S-based filtration of B. We must prove that conditions (i) and
(ii) above are satisfied.
We start by noticing that condition (i) is an immediate consequence of Obser-
vation 7.2.4.
Now we prove that condition (ii) also holds. Indeed, it follows from Observation
7.2.6 that if αj ∈ B \ BS, then there is some αi ∈ BS such that fS(¬αi) ⊂ ‖¬αj‖.
On the other hand, according to Definition 3.3.5, for all αm ∈ L \ Cn(∅) it holds
that fS(¬αm) ⊆ ‖¬αm‖. Hence we can conclude that for all αp ∈ B there is some
αq ∈ BS such that fS(¬αq) ⊆ ‖¬αp‖.
Now let αl be an arbitrary sentence such that αl ∈ B ∩K, we must show that
there is some αk ∈ BS∩K such that fS(¬αk) ⊆ ‖¬αl‖. To see that this indeed holds
it is enough to notice that, on the one hand, according to the above paragraph, there
is some αk ∈ BS such that fS(¬αk) ⊆ ‖¬αl‖ and, on the other hand, from αl ∈ K
and fS(¬αk) ⊆ ‖¬αl‖ it follows that αk ∈ K. Therefore αk ∈ BS ∩K as required,
and this finishes the proof.
Lemma 7.2.10 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and
B be a set of sentences such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. If BS is a subset of B such that:
(i) If αj ∈ BS then fS(¬αk) = fS(¬αj) or fS(¬αk) 6⊂ ‖¬αj‖, for all αk ∈ BS, and
(ii) For all αl ∈ B ∩K there is some αm ∈ BS ∩K such that fS(¬αm) ⊆ ‖¬αl‖,
then {W ∈ WK⊥B : W ⊆
⋃
αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi)} 6= ∅, and
⋃{W ∈ WK⊥B : W ⊆⋃
αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi)} =
⋃
αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi).
Proof. Assume B is a set of sentences satisfying B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ and let BS be a
subset of B such that conditions (i) and (ii) in the statement of the observation are
satisfied.
Consider the function f : {‖α‖ : α ∈ L and 6` ¬α} → P(ML) defined by
f(‖α‖) = fS(α). Then it follows from Definition 3.3.5 that if α ∈ L and 6` ¬α then
∅ 6= f(‖α‖) ⊆ ‖α‖.
Notice also that, it follows from the hypothesis that BS ⊆ B and that:
(i) If αj ∈ BS then f(‖¬αk‖) = f(‖¬αj‖) or f(‖¬αk‖) 6⊂ ‖¬αj‖, for all αk ∈ BS;
(ii) For all αl ∈ B ∩K there is some αm ∈ BS ∩K such that f(‖¬αm‖) ⊆ ‖¬αl‖.
203
Hence, by Lemma 6.2.6 we can conclude that {W ∈WK⊥B :W ⊆
⋃
αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi)}
6= ∅ and ⋃{W ∈WK⊥B :W ⊆ ⋃αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi)} = ⋃αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi).
Observation 7.2.11 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on
‖K‖ and B be a finite set of sentences such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. If BS is the
S-based filtration of B, then {W ∈ WK⊥B : W ⊆
⋃
αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi)} 6= ∅, and⋃{W ∈WK⊥B :W ⊆ ⋃αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi)} = ⋃αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi).
Proof. Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and B
be a finite set of sentences such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. According to Observation
7.2.9, the S-based filtration BS of B satisfies conditions (i)−(ii) of Lemma 7.2.10.
Therefore, it follows immediately from the mentioned lemma that {W ∈ WK⊥B :
W ⊆ ⋃αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi)} 6= ∅ and ⋃{W ∈ WK⊥B : W ⊆ ⋃αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi)} =⋃
αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi).
Lemma 7.2.12 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and
G and H be two finite sets of sentences. If every subset X of K implies some element
of G if and only if X implies some element of H, then for all βi ∈ (GN ∩K)S there
is some ςi ∈ (HN ∩K)S such that ‖βi‖ = ‖ςi‖.
Proof. Let K, S, G and H be as mentioned in the statement of the lemma. Assume
every subset X of K implies some element of G if and only if X implies some element
of H. According to Lemma 6.3.3 it holds that for all βi ∈ GN ∩K there is some
ςi ∈ HN ∩ K such that ‖βi‖ = ‖ςi‖. Hence it follows trivially from the definition
of S-based filtration of a set of sentences that for all βi ∈ (GN ∩K)S there is some
ςi ∈ (HN ∩K)S such that ‖βi‖ = ‖ςi‖, and this finishes the proof.
Lemma 7.2.13 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and
B be a finite set of sentences. Then:
(i) BN ∩K = (B ∩K)N .
(ii) BS ∩K = (B ∩K)S.
(iii) (BN)S = (BS)N .
(iv)
⋃
αi∈BS fS(¬αi) =
⋃
αi∈(BS)N fS(¬αi).
Proof. Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and B be a
finite set of sentences. We will show that conditions (i)-(iv) in the statement of the
lemma are satisfied.
(i)-(iii) Follow immediately from the definitions of normalization and of S-based
filtration of a set of sentences.
(iv) The inclusion
⋃
αi∈(BS)N fS(¬αi) ⊆
⋃
αi∈BS fS(¬αi) follows immediately from
the fact that (BS)N ⊆ BS. Now we show that the converse inclusion also holds.
Assume M ∈ ⋃αi∈BS fS(¬αi). Then there is some αj ∈ BS such that M ∈ fS(¬αj).
If αj ∈ (BS)N it follows immediately that M ∈
⋃
αi∈(BS)N fS(¬αi) and we are done.
Now assume that αj 6∈ (BS)N . It follows from Lemma 6.2.5 that there is some
αk ∈ (BS)N such that ‖¬αk‖ ⊂ ‖¬αj‖. Hence we have that αj, αk ∈ BS and
fS(¬αk) ⊂ ‖¬αj‖. So we obtain from Observation 7.2.9-(i) that fS(¬αk) = fS(¬αj).
Therefore M ∈ fS(¬αk) and we can conclude that M ∈
⋃
αi∈(BS)N fS(¬αi).
204 APPENDIX D. PROOFS OF CHAPTER 7
Theorem 7.2.14 Let K be a belief set and S be a system of spheres centred on
‖K‖. Then the S-based multiple contraction on K by finite sets is a partial meet
multiple contraction on K by finite sets.
Proof. Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖, and ÷S be
the S-based multiple contraction on K by finite sets. We must show that ÷S is a
partial meet multiple contraction by finite sets.
According to Theorem 6.3.6, in order to prove that, it is enough to show that
there is a propositional package selection function h for ‖K‖ such that K÷SB =
Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃h(WK⊥B))), for all finite sets B.
Let h be such that h(WK⊥B) = ∅ if B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅, and h(WK⊥B) = {W ∈
WK⊥B :W ⊆
⋃
αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi)} if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅.
Next will prove that:
(a) h is a propositional package selection function for ‖K‖.
(b) K÷SB = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (
⋃
h(WK⊥B))), for all finite sets B.
(a) We start by showing that h is a function. Assume B and C are sets of
sentences such that WK⊥B = WK⊥C . If WK⊥B = WK⊥C = ∅ then, according to
Observation 6.1.4, B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ and C ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ and, consequently, it follows
from the definition of h that h(WK⊥B) = h(WK⊥C) = ∅. Now we consider the
case WK⊥B = WK⊥C 6= ∅. Again by Observation 6.1.4 we have that B ∩ Cn(∅) =
C ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. Therefore, in order to demonstrate that h(WK⊥B) = h(WK⊥C) we
must show that {W ∈ WK⊥B : W ⊆
⋃
αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi)} = {W ∈ WK⊥C : W ⊆⋃
αi∈CS∩K fS(¬αi)}. To do that we start by proving that the following identity holds:⋃
αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi) =
⋃
αi∈CS∩K fS(¬αi).
Notice that, since WK⊥B = WK⊥C , it follows from Observation 6.3.4 that
K⊥B = K⊥C. Therefore, according to Observation 3.1.3, it holds that every
subset X of K implies some element of B if and only if X implies some element of
C.
Therefore, from Lemma 7.2.12 we can conclude that
⋃
αi∈(BN∩K)S fS(¬αi) =⋃
αi∈(CN∩K)S fS(¬αi). Hence, since (BN ∩K)S = ((B∩K)S)N and (CN ∩K)S = ((C∩
K)S)N (according to Lemma 7.2.13-(i) and (iii)), we obtain that
⋃
αi∈((B∩K)S)N fS(¬αi)
=
⋃
αi∈((C∩K)S)N fS(¬αi). So, Lemma 7.2.13-(iv) gives us that
⋃
αi∈(B∩K)S fS(¬αi) =⋃
αi∈(C∩K)S fS(¬αi). Finally, we can conclude from Lemma 7.2.13-(ii) that
⋃
αi∈BS∩K
fS(¬αi) =
⋃
αi∈CS∩K fS(¬αi), as required.
To show that h is a propositional package selection function for ‖K‖ it only
remains to prove that:
(i) h(WK⊥B) ⊆WK⊥B.
(ii) If WK⊥B 6= ∅ then h(WK⊥B) 6= ∅.
It follows immediately from the definition of h that condition (i) is satisfied. Now
we show that (ii) also holds. Assume WK⊥B 6= ∅. Then, by Observation 6.1.4, we
have that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. So, according to the definition of h, h(WK⊥B) = {W ∈
WK⊥B :W ⊆
⋃
αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi)}, and we can conclude from Observation 7.2.11 that
h(WK⊥B) 6= ∅.
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(b) Let B be an arbitrary set of sentences. In what follows we show that K÷SB =
Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃h(WK⊥B))).
Case 1, B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅. Then, on the one hand, according to Definition 7.2.8,
K÷SB = K. And, on the other hand, it follows from Observation 3.3.3−(a)
and the definition of h that Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃h(WK⊥B))) = K. Hence K÷SB =
Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃h(WK⊥B))), as required.
Case 2, B∩Cn(∅) = ∅. Then h(WK⊥B) = {W ∈WK⊥B :W ⊆
⋃
αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi)}
and, according to Definition 7.2.8, K÷SB = Th
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈BS fS(¬αi))). Hence,
in order to show that the required identity holds, we will prove that, indeed, the fol-
lowing stronger identity is satisfied: ‖K‖∪(⋃αi∈BS fS(¬αi)) = ‖K‖∪(⋃h(WK⊥B)).
First of all we must note that if αi 6∈ K then fS(¬αi) ⊆ ‖K‖. Hence ‖K‖ ∪(⋃
αi∈BS fS(¬αi)
)
= ‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi)). Finally, observing that, according
to Observation 7.2.11,
⋃
h(WK⊥B) =
⋃
αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi), we can conclude that ‖K‖∪(⋃
αi∈BS fS(¬αi)
)
= ‖K‖ ∪ (⋃h(WK⊥B)) as we wished to prove.
Theorem 7.2.15 Let K be a belief set and S be a system of spheres centred on
‖K‖. Suppose that for any finite set of sentences B satisfying B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ the
set BS is a subset of B such that the following conditions hold:
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(i) If αj ∈ BS then fS(¬αk) = fS(¬αj) or fS(¬αk) 6⊂ ‖¬αj‖, for all αk ∈ BS;
(ii) For all αl ∈ B ∩K there is some αm ∈ BS ∩K such that fS(¬αm) ⊆ ‖¬αl‖;
(iii) For any finite set of sentences C satisfying C ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅, if every subset X
of K implies some element of B if and only if X implies some element of C,
then for all βi ∈ (BN ∩K)S there is some ςi ∈ (CN ∩K)S such that ‖βi‖ = ‖ςi‖;
(iv) BS ∩K = (B ∩K)S;
(v) (BN)S = (BS)N ;
(vi)
⋃
αi∈BS fS(¬αi) =
⋃
αi∈(BS)N fS(¬αi).
Then the multiple contraction function ÷S on K defined by:
K÷SB =
{
Th
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈BS fS(¬αi))) , if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅
K , if B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ ,
for any finite set of sentences B, is a partial meet multiple contraction on K by
finite sets.
Proof. Let ÷S be the operation defined by
K÷SB =
{
Th
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃αi∈BS fS(¬αi))) , if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅
K , if B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ ,
where, for any finite set of sentences B satisfying B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅, the set BS is
a subset of B such that conditions (i)−(vi) in the statement of the theorem are
satisfied. We must show that ÷S is a partial meet multiple contraction.
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According to Theorem 6.3.6, in order to prove that, it is enough to show that there
is a propositional package selection function h for ‖K‖ such that K÷SB = Th (‖K‖∪
(
⋃
h(WK⊥B))), for all sets B.
Let h be such that h(WK⊥B) = ∅ if B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅, and h(WK⊥B) = {W ∈ WK⊥B :
W ⊆ ⋃αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi)} if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅.
We start by showing that h is a function. Assume B and C are sets of sentences such
that WK⊥B = WK⊥C . If WK⊥B = WK⊥C = ∅ then, according to Observation 6.1.4,
B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ and C ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ and, consequently, it follows from the definition of
h that h(WK⊥B) = h(WK⊥C) = ∅. Now we consider the case WK⊥B = WK⊥C 6= ∅.
Again by Observation 6.1.4 we have that B ∩ Cn(∅) = C ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. Therefore, in
order to demonstrate that h(WK⊥B) = h(WK⊥C) we must show that {W ∈WK⊥B :W ⊆⋃
αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi)} = {W ∈ WK⊥C : W ⊆
⋃
αi∈CS∩K fS(¬αi)}. To do that we start by
proving that
⋃
αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi) =
⋃
αi∈CS∩K fS(¬αi). It follows from Observation 6.3.4
that K⊥B = K⊥C. Therefore, according to Observation 3.1.3, it holds that every subset
X of K implies some element of B if and only if X implies some element of C.
Then, from (iii) we can conclude that
⋃
αi∈(BN∩K)S fS(¬αi) =
⋃
αi∈(CN∩K)S fS(¬αi).
On the other hand it follows immediately from the definition of normalization of a set of
sentences and from (v) that (BN ∩K)S = ((B ∩K)S)N and (CN ∩K)S = ((C ∩K)S)N .
Hence, we obtain that
⋃
αi∈((B∩K)S)N fS(¬αi) =
⋃
αi∈((C∩K)S)N fS(¬αi). So, (vi) gives
us that
⋃
αi∈(B∩K)S fS(¬αi) =
⋃
αi∈(C∩K)S fS(¬αi). Finally, we can conclude from (iv) that⋃
αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi) =
⋃
αi∈CS∩K fS(¬αi), as required.
To show that h is a propositional package selection function for ‖K‖ it only remains
to prove that: (a) h(WK⊥B) ⊆WK⊥B, and (b) if WK⊥B 6= ∅ then h(WK⊥B) 6= ∅.
(a) follows immediately from the definition of h. For (b), assume WK⊥B 6= ∅. Then,
by Observation 6.1.4, we have that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. So, according to the definition of h,
h(WK⊥B) = {W ∈ WK⊥B : W ⊆
⋃
αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi)} and, since BS ⊆ B and conditions
(i) and (ii) are satisfied, we can conclude from Lemma 7.2.10 that h(WK⊥B) 6= ∅.
Now it only remains to show that K÷SB = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (
⋃
h(WK⊥B))) for any set of
sentences B.
Case 1, B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅. Then, on the one hand, according to the definition of ÷S,
it holds that K÷SB = K. And, on the other hand, it follows from the definition of h
that Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃h(WK⊥B))) = Th(‖K‖). Hence, since Th(‖K‖) = K (cf. Observation
3.3.3−(a)), we can conclude that K÷SB = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (
⋃
h(WK⊥B))), as required.
Case 2, B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. Then h(WK⊥B) = {W ∈ WK⊥B : W ⊆
⋃
αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi)}
and, according to the definition of ÷S, we have that K÷SB = Th
(
‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
αi∈BS
fS(¬αi))). Now, in order to show that the required identity holds we will prove that,
indeed, the following stronger identity is satisfied: ‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
αi∈BS fS(¬αi)
)
= ‖K‖ ∪
(
⋃
h(WK⊥B)).
First of all we must note that if αi 6∈ K then fS(¬αi) ⊆ ‖K‖. Hence ‖K‖ ∪(⋃
αi∈BS fS(¬αi)
)
= ‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi)
)
. Finally, observing that (since BS ⊆ B
and satisfies conditions (i) and (ii)) it follows from Lemma 7.2.10 that
⋃
h(WK⊥B) =⋃
αi∈BS∩K fS(¬αi), we can conclude that ‖K‖∪
(⋃
αi∈BS fS(¬αi)
)
= ‖K‖∪ (⋃h(WK⊥B))
as we wished to prove.
Appendix E
Proofs of Chapter 8
In this chapter we present proofs for most of the results presented throughout Chap-
ter 8. For commodity of the reader before each proof here presented we include the
statement of the result that such proof refers to.
Lemma 8.0.1 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and
α, β ∈ L \ Cn(∅). Then the following statements hold:
(i) If S¬β ⊂ S¬α then
fS(¬α) 6⊂ ‖¬β‖ iff fS(¬α) 6⊆ ‖¬β‖.
(ii) If S¬α = S¬β then
fS(¬α) 6⊂ fS(¬β) iff (fS(¬α) 6⊆ ‖¬β‖ or fS(¬β) ⊆ ‖¬α‖).
Proof. Assume K, S, α and β are as mentioned in the statement of the lemma.
Statement (i) is obviously true. Now we prove that (ii) also holds.
Assume S¬α = S¬β. Since fS(¬α) 6⊂ fS(¬β) ⇔ fS(¬α) 6⊆ fS(¬β) or fS(¬β) ⊆
fS(¬α), the thesis of the statement (ii) is equivalent to (fS(¬α) 6⊆ fS(¬β) or fS(¬β) ⊆
fS(¬α))⇔ (fS(¬α) 6⊆ ‖¬β‖ or fS(¬β) ⊆ ‖¬α‖).
Then it is enough to show that fS(¬α) 6⊆ fS(¬β) ⇔ fS(¬α) 6⊆ ‖¬β‖ and
fS(¬β) ⊆ fS(¬α)⇔ fS(¬β) ⊆ ‖¬α‖. Moreover, by symmetry it is indeed enough to
prove one of the two mentioned equivalences. Hence, in what follows we will show
that fS(¬β) ⊆ fS(¬α)⇔ fS(¬β) ⊆ ‖¬α‖.
(⇒) Follows immediately from the fact that fS(¬α) ⊆ ‖¬α‖.
(⇐) Let fS(¬β) ⊆ ‖¬α‖. Since fS(¬β) ⊆ S¬β and S¬α = S¬β, we can conclude
that fS(¬β) ⊆ ‖¬α‖ ∩ S¬α(= fS(¬α)).
Theorem 8.0.6 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖
and ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K. If ≤ and S satisfy
condition (≤ −S) then, for any finite set of sentences B,
K÷≤B = K÷SB,
where ÷≤ is the ≤-based multiple contraction on K and ÷S is the S-based multiple
contraction on K.
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Proof. Assume K, S and ≤ are as mentioned in the statement of the theorem and
let B be any finite set of sentences.
We must show that K÷≤B = K÷SB.
If B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ then K÷≤B = K÷SB = K and we are done.
Now we consider the case B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. In this case we must prove that
{β ∈ K : ∀αj ∈ B≤ αj < αj ∨ β} = Th
‖K‖ ∪
 ⋃
αj∈BS
fS(¬αj)

We start by noticing that, according to Observation 8.0.4 it holds that B≤ = BS.
Now we prove the above mentioned required equality of sets.
β ∈ {β ∈ K : ∀αj ∈ B≤ αj < αj ∨ β}
iff β ∈ K and ∀αj ∈ B≤ αj < αj ∨ β
iff β ∈
⋂
‖K‖ and ∀αj ∈ BS fS(¬αj) ⊆ ‖β‖ (by Observation 3.3.3-(a),
Lemma 4.2.5 and the equality B≤ = BS)
iff β ∈
⋂
‖K‖ and ∀αj ∈ BS β ∈
⋂
fS(¬αj)
iff β ∈
⋂‖K‖ ∪
 ⋃
αj∈BS
fS(¬αj)

iff β ∈ Th
‖K‖ ∪
 ⋃
αj∈BS
fS(¬αj)

Corollary 8.0.8 Let K be a belief set, S be a system of spheres centred on ‖K‖ and
≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K. Then, for any finite set
of sentences B,
K÷≤B = K÷SB,
if and only if ≤ and S satisfy condition (≤ −S).
Proof. Let K, S and ≤ be as stated above.
Now assume that K÷≤B = K÷SB, for any finite set of sentences B.
Then, in particular, K÷≤B = K÷SB, for any singleton set B ⊆ L and it follows
from Observations 8.0.7 and 7.2.16 that K−≤α = K−Sα, for any sentence α ∈ L.
Hence, according to Theorem 4.2.6, condition (≤ −S) is satisfied.
Hence we have just shown that if K÷≤B = K÷SB, for any finite set of sentences
B, then condition (≤ −S) holds.
The converse implication is given by Theorem 8.0.6.
Appendix F
Appendix of Chapter 9
F.1 Proofs of Chapter 9
In this section we present proofs for some of the results presented throughout Chap-
ter 9. For commodity of the reader before each proof here presented we include the
statement of the result to which such proof corresponds.
Observation 9.1.3 Let K be a belief set and ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment re-
lation with respect to K. Then the ≤-based multiple contraction ÷ on K satisfies
P-conjunctive overlap/P-intersection, P-conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction as well
as the condition (CM≤).
Proof. Let K be a belief set, ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect
to K, ÷ be the ≤-based multiple contraction on K and − be the ≤-based singleton
contraction on K.
We first remark that it follows from Observation 3.4.5 that − satisfies Conjunc-
tive overlap/Intersection, Conjunctive inclusion/Conjunction and condition (C≤).
On the other hand we have, according to Observation 8.0.7, that for all sentences
α it holds that K−α = K÷{α}. Hence, by Observation 9.1.2-(i) and (ii), we
can conclude that ÷ satisfies P-conjunctive overlap/P-intersection, P-conjunctive
inclusion/P-conjunction and condition (CM≤).
Observation 9.1.4 Let K be a belief set. If ÷ is a multiple contraction function
on K that satisfies P-inclusion, P-success, P-uniformity, P-relevance, P-conjunctive
overlap/P-intersection and P-conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction, then the binary
relation ≤ defined from ÷ by means of condition (CM≤) is an epistemic entrench-
ment relation with respect to K.
Proof. Let K be a belief set, ÷ be a multiple contraction function on K that
satisfies P-inclusion, P-success, P-uniformity, P-relevance, P-conjunctive overlap/P-
intersection and P-conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction and ≤ be the binary relation
defined by condition (CM≤).
We start by noticing that it follows from Observation 5.2.3 that ÷ also satisfies
P-closure, P-vacuity, P-extensionality and P-recovery.
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Now we define a singleton contraction function on K in the following way:
∀α ∈ L, K−α = K÷{α}.
From the above we can conclude by Observation 9.1.2-(ii) and (iii) that − sat-
isfies all the basic and supplementary AGM postulates for belief set contraction
(namely, closure, inclusion, vacuity, success, recovery, extensionality, Conjunctive
overlap/Intersection and Conjunctive inclusion/Conjunction). Therefore Observa-
tion 3.4.6 allows us to conclude that the binary relation on L defined from − by
means of condition (C≤) is an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K.
Finally, since, according to Observation 9.1.2-(i) Conditions (C≤) and (CM≤)
define the same binary relation ≤ on L, the required conclusion follows immediately.
Observation 9.1.6 Let K be a belief set and ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment re-
lation with respect to K. Then the ≤-based multiple contraction ÷ on K satisfies
P-singleton reduction.
Proof. Let K be a belief set, ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect
to K, ÷ be the ≤-based multiple contraction on K and B be an arbitrary finite set
of sentences such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅.
We start by remarking that, according to Observations 9.1.1 and 9.1.3, it holds
that ÷ satisfies P-inclusion, P-success, P-uniformity, P-relevance, P-conjunctive
overlap/P-intersection and P-conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction.
Now let ≤÷ be the epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K defined
by
α ≤÷ β if and only if α 6∈ K÷{α ∧ β} or ` α ∧ β.
We only need to show that K÷B = ⋂αi∈B≤÷ K÷{αi}, where B≤÷ is the ≤÷-
based filtration of B.
In order to do that, we first notice that, it follows from Observation 9.1.3 that
condition (CM≤) is satisfied. Hence the binary relation ≤÷ introduced above coin-
cides with the epistemic entrenchment relation ≤ (on which the contraction function
÷ is based).
Therefore the equality that we need to prove is indeed equivalent to following
one: K÷B = ⋂αi∈B≤ K÷{αi}. But this latter equality follows immediately from
Observation 8.0.7, and the proof is complete.
Observation 9.2.1 Let K be a belief set, ÷ be a multiple contraction function on
K that satisfies P-inclusion, P-success, P-uniformity, P-relevance, P-conjunctive
overlap/P-intersection, P-conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction and P-singleton re-
duction and ≤ be the epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to K defined by
condition (CM≤).130 Then K÷B = K÷≤B, for any finite set B, where ÷≤ is the
≤-based multiple contraction on K defined by (CM÷≤).
Proof. Let K be a belief set, ÷ be a multiple contraction function on K that
satisfies P-inclusion, P-success, P-uniformity, P-relevance, P-conjunctive overlap/P-
intersection, P-conjunctive inclusion/P-conjunction and P-singleton reduction. Fur-
thermore, consider the epistemic entrenchment relation ≤ with respect to K defined
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by condition (CM≤) (notice that Observation 9.1.4 assures that under the above
assumptions it holds that the binary relation ≤ thus defined is indeed an epistemic
entrenchment relation with respect to K) and let B be an arbitrary finite set of
sentences.
We must show that K÷B = K÷≤B, where ÷≤ is the ≤-based multiple contrac-
tion defined by (CM÷≤). That is, we must prove that
K÷B =
{ {β ∈ K : ∀αi ∈ B≤ αi < αi ∨ β} , if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅
K , if B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ .
If B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ then it follows immediately from P-inclusion and P-relevance
that K÷B = K and we are done.
So, it only remains to show that if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ then K÷B = {β ∈ K : ∀αi ∈
B≤ αi < αi ∨ β}. Hence, in what follows we assume that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ and show
that (under that assumption) the above equality is satisfied.
We start by noticing that it follows from P-singleton reduction that
K÷B =
⋂
αi∈B≤
K÷{αi}, (9.1)
where B≤ is the ≤-based filtration of B. In fact, in the present conditions, according
to that postulate, it holds that K÷B = ⋂αi∈B≤÷ K÷{αi}, where ≤÷ is the epistemic
entrenchment relation with respect to K defined by
α ≤÷ β if and only if α 6∈ K÷{α ∧ β} or ` α ∧ β,
and B≤÷ is the ≤÷-based filtration of B. So, since it follows from condition (CM≤)
that ≤÷ coincides with ≤, we can conclude that the equality (9.1) indeed holds.
Now let − be the singleton contraction function on K defined in the following
way:
∀α ∈ L, K−α = K÷{α}.
At this point we remark that it follows from Observation 5.2.3 that÷ also satisfies
P-closure, P-vacuity, P-extensionality and P-recovery.
Therefore we can conclude by Observation 9.1.2 that: (a) Conditions (C≤) and
(CM≤) define the same binary relation ≤ on L, and (b) the singleton contraction
− satisfies all the basic and supplementary AGM postulates for belief set contrac-
tion (namely, closure, inclusion, vacuity, success, recovery, extensionality, Conjunc-
tive overlap/Intersection and Conjunctive inclusion/Conjunction). Hence, it follows
from Observation 3.4.6 that K−α = K−≤α for any sentence α, where −≤ is the
≤-based contraction defined by condition (C−≤).
Thus, we can conclude that
∀αi ∈ B, K÷{αi} = {β ∈ K : αi < αi ∨ β}. (9.2)
Finally, combining (9.1) with (9.2) we get K÷B = ⋂αi∈B≤{β ∈ K : αi <
αi ∨ β} = {β ∈ K : ∀αi ∈ B≤ αi < αi ∨ β} as required.
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F.2 Direct Proof of Observation 9.1.1
The purpose of this section is to provide an explicit proof of Observation 9.1.1 (which,
so far, has only been assured to hold by means of some of the results included in
Chapter 8 - some of which, on their turn, have been obtained as a consequence of
some results from Chapter 7).
Thus, in order to be in a position to present such a proof, we first introduce some
auxiliary results.
We start by presenting some observations regarding the composition of the ≤-
based filtration of a set of sentences B. More precisely we will expose the main
property satisfied by the elements of B≤ as well as the reason why an element of B
is discarded along the construction of B≤. Such results will be particularly useful in
the proofs that we shall present for the fact that all epistemic entrenchment-based
multiple contractions satisfy P-success and P-relevance.
We must notice here that, due to the tight interconnection between systems of
spheres and epistemic entrenchment relations (cf. Section 4.2) and, in particular,
to the fact that, whenever an epistemic entrenchment relation ≤ and a system of
spheres S satisfy condition (≤ −S), the ≤-based filtration of a set of sentences
coincides with its S-based filtration (cf. Observation 8.0.4), such results can be seen
as reformulations in terms of epistemic entrenchment relations of some of the ones
that have been presented in Section 7.2 in the context of systems of spheres.148
However, we provide direct proofs for each of the results stated below.
We start with an observation which presents a property satisfied by the elements
of B that are kept in the set B≤:
Observation F.2.1 Let K be a belief set, ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation
with respect to K and B be a finite set of sentences. If αi ∈ B≤, then for any
αt ∈ B≤, αt ∨ ¬αi ≤ αt or αi < αi ∨ ¬αt.
Proof. Assume K, ≤ and B are as mentioned in the statement of the Observation.
If B ⊆ Cn(∅) then, according to Definition 8.0.3, B≤ = ∅ and we are done.
So, in what follows, assume B \ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ and let C1, . . . , Cm, C ′1, . . . , C ′m,
C ′′1 , . . . , C
′′
m, B1, . . . , Bm be the subsets of B considered in the process of construction
of the set B≤ described in Definition 8.0.3.
Now let αi be an arbitrary element of B≤ and assume by reductio that there is
some αt ∈ B≤ such that αt < αt ∨ ¬αi and αi 6< αi ∨ ¬αt. It follows from Lemma
3.4.13-(ii) that αi ≤ αt.
Case 1, αi =E.E. αt. Then, there is some class Cl such that αi, αt ∈ Cl. Since
αi, αt ∈ B≤ we must have αi, αt ∈ C ′l . But, in that case, from αt < αt ∨ ¬αi and
αi 6< αi ∨ ¬αt we conclude that αi 6∈ C ′′l , which contradicts αi ∈ B≤.
Case 2, αi < αt. Then, there are two classes Cl and Cn, with l < n such
that αt ∈ Cl and αi ∈ Cn. Since αt ∈ B≤ we have that αt ∈ C ′′l . Hence, from
148More precisely, we notice that Observation F.2.1, Lemma F.2.2, Observation F.2.3, and Corol-
lary F.2.4 (below) are analogues (in the sense that they can be seen as restatements in terms
of epistemic entrenchment relations) of Observation 7.2.4, Lemma 7.2.5, Observation 7.2.6 and
Corollary 7.2.7 (all stated in terms of systems of spheres), respectively.
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C ′′l ⊆ Bl ⊆ Bn−1 we can conclude that αt ∈ Bn−1. But then, from αt < αt ∨ ¬αi it
follows that αi 6∈ C ′n, which contradicts αi ∈ B≤.
Now we introduce a lemma which we will use afterwards to demonstrate a partial
converse of the above observation. More precisely, such lemma will be helpful for
proving that the property that we have shown, in the above observation, to be
satisfied by all sentences in B≤ is not only necessary but also sufficient for an element
of B to be kept in the set B≤.
Lemma F.2.2 Let ≤ be a relation that satisfies (EE1), (EE2) and (EE3). Assume
that C = {α1, . . . , αn}, with n ≥ 1 is a non-empty finite set of sentences such
that α1 =E.E. · · · =E.E. αn, and, for each αj ∈ C let Cαj be the set defined by
Cαj = {αk ∈ C : αk < αk ∨ ¬αj and αj 6< αj ∨ ¬αk}.
If αj ∈ C and Cαj 6= ∅ then there is some αl ∈ Cαj such that Cαl = ∅.
Proof. Assume K, S, C and Cαj , for each αj ∈ C, are as mentioned in the statement
of the lemma.
Let αj ∈ C be such that Cαj 6= ∅. We must show that there is some αl ∈ Cαj
such that Cαl = ∅.
First notice that given αs, αt ∈ C if αs ∈ Cαj and αt < αt∨¬αs, then αt ∈ Cαj . In
order to verify this we take αs and αt in the mentioned conditions. From αs ∈ Cαj
it follows that αs < αs ∨ ¬αj and αj 6< αj ∨ ¬αs. Now, on the one hand, from
αs < αs∨¬αj and αt < αt∨¬αs it follows by Lemma 3.4.13-(iii) that αt < αt∨¬αj.
On the other hand, by the same lemma, from αt < αt ∨ ¬αs and αj 6< αj ∨ ¬αs, we
obtain that αj 6< αj ∨ ¬αt. Hence αt ∈ Cαj .
From the above it follows immediately that for any αr ∈ C, if αr ∈ Cαj then
Cαr ⊂ Cαj . Indeed, let αr, αp ∈ C be such that αr ∈ Cαj and αp ∈ Cαr , we will start
by showing that αp ∈ Cαj . From αp ∈ Cαr it follows that αp < αp ∨ ¬αr and, as we
have seen above, from this condition and the fact that αr ∈ Cαj we can conclude
that αp ∈ Cαj . Hence Cαr ⊆ Cαj . Finally, since αr ∈ Cαj but αr 6∈ Cαr we can
conclude that Cαr ⊂ Cαj .
Having seen this, to finish the proof it remains only to notice that it can be show
as it was done in the proof of Lemma 7.2.5 that, as we wished to prove, there is
some αl ∈ Cαj such that Cαl = ∅.
With the help of the above lemma we can prove the following observation, which
presents property satisfied by all elements of a set of sentences B which are discarded
along the process of construction of the ≤-based filtration of such set.
Observation F.2.3 Let K be a belief set, ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation
with respect to K and B be a finite set of sentences such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. If
αj ∈ B \B≤, then there is some αl ∈ B≤ such that αl < αl∨¬αj and αj 6< αj ∨¬αl.
Proof. Let K, ≤ and B be as mentioned in the statement of the observation.
If B = ∅ then the observation is trivially true. So, in what remains of this proof
we assume that B 6= ∅ and let C1, . . . , Cm, C ′1, . . . , C ′m, C ′′1 , . . . , C ′′m, B1, . . . , Bm be
the subsets of B considered in the process of construction of the set B≤ described
in Definition 8.0.3 (notice that in the conditions of the observation it follows from
B 6= ∅ that B \ Cn(∅) 6= ∅).
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Now assume αj is such that αj ∈ B but αj 6∈ B≤. We must show that there is
some αl ∈ B≤ such that αl < αl ∨ ¬αj and αj 6< αj ∨ ¬αl.
To do that, we consider separately the two possibilities αj ∈ C1 or αj ∈ Cn, with
1 < n ≤ m.
Case 1, αj ∈ C1. Then, since by construction C1 = C ′1, it holds that αj ∈ C ′1.
On the other hand, from αj 6∈ B≤ it follows that αj 6∈ C ′′1 . Therefore, there is some
αk ∈ C ′1 such that αk < αk ∨ ¬αj and αj 6< αj ∨ ¬αk.
Now we notice that, since B is finite, by construction we have that C ′1 is finite
and for any αr, αs ∈ C ′1 it holds that αr =E.E. αs. Then, according to Lemma F.2.2,
there is some αl ∈ C ′1 such that αl < αl ∨ ¬αj, αj 6< αj ∨ ¬αl and, for any αm ∈ C ′1
it holds that αm 6< αm ∨ ¬αl or αl < αl ∨ ¬αm.
It remains to remark that, according to the definition of C ′′1 , it follows from the
conditions above that αl ∈ C ′′1 . Consequently αl ∈ B≤, and we are done.
Case 2, αj ∈ Cn, with 1 < n ≤ m. From αj 6∈ B≤ it follows that αj 6∈ C ′′n, and
we have to consider the two possibilities αj 6∈ C ′n or αj ∈ C ′n.
Case 2.1, αj 6∈ C ′n. Then there is some αl ∈ Bn−1 such that αl < αl ∨¬αj. Now,
since αl ∈ Bn−1, on the one hand we have that αl ∈ B≤ and, on the other hand,
it follows from the construction of Bn−1 and Cn that αj < αl. So, αl 6≤ αj and it
follows from Lemma 3.4.13-(ii) that αj 6< αj ∨ ¬αl. Hence αl is such that αl ∈ B≤
and αl < αl ∨ ¬αj and αj 6< αj ∨ ¬αl as we wished to prove.
Case 2.2, αj ∈ C ′n. Then, since αj 6∈ C ′′n, there is some αk ∈ C ′n such that
αk < αk ∨ ¬αj and αj 6< αj ∨ ¬αk. Reasoning as we did in Case 1 above we can
conclude that there is some αl ∈ B≤ such that αl < αl ∨ ¬αj and αj 6< αj ∨ ¬αl,
and this finishes the proof.
Finally, combining Observations F.2.1 and F.2.3 we obtain the following corollary
stating a necessary and sufficient condition for an element of a set of sentences B to
belong to the ≤-based filtration of such set.
Corollary F.2.4 Let K be a belief set, ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation
with respect to K, B be a (non-empty) finite set of sentences such that B∩Cn(∅) = ∅
and αi be a sentence in B. Then αi ∈ B≤ if and only if for any αt ∈ B≤ it holds
that αt ∨ ¬αi ≤ αt or αi < αi ∨ ¬αt.
Having seen this, before moving on towards the goal of the present section, it is
worth to make here a very brief detour just to notice that, taking the above results
into account we can conclude that the ≤-based filtration of a finite set of sentences
can be described in one of the more concise forms presented in the following remark:
Remark F.2.5 Let K be a belief set, ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with
respect to K, B be a finite set of sentences and B≤ be the ≤-based filtration of B.
Then:
1. αi ∈ B≤ if and only if αi ∈ B and for every αt ∈ B≤ the following conditions
are satisfied:
(a) If αi < αt, then αt ∨ ¬αi ≤ αt
(b) If αi =E.E. αt, then αt ∨ ¬αi ≤ αt or αi < αi ∨ ¬αt
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2. B≤ = {αi ∈ B : ∀αt ∈ B≤(αt ∨ ¬αi ≤ αt or αi < αi ∨ ¬αt)}.
Now, returning to our path towards the presentation of a direct proof for Ob-
servation 9.1.1, we introduce one more auxiliary result which will be needed in the
proofs that we shall present for the fact that all epistemic entrenchment-based mul-
tiple contractions satisfy P-success and P-relevance. Namely, the following lemma,
which asserts that the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions satisfy
P-closure (and to which we provide a direct proof).
Lemma F.2.6 Let K be a belief set and ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation
with respect to K. Then the ≤-based multiple contraction ÷ on K satisfies P-closure.
Proof. Let K, ≤ and ÷ be as mentioned in the statement of the lemma and assume
B is an arbitrary finite sets of sentences. We must show that K÷B = Cn(K÷B).
If B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ it follows from (CM÷≤) that K÷B = K. Then it follows
from the hypothesis that K÷B = Cn(K÷B). Hence, for the rest of this proof we
assume that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. That K÷B ⊆ Cn(K÷B) follows from the fact that
the consequence operation Cn satisfies inclusion (i.e. Cn is such that A ⊆ Cn(A),
for any set of sentences A).
To show the converse inclusion we take δ ∈ Cn(K÷B) and we prove that δ ∈
K÷B. In order to do that, according to (CM÷≤), and since we are assuming that
B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅, we must show that δ ∈ K and ∀αj ∈ B≤αj < αj ∨ δ.
Case 1, K÷B 6= ∅. Since we are assuming the consequence operation Cn is
compact, there is a finite set S ⊆ K÷B such that S ` δ. Furthermore, given that
K÷B 6= ∅, we can assume that S 6= ∅. Now we consider separately two possibilities.
Case 1.1, S is a singleton set, i.e. S = {β1} for some β1 ∈ K÷B. Then it follows
from P-inclusion (already proven) that β1 ∈ K and, since β1 ` δ and K is a belief
set we can conclude that δ ∈ K. On the other hand, it follows from β1 ∈ K÷B and
B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ that ∀αj ∈ B≤αj < αj ∨ β1. Finally, observing that from β1 ` δ it
follows that, for any αj ∈ B≤, it holds that αj ∨ β1 ` αj ∨ δ, by (EE2), (EE1) and
Observation 3.4.8 we obtain that ∀αj ∈ B≤αj < αj ∨ δ, as we wished to show.
Case 1.2, S = {β1, . . . , βn}, with n ≥ 2. Since β1, . . . , βn ∈ K÷B ⊆ K (by
P-inclusion already proven), and {β1, . . . , βn} ` δ, it follows from the fact that K
is a belief set that δ ∈ K. Next we must show that ∀αj ∈ B≤αj < αj ∨ δ. From
β1, . . . , βn ∈ K÷B and B ∩Cn(∅) = ∅ it follows that ∀βi ∈ S∀αj ∈ B≤αj < αj ∨ βi.
Hence, for any given αl ∈ B≤ we have that αl < αl∨β1 and αl < αl∨β2. From these
two conditions it follows by Observation 3.4.10, that αl < (αl∨β1)∧(αl∨β2). Then,
since ` (αl∨β1)∧(αl∨β2)↔ (αl∨(β1∧β2)), by intersubstitutivity (Observation 3.4.9)
we obtain that αl < αl∨ (β1∧β2). Hence ∀αj ∈ B≤αj < αj ∨ (β1∧β2). By iteration
of the previous procedure we can conclude that ∀αj ∈ B≤αj < αj ∨ (β1 ∧ . . . ∧ βn).
Now we note that, since β1 ∧ . . .∧βn ` δ we have that for any αl ∈ B≤ it holds that
αl∨(β1∧. . .∧βn) ` αl∨δ. So, it follows from (EE2) that ∀αj ∈ B≤αj∨(β1∧. . .∧βn) ≤
αj ∨ δ. Finally by (EE1) and Observation 3.4.8 we obtain that ∀αj ∈ B≤αj < αj ∨ δ
and this finishes the proof for this case.
Case 2, K÷B = ∅. This means that ` δ. Then, that δ ∈ K follows from the fact
that K is a belief set. Hence it remains to prove that ∀αj ∈ B≤αj < αj ∨ δ. Hence,
let αj be an arbitrary element of B≤. That αj ≤ αj ∨ δ follows immediately from
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(EE2). It remains to prove that αj ∨ δ 6≤ αj. From ` δ it follows that ` αj ∨ δ. So,
by (EE2), ε ≤ αj ∨ δ for all ε ∈ L. On the other hand, since 6` αj, it follows from
(EE5) that ε 6≤ αj for some ε ∈ L. Then, by (EE1) αj ∨ δ 6≤ αj and this finishes
the proof.
At this point we remark that with the above lemma we finish the introduction
of auxiliary results which we will need in the proofs that we shall present for the
fact that all epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions satisfy each of the
postulates included in the statement of Observation 9.1.1 except P-uniformity.
However, our direct proof of the fact that any epistemic entrenchment-based
multiple contraction satisfies P-uniformity needs some more auxiliary lemmas which
we introduce right away. In fact, as we shall clarify below, most of such results are
indeed nothing more than reformulations (essentially for a matter of consistency
with the notation and terminology used throughout this chapter) of some lemmas
already introduced in previous chapters.
Thus, we start by stating the following obvious fact:
Observation F.2.7 Let αj, αk be two sentences in L. Then ` αj → αk if and only
if ‖¬αk‖ ⊆ ‖¬αj‖.
Now, bearing in mind the above proposition, we notice that the normalization
of a set of sentences B (introduced in Definition 6.2.4) can be alternatively defined,
without making use of the notion of possible world, in the following equivalent way:
Definition F.2.8 (Reformulation of Definition 6.2.4) Let B be a set of sen-
tences. The normalization of B, denoted by BN , is the following subset of B:
149
BN = {αi ∈ B : ∀αj ∈ B, 6` αi → αj or ` αj → αi}.
Furthermore, Observation F.2.7 yields that Lemmas 6.2.5 and 6.3.3 can be re-
formulated in the following (equivalent) way (that does not require the use of the
concept of possible world):
Lemma F.2.9 (Reformulation of Lemma 6.2.5) Let B be a finite set of sen-
tences and αl ∈ B. If αl 6∈ BN then there is some αk ∈ BN such that ` αl → αk
and 6` αk → αl.
Lemma F.2.10 (Reformulation of Lemma 6.3.3) Let K be a belief set and G
and H be two finite sets of sentences. If every subset X of K implies some element
of G if and only if X implies some element of H, then for every element of GN ∩K
there is a logically equivalent element of HN ∩K.
149Notice that the set BN can, alternatively, be defined in the following (equivalent) way:
BN = {αi ∈ B : αi 6` αj for all αj ∈ B s.t. Cn(αi) 6= Cn(αj)}.
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Apart from the ones above we yet need to introduce a few more lemmas which will
be instrumental to prove that the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contrac-
tions satisfy P-uniformity. In particular, the following couple of Lemmas presents
some properties concerning the normalization and the ≤-based filtration of a set of
sentences (where ≤ is an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect to a given
belief set K) as well as their interrelation. Again we must notice here that, due to
the tight interconnection between systems of spheres and epistemic entrenchment
relations exposed in Section 4.2, such two Lemmas can be seen as immediate con-
sequences of the combination of some of the results of that section with some of
the lemmas that have been presented in Section 7.2.150 However, we provide direct
proofs for each of them.
Lemma F.2.11 Let K be a belief set, ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with
respect to K and G and H be two finite sets of sentences. If every subset X of K
implies some element of G if and only if X implies some element of H, then for
every element of (GN ∩K)≤ there is a logically equivalent element of (HN ∩K)≤.
Proof. Let K, ≤, G and H be as mentioned in the statement of the lemma. Assume
every subset X of K implies some element of G if and only if X implies some element
of H. According to Lemma F.2.10 it holds that for all βi ∈ GN ∩K there is some
ςi ∈ HN ∩ K such that ` βi ↔ ςi. Hence, it follows trivially from the definition
of ≤-based filtration of a set of sentences (Definition 8.0.3) and intersubstitutivity
(Observation 3.4.9) that for all βi ∈ (GN ∩K)≤ there is some ςi ∈ (HN ∩K)≤ such
that ` βi ↔ ςi, as required.
Lemma F.2.12 Let K be a belief set, ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with
respect to K, B be a finite set of sentences and β be a sentence. Then:
(i) BN ∩K = (B ∩K)N .151
(ii) B≤ ∩K = (B ∩K)≤.
(iii) (BN)≤ = (B≤)N .
(iv) ∀αi ∈ B≤ αi < αi ∨ β if and only if ∀αi ∈ (B≤)N αi < αi ∨ β.
Proof. Let K be a belief set, ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with respect
to K, B be a finite set of sentences and β be a sentence. We will show that conditions
(i)-(iv) in the statement of the lemma are satisfied.
(i)-(iii) Follow immediately from the definitions of normalization and of ≤-based
filtration of a set of sentences.
(iv) We must show that ∀αi ∈ B≤ αi < αi ∨ β if and only if ∀αi ∈ (B≤)N αi <
αi ∨ β.
150More precisely, Lemmas F.2.11 and F.2.12 are analogues (in the sense that they can be seen
as reformulations in terms of epistemic entrenchment relations) of Lemmas 7.2.12 and 7.2.13 (both
presented in Section 7.2 in the context of systems of spheres), respectively.
151Notice that this equality has already been stated in Lemma 7.2.13-(i). We only repeat it here
for convenience.
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The left-to-right implication follows immediately from the fact that (B≤)N ⊆ B≤.
Now we prove that the converse implication also holds. Assume ∀αi ∈ (B≤)N αi <
αi ∨ β and let αj be an arbitrary element of B≤. We only need to show that αj <
αj ∨ β. If αj ∈ (B≤)N then it follows from our above assumption that αj < αj ∨ β,
and we are done. Now assume that αj 6∈ (B≤)N . Then, according to Lemma F.2.9,
there is some αk ∈ (B≤)N such that ` αj → αk (and 6` αk → αj). Then (EE2)
yields αj ≤ αk. Furthermore, according to the above assumptions it holds that
αk < αk ∨ β.
On the other hand, according to the definition of B≤, from αk ∈ B≤ we can
conclude that 6` αk. Then, since ` αk ∨¬αj, it follows from Observation 3.4.11 that
αk < αk ∨ ¬αj. Now, since αj, αk ∈ B≤, it follows from Observation F.2.1 that
αj < αj ∨ ¬αk.
Finally, from αj ≤ αk, αk < αk ∨ β and αj < αj ∨ ¬αk we can conclude by
Lemma 3.4.13-(iii) that αj < αj ∨ β, and (iv) is proved.
To be in a position to present our direct proof for the fact that the epistemic
entrenchment-based multiple contractions satisfy P-Uniformity, we need to intro-
duce one last auxiliary result. Namely, the following lemma, which basically con-
firms that the following quite intuitive statement indeed holds: Given an epistemic
entrenchment relation ≤ with respect to a certain belief set K the result of the
≤-based contraction of K by B coincides with the result of the removal of the set
(BN ∩K) from K by means of that same operation.
Lemma F.2.13 Let K be a belief set, ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with
respect to K, ÷≤ be the ≤-based multiple contraction on K and B be a finite set of
sentences. Then:
(i) B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ if and only if (BN ∩K) ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅.
(ii) K÷≤B = K÷≤(BN ∩K).
Proof. Let K, ≤, ÷≤ and B be as mentioned in the statement of the lemma.
We start by showing that condition (i) in the statement of the lemma holds.
The right-to-left implication follows trivially from the fact that BN ∩K ⊆ B. Now
we prove that the converse implication also holds. Assume B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ and let
β ∈ B ∩ Cn(∅). Then β ∈ B and β ∈ Cn(∅). Now, on the one hand, it follows
immediately from Definition F.2.8 that β ∈ BN and, on the other hand, from the
fact that K is a belief set we obtain that β ∈ K, hence that β ∈ BN ∩K and finally
that (BN ∩K) ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅. So, (i) is proved.
Now we prove (ii), i.e. that K÷≤B = K÷≤(BN ∩K). Since (i) holds, according
to Definition 8.0.5, to show that the above equality holds it suffices to prove that if
β ∈ K then
∀αj ∈ B≤ αj < αj ∨ β iff ∀αl ∈ (BN ∩K)≤ αl < αl ∨ β. (F.3)
Let β ∈ K. We start by remarking that (F.3) is equivalent to
∀αj ∈ (B≤ ∩K) αj < αj ∨ β iff ∀αj ∈ (BN ∩K)≤ αj < αj ∨ β. (F.4)
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To see that such equivalence indeed holds it is enough to notice that given αj ∈
B≤ \K it follows from the fact that K is a belief set that αj ∨β ∈ K and, therefore,
by Observation 3.4.12 we can conclude that αj < αj ∨ β.
Having seen this, to finish the proof we only need to show that (F.4) holds.
To prove that, we start by remarking that it follows from Lemma F.2.12-(i) and
(iii) that (BN ∩K)≤ = ((B ∩K)≤)N . Hence, it holds that ∀αj ∈ (BN ∩K)≤ αj <
αj ∨ β if and only if ∀αj ∈ ((B ∩K)≤)N αj < αj ∨ β. On the other hand, according
to Lemma F.2.12-(iv) we have that ∀αj ∈ ((B ∩K)≤)N αj < αj ∨ β if and only if
∀αj ∈ (B ∩K)≤ αj < αj ∨ β. Furthermore, F.2.12-(ii) yields ∀αj ∈ (B ∩K)≤ αj <
αj ∨ β if and only if ∀αj ∈ (B≤ ∩K) αj < αj ∨ β.
Thus, from all the above stated equivalences it follows immediately that ∀αj ∈
(B≤ ∩K) αj < αj ∨ β if and only if ∀αj ∈ (BN ∩K)≤ αj < αj ∨ β, which is the
desired conclusion.
Now we are, finally, in a position to present a proof of Observation 9.1.1 which
does not make use of the interrelations among epistemic entrenchment-based mul-
tiple contractions, system of spheres-based multiple contractions and partial meet
multiple contractions (presented in Chapters 7 and 8).
Observation 9.1.1 Let K be a belief set and ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment re-
lation with respect to K. Then the ≤-based multiple contraction ÷ on K satisfies
P-inclusion, P-success, P-uniformity and P-relevance.
Proof. Let K be a belief set, ≤ be an epistemic entrenchment relation with re-
spect to K, ÷ be the ≤-based multiple contraction on K and B and C be two
arbitrary finite sets of sentences. In what follows we prove that ÷ satisfies each of
the postulates mentioned in the statement of the observation.
• Package inclusion: Follows immediately from the definition of the ≤-based
multiple contraction on K (See Definition 8.0.5).
• Package success: Let B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. We must show that B ∩K÷B = ∅.
Let α be an arbitrary element of B. If α 6∈ K, it follows immediately from
(CM÷≤) that α 6∈ K÷B. Hence, we assume that α ∈ K. Since B∩Cn(∅) = ∅,
it follows from (CM÷≤) that it will only be the case that α ∈ K÷B if ∀αj ∈
B≤ αj < αj ∨ α.
Case 1, α ∈ B≤. Then, since α∨α ` α, it follows from (EE2) that α∨α ≤ α.
Hence α 6< α ∨ α and condition ∀αj ∈ B≤ αj < αj ∨ α fails.
Case 2, α 6∈ B≤. Then, according to Observation F.2.3, there is some αi ∈ B≤
such that αi < αi ∨ ¬α. Assume by reductio that αi < αi ∨ α. From the last
two conditions it follows by Observation 3.4.10, that αi < (αi∨¬α)∧ (αi∨α).
Finally, from ` (αi ∨¬α)∧ (αi ∨α)↔ αi and intersubstitutivity (Observation
3.4.9) we obtain that αi < αi which is absurd.
• Package uniformity: Assume that every subset X of K implies some element
of B if and only if X implies some element of C. We must prove that K÷B =
K÷C. According to Lemma F.2.13, such equality is equivalent to the following
one K÷(BN ∩K) = K÷(CN ∩K). So, in what follows we will show this latter
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equality is satisfied. To do that, according to the Definition 8.0.5, it is enough
to prove that the two following statements hold:
(a) (BN ∩K) ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ if and only if (CN ∩K) ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅.
(b) If β ∈ K then ∀αj ∈ (BN ∩ K)≤ αj < αj ∨ β if and only if ∀αl ∈
(CN ∩K)≤ αl < αl ∨ β
To show that (a) is satisfied we first notice that, since ∅ ⊆ K, it follows from
the hypothesis that B ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅ if and only if C ∩ Cn(∅) 6= ∅. Now,
combining this latter equivalence with Lemma F.2.13-(i), we can assert that
(a) holds.
Finally, in order to prove that (b) also holds, we recall that it follows from
Lemma F.2.11 that for every element of (BN ∩K)≤ there is a logically equiv-
alent element of (CN ∩K)≤, and vice versa. From this it follows immediately,
by intersubstitutivity (Observation 3.4.9), that (b) holds, and this finishes the
proof.
• Package relevance: Let β ∈ K and β 6∈ K÷B. Then it follows from Defini-
tion 8.0.5 that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ and ∃αj ∈ B≤, such that
αj ∨ β ≤ αj (9.5)
We must show that there is a set K ′ such that:
(i) K÷B ⊆ K ′ ⊆ K
(ii) ∀αi ∈ B αi 6∈ Cn(K ′)
(iii) ∃αr ∈ B : ¬β ∨ αr ∈ Cn(K ′)
Consider K ′ = K÷B ∪ {¬β ∨ αj}, where αj is an element of B≤ that satisfies
condition (9.5). We have that K ′ trivially satisfies (iii) and K÷B ⊆ K ′. Now,
in order to verify that it also satisfies K ′ ⊆ K, the remaining inclusion stated
in (i), first recall that it follows from P-inclusion, already proven above, that
K÷B ⊆ K. It remains to show that ¬β ∨ αj ∈ K. Assume by reductio that
αj 6∈ K. It follows by (EE4) that ∀δ ∈ L, αj ≤ δ. Hence, using (EE2), (9.5)
and (EE1) we obtain that ∀δ ∈ L, β ≤ δ. But, from this it follows by (EE4)
that β 6∈ K, which contradicts our assumption. Therefore αj ∈ K and, since
K is a belief set, we can also conclude that ¬β ∨ αj ∈ K as required.
It remains to prove (ii). Assume by reductio that αi ∈ B is such that K ′ ` αi.
Since K ′ = K÷B ∪ {¬β ∨ αj}, it follows by deduction that K÷B ` (¬β ∨
αj) → αi. Hence, by P-closure (which is attested to hold by Lemma F.2.6),
(β ∧ ¬αj) ∨ αi ∈ K÷B. Then, according to the definition of ÷, we have that
∀αk ∈ B≤ αk < ((β ∧ ¬αj) ∨ αi) ∨ αk
and, since ` ((β ∧¬αj)∨αi)∨αk ↔ (β ∨αi ∨αk)∧ (¬αj ∨αi ∨αk), it follows
from intersubstitutivity (Observation 3.4.9), (EE2), (EE1) and Observation
3.4.8 that
∀αk ∈ B≤ αk < β ∨ αi ∨ αk (9.6)
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and
∀αk ∈ B≤ αk < ¬αj ∨ αi ∨ αk (9.7)
Now we distinguish two cases.
Case 1, αi ∈ B≤. Since αj ∈ B≤, according to Observation F.2.1, we have
that αi ∨ ¬αj ≤ αi or αj < αj ∨ ¬αi.
Case 1.1, αi ∨ ¬αj ≤ αi. This is a contradiction because, since αi ∈ B≤,
it follows from (9.7), ` ¬αj ∨ αi ∨ αi ↔ ¬αj ∨ αi, and intersubstitutivity
(Observation 3.4.9), that αi < ¬αj ∨ αi.
Case 1.2, αj < αj ∨ ¬αi. From this and the fact that αj ∨ ¬αi ` αj ∨ ¬αi ∨ β
making use of (EE2), (EE1) and Observation 3.4.8 we obtain that
αj < αj ∨ ¬αi ∨ β. (9.8)
Since αj ∈ B≤, from (9.6) we have that αj < β ∨ αi ∨ αj. From the latter
condition and (9.8) it follows by Observation 3.4.10, that αj < (αj ∨ ¬αi ∨
β) ∧ (β ∨ αi ∨ αj).
Finally from ` (αj ∨¬αi ∨ β)∧ (β ∨ αi ∨ αj)↔ αj ∨ β and intersubstitutivity
(Observation 3.4.9) we obtain that αj < αj ∨ β, which contradicts (9.5).
Case 2, αi 6∈ B≤. Then, let αx ∈ B≤ be such that152
αx < αx ∨ ¬αi (9.9)
Since αx ∈ B≤ it follows from (9.6) and (9.7), respectively, that:
αx < β ∨ αi ∨ αx (9.10)
αx < ¬αj ∨ αi ∨ αx (9.11)
From (9.9) and the fact that αx ∨ ¬αi ` αx ∨ ¬αi ∨ β making use of (EE2),
(EE1) and Observation 3.4.8 we obtain that αx < αx ∨ ¬αi ∨ β. From the
latter condition and (9.10) it follows by Observation 3.4.10, that αx < (αx ∨
¬αi∨β)∧ (β ∨αi∨αx). Hence, from ` (αx∨¬αi∨β)∧ (β ∨αi∨αx)↔ αx∨β
and intersubstitutivity (Observation 3.4.9) we obtain that
αx < αx ∨ β (9.12)
From (9.9) and the fact that αx ∨¬αi ` αx ∨¬αi ∨¬αj making use of (EE2),
(EE1) and Observation 3.4.8 we obtain that αx < αx ∨ ¬αi ∨ ¬αj. From the
latter condition and (9.11) it follows by Observation 3.4.10, that αx < (αx ∨
¬αi∨¬αj)∧(¬αj∨αi∨αx). Hence, from ` (αx∨¬αi∨¬αj)∧(¬αj∨αi∨αx)↔
αx ∨ ¬αj and intersubstitutivity (Observation 3.4.9) we obtain that
αx < αx ∨ ¬αj (9.13)
152Notice that it follows from Observation F.2.3 that there is some αx ∈ B≤ in such conditions.
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According to Lemma 3.4.13-(ii), it follows from (9.13) that αj ≤ αx.
Now we note that, since αj, αx ∈ B≤, according to Corollary F.2.4, we have
that either αx ∨ ¬αj ≤ αx or αj < αj ∨ ¬αx.
Case 2.1, αx ∨ ¬αj ≤ αx. This contradicts (9.13).
Case 2.2, αj < αj ∨¬αx. From this and the fact that αj ∨¬αx ` αj ∨¬αx∨β,
it follows by (EE2), (EE1) and Observation 3.4.8 that
αj < αj ∨ ¬αx ∨ β (9.14)
From αj ≤ αx, (9.12), (EE1) and Observation 3.4.8 we obtain that αj < αx∨β.
Hence, from αx ∨ β ` αx ∨ β ∨ αj, (EE2), (EE1) and Observation 3.4.8 we
obtain that
αj < αx ∨ β ∨ αj (9.15)
From (9.14) and (9.15) it follows by Observation 3.4.10, that αj < (αj ∨¬αx∨
β) ∧ (αx ∨ β ∨ αj). Hence, from ` (αj ∨ ¬αx ∨ β) ∧ (αx ∨ β ∨ αj) ↔ αj ∨ β
and intersubstitutivity (Observation 3.4.9) we obtain that αj < αj ∨ β, which
contradicts (9.5).
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